ars. No astrologer or doctor could have foretold that the frail youth would outlive, by a quarter of a century, his ally and

tremendous and not to be defined. Auctoritas is the word his enemies would have called it potentia. They were right. Yet the

ng is evident enough: their affinity goes much deeper than words. Nor would it be rash to assert that Pollio was closely akin

B.C., and he jealously maintained his independence. To tell the truth would have been inexpedient; and adulation was repugnan

from panegyric and revive the testimony of the vanquished cause. That would merely substitute one form of biography for anoth

e kingdoms or else a renegade, coming like a monarch out of the East, would subjugate Rome to an alien rule. Italy suffered d

in the walls a faction among the nobiles had opened the gates. Cicero would have preserved both dignity and peace of mind had

e by the defence even of notorious malefactors. The nobilis, however, would take pride in his feuds. 1 Yet he had ever to be

es or advocates. Concord and firm alliance between Senate and knights would therefore arrest revolution or even reform, for t

cero lacked the full equipment. He imagined that oratory and intrigue would suffice. A programme, it is true, he developed, n

e all, Münzer, RA, 336 ff. PageBook=>024 prime. 1 But Servilia would not be thwarted by that accident. She cast about

, was a perpetual menace; and the Metelli, for survival or for power, would ally themselves with the strongest military leade

r money. 4 Against the military dynast now returning from the East he would oppose that alliance of stubborn spirit and polit

Spain, asked for a triumph. Cato blocked the triumph. To wait for it would be to sacrifice the consulate. Caesar made a rapi

would be to sacrifice the consulate. Caesar made a rapid decision he would be consul, and to some purpose. The Roman noble,

Ahenobarbus came forth with his candidature and loud threats that he would deprive Caesar of army and provinces. Some might

e Optimates and circumvented by Crassus, their potential ally. Now he would have an army of his own in Spain to support his p

n control of the government. Nor was it at all likely that the dynast would abide by letter or spirit of his own legislation.

ssionate statement of the issue, ib. § 2. PageBook=>042 Caesar would tolerate no superior, Pompeius no rival. 1 Caesar

t rei publicae copiis confidebat. ’ 6 The expectation that Labienus would desert Caesar was probably an important factor.

at Pompeius, weakened by the loss of his ally and of popular support, would be in their power at last, amenable to guidance o

the nominal primacy of Pompeius recognized, Caesar and his adherents would capture the government and perhaps reform the Sta

, winning over to their side the power and prestige of Pompeius. They would be able to deal with Pompeius later. It might not

way now, it was the end. Returning to Rome a private citizen, Caesar would at once be prosecuted by his enemies for extortio

d at once be prosecuted by his enemies for extortion or treason. They would secure lawyers reputed for eloquence, high princi

h moral support from soldiers of Pompeius stationed around the court, would bring in the inevitable verdict. After that, noth

expected that the solid and respectable classes in the towns of Italy would rally in defence of the authority of the Senate a

f the Senate and the liberties of the Roman People, that all the land would rise as one man against the invader. Nothing of t

tter resistance of the Pompeian cause in Africa and in Spain. ‘They would have it thus,’ said Caesar as he gazed upon the R

incere and patriotic co-operation of the governing class, the attempt would be all in vain, the mere creation of arbitrary po

ic could hardly have survived. A few years, and Pompeius the Dictator would have been assassinated in the Senate by honourabl

nd freedom from the tribunician veto. Caesar knew that secret enemies would soon direct that deadly weapon against one who ha

ten years, an ominous sign. A gleam of hope that the emergency period would be quite short flickered up for a moment, to wane

Caesarem senem could be taken as genuine, or even contemporary, they would provide valuable evidence of strong anti-capitali

he permanent ordering of the State. It was too difficult. Instead, he would set out for the wars again, to Macedonia and to t

Dictator’s powers were as considerable as those of a monarch. Caesar would have been the first to admit it: he needed neithe

d the foundation of a consistent government. Whatever it might be, it would owe more to the needs of the moment than to alien

and carried out the assassination of the Dictator. That his removal would be no remedy but a source of greater ills to the

such a theory. Yet it is in no way evident that the nature of Brutus would have been very different had he never opened a bo

cal dynast Crassus used Catilina as his agent. Catilina could not, or would not, understand that reform or revolution had no

f the dominant oligarchy took heart again. It was evident that Caesar would restore and reward his friends and partisans, old

appeal to the duties which they owed to birth and station. The plebs would not have given preference and votes against Caesa

1 Q. Fabius Maximus, who died in his consulate (45 B.C.). 2 Cicero would have preferred Nero (Ad Att. 6, 6, 1). On his ser

y Brutus. Caesar was a patrician to the core. ‘He was Caesar and he would keep faith. ’1 As he also observed, ‘If he had ca

the services of thugs and brigands in defence of his own dignitas, he would have requited them. ’2 No empty words this trait

ertain political intrigues, the fate of Balbus and the role of Cicero would have been very different. Balbus ruled his nati

the flower of Italy, the pride and bulwark of the Roman State. 3 That would not avail to guard these new Italians, whether be

n rank, from the contemptuous appellation of ‘Gaul’. Catullus’ family would perhaps have been eligible for senatorial rank, i

ncentration had been established. Cicero shuddered to think that he would have to sit in the Senate in the sight and presen

citizens had risen to drive them out. 8 The attempt was as vain as it would have been to expel the Aleuadae from Thessalian L

e senatorial order under their protection: they never fancied that he would aspire to the consulate. Marius nursed resentment

red Pompeius as its patron:2 but the men of Auximum protested that it would be intolerable to refuse admittance to the procon

municipal legislation. 6 Whoever succeeded to power after a civil war would be confronted with the task of creating a Notes

hunned politics altogether. Sulla had taught them a sharp lesson. Nor would a seat in the lower ranks of the Senate at Rome h

ll their admitted talents, it is by no means likely that the Dictator would have given the consulate to Ventidius or to Balbu

