eserves the non political classes. Liberty or stable government: that was the question confronting the Romans themselves, a

ain mistakes of fact or attribution, and to remove some blemishes. It was not possible to register, still less to utilize,

s accruing. Essentially, and strictly, therefore, the book is what it was when it first appeared. OXFORD, 1 January 1951

on by adoption of Augustus, consort in his powers. Not until that day was the funeral of the Free State consummated in sole

in 27 B.C., or from the new act of settlement four years later, which was final and permanent. Outlasting the friends, th

s and even the memory of his earlier days, Augustus the Princeps, who was born in the year of Cicero’s consulate, lived to

les: his constitutional reign as acknowledged head of the Roman State was to baffle by its length and solidity all human an

tesPage=>001 1 M. Junius Silanus, grandson of the younger Julia, was born in A.D. 14 (Pliny, NH 7, 58); on Augustus’ r

ver, Tacitus, Ann. 6, 20. PageBook=>002 ‘Pax et Princeps. ’ It was the end of a century of anarchy, culminating in t

ating in twenty years of civil war and military tyranny. If despotism was the price, it was not too high: to a patriotic Ro

ars of civil war and military tyranny. If despotism was the price, it was not too high: to a patriotic Roman of Republican

iotic Roman of Republican sentiments even submission to absolute rule was a lesser evil than war between citizens. 1 Libert

absolute rule was a lesser evil than war between citizens. 1 Liberty was gone, but only a minority at Rome had ever enjoye

aly and the provinces. Yet the new dispensation, or ‘novus status’, was the work of fraud and bloodshed, based upon the s

ger of an indulgent estimate of the person and acts of Augustus. It was the avowed purpose of that statesman to suggest a

invoked philosophy to explain it. The problem does not exist: Julian was closer to the point when he classified Augustus a

d it potentia. They were right. Yet the ‘Restoration of the Republic’ was not merely a solemn comedy, staged by a hypocrite

blic’ was not merely a solemn comedy, staged by a hypocrite. Caesar was a logical man; and the heir of Caesar displayed c

es induced historians to fancy that the Principate of Caesar Augustus was genuinely Republican in spirit and in practice a

hampions of political liberty sympathy has seldom been denied. Cicero was a humane and cultivated man, an enduring influenc

The last year of Cicero’s life, full of glory and eloquence no doubt, was ruinous to the Roman People. Posterity, generou

gia for Cicero or for Octavianus—or for both at once. A section of it was so written by C. Asinius Pollio, in a Roman and R

written by C. Asinius Pollio, in a Roman and Republican spirit. That was tradition, inescapable. The Roman and the senator

bsolute rule: writing of the transition from Republic to Monarchy, he was always of the opposition, whether passionate or f

es much deeper than words. Nor would it be rash to assert that Pollio was closely akin both to Sallustius and to Tacitus. 1

g class. Though symbolized for all time in the Battle of Philippi, it was a long process, not a single act. Sallustius bega

of Metellus and Afranius, in which year the domination of that dynast was established (60 B.C.). Tacitus in his Histories t

he sought to demonstrate that the Principate of the Julii and Claudii was a tyranny, tracing year by year from Tiberius dow

own to Nero the merciless extinction of the old aristocracy. Pollio was a contemporary, in fact no small part of the tran

ntirely credible. 1 Pollio, the partisan of Caesar and of Antonius, was a pessimistic Republican and an honest man. Of to

at Pollio chose to write no further will readily be understood. As it was , his path was hazardous. The lava was still molte

e to write no further will readily be understood. As it was, his path was hazardous. The lava was still molten underneath.

ll readily be understood. As it was, his path was hazardous. The lava was still molten underneath. 2 An enemy of Octavianus

endence. To tell the truth would have been inexpedient; and adulation was repugnant to his character. Another eminent histo

d adulation was repugnant to his character. Another eminent historian was also constrained to omit the period of the Triumv

hat he could not treat his subject with freedom and with veracity. It was no other than Claudius, a pupil of Livy. 3 His ma

age of the Republic and for their last sole heir the rule of Augustus was the rule of a party, and in certain aspects his P

gustus was the rule of a party, and in certain aspects his Principate was a syndicate. In truth, the one term presupposes t

Coerced by Pompeius and sharply repressed by Caesar, the aristocracy was broken at Philippi. The parties of Pompeius and o

otesPage=>007 (No Notes) PageBook=>008 a government. That was left to Caesar’s heir, at the head of a new coali

and history never belied its beginnings. Of necessity the conception was narrow only the ruling order could have any histo

, not Italy. 1 In the Revolution the power of the old governing class was broken, its composition transformed. Italy and th

appear to open the final act in the fall of the Roman Republic. That was not the opinion of their enemy Cato: he blamed th

ears from the Dictatorship of Sulla to the Dictatorship of Caesar. It was the age of Pompeius the Great. Stricken by the am

he Dictator bears the heavier blame for civil war. In truth, Pompeius was no better ‘occultior non melior’. 2 And Pompeius

ked power prevailed. 4 The anger of Heaven against the Roman People was revealed in signal and continuous calamities: the

rces that drove the world to its doom, human forethought or human act was powerless. Men believed only in destiny and the i

ble stars. In the beginning kings ruled at Rome, and in the end, as was fated, it came round to monarchy again. Monarchy

rty and of peace. Those ideals were incompatible. When peace came, it was the peace of despotism. ‘Cum domino pax ista veni

elf power, and after conceding sovranty to the assembly of the People was able to frustrate its exercise. The two consuls r

e. The two consuls remained at the head of the government, but policy was largely directed by ex-consuls. These men ruled,

s of property, power and office in the towns of Italy, the proportion was clearly much higher than has sometimes been imagi

story. Not mere admission to the Senate but access to the consulate was jealously guarded by the nobiles. It was a scanda

but access to the consulate was jealously guarded by the nobiles. It was a scandal and a pollution if a man without ancest

ember of a family to secure the consulate and consequent ennoblement) was a rare phenomenon at Rome. 3 Before the sovran pe

a mighty contest and had broken into the citadel of the nobility:4 he was less assertive in the Senate, more candid to his

s assertive in the Senate, more candid to his intimate friends. There was no breach in the walls a faction among the nobile

es of his own elevation. 5 The political life of the Roman Republic was stamped and swayed, not by parties and programmes

uch of the truth about his candidature. PageBook=>012 Romani’, was a name; a feudal order of society still survived

he history of the Republic, giving their names to its epochs. There was an age of the Scipiones: not less of the Metelli.

e family, money and the political alliance (amicitia or factio, as it was variously labelled). The wide and remembered rami

rases and the façade of constitutional government the most remarkable was Servilia, Cato’s half-sister, Brutus’ mother and

Cato’s half-sister, Brutus’ mother and Caesar’s mistress. The noble was a landed proprietor, great or small. But money wa

tress. The noble was a landed proprietor, great or small. But money was scarce and he did not wish to sell his estates: y

venality at Rome, oppression and extortion in the provinces. Crassus was in the habit of observing that nobody should be c

s was in the habit of observing that nobody should be called rich who was not able to maintain an army on his income. 2 Cra

an army on his income. 2 Crassus should have known. The competition was fierce and incessant. Family influence and wealth

e. From ambition or for safety, politicians formed compacts. Amicitia was a weapon of politics, not a sentiment based on co

l enemies. 2 The plea of security and self-defence against aggression was often invoked by a politician when he embarked up

conferred its favours on whom it pleased. 3 Popularity with the plebs was therefore essential. It was possessed in abundanc

m it pleased. 3 Popularity with the plebs was therefore essential. It was possessed in abundance both by Caesar and by his

agents such as influential freedmen were not despised. Above all, it was necessary to conciliate the second order in state

e of ‘personal honour’, ib. 36 ff. 3 Cicero, Pro Sestio 137. Office was accessible to the ‘industria ac virtus’ of all ci

ce was accessible to the ‘industria ac virtus’ of all citizens. There was not even a property-qualification. The letter of

y designated as boni. The mainstay of this sacred army of the wealthy was clearly the financiers. Many senators were their

f their enmity will be reckoned Lucullus, Catilina and Gabinius. It was no accident, no mere manifestation of Roman conse

responsibility. Not so among the financiers. The Roman constitution was a screen and a sham. Of the forces that lay behin

Italy, were ceasing to feel allegiance to the State; military service was for livelihood, or from constraint, not a natural

7 f., on the definition of ‘optimus quisque’. PageBook=>016 It was an alliance of interest and sentiment to combat t

idened to a consensus omnium bonorum and embraced tota Italia. But it was an ideal rather than a programme: there was no Ci

raced tota Italia. But it was an ideal rather than a programme: there was no Ciceronian party. The Roman politician had to

Within the framework of the Roman constitution, beside the consulate, was another instrument of power, the tribunate, an an

alicum supervened civil war. The party led by Marius, Cinna and Carbo was defeated. L. Cornelius NotesPage=>016 1 Sa

pessimistic remarks about an earlier period, Hist, 1, 12 M. 2 There was no party of the populares; cf. H. Strasburger, in

ion. Sulla resigned power after a brief tenure. Another year and he was dead (78 B.C.). The government which he establi

ernment which he established lasted for nearly twenty years. Its rule was threatened at the outset by a turbulent and ambit

y a pretext, but the Marian party the proscribed and the dispossessed was a permanent menace. The long and complicated war

tful, rose again for Lepidus against the Roman oligarchy. 1 Lepidus was suppressed. But disorders continued, even to a ri

of the ten years’ war in Italy echoed over all the world. The Senate was confronted by continuous warfare in the provinces

tion sons of the resplendent Aemilii. 3 But the power of the Cornelii was waning. Their strength now lay in the inferior Le

h now lay in the inferior Lentuli, whose lack of dangerous enterprise was compensated by domestic fertility and a tenacious

llies of the NotesPage=>018 1 Münzer, RA, 53 ff. 2 No Fabius was consul between 116 and 45 B.C. 3 Q. Fabius Maxi

i, however, persisted, unchanged in their alarming versatility. There was no epoch of Rome’s history but could show a Claud

their line, unequal in talent the Pulchri and the Nerones. The lesser was to prevail. The patricians in the restored olig

brupt decadence, had lacked a consul for two generations. 3 But there was a prominent Lutatius, whose name recalled a great

06; cf. Münzer, RA, 285 ff. 2 Cf. Münzer, RA 305 ff. The patriciate was in very low water in the last decade of the secon

t;020 But the core and heart of Sulla’s party and Sulla’s oligarchy was the powerful house of the Caecilii Metelli, whom

the Caecilii Metelli, whom some called stupid. 1 Their heraldic badge was an elephant, commemorating a victory against the

precipitate the Bellum Italicum, left no son of his blood. His sister was twice married, to a NotesPage=>020 1 As Sc

wife of M. Aemilius Scaurus, the princeps senatus. Servilius’ mother was a sister of Balearicus, and Ap. Pulcher’s wife wa

Servilius’ mother was a sister of Balearicus, and Ap. Pulcher’s wife was his daughter. The table in Münzer, RA, 304, shows

r (pr. 56) and P. Clodius Pulcher (tr. pl. 58). Of the daughters, one was married to Q. Marcius Rex (cos. 68), the second a

nd and best known to Q. Metellus Celer (cos. 60). The youngest Clodia was the wife of L. Licinius Lucullus (cos. 74), who d

henobarbus (cos. 54). 2 The sister of Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos. 78) was married to Q. Hortensius (cos. 69). For the stemm

L. Licinius Lucullus (cos. 74) and his brother Marcus (cos. 73), who was adopted by a M. Terentius Varro, cf. P-W XIII, 41

was adopted by a M. Terentius Varro, cf. P-W XIII, 414 f. L. Lucullus was married first to a Clodia, then to a Servilia, cf

n already, and some died soon or disappeared. 4 Even in numbers there was a poor showing of consulars to guide public polic

efence of Verres or against the bills of Gabinius and Manilius. There was a fine rally at the prosecution of the tribune Co

the duties of their estate. The vain Hortensius, his primacy passing, was loath to contemplate the oratorical triumphs of a

ee sons of Ap. Pulcher. Of these Claudii, the character of the eldest was made no more amiable by early struggles and exped

poverty and to provide for all his brothers and sisters; 3 the second was of little account, and the youngest, P. Clodius,

. Leadership might therefore fall to that part of the oligarchy which was concentrated about the person of Cato; and Cato w

e oligarchy which was concentrated about the person of Cato; and Cato was dominated by his step-sister, a woman possessed o

ouse. 5 Her brother, Q. Servilius, husband of Hortensius’ daughter, was cut off before his NotesPage=>023 1 Eviden

60) and Q. Metellus Nepos (cos. 57). 3 Cf. Varro, RR 3, 16, 1 f. He was married to a Servilia (Ad Alt. 12, 20, 2). 4 He

ged the tone of his political professions. Short of the consulate, it was given NotesPage=>024 1 Plutarch, Cato mino

inscr. ILS 9460. 2 His father, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 96), was very influential with the plebs when tribune in 1

hen carrying a law to transfer sacerdotal elections to the People: he was elected pontifex maximus in the next year. The so

us ingenio. ’ On his ‘iracundia’, Caesar, BC 3, 16, 3. 4 P. Clodius was an ally of Cicero against Catilina. The Claudii w

ignitas of the Julii and secure the consulate in his turn. 2 His aunt was the wife of Marius. Caesar, who took Cinna’s daug

3 and his second wife, Pompeia, doubly recalled the Sullan party she was a granddaughter of Sulla. 4 Active ambition earne

ation of their treason but sought to avert the penalty of death. It was the excellent consul who carried out the sentence

trasburger, Caesars Eintritt in die Geschichte (1938). 3 His mother was an Aurelia, of the house of the Aurelii Cottae. F

gt;026 high assembly. But the speech and authority that won the day was Cato’s.1 Aged thirty-three and only quaestorian i

rove to recall the aristocracy to the duties of their station. 2 This was not convention, pretence or delusion. Upright and

ancestor whom he emulated almost to a parody, Cato the Censor. But it was not character and integrity only that gave Cato t

o had supported Catilina as far as his candidature for the consulate, was a perpetual menace; and the Metelli, for survival

od firm against Italians, hating them from his very infancy; 3 and he was ready to bribe the plebs of Rome with corn or mon

aristocracy,5 were now being monopolized by one man. Something more was involved than the privileges of an oligarchy: in

n. Pompeius Magnus, Cato and his kinsmen NotesPage=>026 1 This was notorious. Cicero could not deny it, cf. Ad Att.

his uncle’s house). Further, his kinsman, L. Porcius Cato (cos. 89), was defeated and killed by the Italian insurgents in

sic territory (Livy, Per. 75). 4 A great extension of the corn-dole was carried through by Cato in 62 B.C. (Plutarch, Cat

arian and an adherent of Lepidus, capitulating at Mutina to Pompeius, was killed by him (Plutarch, Pompeius 16, &c.). A

out between Marius and Sulla. Brutal, corrupt and perfidious, Strabo was believed to have procured the assassination of a

al but providential death the populace broke up his funeral. 3 Strabo was a sinister character, ‘hated by heaven and by the

his own. 6 The career of Pompeius opened in fraud and violence. It was prosecuted, in war and in peace, through illegali

h, Pompeius 6. Prosecuted for peculations committed by his father, he was saved by Philippus, Hortensius and by the Marian

sts of the Mediterranean (the Lex Gabinia). No province of the Empire was immune from his control. Four years before, Pompe

Pompeius; to reject a bill, no argument needed save that the measure was aimed at the People’s general. 2 Among the ambiti

e Pompeius utterly. Crassus used his patronage to demonstrate that he was still a force in politics and to embarrass the

and the armies NotesPage=>029 1 H. M. Last, CAH IX, 349. This was presumably the conception set forth by Sallust in

ndicated its empire abroad. Pompeius never forgave Cicero. But Cicero was not the real enemy. It was the habit of Pompeiu

ompeius never forgave Cicero. But Cicero was not the real enemy. It was the habit of Pompeius to boast of the magnitude o

’. 2 Not so menacing to outward show, but no less real and pervasive, was his influence in the West Africa and Mauretania,

orbis domitor per tresque triumphos ante deum princeps. 3 Pompeius was Princeps beyond dispute but not at Rome. By armed

ere much too stubborn to admit a master, even on their own terms. Nor was Pompeius in any way to their liking. His family w

ir own terms. Nor was Pompeius in any way to their liking. His family was recent enough to excite dispraise or contempt, ev

ances had not brought much aristocratic distinction. Pompeius’ mother was a Lucilia, niece of that Lucilius from Suessa Aur

>031 licence to write political satire with impunity. 1 Pompeius was also related to other families of the local gentr

ersonal adherents in the senatorial and equestrian orders derived, as was fitting, from Picenum men of no great social dist

oted attachment in war and politics to the baronial family of Picenum was the one sure hope of advancement. M. Lollius Pali

rt from the nobiles. The dynastic marriage pointed the way. Sulla, as was expedient, had married a Metella: the aspirant to

A. B. West, AJP XLIX (1928), 240 ff., with a stemma on p. 252. Hirrus was a great landowner. Varro (RR 2, 1, 2) refers to h

arried Caesar’s sister Julia (Suetonius, Divus Aug. 4, 1); and Hirrus was married to a daughter of L. Cossinius (Varro, RR

r against the Pirates (ib. 2, praef. 6). Another member of this group was Cn. Tremellius Scrofa, suitably eloquent about pi

15, 2; Silius Italicus, Punica 10, 34). The assumption that Labienus was a Pompeian partisan from the beginning is attract

ompeian military man M. Petreius, old in service (Sallust, BC 59, 6), was probably the son of a centurion from the Volscian

elii Lentuli. 3 In the year of Cicero’s consulate Q. Metellus Celer was praetor. 4 The activities of the tribune Labienus

ius’ behalf were more open and more offensive: a decree of the People was enacted, permitting the conqueror of the East to

to permit the candidature of his legate, M. Pupius Piso, the request was granted. 9 NotesPage=>032 1 Plutarch, Pomp

us trod warily and pleased nobody. His first speech before the People was flat and verbose, saying nothing. 3 No happier in

le-edged weapon in the hand of Crassus, who disliked them both. 4 Nor was Pompeius’ consul effective, though a witty man an

secured the election of the military man L. Afranius. The other place was won by Metellus Celer, who, to get support from P

ng went wrong. The consul Celer turned against Pompeius, and Afranius was a catastrophe, his only talent for civil life bei

had led the opposition to the laws of Manilius and Gabinius. Catulus was now dead, Hortensius enfolded in luxurious torpor

the result of an earlier clash, in 67 B.C. Velleius 2, 40, 6). There was rioting, and Pompeius’ tribune Flavius imprisoned

us. Celer opposed it. More significant evidence of Pompeius’ weakness was the conduct of Cicero. He leapt boldly into the f

d slashed the bill to pieces. Yet he claimed at the same time that he was doing a good service to Pompeius. 1 Cicero was in

the same time that he was doing a good service to Pompeius. 1 Cicero was in high spirits and fatal confidence. At variance

us Piso from getting the province of Syria. 3 But the great triumph was Cato’s, and the greater delusion. The leader of t

e, Cato denounced their rapacity and repelled their demand. 5 Crassus was behind the financiers and Crassus waited, patient

ain stage in his career, with no discredit to either. Caesar’s choice was still open had it not been for Cato; and Caesar’s

choice was still open had it not been for Cato; and Caesar’s daughter was betrothed to Servilia’s son, Cato’s nephew. 7 But

suam. ’ 5 Ib. 2, 1, 8. 6 Suetonius, Divus Iulius 19, 1. 7 Julia was betrothed to a certain Servilius Caepio (Suetoniu

as well as public for hating Caesar, the lover of Servilia. 1 There was nothing to preclude an alliance with Pompeius. Pr

He had also prosecuted an ex-consul hostile to Pompeius. 3 But Caesar was no mere adherent of Pompeius: by holding aloof he

n concert with L. Lucceius, an opulent friend of Pompeius. 4 Caesar was elected. Pompeius, threatened in his dignitas, wi

cta needing ratification and loyal veterans clamorous for recompense, was constrained to a secret compact. The diplomatic a

with history. 5 In the next year the domination of Pompeius Magnus was openly revealed. It rested upon his own auctorita

ten years. 7 This capture of the NotesPage=>035 1 The liaison was notorious (Plutarch, Brutus 5, &c.) and gave

amp;c.) and gave rise to the vulgar and untenable opinion that Brutus was Caesar’s son. 2 In alliance, namely, with both

ntiae cupidis de invadenda re publica facile convenit. ’ 6 Afranius was perhaps proconsul of Gallia Cisalpina in 59 B.C.

0-59 B.C. (Suetonius, Divus Aug. 3 f.). In Syria L. Marcius Philippus was succeeded by Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus i

rly be designated as the end of the Free State. From a triumvirate it was a short step to dictatorship. Caesar’s consulat

triumvirate it was a short step to dictatorship. Caesar’s consulate was only the beginning. To maintain the legislation o

d for his ally more than an ordinary proconsulate. To this end Caesar was granted the province of Cisalpine Gaul, which dom

alpine Gaul, which dominated Italy, for five years. Pompeius’ purpose was flagrant there could be no pretext of public emer

of public emergency, as for the eastern commands. 1 Transalpine Gaul was soon added. Further, the three rulers designated

at home and armed power in the provinces, the ascendancy of Pompeius was highly unstable. As a demonstration and a warning

ompeius was highly unstable. As a demonstration and a warning, Cicero was sacrificed to Clodius. Not content thus to satisf

sar’s niece Atia, widow of C. Octavius (his daughter Marcia, however, was the wife of Cato); and Marcellinus had been a leg

been a legate of Pompeius (Appian, Mithr. 95; S1G3 750). 3 Crassus was in alliance with the Metelli not only through his

li not only through his elder son (ILS 881). The younger, P. Crassus, was married by now to Cornelia, daughter of that P. S

opted by Metellus Pius, became Q. Metellus Scipio. P. Scipio’s mother was the daughter of L. Licinius Crassus (cos. 95 B.C.

y to the Senate and guided by modest and patriotic principes. 2 Which was harmless enough, had he not been emboldened to an

r that, Spain and Syria respectively for five years; Caesar’s command was also to be prolonged. Pompeius emerged with ren

e dynasts paid for their confidence or their illusions. Ahenobarbus was robbed of his consulate, and Cicero was compelled

heir illusions. Ahenobarbus was robbed of his consulate, and Cicero was compelled to give private guarantees of good beha

ies might have been tolerated in a small city-state or in a Rome that was merely the head of an Italian confederation. In t

e bloodless but violent usurpations of 70 and 59 B.C. the logical end was armed conflict and despotism. As the soldiers wer

taly, the revolution became social as well as political. The remedy was simple and drastic. For the health of the Roman P

r of a breach between Pompeius and his ally might appear imminent. It was not so in reality. Pompeius had not been idle. Th

l at last, with Ap. Claudius Pulcher for colleague (54 B.C.). Neither was strong enough to harm Pompeius; and Ap. Pulcher m

lic business. The next year opened without consuls. Similar but worse was the beginning of 52 B.C., three candidates conten

three candidates contending in violence and rioting, chief among whom was the favourite of the Optimates, T. Annius Milo, a

rried Fausta, the dissolute daughter of Sulla. 2 His enemy P. Clodius was running for the praetorship. When Milo killed Clo

Pompeius, clamouring for him to be consul or dictator. 3 The Senate was compelled to act. It declared a state of emergenc

late, without colleague. The proposal came from Bibulus, the decision was Cato’s.5 The pretext was a special mandate to h

e proposal came from Bibulus, the decision was Cato’s.5 The pretext was a special mandate to heal and repair the Commonwe

orship and consulate, but when an interval of five years had elapsed, was recommended by the fair show of mitigating electo

esources of patronage for the party in control of the government. Nor was it at all likely that the dynast would abide by l

r spirit of his own legislation. NotesPage=>039 1 The proposal was not published until 53, when Hirrus was tribune.

Page=>039 1 The proposal was not published until 53, when Hirrus was tribune. Cato nearly deprived him of his office (

uthentic rumours the year before, cf. Ad Q. fratrem 3, 8, 4. 2 Milo was a Papius by birth, adopted by his maternal grandf

Hypsaeus, once his own adherent but now coolly sacrificed. The third was more useful Q. Metellus Scipio, vaunting an unmat

league for the remaining five months of the year. A new combination was ready to form, with the ultimate decision to turn

absence. Detected, he made tardy and questionable amends. The dynast was not yet ready to drop his ally. He needed Caesar

made final choice between the two. Cato, standing for the consulate, was signally defeated, to the satisfaction of Pompeiu

impatient. Early in 51 the consul M. Marcellus opened the attack. He was rebuffed by Pompeius, and the great debate on Cae

He was rebuffed by Pompeius, and the great debate on Caesar’s command was postponed till March 1st of the following year. P

ogether against his will, to demand a legion from Caesar. The pretext was the insecurity of Syria, gravely menaced by the P

us proclaimed submission to the Senate as a solemn duty. 3 The legion was not withdrawn, however, until the next year, alon

r the enemies of Caesar might prevail at the consular elections, that was no unmixed advantage. The Marcelli were rash but

save the Commonwealth. Curio became a popular hero, and the People was incited against the Senate. The threat of a coali

per. Ap. Claudius Pulcher, elected to the censorship, an office which was a patent rebuke to his own private conduct, worke

al vice. 2 Caelius’ enemies drove him to Caesar’s side. Ap. Pulcher was no adornment to the party of Cato. Already anothe

rio. In the autumn men began to speak of an inevitable war. Fortune was arranging the scene for a grand and terrible spec

a grand and terrible spectacle. 4 1 Ser. Sulpicius Rufus (cos. 51) was very mild and loath to provoke a civil war (Dio 4

o 40, 59, 1; Ad fam. 4, 3, 1, &c.); L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. 50) was bought (Suetonius, Divus Iulius 29, 1, &c.);

he apathy of senators as submission to tyranny, protested that Caesar was already invading Italy, and took action on behalf

re ready to bring their levies at his command. Magnus, it might seem, was strong enough to prevent civil war, free to negot

ed told of discontent among Caesar’s soldiers and officers; and there was solid ground to doubt the loyalty of Caesar’s bes

ation and negotiation in private. On January 1st a proposal of Caesar was rejected and he was declared contumacious: six da

n in private. On January 1st a proposal of Caesar was rejected and he was declared contumacious: six days later his provinc

ejected and he was declared contumacious: six days later his province was taken from him. The Caesarian tribunes NotesPag

s confidebat. ’ 6 The expectation that Labienus would desert Caesar was probably an important factor. PageBook=>043

ius, their veto disregarded, fled from the city. A state of emergency was proclaimed. Even had Pompeius now wished to ave

aimed. Even had Pompeius now wished to avert the appeal to arms, he was swept forward by uncontrollable forces, entangled

with the Catonian faction to attack and harry Pompeius. But the feud was not bitter or beyond remedy: the Metelli were too

emedy: the Metelli were too politic for that. Three years later Nepos was consul, perhaps with help from Pompeius. Signs of

ulates in twenty-three years, the Metelli soon found that their power was passing. Death took off their consuls one by one.

ed their women to good effect in the past; and one of their daughters was given in marriage to the elder son of the dynast

grandson of a Metella, had passed by adoption into their family. This was Q. Metellus Scipio, father-in-law and colleague o

. 3 L. Cornelius Scipio Asiagenus (cos. 83), a Marian partisan, who was proscribed and escaped to Massilia, where he died

this generation rewarded their sagacity. 3 With these four families was now joined the faction of Cato. Of his allies and

llies and relatives, Lucullus and Hortensius were dead, but the group was still formidable, including his nephew M. Junius

by the young Pompeius in a foul and treacherous fashion. Ahenobarbus was a great political dynast in his own right, born t

fruitless contests with the consul and the tribunes of Pompeius. It was later claimed by their last survivor that the par

of NotesPage=>043 1 Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus (cos. 72) was a plebeian by birth (Cicero, De imp. Cn. Pompei 5

were all, or consistently, allies of Pompeius: Lentulus Sura (cos.71) was expelled from the Senate by the censors of 70. Bu

m the Senate by the censors of 70. But Clodianus (cos. 72, censor 70) was a legate in the Pirate War (Appian, Mithr. 95) an

censor 70) was a legate in the Pirate War (Appian, Mithr. 95) and so was Marcellinus (ib. and the inscr. from Cyrene, SIG3

recall such palpable and painful testimony. The party of the Republic was no place for a novus homo: the Lentuli were synon

d given him a pointed reminder of the dignitas of their house. 4 It was the oligarchy of Sulla, manifest and menacing in

nd menacing in its last bid for power, serried but insecure. Pompeius was playing a double game. He hoped to employ the lea

enlist a man of principle on their side, celebrated as integrity what was often conceit or stupidity and mistook craft for

(No Notes) Ch. IV CAESAR THE DICTATOR PageBook=>047 SULLA was the first Roman to lead an army against Rome. Not

when he landed in Italy after an absence of nearly five years, force was his only defence against the party that had attac

his only defence against the party that had attacked a proconsul who was fighting the wars of the Republic in the East. Su

blic in the East. Sulla had all the ambition of a Roman noble: but it was not his ambition to seize power through civil str

aesar set the tune from the beginning, in the knowledge that monarchy was the panacea for the world’s ills, and with the de

perhaps reform the State. Caesar’s enemies were afraid of that and so was Pompeius. After long wavering Pompeius chose at l

position or for time to bring up his armies. 2 Caesar knew how small was the party willing to provoke a war. As the artful

than surrender it, Caesar appealed to arms. A constitutional pretext was provided by the violence of his adversaries: Caes

ights of the tribunes and the liberties of the Roman People. But that was not the plea which Caesar himself valued most it

People. But that was not the plea which Caesar himself valued most it was his personal honour. His enemies appeared to ha

deal with Pompeius later. It might not come to open war; and Pompeius was still in their control so long as he was not at t

me to open war; and Pompeius was still in their control so long as he was not at the head of an army in the field. Upon Cae

d as had been Gabinius, the governor of Syria. If he gave way now, it was the end. Returning to Rome a private citizen, Cae

lawyers reputed for eloquence, high principle and patriotism. Cato was waiting for him, rancorous and incorruptible. A j

e red mullet and Hellenic culture of that university city. 3 Caesar was constrained to appeal to his army for protection.

king the constitution against the craftiest politician of the day: he was declared a public enemy if he did not lay down hi

ients are commonly the work of hot blood and muddled heads. The error was double and damning. Disillusion followed swiftly.

error was double and damning. Disillusion followed swiftly. Even Cato was dismayed. 1 It had confidently been expected that

e as one man against the invader. Nothing of the kind happened. Italy was apathetic to the war-cry of the Republic in dange

aised by politicians at Rome forbade intervention in a struggle which was not their own. 2 Pompeius might stamp with his fo

e preparation for war, may have impaired his decision. 3 Yet his plan was no mere makeshift, as it appeared to his allies,

Caesar, it is true, had only a legion to hand: the bulk of his army was still far away. But he swept down the eastern c

dence as he went. Within two months of the crossing of the Rubicon he was master of Italy. Pompeius made his escape across

ound. Then a second blow, quite beyond calculation: before the summer was out the generals of Pompeius in Spain were outman

stroy them. His enemies had the laugh of him in death. Even Pharsalus was not the end. His former ally, the great Pompeius,

he domination of Caesar and the destruction of the Free State. That was the nemesis of ambition and glory, to be thwarted

mere creation of arbitrary power, doomed to perish in violence. It was rational to suspend judgement about the guilt of

n the Senate by honourable men, at the foot of his own statue. That was not the point. The cause of Pompeius had become t

rant to autocracy and the forces of law and order. Caesar’s following was heterogeneous in composition at its kernel a smal

ess their dangerous ambitions. In name and function Caesar’s office was to set the State in order again (rei publicae con

ae). Despite odious memories of Sulla, the choice of the Dictatorship was recommended by its comprehensive powers and freed

rting the rights of the tribunes, the liberty of the Roman People. He was not mistaken. Yet he required special powers: aft

mistaken. Yet he required special powers: after a civil war the need was patent. The Dictator’s task might well demand sev

ment, to wane at once and perish utterly. 1 In January 44 B.C. Caesar was voted the Dictatorship for life. About the same t

ordering of the Roman State? Was this a res publica constituta? It was disquieting. Little had been done to repair the r

ravages of civil war and promote social regeneration. For that there was sore need, as both his adherents and his former a

oppressed, whether Roman, Italian or provincial. He had shown that he was not afraid of vested interests. But Caesar was no