. For his connexions, above, p. 64, n. 2 PageBook=>096 caution would have repelled the advances of the Liberators. The

ence to that. When the tyrant fell and the constitution was restored, would Antonius be strong enough to hold party and gover

nest and austere oratory of Brutus. How different, how fiery a speech would Cicero have composed; 2 but Cicero was not presen

o be dated immediately after the funeral (see the preceding note), it would not prove, though it might support, the view that

s and Cassius forsworn its principles and appealed to arms, their end would have been rapid and violent. The moderates, the p

sar, the veterans in Italy, and the Caesarian armies in the provinces would have been too strong. The Liberators had not pl

ad not initiated him into their designs. The public support of Cicero would be of inestimable value after a revolution had su

tor’s acta were ratified on March 17th, it was feared that the consul would not allow them to take over their provinces. 1 Wh

tted real revolution instead of the mere removal of an autocrat, they would clearly have failed. Yet even now, despite the de

ke over a province in 44, and Antonius, elected consul for that year, would be left in charge of the government when Caesar d

leader was later to be taunted with inconsistency on this point. 2 It would not be paradoxical to assert that Antonius felt r

nd upon Antonius. It had been feared that the assassination of Caesar would have wide and ruinous repercussions outside Rome,

had learned to expect of the politician in power. His year of office would have to go far in violence and corruption to equa

e next year, with A. Hirtius and C. Vibius Pansa as consuls, Antonius would have his province of Macedonia. But the proconsul

power in Rome and sought to pay back old scores. In 42 B.C. D. Brutus would be consul along with the diplomatic and unreliabl

he consulate. But Dolabella, an unscrupulous and ambitious young man, would still have to be watched. To Lepidus Antonius sec

preceding twenty years. The revival of Libertas in a period of crisis would mean the strife of faction, veiled at first under

. Cato too was dead. Averse from compromise and firm on principle, he would have been a nuisance to any government: not less

tions to Gaul and Spain. Antonius was ready to parry that danger he would take that region for his own consular province an

ta as well (the region recently conquered by Caesar):1 these lands he would garrison with the Macedonian legions. For how lon

. Peducaeus and A. Allienus carried no weight; and only another war would bring rapid distinction to Carrinas, Calvisius an

ortune of Caesar survived his fall. On no rational forecast of events would his adopted son have succeeded in playing off the

e troops, which certain friends counselled, was wisely postponed. Nor would he enter Rome until he had got into touch with pe

and veterans, and the acquiescence of the Senate. A move to one side would alienate the other. Hitherto Antonius had neglect

rage, may have gone too far. It was known before the event that there would be criticism of the consul at the meeting of the

so. The balance in politics seemed to be turning against Antonius: he would have to make a choice. Sanguine informants from R

onius might surrender his provincial command, that Brutus and Cassius would be able to return to Roman political life. 4 No

ppi. The same phantom bore heavily on Antonius and stayed the hand he would have raised against Caesar’s heir. The word of th

e to be a province at the end of the year and be added to Italy. That would preclude competition for a post of vantage and ar

orce his enemies to come out into the open. Nor was it likely that he would consent to surrender his command, hardly even a p

toritas of a senior statesman, all that was too long and too slow. He would have to wait until middle age: his laurels would

ong and too slow. He would have to wait until middle age: his laurels would repose on grey hairs or none remaining. Legitimat

t and perilous path that Octavianus intended to tread, such resources would have to be doubled and redoubled. Octavianus wa

ns upon this office. 1 Nothing came of it for the moment: at need, he would always be able to purchase one or other of the te

ir reveals never a trace of theoretical preoccupations: if it did, it would have been very different and very short. Lesson

t place, after that, Republican allies and constitutional backing. He would then have to postpone the avenging of Caesar unti

nture openly to advocate sedition, violence and civil war, Octavianus would have to take the lead and act. 1 NotesPage=>

e part of his consular province, the Cisalpina, at once. Then Plancus would raise no difficulties about Comata. Antonius summ

onius summoned D. Brutus to yield up his command. The threat of force would be necessary. Antonius set out for Brundisium on

3 Ib. 16, 15, 3. 4 Appian, BC 3, 42, 174. PageBook=>126 It would surely be easy to incriminate or to intimidate hi

ned westwards. Antonius confronted the mutineers at Alba Fucens. They would listen neither to argument nor to bribes: what he

onary cause. Had the consul attempted to outlaw Octavianus, a tribune would surely have vetoed the measure: he could not affo

direction of Arretium. The veterans in the private army of Octavianus would not stand against Antonius, the Caesarian general

llus were both desperately anxious not to be openly compromised. They would have to go quietly for the present but their chan