. He had shown that he was not afraid of vested interests. But Caesar was not a revolutionary. He soon disappointed the rap

phil.-hist. Abt., N.F. 15 (1937), 32 ff. Premerstein argues that this was a general oath, not confined to senators. 3 If

53 Caelius complained quite early in the Civil War. 1 Not everybody was as outspoken or as radical as Caelius, who passed

ictator himself expressed alarming opinions about the res publica ’it was only a name: Sulla, by resigning supreme power, s

it was only a name: Sulla, by resigning supreme power, showed that he was an ignorant fellow’. 3 Caesar postponed decisio

esar postponed decision about the permanent ordering of the State. It was too difficult. Instead, he would set out for the

n, to Macedonia and to the eastern frontier of the Empire. At Rome he was hampered: abroad he might enjoy his conscious mas

nto literature and legend, declamation and propaganda. By Augustus he was exploited in two ways. The avenging of Caesar fel

the title of Divi filius as consecration for the ruler of Rome. That was all he affected to inherit from Caesar, the halo.

e. That was all he affected to inherit from Caesar, the halo. The god was useful, but not the Dictator: Augustus was carefu

Caesar, the halo. The god was useful, but not the Dictator: Augustus was careful sharply to discriminate between Dictator

ate between Dictator and Princeps. Under his rule Caesar the Dictator was either suppressed outright or called up from time

blance to Alexander in warlike fame and even in bodily form. 3 Caesar was a truer Roman than either of them. The complete

ship. PageBook=>055 in misunderstandings. 1 After death Caesar was enrolled among the gods of the Roman State by the

exercised by Cicero during his consulate for the new man from Arpinum was derided as ‘the first foreign king at Rome since

derided as ‘the first foreign king at Rome since the Tarquinii’. 2 It was to silence rumour that Caesar made an ostentatiou

ut monarchy presupposes hereditary succession, for which no provision was made by Caesar. The heir to Caesar’s name, his gr

alien or theoretical models. More important the business in hand: it was expedited in swift and arbitrary fashion. Caesar

secretaries: the Senate voted but did not deliberate. As the Dictator was on the point of departing in the spring of 44 B.C

Suetonius, Divus Iulius 79, 2. PageBook=>056 At the moment it was intolerable: the autocrat became impatient, annoy

vert opposition, petty criticism and laudations of dead Cato. That he was unpopular he well knew. 1 ‘For all his genius, Ca

ll his genius, Caesar could not see a way out’, as one of his friends was subsequently to remark. 2 And there was no going

y out’, as one of his friends was subsequently to remark. 2 And there was no going back. To Caesar’s clear mind and love of

agic sense of impotence and frustration he had been all things and it was no good. 3 He had surpassed the good fortune of S

m. 5 The question of ultimate intentions becomes irrelevant. Caesar was slain for what he was, not for what he might beco

ultimate intentions becomes irrelevant. Caesar was slain for what he was , not for what he might become. 6 The assumption o

ll hope of a return to normal and constitutional government. His rule was far worse than the violent and illegal domination

orse than the violent and illegal domination of Pompeius. The present was unbearable, the future hopeless. It was necessary

tion of Pompeius. The present was unbearable, the future hopeless. It was necessary to strike at once absence, the passage

om the most NotesPage=>056 1 His imperious and arrogant temper was noted by contemporaries, who recalled his behavio

s to the Commonwealth, the Dictator himself observed. 1 His judgement was vindicated in blood and suffering; and posterity

Moreover, the originator of the plot, the dour and military Cassius, was of the Epicurean persuasion and by no means a fan

amely monarchy or the brotherhood of man. The Stoic teaching, indeed, was nothing more than a corroboration and theoretical

t explain Cato; 3 and the virtus about which Brutus composed a volume was a Roman quality, not an alien importation. The

ote a book with the title De officiis (Seneca, Epp. 95, 45). The code was certainly narrow but not by contemporary standard

e Salaminian senators. The figure of interest demanded (48 per cent.) was high but not unparalleled in such transactions (S

ideal of character, admired by those who did not care to imitate. His was not a simple personality but passionate, intense

not a simple personality but passionate, intense and repressed. 1 Nor was his political conduct wholly to be predicted. Bru

e and designed that Brutus should marry Caesar’s daughter. 2 Her plan was annulled by the turn of events in the fatal consu

lled by the turn of events in the fatal consulate of Metellus. Caesar was captured by Pompeius: Julia, the bride intended f

d power, ready to use his birth and station to subvert his own class, was an ominous type, the monarchic aristocrat, recall

narchy’, whatever meaning may attach to that phrase. The Dictatorship was enough. The rule of the nobiles, he could see, wa

. The Dictatorship was enough. The rule of the nobiles, he could see, was an anachronism in a world-empire; and so was the

e nobiles, he could see, was an anachronism in a world-empire; and so was the power of the Roman plebs when all Italy enjoy

the Roman plebs when all Italy enjoyed the franchise. Caesar in truth was more conservative and Roman than many have fancie

o Roman conceived of government save through an oligarchy. But Caesar was being forced into an autocratic position. It mean

e of the Civil War and reinvigorate the organs of the Roman State. It was going to last and the Roman aristocracy was not t

ns of the Roman State. It was going to last and the Roman aristocracy was not to be permitted to govern and exploit the Emp

Brutus each had right on his side. The new party of the Liberators was not homogeneous in origin or in motive. The resen

l, he may have to be dropped or suppressed. The reformer Ti. Gracchus was put up by a small group of influential consulars.

AR, who took his stand on honour and prestige, asserted that Pompeius was disloyal. Caesar had made enemies through Pompeiu

rom interest, from ambition, or for the Republic. The coalition party was the head and front of the nobilitas, paramount in

n the spring of 49 (Dio 41, 14, 5), at the age of ninety-eight, so it was alleged (Pliny, NH 7, 156). 3 Above, p. 41 4

commands in the Civil War. Among the other eleven consulars only one was an active partisan, commanding armies, namely Cn.

ive partisan, commanding armies, namely Cn. Domitius Calvinus, and he was no better than his colleague Messalla or his illu

out, through merit or accident, from a dreary background. Neutrality was repugnant to a noble and a man of spirit: but kin

stand neutral without the imputation of lack of courage or principle was Caesar’s father-in-law, the virtuous L. Calpurniu

te turned with alacrity to a politician whose boast and reputation it was that he never let down his friends. Where Pompeiu

s of needy senators and winning the support of daring agents. There was no scope for talent or ideas on the other side. T

iant circle of orators and poets, young men hostile to whatever party was in NotesPage=>062 1 C. Antonius (cos.63),

=>063 power and noted for their attacks upon Caesar, when Caesar was an ally and agent of the dynast Pompeius. They no

decided C. Scribonius Curio, so history records and repeats but that was not the only incentive, for Clodius’ widow, Fulvi

eats but that was not the only incentive, for Clodius’ widow, Fulvia, was his wife, Antonius his friend, Ap. Pulcher his en

of Cato’s partisans. 2 Civil war might cut across families: as this was a contest neither of principle nor of class, the

bond of personal allegiance may be compared to that of the family. It was often stronger. Whatever their class in society,

marriage, certain were neutral. 3 The young Marcus Antonius, however, was the son of a Julia. Marriage secured the inactivi

nd as quaestor. 5 Caesar had kept faith with Crassus; the younger son was dead, the elder followed Caesar, for all that his

ounger son was dead, the elder followed Caesar, for all that his wife was a Caecilia Metella. 6 NotesPage=>064 1 For

ünzer, RA, 407; P- W, Supp. v, 369 ff. 3 L. Julius Caesar (cos. 64) was a legate (BC 1, 8, 2), but his son fought for the

egate (BC 1, 8, 2), but his son fought for the Republic in Africa and was killed there. Another young kinsman, Sex. Julius

or the stemma of the Julii, P-W X, 183 f. L. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 65) was still alive (cf. Suetonius, Divus Iulius 79, 4) b

low, p. 69 and p. 136. The younger C. Antistius Vetus (cos. suff. 30) was in charge of Syria in 45 (Dio 47, 27, 2). 6 Wit

27, 2). 6 With Caesar in Gaul from 54 onwards, M. Licinius Crassus was made governor of the Cisalpina in 49 (Appian, BC

of the last civil war, only thirty years before. The memory of Sulla was loathed even by those who stood by the order he h

by those who stood by the order he had established. Pompeius’ repute was evil enough with his own class; when he formed an

iscovered on the side of Caesar. 4 The Marian tradition in politics was carried on by men called populares. Pompeius had

nsistent party politician, for good or for evil. Caesar the proconsul was faithful to the cause. In his company emerge ex-t

s, p. 90. 3 For nobiles of the Marian faction, above, p. 19. 4 He was married to a Julia (Val. Max. 6, 7, 3). This P. S

Antonius (ILS 6204). PageBook=>066 in Gaul. The active tribune was a marked man. Some of these pestilential citizens

or idealistic enemies of the dominant oligarchy took heart again. It was evident that Caesar would restore and reward his

soon produced another crop of ‘homines calamitosi’. The censorship was a valuable weapon. In 70 B.C. two Pompeian censor

pel Curio from the Senate. His colleague Piso thwarted that move, but was unable or unwilling to save the Caesarian C. Sall

Jews, nations born to servitude. 1 For that enormity Gabinius himself was sacrificed to the publicani. Pompeius could sur

great marshal T. Labienus. Honoured and enriched by Caesar, Labienus was encouraged to hope for the consulate. 7 Other Pom

take his defence: with how much sincerity, another question. Pompeius was probably desirous of conciliating the financial i

iliaretur ad consulatus petitionem. ’ The history that never happened was the consulate of Caesar and Labienus in 48 B.C.,

al principle he returned to an old allegiance. 1 Caesar’s following was dual in composition. The fact that he took up arm

p arms against the party in power, had been a Marian and a popularis, was feared for a time by contemporaries and often bel

in his party and in his policy. The majority of the leading consulars was massed against him. No matter Caesar’s faction nu

f all is the group of nobiles of patrician stock. Caesar, like Sulla, was a patrician and proud of it. He boasted before th

atrician and proud of it. He boasted before the people that his house was descended from the immortal gods and from the kin

rity, strove to revive and re-establish their peers. 5 The patriciate was a tenacious class; though depressed by poverty, b

bienus’ desertion, Dio 41, 4, 4; Cicero, Ad Att. 7, 12, 5, &c. He was solicited in 50 B.C., BG 8, 52, 3. 2 Suetonius,

ans long ago but had not forgotten its patrician origin. P. Servilius was a man of some competence: Lepidus had influence b

cius Galba. 3 Münzer, RA, 12 ff. 4 Ib. 347 ff. Her second husband was D. Junius Silanus (cos. 62). An inscription from

iption from Cos (L’ ann. ép., 1934, 84) shows that P. Servilius’ wife was a Junia, daughter of Decimus. 5 Appian, BC 2, 2

e was a Junia, daughter of Decimus. 5 Appian, BC 2, 26, 102. (Curio was a relative of his, Dio 40, 63, 5.) PageBook=>

nstitution did not matter they were older than the Roman Republic. It was the ambition of the Roman aristocrat to maintain

ities valued by the governing class, by Caesar as by Brutus. Caesar was a patrician to the core. ‘He was Caesar and he wo

ss, by Caesar as by Brutus. Caesar was a patrician to the core. ‘He was Caesar and he would keep faith. ’1 As he also obs

have requited them. ’2 No empty words this trait and policy of Caesar was patent to contemporaries. 3 Justice has not alway

, conspicuous in the Julii and in the Claudii. The novus homo at Rome was all too anxiously engaged in forgetting his origi

hope of procuring gain and political advancement, military experience was not confined to centurions, their social inferior

ansa, and possibly Hirtius, had already entered the Senate. 4 Hirtius was a comfortable person of scholarly tastes, in high

mfortable person of scholarly tastes, in high repute as a gourmet: it was a danger to ask him to dinner. 5 Pansa was also i

gh repute as a gourmet: it was a danger to ask him to dinner. 5 Pansa was also in Gaul for a time. Hirtius was later to com

er to ask him to dinner. 5 Pansa was also in Gaul for a time. Hirtius was later to complete the Bellum Gallicum and to comp

ünzer in P-W I A, 1592 ff. It is not really very plausible. Ventidius was perhaps, like Mamurra, a praefectus fabrum in Cae

nage in the ancient Punic city of Gades in Spain. L. Cornelius Balbus was not a citizen by birth he received the franchise

ar threatened to collapse. At this favourable moment an unknown agent was instigated to prosecute Balbus, impugning his tit

n the Roman State. Not so Crassus and Caesar. The faction of Pompeius was unable to move either the propertied NotesPage=

The prince of all the bankers and financiers, C. Rabirius Postumus, was an ardent Caesarian. 4 His father, C. Curtius, is

designated as a leader of the equestrian order: not only that Curtius was ‘fortissimus et maximus publicanus’, which should

hief minister of finance in the kingdom. Senators and knights, such was the party of Caesar. With the Roman plebs and the

ageBook=>074 But Rome had conquered an empire: the fate of Italy was decided in the provinces. In earlier days the Rom

East. 1 Pompeius derided Lucullus, naming him ‘the Roman Xerxes’:2 he was an Oriental despot himself. In the West, in the

rona the father of the poet Catullus, no doubt a person of substance, was the friend and host of the proconsul:4 among his

begun. In Gaul beyond the Alps, the provincia (or Narbonensis as it was soon to be called), there was a chieftain of the

ps, the provincia (or Narbonensis as it was soon to be called), there was a chieftain of the Vocontii who had led the caval

wise served in the war against Mithridates. His son, Pompeius Trogus, was the confidential secretary of Caesar. 6 Another

sPage=>074 1 Ad Att. 8, 11, 2; 9, 10, 3; 11, 6, 2. In 48 B.C. he was in negotiation with Burebistas, the Dacian monarc

, Caesar, BC 3, 71, 1. The maternal grandfather of L. Calpurnius Piso was a business man called Calventius from that colony

. 6 Justin 43, 5, 11 f. PageBook=>075 agent of the proconsul was the admirable C. Valerius Troucillus, ‘homo hones

ca the adventurer P. Sittius, who had built up a kingdom for himself, was mindful of old Catilinarian memories. Neither the

. Gallus came from Forum Julii (Jerome, Chron., p. 164 H). His father was called Cn. Cornelius (ILS 8995), and may be a Gal

. R. Syme, CQ XXXII (193K), 39 ff. 3 The contingent from Opitergium was justly celebrated, Livy, Per. 110, &c. 4 IL

m, raised an army for Caesar and relieved the siege of Alexandria; he was also helped by the Idumaean Antipater. Mytilene w

of Alexandria; he was also helped by the Idumaean Antipater. Mytilene was in the clientela of Pompeius: Theophanes of that

r. Mytilene was in the clientela of Pompeius: Theophanes of that city was his friend, domestic historian and political agen

a certain Rufinus, the son of one of his freedmen. 5 Such in brief was the following of Caesar, summarily indicated and

ight to sell, grant or divide up the estates of his adversaries. Land was seized for his veteran colonies, in Italy and abr

d. At auction Pompeius’ property brought in fifty million denarii: it was worth much more. 6 Antonius and the poet Q. Corni

the Gaetuli, Bell. Afr. 56, 3. The clientela of the Pompeii, however, was very strong, cf. Cato’s words to Pompeius’ son, i

cquired an evil name for his acquisitions thirty years before. Balbus was notorious already, envied and hated for his princ

sar’s measures were provisional in purpose, transient in effect. This was permanent. NotesPage=>077 1 Ad Att. 14, 21

es are neither alarming nor novel. In theory, every free-born citizen was eligible to stand for the quaestorship: in fact,

nd for the quaestorship: in fact, the wealth and standing of a knight was requisite no exorbitant condition. Sons of freedm

torious for their loyalty, and for the rewards of loyalty. The Senate was full of them, it was alleged. Only ignorance or t

alty, and for the rewards of loyalty. The Senate was full of them, it was alleged. Only ignorance or temerity will pretend

therefore juryman, officer or man of affairs, the progenitor, when he was not the heir, of a family with municipal repute a

not all centurions were rustic and humble in origin. The centurionate was worth having: it could be got through patronage a

Fango (Dio 48, 22, 3; Cicero, Ad Att. 14, 10, 2). A man of this name was a municipal magistrate at Acerrae (CIL X, 3758).

truscan Cafo, JRS XXVII (1937), 135, though it is not certain that he was a senator. 2 Suetonius, Divus Iulius 80, 2: G

. Hostilius Saserna, can be distinguished, of whom the first at least was a senator (Münzer, P-W VII, 2512 ff.). If the sch

colony at Narbo as early as 118 B.C., before all Italy became Roman, was also subjected to casual settlement of Italians a

ibed as an immigrant or colonial Roman. Balbus, the Gaditane magnate, was not a Roman by birth, but a citizen of an alien c

entio 161)? 2 For his services to Caesar, Velleius 2, 51, 3. Balbus was quaestor in Hispania Ulterior under Pollio, who r

ed admission to the Dictator. Between senator and knight the cleavage was of rank only. The greater part of the socially un

but from choice, from gratitude or for profit. The patrician P. Sulla was joined by the nobilis C. Antonius and the obscure

aestors (Cicero, Brutus 242), C. Billienus, ‘homo per se magnus’, who was nearly elected consul c. 105–100 (ib. 175), L. Tu

obility; and the friendship and influence of the municipal aristocrat was largely solicited by Roman politicians. Not only

11, 16, 2), ‘vir prae- stantissimus et ornatissimus’ (In Pisonem 64), was aedile in 45 (Ad Att. 13, 45, 1). He had business

. The Aelii Lamiae alleged an ancestor among the Laestrygones,1 which was excessive, frivolous and tainted by Hellenic myth

trician house of the early Republic. 2 Some said that Cicero’s father was a dyer of clothes: others carried his lineage bac

llus, a king of the Volsci who had fought against Rome. 3 Yet there was no lack of evidence, quite plausible and sometime

a patrician pedigree for certain Octavii. Trouble for nothing: there was solid and authentic testimony at Velitrae the nam

uries before, the citizens had risen to drive them out. 8 The attempt was as vain as it would have been to expel the Aleuad

raenomina ‘Kaeso’ and ‘Numerius’ among the Fabii. The cognomen ‘Nero’ was Sabine (Suetonius, Tib. 1, 2); and Inregillensis’

wing ever closer and more exclusive. Marius, the knight from Arpinum, was helped by the Metelli. For merit and military ser

fit a transformed state. Men spoke indeed of tota Italia. The reality was very different. 2 The recent war of Italy against

at least subjected to Roman influences. In a wide region of Italy it was reinforced by hostility to Rome as yet unappeased

name Bellum Italicum is more comprehensive and no less revealing: it was a holy alliance, a coniuratio of eight peoples ag

f Italy. Italia they stamped as a legend upon their coins, and Italia was the new state which they established with its cap

ew state which they established with its capital at Corfinium. 1 This was secession. The proposal to extend the Roman franc

s secession. The proposal to extend the Roman franchise to the allies was first made by agrarian reformers at Rome, with in

nd associate of certain local dynasts,2 the Italians took up arms. It was not to extort a privilege but to destroy Rome. Th

tilities everywhere. Samnium remained recalcitrant. 3 The contest was not only brutal and bloody, with massacres of cap

and bloody, with massacres of captives, hostages or non-combatants it was complicated and embittered by the strife of local

n. Before peace came another civil war supervened, into which Etruria was dragged along with the stubborn remnants of the I

B.C., Livy, Per. 89. PageBook=>088 After a decade of war Italy was united, but only in name, not in sentiment. At fi

t the vanquished party in the Bellum Italicum and the Marian sedition was not richly represented in the Roman Senate, even

d Labienus. 4 The defeated still had to wait for a champion. Cicero was lavish with appeals to the sentiments and loyalty

h with appeals to the sentiments and loyalty of Italy tota Italia; he was profuse in praise of the virtue and vigour of the

he virtue and vigour of the novus homo. No evidence, however, that he was generous in act and policy, no man from remoter I

ok=>089 received more active assistance. 1 Atina’s first senator was very recent. 2 But Tusculum, and even Atina, had

d even Atina, had long been integral members of the Roman State. It was no part of Cicero’s policy to flood the Senate wi

the Roman State. He glorified the memory of Cato and of Marius but it was for himself, as though they were his own ancestor

that the sentiment and voice of Italy should be heard at Rome but it was the Italy of the post-Sullan order, and the repre

ly of the post-Sullan order, and the representation, though indirect, was to be adequate and of the best, namely his own pe

t, was to be adequate and of the best, namely his own person. Italy was held to be firm for conservative interests. No do

who offered public opposition to M. Livius Drusus; 4 and L. Visidius was one of the partisans who watched over the life of

o (Plancio?) 19 ff., contrasting Atina and Tusculum. Plancius’ parent was ‘princeps iam diu publicanorum’ (ib. 24). 2 Ib.

resistance. Cingulum owed recent benefits to Labienus:1 yet Cingulum was easily won. Auximum honoured Pompeius as its patr

ens poured forth in jubilation to meet Antonius, Caesar’s man; and it was more than the obstinate folly of Ahenobarbus that

s the true condition of Italy: his decision to evacuate the peninsula was taken long before it was manifest and announced.

taly: his decision to evacuate the peninsula was taken long before it was manifest and announced. It is evident enough th

Like the families proscribed by Sulla, regions where Marian influence was strong furnished partisans. The military man C. C

as is presumably Umbrian or Etruscan. 4 Pansa came from Perusia,5 but was a senator already. The Sabine country, a land of

re not of Samnite stock. 6 But the Caesarian general L. Staius Murcus was presumably of central Italian origin; 7 and the w

e courts of Rome, making enemies and friends in high places. 1 Pollio was with Caesar when he crossed the Rubicon. Herenn

es. 1 Pollio was with Caesar when he crossed the Rubicon. Herennius was a general of the insurgents in Picenum; and a Pic

senator and consul in the revolutionary period. 2 Most famous of all was P. Ventidius, the army contractor. All posterity

contractor. All posterity knows Ventidius as a muleteer. 3 His career was laborious, but his origin may have been reputable

is private army, he had to expel the Ventidii from that city. Picenum was the scene of faction and internecine strife. Not

aly into something that resembled a nation, with Rome as its capital, was not consummated by orators or by political theori

ceful change, the gradual adoption of the Latin tongue and Roman ways was brutally accelerated by violence and confiscation

, therefore, to exaggerate his work, in motive or in effects. That he was aware of the need to unify Italy will perhaps be

name to his maternal uncle, a wealthy man (P-W XV, 1947): by birth he was M. Satrius (P-W II A, 190), and is described as ‘

tics. But even now the work had much farther to go in so far as Italy was concerned: the Revolution had barely begun. A u

promise change. 2 Cicero claimed that in the space of thirty years he was the first knight’s son to become consul. He was c

ce of thirty years he was the first knight’s son to become consul. He was correct but other novi homines, socially more emi

cially more eminent, had not been debarred in that period; and Cicero was soon to witness the consulates of Murena and of P

64) may be mentioned. 2 C. Flavius Fimbria, a novus homo (cos. 104) was certainly a partisan of Marius T. Didius (98), C.

s. 62), of a distinguished family of praetorian rank (Pro Murena 41), was the first consul from Lanuvium (ib. 86). 4 In e

(ib. 86). 4 In each of the years 54–49 B.C. One of the two consuls was of patrician extraction: and three of the plebeia

ella(cos. suff. 44) were patrician, while P. Servilius Isauricus (48) was ultimately of patrician stock. M. Antonius was pl

rvilius Isauricus (48) was ultimately of patrician stock. M. Antonius was plebeian. 7 Namely Q. Fufius Calenus (47), P. V

, Hirtius and Pansa, the level of social eminence fell a little,1 but was to rise again in 42 with two of the marshals, the

to the Dictator. 7 Brutus, indeed, an especial friend and favourite, was named in his will among the heirs by default. 8

vourite, was named in his will among the heirs by default. 8 Brutus was a nobilis, Galba a patrician. Yet the opposition

nius from loyalty and Lepidus from NotesPage=>095 1 A. Hirtius was probably the son of a municipal magistrate from F

tor left, and could leave, no heir to his personal rule. But Antonius was both a leading man in the Caesarian party and con

make no difference to that. When the tyrant fell and the constitution was restored, would Antonius be strong enough to hold

to the gods of the Roman State, They had no further plans the tyrant was slain, therefore liberty was restored. A lull f

te, They had no further plans the tyrant was slain, therefore liberty was restored. A lull followed and bewilderment. Sym

tus delivered on the Capitol the next day likewise fell flat. The mob was apathetic or hostile, not to be moved by the logi

ifferent, how fiery a speech would Cicero have composed; 2 but Cicero was not present. The Liberators remained ensconced up

gotiation with them, adopted a firm and even menacing tone. D. Brutus was in despair. 3 NotesPage=>097 1 At least ac

both extremes, he brought forward a practical measure. Though Caesar was slain as a tyrant by honourable and patriotic cit

s, as yet unpublished were to have the force of law. The need of this was patent and inevitable: many senators, many of the

d Republicans, Rome received constitutional government again. Concord was advertised in the evening when the Caesarian lead

and the results may have outstripped his designs. In form, the speech was brief and moderate:1 the audience was inflammable

is designs. In form, the speech was brief and moderate:1 the audience was inflammable. At the recital of the great deeds of

prayers and a cult to Caesar. Prominent among the authors of disorder was a certain Herophilus (or Amatius), who sought to

of the capital. Long before this, the futility of their heroic deed was manifest to the assassins and to their sympathize

n done. Not the funeral of Caesar but the session of March 17th, that was the real calamity. 1 Both the acts and the party

re of the conspiracy: the slaying of a tyrant, and that action alone, was the end and justification of their enterprise, no

surped authority and summoned the Senate to meet upon the Capitol, it was afterwards urged. 3 But that was treason. They sh

Senate to meet upon the Capitol, it was afterwards urged. 3 But that was treason. They should not have left the consul Ant

son. They should not have left the consul Antonius alive. But there was no pretext or desire for a reign of terror. Brutu

s had not planned a seizure of power. Their occupation of the Capitol was a symbolical act, antiquarian and even Hellenic.

Capitol was a symbolical act, antiquarian and even Hellenic. But Rome was not a Greek city, to be mastered from its citadel

e acquiescence of the Senate were requisite. Of the consuls, Antonius was not to be had, Dolabella an uncertain factor. The

ominees of the Dictator, lacked prestige and confidence. The majority was for order and security. They were not to be blame

. Cicero, who had lent his eloquence to all political causes in turn, was sincere in one thing, loyalty to the established

ned dagger, crying the name of Cicero with a loud voice. 2 The appeal was premature. Nor could the faction of Brutus and

an Bibulus. 3 Debauched by demagogues and largess, the Roman People was ready for the Empire and the dispensation of brea

esar, who had taken up arms in defence of the rights of the tribunes, was manoeuvred into a clash with the champions of the

eventually for civil war, is another question. Their generous ardour was not put to the test. NotesPage=>101 1 Appi

uppressed a recrudescence of the irregular cult of Caesar at Rome: it was hoped that he might be induced to support the Lib

s to their cause. 2 But Dolabella, though not impervious to flattery, was fortified by distrust of his father-in-law and by

om Antonius, while Hirtius expressed his firm disapproval. 3 Antonius was apprised. When he requested that the bands of Rep

ed, Brutus agreed. 4 Demonstrations of sympathy cost nothing. Money was another matter. The Liberators sought to inveigle

d and wrecked the venture. For friendship, however, or for safety, it was advisable to maintain or contract ties with all p

as advisable to maintain or contract ties with all parties. Atticus was quite willing to offer Brutus private subsidies;

vinces, as Pompeius knew and as some of his allies did not. The price was civil war. Even had the Liberators been willing t

of the army commanders for their cause and they did not think that it was necessary. At the time of Caesar’s death, the arm

;103 and before the Dictator’s acta were ratified on March 17th, it was feared that the consul would not allow them to ta

o in the Cisalpina. For the rest, the only support in the provinces was distant and negligible the private adventurers Se

pamea. His forces were inconsiderable, one or two legions; and Apamea was closely invested by Caesarian generals. So much

ublicans did not dare to show themselves before the Roman People, all was not lost. The Dictator was dead, regretted by man

ow themselves before the Roman People, all was not lost. The Dictator was dead, regretted by many, but not to be avenged; a

7th corresponded with political facts and with personal interests, it was not altogether foolish to hope for normal and ord

prolonged. It all turned upon the Caesarian consul. Marcus Antonius was one of the most able of Caesar’s young men. A nob

n of an illustrious but impoverished plebeian family (his grandfather was a great orator, his father a good-natured but car

brighter prospects, to the camps and the councils of Caesar. Antonius was an intrepid and dashing cavalry leader: yet at th

Italy more than once during the Civil Wars, in 49 B.C. when Antonius was only tribune of the plebs, and after Pharsalus, a

ter Pharsalus, as Master of the Horse, for more than a year. The task was delicate, and Caesar may not have been altogether

there is no proof of any serious estrangement. 1 Lepidus, it is true, was appointed consul in 46 and Master of the Horse: n

Caesar prized him above Antonius for loyalty or for capacity. Lepidus was the elder man and a patrician as well. Lepidus re

retained the position of nominal deputy to the Dictator. But Lepidus was to take over a province in 44, and Antonius, elec

e of the government when Caesar departed. Born in 82 B.C., Antonius was now in the prime of life, richly endowed with str

were to show up in deadly abundance. The frank and chivalrous soldier was no match in statecraft for the astute politicians

ulous or conventional. That the private life of the Caesarian soldier was careless, disorderly, and even disgraceful, is ev

in 47 B.C., during Caesar’s absence. If Antonius stayed in Italy, it was precisely because he was dependable and most usef

r’s absence. If Antonius stayed in Italy, it was precisely because he was dependable and most useful there, whether as Mast

or alarming in the holders of office and power at Rome. In the end it was not debauchery that ruined Antonius, but a fatal

loyalty incompatible with the chill claims of statesmanship. But that was later. To gain a fair estimate of the acts and in

ity for the turn which events took at the funeral will be debated: it was certainly in his interest to alarm the Senate and

remain away from Rome. He spoke the language of conciliation,1 and it was long before he abandoned it. On his lips the prof

ore he abandoned it. On his lips the profession of respect for Brutus was something more than a conventional or politic for

us was something more than a conventional or politic formula Antonius was never accused of dissimulation: the Caesarian lea

ula Antonius was never accused of dissimulation: the Caesarian leader was later to be taunted with inconsistency on this po

g they did not interfere with the first object of his ambition, which was to seize and maintain primacy in the Caesarian pa

d public order. The Liberators were certainly a problem; yet Antonius was amicable, not exploiting his position unduly. I

aul and the armies remained tranquil, the danger of popular outbreaks was averted, the veterans were kept in hand. Property

med secure from revolution or from reaction. 5 To be sure, the tyrant was slain, but the tyranny survived hence open dismay

;107 Roman State had much to be thankful for, as partisan testimony was prepared to concede at a later date and for abusi

o concede at a later date and for abusive comparisons. 1 The consul was firm but conciliatory, taking counsel with senior

proposed and carried a specious measure the name of the Dictatorship was to be abolished for ever. Thoughtful men reflecte

ong, to be reinforced by monstrous allegations when proof or disproof was out of the question: in these early months the co

parently some kind of fund distinct from the official treasury, which was housed in the Temple of Saturn. If the mysterious

ry, which was housed in the Temple of Saturn. If the mysterious hoard was the Dictator’s war-chest, intended for the Balkan

ded for the Balkan and eastern wars, it might be doubted whether much was still at Rome for Antonius to take. The character

embezzlement are hard to establish or to refute. In October Antonius was certainly very far from abounding in ready cash.

of Antonius went beyond the measure of the Roman party-politician. He was consul and chief man in the Caesarian faction: po

ght of electing the pontifex maximus. This looked well. Naturally, it was a piece of political jobbery: Lepidus was chosen.

looked well. Naturally, it was a piece of political jobbery: Lepidus was chosen. Further, there was an abortive proposal t

was a piece of political jobbery: Lepidus was chosen. Further, there was an abortive proposal to elect a pair of censors (

he inhabitants of Sicily. 3 Bribery and forged decrees, of course, it was whispered. But Cicero himself hoped to profit, ti

icus in a matter concerning lands in Epirus. 4 On the whole, Antonius was distinctly superior to what Rome had learned to e

Caesarian policy and final contest for the dominion of the world, it was easy to pretend that Antonius strove from the beg

rom the authority of the office he held, the predominance of Antonius was a given and inescapable fact. Certain of his acts

he position of vantage. At first he seemed harmless:5 before long, he was seen to NotesPage=>108 1 Ad Att. 14, 13a a

Att. 14, 13a and 13b, Antonius’ letter and Cicero’s reply. The person was Sex. Clodius, a henchman of P. Clodius. 2 Ib. 1

enchman of P. Clodius. 2 Ib. 14, 12, 1. Deiotarus, King of Galatia, was Rome’s most important vassal in Asia, worth conci

, and advancing steadily. To what end? Primacy in the Caesarian party was now his: but he might have to fight to retain it.