M. Brutum 1, 17, 4). No mention of either by Cicero their mere names would have been a damaging revelation. Salvidienus may

least of the reserves of money which he needed for his campaigns. It would be folly to leave a large treasure behind him, a

ome. Atticus, who refused to finance the war-chest of the Liberators, would not have looked at this venture. No matter: Caesa

ot been inactive. 5 The Caesarian Rabirius Postumus also shows up, as would be expected, benevolent and alert in any shady tr

e arrived in Campania. Friends of Caesar, to whom they owed all, they would surely not repel his heir. Yet these men, mere mu

estore concord in the Caesarian party and so in the Roman State. They would gladly see Antonius curbed but not destroyed: the

d his way of living to his family tradition and to his fortune, which would not have supported ostentatious display and sense

icy, to enhance his power and that of his clan. His family connexions would permit an independent and, if he chose, a concili

political alignment between Caesarians and Republicans. That prospect would certainly appeal to his mother-in-law Servilia.

es and his own apologies attest. The sagacious and disinterested Piso would hardly lend help or sanction to the NotesPage=&

tain it. His defence can hardly cover the whole of his career. Yet it would be perverse and unjust to rail and carp at an asp

intimidated by the bloodthirsty threats of the absent Pompeians, who would deal with neutrals as with enemies. Spain might b

ed by circumstantial rumours. It was by no means unlikely that Caesar would be entangled and defeated in Spain by the experie

xtum scutum abicere nolebam. ’ PageBook=>140 the Senate; there would be a meeting of the Senate on August 1st and some

ked an incident, but gave no indication that the day of September 2nd would be a turning- point in Roman politics. For the

ernatives: ‘if Octavianus succeeded and won power, the acta of Caesar would be more decisively confirmed than they were on Ma

sively confirmed than they were on March 17th; if he failed, Antonius would be intolerable. ’9 Cicero was all too often del

pliable. It was Cato’s fatal plan all over again the doom of Antonius would warn the young man against aspiring to military d

s would warn the young man against aspiring to military despotism and would reveal the strength which the Commonwealth could

s for the struggle against Antonius, eager for war and implacable, he would hear no word of peace or compromise: he confronte

access lay open to merit as well as to birth; and the good statesman would not be deserted by his peers, coerced by military

, liberty and the laws against the forces of anarchy or despotism. He would stand as firm as Cato had stood, he would be the

of anarchy or despotism. He would stand as firm as Cato had stood, he would be the leader of the Optimates. It might fairly

and constancy, of Roman virtus and aristocratic magnitudo animi that would have justified the exorbitant claims of his perso

nor traitors. If they followed Cicero there was no telling where they would end. When Republicans both distrusted the politic

by adopting the adversary’s weapons; and victory no less than defeat would be fatal to everything that an honest man and a p

an:6 he was a partisan of Antonius. Had he been on the right side, he would have been praised no less than that man from Gade

lf. Once in power, the popularis, were he Pompeius or were he Caesar, would do his best to curb the dangerous and anachronist

oned. 4 Plancus had assured Cicero that no personal grounds of enmity would ever prevent him from allying with his bitterest

he had described as ‘madmen’, ‘raging brigands’ or ‘parricides’. 7 It would be necessary to ‘bring them to their right minds

PageBook=>159 who led them: salutary compulsion from the army would then be needed to transform a brigand and murdere

veterans, the plebs and the name of Caesar: his allies in the Senate would provide the rest. NotesPage=>161 (no notes

said, was an assassin, a brigand, a Spartacus. He must be crushed and would be crushed, as once Senate, People and Cicero had

scarcely to be expected that the generals and the veterans of Caesar would lend ready aid to the suppression of Antonius, to

ated and despised for lack of the splendour, courage and ability that would have excused his ambitions. 1 The Aemilian name,

n political negotiations where the diplomacy of a Cicero or a Plancus would have excited rational distrust among friends as w

still no certain knowledge at Rome at the end of the year. That they would in fact not go to their trivial provinces of Cret

n October, but no confirmation. Winter, however, while delaying news, would facilitate a revolution in the East. The friends

lship ten years before the legal age. Octavianus was now nineteen: he would still have thirteen years to wait. After this, th

aps with sharp reminder of the fate of the associates of Catilina, it would not do to condemn a Roman citizen unheard. At the

appearances: which did not meet the ideas of Cicero. That the embassy would fail he proclaimed in public and prayed in secret

need for timidity or compromise. As for the terms that the adversary would offer, he conjectured that Antonius might yield t

conditions upon which Antonius was prepared to treat were these:3 he would give up Cisalpine Gaul, but insisted on retaining

up Cisalpine Gaul, but insisted on retaining Comata: that province he would hold for the five years following, until Brutus a

little time to be lost, for the beginning of hostilities in the north would preclude any compromise. Two attempts were made i

ero, however, changed his mind and backed out. The embassy, he urged, would be futile: to negotiate at this stage would Not

t. The embassy, he urged, would be futile: to negotiate at this stage would NotesPage=>172 1 Phil, 10, 25 f. 2 Phil.

ade no secret of his agreement with Antonius: Antonius suppressed, he would be the next of the Caesarian generals to be assai

rm in the West, the combined armies of the Republic in northern Italy would have an easy task. So it might seem. Antonius bro

from Caesar’s assassin: nor, if he had, is it certain that the troops would have obeyed. 1 And so Ventidius slipped through.