: but he might have to fight to retain it. More than that, Antonius was consul, head of the government, and so unassailab

uls, Antonius would have his province of Macedonia. But the proconsul was vulnerable if a faction seized power in Rome and

between the Caesarians and the Liberators; and not Lepidus only there was P. Servilius his brother-in-law, soon to return f

. 2 The alternative to the primacy of Antonius during his consulate was the free working of Republican institutions. An i

again. Deplored by the Liberators, the lack of leaders in the Senate was a strong factor for concord. The surviving consul

celli, the stubborn Ahenobarbus, the proud and tortuous Ap, Claudius, was yet merciful to the Roman People, for it suppress

ectable nonentities designated as consuls for the next year. Cato too was dead. Averse from compromise and firm on principl

on In April Antonius seemed reasonably secure. At home the one menace was assassination. Republicans who cursed the melanch

ts and lying athwart the communications to Gaul and Spain. Antonius was ready to parry that danger he would take that reg

March he had received Macedonia. Before the end of April, however, it was known that Antonius intended to propose on June 1

vinces of Gallia Narbonensis and Hispania Citerior. C. Asinius Pollio was in Hispania Ulterior. Nor was this all. The tru

Hispania Citerior. C. Asinius Pollio was in Hispania Ulterior. Nor was this all. The trusty and experienced Caesarian pa

26), App. IX, 546ff. 3 Caesar had divided Africa. Sextius’ province was Africa Nova, where he succeeded Sallustius. Q. Co

. Calvisius Sabinus. PageBook=>111 the proconsul of Macedonia, was a Caesarian but also a kinsman of Brutus, hence a

also a kinsman of Brutus, hence a potential danger. But that province was soon to be stripped of its legions. As for the Ea

Alexandria to maintain order in the dependent kingdom of Egypt. Nor was trouble likely to come from the other Caesarian m

mitius Calvinus, who had fought in Thessaly, Pontus and Africa. There was no public mention of the nobilis P. Sulpicius Ruf

with the allotment of lands and the founding of military colonies. He was absent for a month. Various intrigues were devise

es were devised against him but came to nothing. When he returned, it was to discover with dismay that a new and incalculab

e situation in Syria is very obscure. The quaestor C. Antistius Vetus was still apparently in charge at the end of 45 B.C.

sarian alliance maintained the fortunes of the family. The widow Atia was at once transferred in matrimony to L. Marcius Ph

via and a son, C. Octavius. Of the two children of Atia, the daughter was subsequently married to C. Marcellus (cos. 50 B.C

t assured of a brilliant career through these influential connexions, was taken up by Caesar. 5 When C. Octavius passed b

ionships, see Table III at end. Balbus himself, on the maternal side, was a near relative of Pompeius (Suetonius, Divus Aug

. 5 The young Octavius, in Spain for a time with Caesar in 45 B.C., was enrolled among the patricians; and Caesar drew up

nd the assumption of the name ‘Augustus’, the titulature of the ruler was conceived as ‘Imperator Caesar Divi filius August

r was conceived as ‘Imperator Caesar Divi filius Augustus’. Posterity was to know him as ‘Divus Augustus’. In the early and

and misleading. As his enemies bitterly observed, the name of Caesar was the young man’s fortune. 2 Italy and the world ac

accepted him as Caesar’s son and heir; that the relationship by blood was distant was a fact of little moment in the Roman

as Caesar’s son and heir; that the relationship by blood was distant was a fact of little moment in the Roman conception o

thing at least is clear. From the beginning, his sense for realities was unerring, his ambition implacable. In that the yo

ealities was unerring, his ambition implacable. In that the young man was a Roman and a Roman aristocrat. He was only eight

lacable. In that the young man was a Roman and a Roman aristocrat. He was only eighteen years of age: but he resolved to ac

n the study of oratory and the practice of military exercises, for he was to accompany the Dictator on the Balkan and easte

was to accompany the Dictator on the Balkan and eastern campaigns. He was not slow in reaching a decision. Crossing the Adr

activity the appeal to the troops, which certain friends counselled, was wisely postponed. Nor would he enter Rome until h

surveyed the political situation. By the middle of April his presence was signalled in Campania, where he was staying with

the middle of April his presence was signalled in Campania, where he was staying with his step-father, the consular Philip

tius and Pansa were certainly in the neighbourhood. 3 But the youth was too astute to confine his attentions to one party

e youth was too astute to confine his attentions to one party. Cicero was living at Cumae at this time. He had heard rumour

in secret. 5 Then Octavianus called on Cicero. The illustrious orator was flattered: ‘he is quite devoted to me’, he wrote.

was flattered: ‘he is quite devoted to me’, he wrote. 6 The ground was prepared. Early in May, Octavianus drew near the

rly in May, Octavianus drew near the city. As he entered Rome, a halo was seen to encircle NotesPage=>114 1 Ad Att.

to address the People. By the middle of the month, the consul himself was back in Rome. An unfriendly interview followed. O

iliation towards the assassins, with impunity. The disloyal Caesarian was soon to be brought to book. To maintain power wit

book. To maintain power with the populace and the veterans, Antonius was forced into a policy that alarmed the Senate and

alarmed the Senate and gave his enemies a pretext for action. Thus he was to find himself attacked on two fronts, by a radi

by respected conservatives. For the moment, however, Caesar’s heir was merely a nuisance, not a factor of much influence

the Liberators, who wrote to him in vain protestation. 2 Hirtius too was displeased. 3 The meeting of the Senate on June 1

2 Hirtius too was displeased. 3 The meeting of the Senate on June 1st was sparsely attended. But Antonius chose to get his

had been assigned to Dolabella and Antonius some two months earlier, was now prolonged until the end of 39 B.C. But Antoni

is consular province Gallia Cisalpina and Gallia Comata as well. Such was the Lex de permutatione provinciarum (June 1st).

t been passed (cf. esp. Dio 45, 5, 3; Appian, BC 3, 14, 48 ff.). This was a mere formality. 2 Ad fam. 11, 2. 3 Ad Att.

mere formality. 2 Ad fam. 11, 2. 3 Ad Att. 15, 8, 1. But Hirtius was by no means favourable to the Liberators, ib. 14,

irly wide terms of reference. More patronage: L. Antonius the tribune was to be president of a board of seven commissioners

be president of a board of seven commissioners. They were chosen, as was traditional at Rome, from partisans. 1 The Libe

e provinces of Sicily and Asia. Complimentary in appearance, the post was really an honourable pretext for exile. Brutus an

at Antium, presided over by Servilia, debated the question. 2 Cassius was resentful and truculent, Brutus undecided. Servil

promised her influence to get the measure revoked. No other decision was taken. For the present, the Liberators remained i

inly offered by Antonius at the classic scene of the Lupercalia. 3 He was promptly thwarted by a Republican or NotesPage=

us and Cassius were there, also the faithful Favonius and Cicero, who was mercilessly snubbed by Servilia when he embarked

he enemies of Antonius, taking new courage, may have gone too far. It was known before the event that there would be critic

the Senate announced for August 1st; it may also have been known who was to take the lead, namely the respected consular L

id terris fuit. ’ 3 Phil. 1, 8, cf. Ad Att. 16, 7, 1. 4 So Cicero was informed at Leucopetra, near Rhegium, on or soon

he prospect of a split between the Caesarian leader and Caesar’s heir was distasteful to the sentiments of soldiers and off

ts of soldiers and officers, ruinous to their interests. Remonstrance was addressed to Antonius: the military men urged him

d to a formal and public reconciliation with Octavianus. The ceremony was staged on the Capitol. In revenge for the Ides

nate of Rome. When L. Piso spoke, at the session of August 1st, there was no man to support him. Of the tone and content of

ad hitherto been couched in a vein of conciliation; his recent speech was held to be distinctly amicable. 1 To their edict

s he did in order to force his enemies to come out into the open. Nor was it likely that he would consent to surrender his

ns leading up to the session of August 1st is Cicero’s report of what was told him when he was absent from Rome. In Cicero,

session of August 1st is Cicero’s report of what was told him when he was absent from Rome. In Cicero, however, no mention

n waters for some time. As for Antonius, pressure from a competitor was now beginning to force him to choose at last betw

him to choose at last between the Senate and the veterans. The Senate was hostile: yet the uneasy reconciliation with Octav

iation with Octavianus could scarcely last. On any count, the outlook was black for the friends of settled government. Octa

he command of an army, the auctoritas of a senior statesman, all that was too long and too slow. He would have to wait unti

, such resources would have to be doubled and redoubled. Octavianus was resolute. He had a cause to champion, the avengin

was resolute. He had a cause to champion, the avenging of Caesar, and was ready to exploit every advantage. In the first pl

influence in the towns of Italy. Once a compact and devoted following was won, and his power revealed, he could build up a

er revealed, he could build up a new Caesarian party of his own. It was the aim of Octavianus to seduce the moderate Caes

nough, a faction may grow into something like a national party. So it was to be in the end. But this was no time for an ide

something like a national party. So it was to be in the end. But this was no time for an ideal and patriotic appeal. Such

cquaintance with Roman political behaviour that he possessed and that was all he needed. It is a common belief, attested by

ligarchs. Caesar had been saved because he had a party behind him. It was clear that many a man followed Caesar in an impio

rinciple. The devotion which Caesar’s memory evoked among his friends was attested by impressive examples; 1 and it was not

voked among his friends was attested by impressive examples; 1 and it was not merely from lust of adventure or of gain that

s also, though less easily perhaps. Only two of his associates, so it was recorded, were ever thrown over, and that was for

f his associates, so it was recorded, were ever thrown over, and that was for treachery. 2 NotesPage=>121 1 For exam

Book=>122 Next to magnanimity, courage. By nature, the young man was cool and circumspect: he knew that personal coura

the young man was cool and circumspect: he knew that personal courage was often but another name for rashness. But the time

f Caesar. He soon took the measure of Antonius: the Caesarian soldier was a warning against the more generous virtues and v

cking. He would then have to postpone the avenging of Caesar until he was strong enough, built up by Republican help, to be

ilt up by Republican help, to betray the Republicans. The calculation was hazardous but not hopeless on the other side, cer

body in cases of breach of the peace or high treason. This time there was criticism and opposition in the Senate on the fol

delay retorted with a bitter personal attack (September 19th). Cicero was absent. Such was the outcome of Cicero’s first

a bitter personal attack (September 19th). Cicero was absent. Such was the outcome of Cicero’s first public appearance s

, though negative, irresolute and not followed by action of any kind, was certainly a check to Antonius, revealing the inse

eck to Antonius, revealing the insecurity of his position. The blow was to fall from the other side, from the plebs, from

s then delivered a violent speech, with abuse of the Liberators. This was on October 2nd. Three or four days NotesPage=&g

aturally eludes inquiry. Antonius did not press the charge perhaps it was nothing more than a clumsy device to discredit th

of Antonius in this summary and premature fashion. To remove a rival was to remove a potential ally. 2 However it was, A

ion. To remove a rival was to remove a potential ally. 2 However it was , Antonius took alarm. Rome was becoming untenable

emove a potential ally. 2 However it was, Antonius took alarm. Rome was becoming untenable. If he lingered until the expi

tenable. If he lingered until the expiration of his consular year, he was lost. His enemies might win the provincial armies

of Crete and Cyrene; of their whereabouts and true intentions nothing was known. But late in October disquieting news cam

in October disquieting news came to Rome through private sources. It was reported that the legions at Alexandria in Egypt

ed that the legions at Alexandria in Egypt were riotous, that Cassius was expected there. 3 Further, Cassius might appeal t

ere. 3 Further, Cassius might appeal to the large armies in Syria. It was probably at this point that Dolabella, without aw

to secure the province of Syria. Antonius had already acted. There was a nearer danger, D. Brutus holding the Cisalpina

e and resources, training them in warfare against Alpine tribes. This was serious. Antonius therefore resolved to take over

rves, BC 3, 39, 158. 3 Ad Att. 15, 13, 4 (Oct. 25th). The informant was Servilia; a slave of Caecilius Bassus had brought

at Rome. Servilia promised to pass on her information to Cicero, who was jubilant ‘videtur enim res publica ius suum recup

Italy. Octavianus solicited his father’s veterans. A tour in Campania was organized. With the young man went five of his in

ly some three thousand veterans. The new Pompeius now had an army. He was at first quite uncertain what to do with it. Was

the honours and station of his parent. 3 The coup failed. Antonius was approaching with the Macedonian legions. The vete

They would listen neither to argument nor to bribes: what he offered was miserable in comparison with the lavish generosit

o Rome. On November 28th the Senate met by night upon the Capitol. It was later alleged that a consular was ready on the si

e met by night upon the Capitol. It was later alleged that a consular was ready on the side of Antonius with a bill of atta

nder against Octavianus. 1 Nothing came of this perhaps the situation was too serious. Not only his soldiers but his partis

Crete and Cyrene were taken from Brutus and Cassius, while Macedonia was assigned to his brother, the praetor C. Antonius.

nd a certain Cafo, raised recruits in this region, while P. Ventidius was suitably employed in the populous and martial ter

e coalition of March 17th had not merely been split and shattered: it was being rebuilt, this time against Antonius, by a h

LI (1892), 198 ff. PageBook=>127 Caesarian leader his primacy was menaced. Senate, plebs and veterans were mobilize

would not stand against Antonius, the Caesarian general: yet Antonius was impotent against the heir of the Dictator. Once a

mall town of Aricia! From dealing with D. Brutus, however, Antonius was impeded by no doubts of his own, by no disloyalty

d independent spirit of the young Caesar. 3 Though Philippus’ caution was congenital, his lack of open enthusiasm about Oct

s congenital, his lack of open enthusiasm about Octavianus’ prospects was perhaps only a mask. The young man was much in th

sm about Octavianus’ prospects was perhaps only a mask. The young man was much in the company of his step-father: the profi

of his step-father: the profit in political counsel which he derived was never recorded. Philippus wished for a quiet ol

ge=>128 1 His father, L. Marcius Philippus (cos. 91, censor 86), was an astute politician above, p. 19. In politics th

ensor 86), was an astute politician above, p. 19. In politics the son was able to enjoy support from Pompeius and Caesar, a

daughter Marcia (by an earlier marriage) for wife to Cato. Philippus was a wealthy man and a ‘piscinarius’ (Macrobius 3, 1

gain until his consulate, August 43 B.C. Pinarius, otherwise unknown, was a general at Philippi and probably the same perso

nd of his half- sister Octavia, only the name is known (ILS 8963); he was the father of Sex. and of M. Appuleius, consuls i

diplomat and a statesman, an artist and a voluptuary. His grandfather was a man of property, of suitable and conservative s

But they could not be stripped of their ancestors Octavianus’ friend was of regal stock, deriving his descent on the mater

tesPage=>129 1 Velleius 2, 59, 5. 2 Dio 48, 33, 1. Salvidienus was the elder and the more important of the two, cf.

3, 32, 4: ‘M. Agrippae pater ne post Agrippam quidem notus. ’ Agrippa was the same age to within a year as Octavianus, and

uscans, M. Perperna and C. Tarquitius, at the banquet where Sertorius was murdered (Sallust, Hist. 3, 83 M) is presumably a

ust, Hist. 3, 83 M) is presumably a member of this family. The father was L. Maecenas (ILS 7848; cf. Nicolaus 31, 133?). Ta

us’ following could not raise the semblance even of being a party. It was in truth what in defamation the most admirable ca

ere a minority and could be held in check. The cause of Caesar’s heir was purely revolutionary in origin, attracting all th

ese moneys to Rome, to the Treasury, holding that his own inheritance was sufficient. 3 His own patrimony he was soon to in

lding that his own inheritance was sufficient. 3 His own patrimony he was soon to invest ‘for the good of the Commonwealth’

th’ and much more than his patrimony. The diversion of public funds was not enough. Octavianus also won the support of pr

of the Dictator. Among the first Caesarians to be approached in April was the millionaire Balbus. Balbus could keep his cou

he advanced money for the celebration of the games in July. 6 Oppius was a diplomat as well as a financier. In November he

en pantomimes, the Spaniard Decidius Saxa. 2 The fact that Octavianus was deemed to be on the side of the Republic preclude

assassin but a Caesarian in sympathy), and D. Carfulenus. The latter was presumably an equestrian officer (Bell. Al. 31, 3

eradoes and financiers, incongruously allied. The help of the bankers was private and personal, not the considered policy o

Caesarian faction and forced into the conduct of a civil war. Hirtius was accessible to the sinister influence of Balbus3 n

cans, but a gain for Octavianus. Less is known about Pansa. Yet Pansa was no declared enemy of Antonius; 4 and he had marri

hey were clearly working for their young kinsman. 4 But the situation was complicated, and Philippus’ policy was ambiguous.

g kinsman. 4 But the situation was complicated, and Philippus’ policy was ambiguous. Even if stirred by the example of his

e example of his father’s actions on behalf of the young Pompeius, he was reluctant to break with Antonius, for he hoped th

ped through Antonius to get an early consulate for his own son. 5 Nor was the devious Marcellus wholly to be neglected he h

and get one of the places for his son, praetor in 44. 6 His mother was a Junia (Ad fam. 15, 8), presumably the aunj: of

as a Junia (Ad fam. 15, 8), presumably the aunj: of D. Brutus: and he was also connected with Ser. Sulpicius Rufus (cos. 51

fore might be said to have encouraged the designs of Octavianus. That was all they had in common in character, career and p

a lively appreciation of the literature and philosophy of Hellas: he was the friend and patron of Philodemus, the poet and

t ‘Sallust’, In Ciceronem, a brief, vigorous and concentrated attack, was written by Piso, as has been argued by Reitzenste

gain appeared to be degenerating into faction strife. 1 His character was vindicated by his conduct, his sagacity by the co

ity by the course of events: to few, indeed, among his contemporaries was accorded that double and melancholy satisfaction.

poraries was accorded that double and melancholy satisfaction. Piso was an ex-Caesarian turned independent. P. Servilius

l on September 2nd. When Octavianus marched on Rome, however, no news was heard of P. Servilius: like other consulars avers

vate army against a consul of the Roman People. Servilius, however, was not altogether blameless, while Cicero stood out

rtunes, rather than Pompeius with whom the last word rested. Pompeius was the stronger from the earliest years of Cicero’s

the stage and directed the action. Twice the predominance of Pompeius was threatened (in 61-60 B.C. and in 56): each time h

and Caesar together a common taste for literature, to which Pompeius was notoriously alien, and common friends, a hankerin

to avert hostilities. He showed both judgement and impartiality. 1 It was too late. He had few illusions about Pompeius, li

ority of the active consulars. The leaders were Pompeius and Cato. It was clearly the better cause and it seemed the Note

o back upon his principles and make concessions to Caesar. 1 Cicero was induced to accept a military command under Pompei

acts and policy by presence in the Senate. Courage, but also fear he was intimidated by the bloodthirsty threats of the ab

oin Pompeius, without waiting for news of the decision in Spain. 2 It was not passion or conviction, but impatience and des

but impatience and despair. Pharsalus dissolved their embrace. Cicero was persuaded to avail himself of the clemency and pe

acquiesced in a large measure of authoritative government at Rome. He was not a Cato or a Brutus; and Brutus later remarked

atter and to praise him, he will put up with servitude. ’3 But Cicero was able to hold out against Caesar. Though in the Se

t Cicero was able to hold out against Caesar. Though in the Senate he was once moved to celebrate the clemency and magnanim

2 He may, however, have been influenced by circumstantial rumours. It was by no means unlikely that Caesar would be entangl

er than emend, Cicero gave it up, gladly. Caesar did not insist. Time was short agents like Balbus were of more use to a bu

months, the most critical for the new and precarious concord, Cicero was never even seen in the Senate. In spring and summ

n in the Senate. In spring and summer the cause of ordered government was still not beyond hope: to save it, what better ch

sa were consuls. The legislation of June 1st deepened his dismay. Nor was any decision or hope to be discerned among the Li

pain that Sex. Pompeius had come to terms with the government. Cicero was sorry. 4 The domination of the Caesarian faction

t it best not to turn up. He salved his dignity by the belief that he was in danger of his life, and by the composition of

of a speech in reply, the pamphlet known as the Second Philippic:3 it was never spoken the adversaries were destined never

hat is not surprising: the editor knew his business. A necessary veil was cast over the earlier and private preliminaries i

ng more for six weeks. In June, however, he recognized that the youth was to be encouraged and kept from allying himself wi

sul. However that may be, by the beginning of October Caesar’s heir was an alarming phenomenon. But even now, during the

enon. But even now, during the months of October and November, Cicero was full of distrust, suspecting the real designs of

agent Caecina of Volaterrae with demands for an interview, for Cicero was close at hand. 1 Cicero refused to be compromised

n, and renew the memory of the glorious Nones of December. 2 Cicero was not to be had. He left Campania and retired to Ar

urneying to Campania, ostensibly to take the waters. 5 Wherever there was trouble, the secret agent Balbus might be detecte

t the prospect of Antonius’ return with troops from Brundisium, there was safety in Arpinum, which lay off the main roads.

revolutionary marched on Rome without him. About Octavianus, Cicero was indeed most dubious. The veterans arose at the ca

re respectable backing. ‘But look at his age, his name. ’6 Octavianus was but a youth, he lacked auctoritas. On the other h

tavianus was but a youth, he lacked auctoritas. On the other hand, he was the heir of the Dictator, a revolutionary under t

re, easily made and easily revoked. More significant and most ominous was the speech delivered in Rome, the solemn oath wit

March 17th; if he failed, Antonius would be intolerable. ’9 Cicero was all too often deluded in his political judgements

Cicero and called him ‘father’ an appellation which the sombre Brutus was later to recall with bitter rebuke. 1 Octavianus

ut of the truth. The political alliance between Octavianus and Cicero was not merely the plot of a crafty and unscrupulous

was not merely the plot of a crafty and unscrupulous youth. Cicero was possessed by an overweening opinion of his own sa

he received an alarming proposal of this kind: to his Scipio, Cicero was to play the Laelius. Again, on his return from ex

back on his allies, drop Caesar, and become amenable to guidance: he was abruptly brought to heel by Pompeius, and his inf

bruptly brought to heel by Pompeius, and his influence as a statesman was destroyed. The experience and wisdom of the non-p

n was destroyed. The experience and wisdom of the non-party statesman was not invoked by Caesar the Dictator in his organiz

aesar the Dictator in his organization of the Roman Commonwealth. Nor was Antonius more susceptible. Cicero was constrained

of the Roman Commonwealth. Nor was Antonius more susceptible. Cicero was constrained to lavish his treasures upon an unwor

Antonius and discard him in the end, if he did not prove pliable. It was Cato’s fatal plan all over again the doom of Anto

d whether at any time he felt that he could trust Octavianus. Neither was the dupe. When he heard of the failure of the m

State, they clamoured to have their position legalized. The offensive was therefore launched earlier than had been expected

from his earlier career: there precisely lies the explanation. Cicero was spurred to desperate action by the memory of all

y in the present, but simply the ancestral constitution of Rome as it was or should have been a century earlier, namely a s

to the guidance of a small group of enlightened aristocrats. 1 There was place in the NotesPage=>144 1 For this con

, coerced by military dynasts or harried by tribunes. This treatise was published in 51 B.C. About the same time Cicero h

firmity or a vice. Ambition can be legitimate and laudable. De gloria was written in the same year as a pendant to De offic

ember he urged his friend to turn to the writing of history. 6 Cicero was obdurate: he hoped NotesPage=>145 1 Ad fam

rumque oppressionem taetram et detestabilem gloriosam putat. ’ 4 It was finished first and sent to Atticus in July (Ad At

standards other than those of a man’s time, class and station. Yet it was precisely in the eyes of contemporaries that Cice

ation. Yet it was precisely in the eyes of contemporaries that Cicero was found wanting, incompetent to emulate the contras

ippic, though technically perfect, is not a political oration, for it was never delivered: it is an exercise in petty ranco

a menace to posterity as well as to its author or its audience. There was another side not Antonius only, but the neutrals.

e. There was another side not Antonius only, but the neutrals. Cicero was not the only consular who professed to be defendi

uthor stood in sole control of the policy of the State. The situation was much more complicated than that, issues entangled

ageBook=>147 recalled his career. His hostility towards Antonius was declared and ferocious. But Cicero’s political fe

romise were neither fools nor traitors. If they followed Cicero there was no telling where they would end. When Republicans

s, there were clearly two opinions. Octavianus marched on Rome. Where was Brutus? What a chance he was missing! 3 When Brut

nions. Octavianus marched on Rome. Where was Brutus? What a chance he was missing! 3 When Brutus heard of these alarming tr

vail against posterity or the moral standards of another age), Brutus was not only a sincere and consistent champion of leg

s matter all too perspicacious a judge of men and politics. Civil war was an abomination. Victory could only be won by adop

tal to everything that an honest man and a patriot valued. But Brutus was far away. Winter held up warfare in the north,

iberty, the deeds of Pompeius, and a Brutus besieged at Mutina. There was no respite: at Rome the struggle was prosecuted,

Brutus besieged at Mutina. There was no respite: at Rome the struggle was prosecuted, in secret intrigue and open debate, v

blic, not constrained by any law of libel, the literature of politics was seldom dreary, hypocritical or edifying. Persons,

ies and political feuds, a theatre for oratory. The best of arguments was personal abuse. In the allegation of disgusting i

ed him to write indecent verses. 3 This at Rome: in his province lust was matched with cruelty. Virgins of the best familie

sonem 84. PageBook=>150 financiers in Syria. 1 Marcus Antonius was not merely a ruffian and a gladiator, a drunkard

s not merely a ruffian and a gladiator, a drunkard and a debauchee he was effeminate and a coward. Instead of fighting at C

fighting at Caesar’s side in Spain, he lurked at Rome. How different was gallant young Dolabella! 2 The supreme enormity A

ipal origin. On the paternal side, the greatgrandfather of Octavianus was a freedman, a rope-maker; on the maternal, a sord

andfather did not come from the ancient colony of Placentia at all it was Mediolanium, and he was an Insubrian Gaul exercis

rom the ancient colony of Placentia at all it was Mediolanium, and he was an Insubrian Gaul exercising the ill-famed profes

icts of testimony and miraculous metamorphoses of character. Catilina was not a monster after all: a blended and enigmatic

een preserved. One learns, however, that the strange garb of Vatinius was merely the badge of devout but harmless Pythagore

; and casual evidence reveals the fact that Piso’s Epicurean familiar was no other than the unimpeachable Philodemus from G

em. 2 In the professed ideals of a landed aristocracy earned wealth was sordid and degrading. But if the enterprise and t

se the foreigner. Decidius Saxa is derided as a wild Celtiberian:6 he was a partisan of Antonius. Had he been on the right

me standard jests, treasured by friends as well as enemies. Ventidius was called a muleteer:8 the fullest elaboration on th

n on that theme belongs to a time when it could do him no harm. 9 Nor was it Caesar’s enemies but his beloved soldiery who

seems to have borne Cicero no malice for the speech In Vatinium. 2 It was a point of honour in a liberal society to take th

f honour in a liberal society to take these things gracefully. Caesar was sensitive to slander: but he requited Catullus fo

our and indecency by inviting the poet to dinner. 3 Freedom of speech was an essential part of the Republican virtue of lib

of peace and the common good, all power had to pass to one man. That was not the worst feature of monarchy it was the grow

had to pass to one man. That was not the worst feature of monarchy it was the growth of servility and adulation. Men prac

erely to accuse one’s opponents of aiming at regnum or dominatio that was too simple, too crude. It had all been heard befo

ons of liberty and the laws, of peace and legitimate government. That was precisely the question at Rome where and what was

te government. That was precisely the question at Rome where and what was the legitimate authority that could demand the un

iolation of legal and constitutional form. The Principate of Augustus was justified by the spirit, and fitted to the fabric

on: no paradox, but the supreme and authentic revelation of what each was worth. The realities of Roman politics were ove

coating of deceit, democratic and aristocratic. In theory, the People was ultimately sovran, but the spirit of the constitu

the People was ultimately sovran, but the spirit of the constitution was held to be aristocratic. In fact, oligarchy ruled

s, Divus Iulius 73. PageBook=>153 The auctoritas of the Senate was naturally managed in the interests of the party i

onary power of the Senate, in its tendering of advice to magistrates, was widened to cover a declaration that there was a s

advice to magistrates, was widened to cover a declaration that there was a state of emergency, or that certain individuals

right and abstract justice, but to something called mos maiorum. This was not a code of constitutional law, but a vague and

t a code of constitutional law, but a vague and emotional concept. It was therefore a subject of partisan interpretation, o

or definite policies. They are rather ‘ideals’, to which lip-service was inevitably rendered. Not, indeed, a complete empt

ence. The boni, after all, did exist the propertied classes; and it was presumably in their interests that an alliance be

le, maintain the rights of property and avert revolution. Further, it was an attractive theory that the conduct of affairs

cero, no unique revelation of patriotism and political sagacity. It was easier to formulate an ideal than a policy. The d

e’s rights but hardly the belief and conviction that popular sovranty was a good thing in itself. Once in power, the popula

to curb the dangerous and anachronistic liberties of the People. That was the first duty of every Roman statesman. There

l the use of political fraud at Rome. On the contrary, the vocabulary was furbished up and adapted to a more modern and dea

y in civil strife and class-war, the relation between words and facts was inverted. 3 Party-denominations prevailed entirel

leas and the noblest of principles were assiduously enlisted. The art was as old as politics, its exponents required no men

olitics, its exponents required no mentors. The purpose of propaganda was threefold to win an appearance of legality for me

government. Exactly what corresponded to the Republican constitution was , however, a matter not of legal definition but of

egnum or dominatio, is a convenient term of political fraud. Libertas was most commonly invoked in defence of the existing

ould not be monopolized by the oligarchy or by any party in power. It was open to their opponents to claim and demonstrate