nal calculation of persons and interests, it was likely that Antonius would regain the support of Lepidus and Plancus. Antoni

me to Italy with their host of seventeen legions, his ‘father’ Cicero would have no compunction about declaring the young man

uit to Macedonia. He was trapped and killed by a Gallic chieftain. It would be easy and unprofitable to arraign the Caesarian

discover. For the judgement on these men, if judged they must be, it would be sufficient to demonstrate that they acted as t

ds laid upon his extreme youth was becoming more and more irksome. He would show them. Cicero entered into the original com

the value of the results thereby achieved, in hoping that Octavianus would still support the constitutional cause now that i

ay vacant but not unclaimed. Octavianus aspired to the honour; and it would clearly be expedient to give the youth a senior c

g this matter there is scant but significant evidence. In June (so it would seem) Cicero denounced certain ‘treasonable machi

perpetuum modestiorem sperem fore. ’ PageBook=>169 that Cicero would usurp the vacant place. 1 Later, after both consu

on in ignominy. ’3 Even in mid-July, when the end was near, Cicero would not admit to Brutus the ruinous failure of the al

sius. To cross to Italy without Cassius and the resources of the East would have been a fatal step. The Caesarian generals wo

rces of the East would have been a fatal step. The Caesarian generals would have united at once to destroy him Octavianus in

t act was to stem its advance, to consolidate the existing order. Nor would Antonius and his associates have behaved as they

on chose Caesar in preference to Pompeius and the oligarchy; but they would not tolerate Caesar’s ostensible political heirs

promptly. That was the only weak spot in the forces of the Republic: would the legions stand against the name and fortune of

to prolong the campaign into the winter months, the lack of supplies would disperse the Caesarian legions over the desolate

tus and with Cassius: he had surrendered himself to Octavianus and he would pay for his folly in the end. 4 When the chief

all but fatal to himself. No calculation could have predicted that he would emerge in strength and triumph from the varied ha

. 2 Fulvia, if anybody, knew the character of her husband: he neither would nor could go back upon his pledges of alliance to

the Antonian and Republican forces in Italy and on the seas adjacent would have destroyed Octavianus. But there was neither

ption of their own interests as well as a strong distaste for war: it would be plain folly to fight for L. Antonius and the p

ned in the province, was at last overcome and killed. 3 Caesar’s heir would soon be trapped and crushed at last. That way all

s, with offer of alliance. 6 Failing a general compact and peace that would NotesPage=>215 1 Dio 48, 27, 1: ὑπό τϵ το

d on the admiral’s ship, moored by the land. A rope cut, and Pompeius would have the masters of the world in his power a topi

he young Caesar, strong in the support of the plebs and the veterans, would have to be NotesPage=>221 1 Nicolaus, Vita

ur. Peace with Pompeius brought him further allies. 1 The aristocrats would have disdained to associate with the young advent

large fleet from Athens to Italy. Once again he found that Brundisium would not admit him. Not that he had either the desire

e years until the end of 33 B.C.3 By then, it was presumed, the State would have been set in order and the organs of governme

ived. He may have hoped that his military genius as well as his ships would NotesPage=>225 1 Horace, Sat. 1, 5, 31 ff.

PageBook=>226 be enlisted to deal with Pompeius. But Octavianus would have none of that. Further, from duty to his ally

us disapproved, and Sex. Pompeius for his part believed that Antonius would not support his colleague. The young man went o

the next year as his reward, did not choose to hold the triumph that would have thrown the disasters of Octavianus into high

taxes; and he gave public expression to the hope that the Free State would soon be re-established. 2 It only remained for hi

ral partner to perform his share and subdue the Parthians, when there would be no excuse for delay to restore constitutional

s acquiring a considerable faction among the aristocracy. The nobiles would attract others of their own rank and many a humbl

with distance or might be artfully depreciated; his own achievements would be visible and tangible. It was on the north-ea

p to the line of the Dinaric Alps, but not beyond it. If war came, he would secure Italy in the north-east from an invasion f

ns up the valley of the Save and across the Julian Alps; and an enemy would win no support along or near the coast of Dalmati

espite the disappearance of Lepidus) was due to lapse. Then the trial would come. After the termination of the Sicilian and

Junius or Calpurnius. Those families were not extinct, but many years would have to pass before the Fasti of the consuls and

wn worn by a man called Vipsanius, or the elephant of Cornificius. It would have been vain to point in extenuation to their v

vices of subservience loathed by the Roman aristocracy: no honest man would care to surrender honour and independence by beco

anguage, artful variations of argument and ample development of theme would scarcely have retained their hold upon a generati

parture. But a direct, not to say hard and truculent manner of speech would be well matched with the temper of a military age

ance of rhythm to the extremity of abruptness and so archaic that one would have fancied him born a century earlier. 4 Pollio

f the melancholy future of eloquence were plainly to be read. Oratory would degenerate into the private practice of rhetoric:

pessimism, found it bad from the roots. History, to be real and true, would have to concern itself with something more than t

ollio, anticipating his return and triumph, in a tone and manner that would have been fitting if the whole collection were be

eyond comparison; 1 Italy had barely been touched by the wars; and it would have been an anachronism to revert from vine and

ulent, but humane and tolerant: which suited his own temperament. Nor would the times now permit political satire or free att

ure, disdaining the caprice of individual tastes in love or politics, would assert the primacy of common sense and social sta

lapsed at Philippi. The doom of empire was revealed the ruling people would be submerged in the innumerable hordes of its sub

e people; 4 and a return to the religious forms and practices of Rome would powerfully contribute to the restoration of polit

n the struggle. One thing was clear. Monarchy was already there and would subsist, whatever principle was invoked in the st

the Triumvirate at Tarentum when that office lapsed, Antonian consuls would be in power at Rome. Antonius had already lost th

Rome and friends of Antonius. A ruler endowed with liberal foresight would seek to demonstrate that the Roman was not a brut

of Pontus. PageBook=>263 will. Regard for Hellenic sentiments would reinforce peace and concord through alliance with

cord through alliance with the men of property and influence. 1 A day would come when the ruling class in the cities of Asia

an party leader and Hellenistic dynast in one person; the latter role would be sensibly enhanced by the glory of victory in P

a could have competed with Italy in valour and even in discipline. It would take time to train them: Antonius wanted the twen

east, oriented now on the line Macedonia-Bithynia-Pontus. The results would soon be evident in the Balkans and on the Black S

rsonal loyalty or family ties rather than by a programme and a cause, would stand the strain of war. The clash was now immi

e facts, there is and was no authentic record; even if there were, it would be necessary further to speculate upon the policy

n Gaul and in Spain; elsewhere, however, the burden of administration would impose a severe strain upon the Roman People. If

People. If the Roman oligarchy was to survive as a governing class it would have to abate its ambitions and narrow the area o

ge of the ruler of Rome. Even if the old dynasty lapsed, the monarchy would subsist in Egypt. Antonius’ dispositions and An

instead of the western fallen by partition to Octavianus, his policy would hardly have differed from that of Antonius. The f

His position was awkward if he did not placate the Queen of Egypt he would have to depose her. Yet he was quite able to repe

two Caesarian leaders. Failing Cleopatra and her children, Octavianus would have been reduced to inferior expedients, mere de

h the Queen of Egypt. Then irony: the grandiose conquests of Antonius would surely be more than enough to provide bounties or

the Senate, instructing it to assemble again on a fixed day, when he would supply documentary evidence against Antonius. T

nd L. Cornelius Cinna, grandson of Sulla’s enemy. In the next year he would be consul with Corvinus, instead of Antonius: one

ern frontier. Octavianus had to wait and hope for the best. His enemy would soon have to make a ruinous decision. Antonius

with Octavianus, was the equivalent of a declaration of war; and war would have ensued, Cleopatra or no Cleopatra. But the Q

Cleopatra. But the Antonian party was already disintegrating. Loyalty would not last for ever in the face of evidence like th

ely that Antonius and Cleopatra designed to conquer the West Antonius would surrender the city of Rome to the Queen of Egypt

had picked the quarrel to invade Italy with Cleopatra in his company would alienate sympathy and confirm the worst allegatio

the shackles of servitude. Bononia, or any recalcitrant communities, would pay the price in confiscation of their lands when

eii: that was a reality. More recently, Perusia. For any contest it would have been difficult enough to enlist Italian sent

re under the control of Octavianus’ firmest friends and partisans. It would be a brave man, or a very foolish one, who assert

so well and delayed so long. The loss of the dominions beyond the sea would be ruinous to an Italy that had prospered and gro

soldiers, financiers and governors. The source of life cut off, Italy would dwindle into poverty and dishonour. National prid

e of peace and survival. There was no choice : the Caesarian leader would tolerate no neutrality in the national struggle.

erning these transactions and it can be well understood. His comments would have been frank and bitter. Octavianus, support

private and personal. But if Antonius stood by his ally, his conduct would patently stamp him as a public enemy. 1 The win

harbours, and Brundisium was heavily fortified. Moreover, the invader would sacrifice the advantages of supply, reinforcement

ower. Not perhaps by a battle at sea: the greatest general of the day would prefer to re-enact the strategy of Pharsalus and

s composed in the main of the survivors of his veteran legions. 1 But would Roman soldiers fight for the Queen of Egypt? They

emained on Antonius’ side, Canidius, Sosius and Gellius Poplicola. It would not be long before the defection of the leaders,

all Italy. But the young Caesar required the glory of a victory that would surpass the greatest in all history, Roman or Hel

the wintry seas to Brundisium and appeased their demands. 3 Warfare would provide occupation for some of his legions. Thoug

k had disturbed the provinces, the repercussions of a Roman civil war would soon be felt. Some at least of the triumphs soon

l and spirited father disdained to beg for mercy :8 his mother Fulvia would have approved. There were other victims. As for t

en granted him for a time the territory of Armenia Minor—for the Mede would hold both Armenia and Parthia in check. Yet again

ts announced) the true, complete and sublime triumph—the young Caesar would pacify the ends of the earth, subjugating both Br

enty legions. For the military needs of the empire, fewer than thirty would be ample: any larger total was costly to maintain

ianus had skilfully worked upon such apprehensions. Once aroused they would be difficult to allay: their echo could still be

Some informal exchange of opinion there may well have been. No record would be likely to survive, when an important public ev

to face and frustrate any mere constitutional opposition in Rome. It would be uncomfortable but not dangerous. Armies and pr

re 23. See further below, p. 336. 2 According to Dio (51, 24, 4) he would have been entitled to the spolia opima, єἴπєρ αὐτ

only prestige was at stake—the armed proconsuls were a menace. Yet it would be inexpedient to remove them all. Octavianus dec

, taken imperatorial acclamations and celebrated triumphs. Octavianus would now remove the proconsuls from the more powerful