(or factio), in control for the moment of the legitimate government, was oppressing the Republic and exploiting the consti

he constitution in its own interests. Hence the appeal to liberty. It was on this plea that the young Pompeius raised a pri

and the Roman People from the domination of a faction’. 3 The term was not novel. Nobody ever sought power for himself a

led to civil strife. The non-party government of March 17th, 44 B.C., was inaugurated under the auspices of concord and app

han the justest of wars. Then the fair name lost credit. So much talk was there of peace and concord in the revolutionary p

t treacheries were gaily consummated; and devotion to the public good was supported by the profession of private virtues, i

d almost feudal form of clientship: on a favourable estimatė the bond was called amicitia, otherwise factio. 1 Such allianc

esupposed or provoked the personal feud which, to a Roman aristocrat, was a sacred duty or an occasion of just pride. The

stocrat, was a sacred duty or an occasion of just pride. The family was older than the State; and the family was the kern

of just pride. The family was older than the State; and the family was the kernel of a Roman political faction. Loyalty

a Roman political faction. Loyalty to the ties of kinship in politics was a supreme obligation, often imposing inexpiable v

le of the words ‘pius’ and ‘pietas’ in the revolutionary wars. Pietas was the battle-cry of the Pompeians in the last battl

blood-feud and insisting on vengeance,4 whereas the disloyal Antonius was ready to compromise with the assassins of his lea

of his leader and benefactor. Pietas and a state of public emergency was the excuse for sedition. But the Antonii at least

lty, even to the extremity of civil war. Among Caesar’s allies Pollio was not the only one who followed the friend but curs

or safety it might be necessary to change sides. Suitable terminology was available. The dissolution of one alliance and th

ailable. The dissolution of one alliance and the formation of another was justified by good sense to acquire new friends

t of sheer patriotism. 2 Octavianus, to secure recognition and power, was ready to pospone for the moment a sacred vendetta

pospone for the moment a sacred vendetta: his sincere love of country was loudly acclaimed. 3 This austere devotion to th

e’. 6 In the heat of civil passion the task of the apostle of concord was not always easy when he had to deal with enemies

ould be necessary to ‘bring them to their right minds again’. Plancus was an adept. Years before in Caesar’s Civil War he h

cae causa, quis me tandem iure reprehendet? ’ Cicero explains that he was not really, despite appearances, an ‘inimicus’ of

their leaders as a matter of their own choice and favour. 1 Treachery was commended by the example of their superiors; and

mmended by the example of their superiors; and the plea of patriotism was all-embracing surely they could help the State on

Balbus and Oppius but destined for wider circulation: the gist of it was to announce a new style of ending a civil war cle

alus, the Caesarians passed round the watchword ‘parce civibus’. 4 It was repeated and imitated in twenty years of civil wa

that he had killed no citizen who had asked for mercy:1 his clemency was published on numerous coins with the legend Ob ci

lished on numerous coins with the legend Ob cives servatos. 2 There was no limit to the devices of fraudulent humanitaria

er raised troops in Italy on his own initiative, privato consilio, it was claimed that the Senate could at once legalize tr

gh publica auctoritas; 3 the bribery of the troops of the Roman State was coolly described as the generous investment of a

mony for the public good; 4 when the legions of a consul deserted, it was taken to prove that the consul was not a consul.

e legions of a consul deserted, it was taken to prove that the consul was not a consul. 5 The author of this audacious prop

on8 but they might be necessary to save the State. Of that the Senate was supreme judge. What if it had not lent its sancti

not everything. A leader or a party might find that the constitution was being perversely invoked against them: what if th

bertas, the Senate unreliable, unpatriotic or unrepresentative? There was a remedy. The private enterprise of citizens, ban

n in Italy so as to exert unofficial pressure on the government. This was called a consensus: the term coniuratio is more r

was called a consensus: the term coniuratio is more revealing. If it was thought inexpedient for the moment or even outwor

own that worthy and innocuous pair, Hirtius and Pansa. The true cause was probably an urgent dispatch from the governor of

rnor of Cisalpine Gaul. Though nothing could be done while Antonius was still consul, Cicero seized the chance to develop

action. Octavianus had no standing at all before the law, and Brutus was insecure. Antonius was patently in the right when

no standing at all before the law, and Brutus was insecure. Antonius was patently in the right when summoning him to surre

otic panegyric upon treason. 1 He demonstrated that if a private army was raised against Antonius, if his troops were mutin

money. The claim urged for D. Brutus might perhaps be defended: he was at least a magistrate and held his province throu

m in consulis iure et imperio debent esse provinciae’ (ib. 4, 9). But was that the point? The fact that Cicero uses this ar

There he boldly inverted the protests of Antonius: Antonius, he said, was an assassin, a brigand, a Spartacus. He must be c

n in the Senate and war against the proconsul Antonius. That prospect was cheerfully envisaged. What resources might be enl

ces might be enlisted for the struggle? The authority of the Senate was now to be played against the People and the army

omposed, with its preponderance of Caesarians or neutrals, the Senate was prone to inertia, a treacherous instrument if caj

d a lack of personal energy as well as of social distinction. There was no Fabius now of consular rank, no Valerius, no C

iones and the Lentuli, along with Sulla and Cinna, the leading member was now the youthful consul P. Cornelius Dolabella; a

tesPage=>163 1 Phil. 4. 2 M. Valerius Messalla Rufus (cos. 53) was still alive, but took no part in politics. Page

n were with the young Pompeius in Spain. The weakness of the Senate was flagrantly revealed in the persons of its leading

re suitably designated as ‘auctores publici consilii’. 1 Nowhere else was the havoc of the Civil Wars more evident and irre

total of consulars had fallen to seventeen: their effective strength was much less. Various in character, standing and all

ecision and authority. ‘We have been let down by the principes’; such was the constant and bitter complaint of Cicero throu

d patriots himself, L. Piso and P. Servilius. 8 From the rest nothing was to be expected. Cicero distrusted for different r

ns. His harsh verdict is borne out by the facts. Only one of the five was an obstacle to Cicero, or of service to Antonius,

al support from the provincial governors, usurpation of power at Rome was doomed to collapse. Gallia Cisalpina dominated It

own exemplary professions of loyalty to the Republic, their attitude was ambiguous and disquieting: it was scarcely to be

lty to the Republic, their attitude was ambiguous and disquieting: it was scarcely to be expected that the generals and the

ho had served as Caesar’s legate in the Gallic and in the Civil Wars, was the reverse of a bellicose character. A nice calc

ce and loyalty to the Republic who did not? But Plancus, it is clear, was coolly waiting upon events. He already possessed

, M. Valerius Messalla Rufus, who lived on obscure and unrecorded (he was augur for the space of 55 years), and Cn. Domitiu

66 Lepidus stood, if the word can be used of this flimsy character, was with Antonius, his ally in the days following the

he Ides of March; and he will have reflected that next to Antonius he was the most hated of the Caesarian leaders, hated an

ntered the competition. One of the earliest acts of Cicero in January was to propose that, in grateful memory of the servic

afford to wait. A stronger character than either Lepidus or Plancus was C. Asinius Pollio in Hispania Ulterior, but his p

Plancus was C. Asinius Pollio in Hispania Ulterior, but his province was distant, his power unequal. A scholar, a wit and

and insincerity of whose oratory he found so distasteful. But Pollio was to play his part for peace, if not for the Republ

s part for peace, if not for the Republic: his uncompromising honesty was welcome in political negotiations where the diplo

almost completely stripped of its garrison. Antonius’ ally Dolabella was on his way eastwards: he had sent legates in adva

Syria, the other to secure for him the legions in Egypt. Yet the East was not altogether barren of hope for the Republic. O

of hope for the Republic. Of the whereabouts of the Liberators there was still no certain knowledge at Rome at the end of

y would in fact not go to their trivial provinces of Crete and Cyrene was a fair conjecture. Rumours came from NotesPage=

Rome, whatever they knew, probably kept a discreet silence. Macedonia was nearer than Syria or Egypt and Macedonia was soon

creet silence. Macedonia was nearer than Syria or Egypt and Macedonia was soon to provide more than rumours. But there is n

on the plea of legality, with arguments for compromise. The result was hardly a triumph for Cicero. One point, indeed, h

d; in addition, dismissal after the campaign and estates in Italy. It was also decided that governors should continue to ho

th the title of pro-praetor. 2 Further, by a special dispensation, he was to be allowed to stand for the consulship ten yea

o stand for the consulship ten years before the legal age. Octavianus was now nineteen: he would still have thirteen years

t. After this, the vote of a gilded statue on the motion of Philippus was a small thing. It was claimed by conservative p

of a gilded statue on the motion of Philippus was a small thing. It was claimed by conservative politicians and widely ad

lone, decided the choice of magistrates and hence entry to the Senate was a fundamental principle, whether democratic or ar

whether democratic or aristocratic, of the Republican state. 1 That was not the only irregularity practised by the party

‘established the Republic upon a firm basis’. While consul, Antonius was clearly unassailable; when proconsul, his positio

rly unassailable; when proconsul, his position, though not so strong, was valid in this, that he held his extraordinary com

eius and Caesar in the past. 2 To contest the validity of such grants was to raise a large question in itself, even if it w

In the end the proposal of Q. Fufius Calenus, the friend of Antonius, was adopted. Envoys were to be sent to Antonius; they

les of Rome, but to submit to the authority of the government. This was a firm and menacing demand. For the friends of An

f concord, a respite and time for negotiation. Even now the situation was not beyond all hope. NotesPage=>168 1 Pro

gerentur autem in id consilium ab universo populo. ’ 2 Therefore it was legal until the legislation of Antonius (and of h

ius (and of his agents) should have been declared null and void. That was not done until early in February. The arguments i

r province: but that might have been contested, for Antonius’ command was not a normal consular province, decreed by the Se

y, the law had been passed in defiance of the auspicia: but that plea was very weak, for the authority of sacred law had be

and dangerous there could be no treating with Antonius, for Antonius was in effect a public enemy and beyond the law. Cice

he law. Cicero himself had always been an advocate of peace. But this was different a just and holy war. Thus to the Senate

mission by Piso and Philippus. ’2 The conditions upon which Antonius was prepared to treat were these:3 he would give up C

nally named in the plebiscite of June 1st. The proposal of Antonius was neither unreasonable nor contumacious. As justice

th legality a casual or partisan question, he required guarantees: it was not merely his dignitas that he had to think of,

as that he had to think of, but his salus. The sole security for that was the possession of an army. To give up his army an

at the discretion of a party that claimed to be the government, that was folly and certain extinction. Considering the rec

to have recognized their right to the consulate of 41 B.C. The breach was not yet irreparable. The Senate was obdurate. T

consulate of 41 B.C. The breach was not yet irreparable. The Senate was obdurate. They rejected the proposals and passed

ls were to take steps for the security of the State. With the consuls was associated Octavianus. The most extreme of sancti

ls was associated Octavianus. The most extreme of sanctions, however, was reserved on the plea of the consular L. Julius Ca

eless repute and Republican sentiments. Pansa supported him. Antonius was not declared a public enemy. But Cicero did not a

s. ’ 3 Phil 8, 27. 4 Phil. 9. PageBook=>171 A state of war was then proclaimed. It existed already. For the mome

the month. 2 After departing from Italy, Brutus went to Athens and was seen at the lectures of philosophers. It may be p

presumed that his agents were at work in Macedonia and elsewhere. He was aided by the retiring proconsul of Macedonia, Hor

son of the great orator and one of his own near relatives. 3 When all was ready, and the decision at last taken, he moved w

n of the State, no doubt. By the end of the year almost all Macedonia was in his hands; and not only Macedonia Vatinius t

yricum had been unable to prevent his legions from passing over. Such was the situation that confronted C. Antonius when he

d and penned him up in the city of Apollonia. Even more spectacular was the success of Cassius. He went to Syria, a provi

lar was the success of Cassius. He went to Syria, a province where he was known and esteemed, outstripping Dolabella. There

ide the city of Apamea which the Pompeian adventurer Caecilius Bassus was holding with a legion. 5 Besiegers and besieged a

with a legion. 5 Besiegers and besieged alike joined Cassius. That was not all. The Caesarian A. Allienus was conducting

d alike joined Cassius. That was not all. The Caesarian A. Allienus was conducting four legions northwards from Egypt thr

PageBook=>172 On receipt of the dispatch from Brutus the Senate was summoned. Quelling the objections of the Antonian

for Brutus and secured the legalization of a usurped command:1 Brutus was appointed proconsul of Macedonia, Illyricum and A

the plea of patriotism and the higher legality. As for Cassius, there was as yet no authentic news of his successes: his us

successes: his usurpation in the East and seizure of a dozen legions was not confirmed until more than two months had elap

ed by the partisan emotions of the moment. On a long view, the future was ominous with a war much more formidable than that

he future was ominous with a war much more formidable than that which was being so gently prosecuted in the Cisalpina. Cice

had captured him and executed him after a summary trial:2 the charge was probably high treason, justified by assistance wh

publicans exploited their advantage with allegations of atrocities it was affirmed that Dolabella had applied torture to th

The Caesarians were thus forced to disown their compromising ally. It was Calenus and no other who proposed a motion declar

volutionary change in the East alarmed the friends of Antonius: there was little time to be lost, for the beginning of host

3 impair the military fervour of the patriotic front. 1 The project was therefore wrecked. On March 20th came dispatche

urprise and earnest exhortation, he wrote to Plancus. 4 To Lepidus he was abrupt and overbearing ‘in my opinion you will be

citizen. ’5 Lepidus did not forget the insult to his dignitas. Such was the situation towards the end of March. The effor

d forward in the direction of Mutina, passing Bononia, which Antonius was forced to abandon; but Antonius drew his lines cl

um some seven miles south-east of Mutina. In the battle Pansa himself was wounded, but Hirtius arriving towards evening fel

with Pansa and Hirtius he received the imperatorial acclamation. Such was the battle of Forum Gallorum (April 14th). 1 Se

battle of Forum Gallorum (April 14th). 1 Seven days later, Antonius was forced to risk a battle at Mutina. He was defeate

Seven days later, Antonius was forced to risk a battle at Mutina. He was defeated but not routed; on the other side, Hirti

ut not routed; on the other side, Hirtius fell. In the field Antonius was rapid of decision. On the day after the defeat he

him a month earlier, but now highly dubious. At Rome the exultation was unbounded. Antonius and his followers were at las

nary honours had already been devised. 2 A thanksgiving of fifty days was decreed to the immortal gods unprecedented and im

, and never claimed by Sulla or by Caesar. To a thoughtful patriot it was no occasion for rejoicing. ‘Think rather of the d

sword-work of the veterans terrified the raw recruits. 5 The carnage was tremendous. With a glorious victory to the cred

καὶ σιωπῇ γιγνόμ∈να ἐΦ ορῶσιν. PageBook=>175 victory at Mutina was deceptive and ruinous. The ingenious policy of de

. XIII THE SECOND MARCH ON ROME PageBook=>162 THE public enemy was on the run. All that remained was to hound him do

PageBook=>162 THE public enemy was on the run. All that remained was to hound him down. If Lepidus and Plancus held fi

ccumbed to his wounds; Antonius soon increased his lead, for his army was strong in cavalry. Brutus had none; and the exhil

mall a share could not compensate the ravages of a long siege. That was not the worst. The conduct of the war by the two

n important but sometimes neglected factor in the campaign of Mutina, was coming up in the rear of the constitutional force

avianus received news from Rome that amply justified his decision: he was to be discarded as soon as he had served the purp

n the tidings of Mutina were known. In the victory-honours Octavianus was granted an ovation, Decimus Brutus, however, a tr

ec Caesar exercitui suo quod utrumque pessimum est. ’ 2 The ovation was opposed and perhaps rejected by certain Republica

es, choosing a commission to effect that salutary economy. Octavianus was not among its members but neither was D. Brutus.