For the rest, proconsuls might govern, in appearance unhindered. Some would have military provinces in their charge, about wh

ld have military provinces in their charge, about which due foresight would be exercised— few legions for garrison, proconsul

e might be the first cousin of M. Licinius Crassus, cos. 30 B.C. It would be exceedingly rash to speculate on the identity

ver and gone. The word had too military a flavour for all palates: it would be expedient to overlay the hard and astringent p

s maiorum’. 3 He did not need to. As it stood, the Roman constitution would serve his purpose well enough. It is, therefore,

e. Very different was Augustus, a ‘salubris princeps’, for as such he would have himself known. 5 Not only that. The whole

in war. 1 His murders and his treacheries were not forgotten. 2 It would not do to revive such memories, save by covert ap

iving form and shape in the New Republic of Caesar Augustus. 3 That would be comforting, if true. It only remains to elucid

ble observations goes on to speak of a ‘novus status’. 3 The Princeps would never have denied it. Only ghosts and words wer

ustus the stubborn class-conscious Republicanism of Cato or of Brutus would not have found a secure haven. The uncontrolled l

to fight to the end against any power that set itself above the laws, would have known the true name and essence of the aucto

In the New State, which was quite different from Dictatorship, Cicero would be honoured by Princeps and Senate for his eloque

the magnanimity of success to pass over the scorn of the nobiles; he would not be harried by tribunes or constrained to spea

none of them left—they had all joined the national government. Cicero would easily have proved to himself and to others that

e ‘optimus civis’ from Panaetius through Cicero. PageBook=>322 would pretend that internecine war and the proscription

s’. Auctoritas has a venerable and imposing sound: unfriendly critics would call it ‘potentia’. Yet the combination of auct

oppression. Free elections returned—that is to say, a grateful people would unfailingly elect the candidates whom Caesar in h

proconsul as legally defined appears portentous and alarming. Yet it would be an elementary error to fancy that the ceremony

the legislation of 28 B.C.— he speaks of ‘pax et princeps’; 3 others would have said ‘pax et dominus’. NotesPage=>323

r proconsuls of consular rank, with a tenure longer than annual. That would be most unfortunate. 3 Among the ex-consuls were

had fought wars under their own auspices and had celebrated triumphs would consider it no great honour to serve as legates.

he ex-Antonians Pollio, Censorinus, C. Sosius and M. Licinius Crassus would command armies again. Yet, apart from these survi

were rivals to the Princeps in power as well as in military glory. It would be expedient to rely instead upon the interested

ears it might be expected that from time to time men of consular rank would be put in charge of the military provinces of Ill

hout restricting the powers of the Princeps. The formula then devised would serve for the present, but his New State would re

e formula then devised would serve for the present, but his New State would require yet deeper foundations. The provinces mus

even if the Princeps were an infant, an idiot or an absentee. That would take time. Augustus’ provincia at once called for

ple. Ruin had been averted but narrowly, peace and order restored but would it last? And, more than security of person and pr

would it last? And, more than security of person and property, whence would come salvation and regeneration? Quem vocet div

en solemnized in Rome. Already in 23 the young man was aedile; and he would get the consulate ten years earlier than the lega

ple, nor the leadership of his party Agrippa and other party-magnates would have their word to say about that. Two different

his nephew. Agrippa received for himself a share in the power. There would be some warrant for speaking of a veiled coup d’é

ung man should become consul at the age of twenty-three: his adoption would be catastrophic. Not merely that it shattered the

PageBook=>344 Agrippa’s nature was stubborn and domineering. He would yield to Augustus, but to no other man, and to Au

e. There were grounds for the opinion that, if Augustus died, Agrippa would make short work of the Princeps’ young nephew. 2

on afterwards. There was never meant to be. Any prominence of Agrippa would threaten the leader’s monopoly of prestige and ho

rippa would threaten the leader’s monopoly of prestige and honour and would reveal all too barely the realities of power. Tha

d honour and would reveal all too barely the realities of power. That would never do. M. Vipsanius Agrippa was an awkward top

ance of sole power, to become all that Augustus had been. The nobiles would not have stood it. Agrippa is rather to be regard

beyond all others, he could invite to a share in his rule allies who would not be rivals. It was hardly to be expected tha

. But the Princeps after all stood at the head of the Roman State and would be required in the capital. It might be desirable

e proceeded to his duties. Before long Marcellus, Tiberius and Drusus would be available to second or to replace him. Even th

and Drusus would be available to second or to replace him. Even they would not suffice. It would be necessary, behind the fa

vailable to second or to replace him. Even they would not suffice. It would be necessary, behind the façade of the constituti

tain senatorial rank, in name at least. As soon as a census came they would forfeit it, if they had lost their fortunes. Afte

y survived from good fortune or a better calculation in treason, they would have held pride of place among the grand old men

en offered some prospect that their aspirations for land and security would be recognized, the soldiers had been able to baff

senators’ sons who had not yet held the quaestorship). Ex-centurions would naturally not be excluded, if they had acquired t

of Caesar and of the Triumvirs: ‘occultior, non melior’, his enemies would have said. Under the new regulations, access to t

s also thus used. 2 To the best of the new-comers loyalty and service would ultimately bring the consulate and ennoblement of

e renewed advance of novi homines, most of them military. Picenum, as would be expected, supplied soldiers: the two Poppaei c

t could hardly be suspended at one blow. Even had he desired, a ruler would be impotent to arrest the working of a natural pr

t to arrest the working of a natural process. How soon and how far it would go beyond Italy, which of the personal adherents

omata, the wealthy aristocracy of Asia and even the kings of the East would enter the imperial Senate, time and circumstance

gs of the East would enter the imperial Senate, time and circumstance would ordain. 1 Over all the world were zealous and i

person. Furthermore, whatever the fate of the Princeps, the coalition would endure. NotesPage=>368 (No Notes) XXV. T

to wait for a number of years. Which was fitting. Knights themselves would not have complained. NotesPage=>369 1 Cf.

embers. He professed half that size to be ideal and desirable. 1 That would have been harsh and narrow; even with a Senate of

reedom. On the other hand, the candidate, at least for the consulate, would do well to seek the approbation of the Princeps.

the approbation of the Princeps. He did not nominate candidates that would have been invidious and superfluous. His will pre

onsulate. 2 None of them could prevail alone. Neither law nor oratory would carry a man far, save when a conspicuous dearth o

tent to promote a deserving partisan. Pompeius, however, could not or would not support the Picene intriguer, the loquacious

he Roman voter, free citizen of a free community, might elect whom he would : his suffrage went to ancestry and personality, n

, Ann. 3, 66; 6, 29). PageBook=>375 Under the new order Cicero would have won the consulate without competition, held

t lively talents, like Cassius Severus, were doomed to opposition. It would be impertinent and pointless to scrutinize the me

ch. Enemies were dangerous only if they had armies and even then they would hardly be able to induce the soldiers to march ag

orce his Vipsania, who fell to Gallus, Pollio’s ambitious son. What would have happened if Augustus like that great politic

of Actium by not many more than twenty members. The sons of the slain would be available before long. But they would not suff

mbers. The sons of the slain would be available before long. But they would not suffice. Augustus at once proceeded to create

their turn, open or secret. Tiberius, being the head of the Claudii, would have had a dynastic and personal following whatev

came from Aeclanum (ILS 1335). As the gentilicium is not uncommon it would hardly be fair to conjecture a relationship with

s and an uncle of consular rank. 7 The patronage which he could exert would have been formidable enough, even if he had not b

ituation might well appear desperate for Princeps and for Empire. Who would there be now to prosecute the northern wars or go

nt order of praetorian and consular provinces. Yet rigidity of system would have been foreign both to the Roman spirit and to

o great was the emphasis laid by Augustus on military service that he would even place two senators’ sons in charge of a sing

cos. I B.C., proconsul of Asia (ILS 8814). 8 No evidence: but there would be room for him in the period 4–1 B.C. The dedica

abala in Cilicia, published in Jahreshefte XVIII (1915), Beiblatt 51, would not be sufficient or secure support, for it may b

ater date; and Castabala was the capital of a native principality. It would be possible, however, to assign to Piso the aceph

essful war, then proconsul of Asia, then legate again, of Syria. This would fit Piso and his Bellum Thracicum quite well; but

was dead and Tiberius in exile. Whatever had happened at Rome, there would have been a lull in operations after the conquest

Illyricum and the invasions of Germany. Other generals in their turn would have commanded in the north. Moreover a large n

eness be recovered, the full record of wars and generals in the north would reveal momentous political facts. 1 When Tiberius

be proved that he was legate of Citerior rather than of Ulterior, it would show that by now the region of Asturia-Callaecia

.C. there were no more triumphs of senators; and in any case Augustus would have wished, even if he had not been forced, to s

s, might assume the title of imperator. 6 Before long that honour too would be denied. Military glory was jealously engross

is clientela. 2 Descendants of Pompeius survived: no chance that they would be allowed to hold high command in Spain. The ear

ree elections and free debate in the Senate, it is evident that there would have to be expert preparation and firm control be

magisterial powers and gradually usurped jurisdiction: to aid him he would summon from time to time a consilium, drawn from

State and from their effects as revealed in the course of events: it would have to be postulated, were it not flagrant and e

carried out public works. For the management of the various funds he would have resort to the tried skill of slaves and free

sty counsellors, Agrippa and Maecenas: had they lived, certain things would never have happened. 2 In the elaborate fiction

ng of a solemn political show. The taciturn and business-like Agrippa would have been of little use. Nor would Taurus, the ot

taciturn and business-like Agrippa would have been of little use. Nor would Taurus, the other soldier and administrator. Even

ribund despot. Modesty or ignorance deterred him from the attempt. It would have required imagination that he did not possess

recaution seems excessive. In a Republic like that of Pompeius, Livia would have been a political force, comparable to her ki

of five years yet even this hardly meant the succession. The measure would be a visible reminder and check to conspirators.

d subordination, Tiberius concealed a high ambition; like Agrippa, he would yield to Augustus but not in all things. His prid

the Princeps, her son under the revived aristocracy of the New State would have reached the consulate in his thirty- third y

narch and the sure expectation of divinity: his sons were princes and would succeed him. The aristocracy could tolerate the r

inted out the folly of the attempt. Even if he succeeded, the nobiles would not put up with Cinna in the place of Augustus. 1

s sons attained their majority, a Council of Regency, open or secret, would control the government. It would be idle indeed

ouncil of Regency, open or secret, would control the government. It would be idle indeed to speculate upon the composition

that the political crisis in Rome and defeat of the Claudian faction would create repercussions to be detected on the consul

ian, Augustus was ruthless and consequent. To achieve his ambition he would coolly have sacrificed his nearest and dearest; a

Tiberius. Still, he preferred to run no risks. The disgrace of Julia would abolish the only tie that bound Tiberius to the r

s sent out, accompanied by M. Lollius as his guide and counsellor1 it would never do if an ambitious and inexperienced youth

obiles, the rivals and equals of Tiberius, could hope that their sons would govern provinces with legionary armies certainly

lert to prosecute their advantage. Tiberius Caesar had the power they would not let him enjoy it in security and goodwill. In

of law and order, built by the untutored sagacity of Roman statesmen, would stand and endure for ever. The Romans could not c

e of ambition and ‘impia arma’. Augustus, like the historian Tacitus, would have none of them; and so they receive no praise

ascended to heaven. Though bitterly reviled in his lifetime, Augustus would have his reward: si quaeret Tater Urbiunm’ subs

interest or the whim of either party. Few indeed of the great ladies would have been able or eager to claim, like Cornelia,

large part of their fortune. The tightening of the matrimonial bond would hardly induce the aristocracy to marry and propag

apsed. No peace for the Roman, but the inherited and cumulative curse would propagate, from one generation of corruption to t

orse than the last, till the temples should be repaired. 1 Whose hand would Heaven guide to begin the work of restoration?

e should stand for service. If the citizen refused to fight, the city would perish at the hands of its enemies or its mercena

this time in Italy was not complete and exclusive the new proprietors would not be utterly alien to the practice of agricultu

ts of economic science, or reveal the manner of their operation. That would be inexpedient. The political theorists of antiqu

e of Augustus, it may be presumed that men from Spain and Narbonensis would be discovered in large numbers. 3 There was less

or faction, appear to be fervently on the side of the government. It would be premature to discern in this metamorphosis a f

the frugal virtues of upstarts enriched by the Civil Wars. His books would have been burned in the Forum, with the greatest

sanguine Teucri proderet, ac totum sub leges mitteret orbem. 2 None would have believed it, but Rome’s salvation issued fro

r of Rome ‘deum deo natum, regem parentemque urbis Romanae’. 1 But it would not do to draw too precise a parallel. The Romulu

ir record of recent and contemporary history had been preserved, they would no doubt set forth the ‘lessons of history’ in a

eace: pacis amor deus est, pacem veneramur amantes. 4 No son of his would be a soldier: nullus de nostro sanguine miles e

tration perhaps to find a scapegoat whose very political harmlessness would divert attention from the real offences of Julia,

e classes of a regenerated society. Their influence and their example would cause the lessons of patriotism and morality to s

ocabulary of politics was not more frequently drawn upon. Tota Italia would not have been out of place. The Princeps’ own f

had deserted the consul Antonius, ‘heavenly legions’. But the orator would have been shocked had he known that the testimony

ve been shocked had he known that the testimony of his earlier dreams would be preserved and invoked a boy descending from he

f honours almost divine. Augustus was not a god, though deification would come in due course, from merit and for service, a

ce, and through the dynasty to Rome and the Empire. 1 The institution would further inspire among the Gauls just so much comm

urther inspire among the Gauls just so much community of sentiment as would serve the convenience of Rome without creating a

almatians and Pannonians, incompletely conquered twenty years before, would have risen again at the earliest opportunity when

and with the Roman People. 1 Hence the veterans and the local dynasts would sharply have dealt with social discontent or the

arely: he could not stand the sun, even in winter, in which season he would wear no fewer than four under-shirts, not to ment

ians who, praising the ‘lenitas ducis’ after Actium, exclaims that he would have behaved precisely so in earlier wars, had it

ery denial of Canidius’ constancy in the last emergency, if believed, would reveal one man at least who was killed though beg

ed Pollio. 3 Labienus also wrote history. When reciting his works, he would ostentatiously omit certain passages, explaining

, he would ostentatiously omit certain passages, explaining that they would be read after his death. 4 The last years of Au

ii, the Domitii, a dynastic plebeian house of fairly recent nobility, would yet, to the contemporaries of Pompeius, have seem

i Lentuli grew smaller and smaller: if they went on long enough, they would disappear, so a wit of the Republic observed. 3 Y

rian. 9 For prudence and for success, it might have seemed that all would be outdone by the Cocceii, Antonian partisans enn

re arose indignant protest in his privy council those wealthy dynasts would swamp out descendants of noble houses and impover

nensian from Nemausus. Even had Antoninus Pius not become emperor, he would still have been one of the wealthiest citizens in

upon dignitas or magnitudo animi was a dangerous anachronism. Murena would have escaped his doom had he been content with ‘a

y readily be inferred Cato, always an advocate of ordered government, would have been an enthusiastic supporter of the New St

a party has triumphed in violence and seized control of the State, it would be plain folly to regard the new government as a

ratively immune. But for that, the aristocratic partisans of Augustus would have illumined history with a constellation of ch

ty to repair their shattered fortunes, and the hope that the Princeps would provide: Rome owed them a debt for their ancestor

more irresponsible type of serious-minded person. No danger that they would be challenged to put their ideals into practice.

lippi. Such was the conventional and vulgar opinion:3 Tacitus himself would have thought it impossible after a civil war. L

y to be utopian. 4 But the situation was not hopeless. A good emperor would dispense the blessings of his rule over the whole

parallels in the language of the Stoics, is Roman and military. 2 He would not desert his post until a higher command reliev

h of all. Had he died in the early years of the Principate, his party would have survived, led by Agrippa, or by a group of t

basis of his domination. Such were the Res Gestae Divi Augusti. It would be imprudent to use the document as a sure guide

he Roman State. Yet one thing was certain. When he was dead, Augustus would receive the honours of the Founder who was also A

e Founder who was also Aeneas and Romulus, and, like Divus Julius, he would be enrolled by vote of the Roman Senate among the