at salutary economy. Octavianus was not among its members but neither was D. Brutus. The envoys were instructed to approach

D. Brutus, resolved to stand firm, precarious though his own position was . Antonius might be destroyed hence ruin to the Ca

soon to Caesar’s heir. Antonius had warned him of that, and Antonius was uttering a palpable truth. 2 On a rational calcul

pable truth. 2 On a rational calculation of persons and interests, it was likely that Antonius would regain the support of

compunction about declaring the young man a public enemy. The danger was manifest. It did not require to be demonstrated b

duas acies lanista Cicerone dimicantis. ’ To call Cicero a ‘lanista’ was a fair and pointed retort to his favourite appell

. PageBook=>164 East were consigned to Cassius in one act. Nor was this all. Sextus Pompeius had already promised hi

ius had already promised his aid to the Republic against Antonius. He was rewarded by a vote of thanks on March 20th. To Po

onius. He was rewarded by a vote of thanks on March 20th. To Pompeius was now assigned an extraordinary command over the fl

y command over the fleets and sea-coasts of the Roman dominions. It was high time for the Caesarians to repent and close

a Sabatia (some thirty miles south-west of Genoa). Here on May 3rd he was met by the trusty Ventidius with the three vetera

the trusty Ventidius with the three veteran legions. The first round was won. The next task was to safeguard the march of

ith the three veteran legions. The first round was won. The next task was to safeguard the march of the weary columns along

f Pollentia. Brutus fell into the trap and turned westwards. Antonius was able to enter Gallia Narbonensis unmolested. He r

lii towards the middle of the month. The confrontation with Lepidus was not long delayed. One of the lieutenants of Lepid

accept his mediation; and Antonius publicly asseverated that Lepidus was on his side. Their palpable community of interest

est, hardened by the renascence of the Republican and Pompeian cause, was so strong that the loyal dispatches which Lepidus

s, his kinsman, had actually fought at Mutina (Ad fam. 10, 30, 1). It was Q. Terentius Culleo who joined Antonius instead o

tead of opposing his invasion of Narbonensis. Lepidus alleged that he was pained by their behaviour but merciful ‘nos etsi

4, 2). 2 Caesar, BC 3, 19. PageBook=>165 intervened. Lepidus was not as vigilant against the dangers of fraterniza

followed Lepidus not from merit or affection but only because Lepidus was a Caesarian. The troops introduced Antonius into

firm rejection of his earlier proposals for peace and concord. 2 It was on May 30th that Antonius and Lepidus carried out

Bernard. If Plancus had by now resolved to join Antonius, his design was subtle and grandiose to lure Brutus to his ruin w

Plancus knew what recruits were worth. 4 A lull followed. Antonius was in no hurry. He waited patiently for time, fear a

oops had been solicited by envoys of Antonius and Lepidus. 2 Pollio was bound by his personal friendship to Antonius; and

e his way through the Alpine lands by a wide circuit to Macedonia. He was trapped and killed by a Gallic chieftain. It woul

heroism and lack of principle. They had no quarrel with Antonius; it was not they who had built up a novel and aggressive

ow the legitimate government and the authority of the Roman State, it was impossible to discover. For the judgement on thes

igh principle were invoked to justify the shedding of Roman blood. It was no time-server or careerist, but the Stoic Favoni

y collapsed; Caesar’s heir turned his arms against his associates and was marching on Rome. Fate was forging a new and more

turned his arms against his associates and was marching on Rome. Fate was forging a new and more enduring compact of intere

t of interest and sentiment through which the revived Caesarian party was to establish the Dictatorship again, this time wi

dvocated the summoning of Marcus Brutus from Macedonia. Already there was talk of bringing over the African legions. In R

ration sapped the public counsels. No new consuls were elected. There was no leadership, no policy. A property-tax had been

levied to meet the demands of the armies of the Republic. The return was small and grudging; 3 and the agents of the Liber

ues of the eastern provinces. As Cicero wrote late in May, the Senate was a weapon that had broken to pieces in his hands.

at had broken to pieces in his hands. 4 The prime cause of disquiet was Cicero’s protégé, the ‘divine youth whom Providen

ore menacing. That young man had got wind of a witticism of Cicero he was to be praised and NotesPage=>167 1 Ad fam.

3: ‘populi vero Romani totiusque Italiae mira consensio est. ’ 3 It was trivial (1 per cent.), but the rich refused to pa

hasis that open enemies and false friends laid upon his extreme youth was becoming more and more irksome. He would show the

llus) who appeared to be supporting the ambition of Octavianus. 4 Who was the destined colleague? It may well have been the

o Plancus, he described Servilius as ‘homo furiosus’. 6 If a consul was required, what more deserving candidate than Cice

time of the Battle of Forum Gallorum and rumoured death of Pansa, it was widely believed in Rome NotesPage=>168 1 A

M. Brutum 2, 2, 3. After an altercation covering two days, Servilius was crushed ‘a me ita fractus est ut eum in perpetuum

ht fairly be represented that the mature wisdom of a senior statesman was best employed in guiding and repressing the inord

otion to play the political counsellor to a military leader; and this was but the culmination of the policy that he had ini

of the policy that he had initiated in the previous autumn. Brutus was evidently afraid of some such manoeuvre. 4 He rem

in urgent tones. Brutus refused. Their incompatibility of temperament was aggravated by a complete divergence of aims and p

onia. Cicero insisted that the criminal should be put to death: there was nothing to choose between Dolabella and any of th

severity, and there will be no more civil wars. 5 The plea of Brutus was plain and dignified. It was more important to ave

no more civil wars. 5 The plea of Brutus was plain and dignified. It was more important to avert the strife of citizens th

on the vanquished. 6 To his firm character and Roman patriotism there was something highly distasteful in Cicero’s fanatica

have hoped for an accommodation:7 the brother of the Caesarian leader was a valuable hostage. Brutus had been desperately

s gradually drove him to a decision. When he left Italy in August, it was not with the plan already conceived of mustering

ar’s heir marching on Rome will have convinced him at last that there was no room left for scruple or for legality. 1 Yet e

uch an instrument for war as security and a basis for negotiation. He was reluctant to force the pace and preclude compromi

anded a Republican to resist the worst excesses of civil war. Lepidus was a Caesarian: but Brutus refused to concur in the

tility in civil wars before now when waged by Roman nobles. 3 Lepidus was declared a public enemy on June 30th. Before the

ding for his relatives. Cicero answered with a rebuke. 4 Octavianus was a greater danger to the Republic than Antonius; t

Octavianus was a greater danger to the Republic than Antonius; that was the argument of the sombre and perspicacious Brut

2 let Cicero live on in ignominy. ’3 Even in mid-July, when the end was near, Cicero would not admit to Brutus the ruinou

ith Servilia he launched a final appeal on July 27th. 4 By now Brutus was far out of reach. Before the end of May he began

shed on with picked troops, moving with the rapidity of Caesar. There was consternation in Rome. The Senate sent envoys wit

ng that the adventurer could be won to legitimate methods. Octavianus was not deflected from his march. And now for a mom

legion of recruits they were stationed on the Janiculum and the city was put in a posture of defence. Whether the Senate n

ublic went over without hesitation. A praetor committed suicide. That was the only bloodshed. The senators advanced to make

ke their peace with Octavianus; among them, but not in the forefront, was Cicero. ‘Ah, the last of my friends’, the young m

announced the glad tidings to the people in the Forum; and an officer was dispatched to organize military levies in Picenum

cer was dispatched to organize military levies in Picenum. The rumour was false. 2 On the following day Octavianus forbor

Octavianus forbore to enter the city with armed men a ‘free election’ was to be secured. The people chose him as consul alo

seen in the sky, the omen of Romulus, the founder of Rome. 3 The day was August 19th. Octavianus himself was not yet twent

s, the founder of Rome. 3 The day was August 19th. Octavianus himself was not yet twenty. NotesPage=>172 1 Appian, B

from senior statesmen and from the party of the constitution. Now he was consul, his only danger the rival army commanders

ring to trial and punishment the assassins of Caesar, a special court was established by a law of the consul Pedius; along

dy have a foretaste of legal murder. One of the praetors, Q. Gallius, was accused of an attempt to assassinate the consul O

as an equal. Antonius had been thwarted and defeated at Mutina. That was enough. It lay neither in the plans nor even in t

ending one of the officers to Antonius with a friendly message, so it was alleged. 1 The union of Antonius and Lepidus clea

ared the situation; messages may then have passed. A clear indication was soon given. As Octavianus moved up the Flaminia,

nsul had abolished the Dictatorship for all time. The tyrannic office was now revived under another name for a period of fi

young Caesar to resign the office he had seized. The rest of the year was given to P. Ventidius and C. Carrinas, a pair of

public. 2 The others were of no importance. Lepidus himself, however, was to have a second consulate in the next year, with

f Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. The possession of Africa at this time was dubious, disputed in a local civil war for severa

years. 5 As for the islands, it may already have been feared, and it was soon to be known, that some of them had been seiz

Antonius. NotesPage=>189 1 Ad fam. 10, 21, 4. 2 At least he was with Sex. Pompeius in 39 B.C. (Velleius 2, 77, 3)

ν το ς χωρίοις κϵίνοτς σχϵ (48, 4, 3) perhaps unjustly. Varius Cotyla was left in control of Comata in 43 B.C. (Plutarch, A

us and his allies did not claim to be the government or the State: it was enough that their rivals should be thwarted and i

these experts the most venerable exclaimed that the ancient monarchy was returning and died upon the spot, of his own will

his own will. 2 The scene may have been impressive, but the prophecy was superfluous. The three leaders marched to Rome an

ith them perished honour and security, family and friendship. Yet all was not unrelieved horror. History was to commemorate

ty, family and friendship. Yet all was not unrelieved horror. History was to commemorate shining examples of courage or def

battle to shed the noblest blood of Rome, compassion and even excuse was found in later generations. He composed his own a

logists artfully suggested that the merciful reluctance of Octavianus was overborne by the brutal insistence of his older a

the taste to draw fine distinctions between the three terrorists, it was hardly for Octavianus that they invoked indulgenc

onius reduced to such company and such expedients. For Antonius there was some palliation, at least when consul he had been

by faction and treason, when proconsul outlawed. For Octavianus there was none, and no merit beyond his name: ‘puer qui omn

ni debes’, as Antonius had said, and many another. That splendid name was now dishonoured. Caesar’s heir was no longer a ra

d many another. That splendid name was now dishonoured. Caesar’s heir was no longer a rash youth but a chill and mature ter

thirty senators and a great number of Roman knights. 3 Their victory was the victory of a party. 4 Yet it was not their pr

f Roman knights. 3 Their victory was the victory of a party. 4 Yet it was not their principal purpose to wipe out utterly b

itical adversaries and dissentient neutrals; and the total of victims was probably never as high as was believed with horro

ient neutrals; and the total of victims was probably never as high as was believed with horror at the time, or uncritically

slands. There had been delay and warning enough. For the Triumvirs it was expedient to drive their political enemies out of

nd led men to seek powerful protection in advance. The banker Atticus was not put on the list even for form’s sake or as a

of a Republican victory by protecting the mother of Brutus. 4 Atticus was also able to save the knight L. Julius NotesPag

arch, Cicero 47 f.; Appian, BC 4, 19, 73 ff. The best obituary notice was Pollio’s (quoted by Seneca, Suasoriae 6, 24), adm

: his wealth alone should have procured his doom. The Caesarian party was fighting the Republicans at Rome as it was soon t

doom. The Caesarian party was fighting the Republicans at Rome as it was soon to fight them in the East. But the struggle

ns at Rome as it was soon to fight them in the East. But the struggle was not purely political in character: it came to res

ny a long-standing contest for wealth and power in the towns of Italy was now decided. The Coponii were an ancient family o

Marrucini will likewise have been found there:6 his own father-in-law was also proscribed. 7 Such respectable examples conf

otesPage=>193 1 Nepos, Vita Attici 12, 4: according to Nepos, he was by far the most elegant poet since Lucretius and

p. 283. 5 His brother Gaius, otherwise known as L. Plotius Plancus, was proscribed and killed (Pliny, NH 13, 25). M. Titi

owerful financial interests and representatives of the landed gentry, was averse from any radical redistribution of propert

y prevailed when Caesar defeated Pompeius yet the following of Caesar was by no means homogeneous, and the Dictator stood a

one class against another. If he had begun a revolution, his next act was to stem its advance, to consolidate the existing

seized what they regarded as their just portion. A social revolution was now carried out, in two stages, the first to prov

rs or pacific knights, anxiously abstaining from Roman politics. That was no defence. Varro was an old Pompeian, politica

nxiously abstaining from Roman politics. That was no defence. Varro was an old Pompeian, politically innocuous by now: bu

ce. Varro was an old Pompeian, politically innocuous by now: but he was also the owner of great estates. 3 Likewise Lucil

y in Africa. 7 Cicero, though chronically in straits for ready money, was a very wealthy man: his villas in the country and

ion. 8 But a capital levy often defeats its own purpose. The return was at once seen to be disappointing. From virtue or

nds of Varro, wealthy landowners, cf. above, p. 31. 4 In 45 B.C. he was able to provide Caesar with six thousand muraenae

a Roman knight; 1 and at the beginning of the next year a fresh list was drawn up, confiscating real property only. 2 Hi

ed their gains and bought landed property. The Roman citizen in Italy was subject to no kind of taxation, direct or indirec

and Italy had to pay the costs of civil war, in money and land. There was no other source for the Caesarians to draw upon,

teen of the most wealthy cities of Italy. 3 What had already happened was bad enough. After the victory of the Caesarians i

esar as an age of gold. 4 Thinned by war and proscription, the Senate was now replenished to overflowing with the creatures

ed to overflowing with the creatures of the Triumvirs: before long it was to number over a thousand. 5 Scorn and ridicule h

e in advance. Of consulars and men of authority in the Senate there was a singular dearth, recalling the days when Cinna

the Senate there was a singular dearth, recalling the days when Cinna was dominant at Rome. In December of the year 44 B.

umbed early in his tenure of office, stricken by shame and horror, it was alleged, at the proscriptions which it was his du

en by shame and horror, it was alleged, at the proscriptions which it was his duty to announce. 3 If the three dynasts be e

despair. Six years earlier the cause of the Republic beyond the seas was represented by Pompeius, a group of consulars in

eads of those families had mostly perished, leaving few sons; 2 there was not a single man of consular rank in the party; i

to, almost all kinsmen of Marcus Brutus. When Brutus left Italy, he was accompanied or followed by his relatives Cn. Domi

eath by Dolabella; but his quaestor P. Lentulus, the son of Spinther, was active with a fleet for the Republic. 10 Most of

ins of Caesar had no doubt left Italy at an early date; and the party was NotesPage=>198 1 Above, p. 43. 2 C. Marc

NotesPage=>198 1 Above, p. 43. 2 C. Marcellus (cos. 50 B.C.) was still alive: for the sons and relatives of the ot

Flaccus. 7 Above, p. 171. 8 Ad M. Brutum 1, 12, 1, cf. 15, 1. He was the son of the consul of 61 B.C. His half- brothe

son of the consul of 61 B.C. His half- brother, L. Gellius Poplicola, was also with Brutus for a time, but acted treacherou

art 1); and perhaps Q. Marcius Crispus, if he be the Marcius who also was cos. suff. in that year. Nothing is known of the

either Asprenas or of any person called Marcius. 4 L. Staius Murcus was active for the Republic until killed by Sex. Pomp

another Marsian, Poppaedius Silo, gained only brief glory. 2 The pace was fast, the competition ferocious. The ranks of the

icene, none of them heard of before Caesar’s death. 3 Another novelty was the mysterious family of the Cocceii, which furni

30, 5. Cf. Cicero, Phil. 11, 4. 2 Dio 48, 41, 1 ff. 3 C. Norbanus was admitted to honours by Caesar: the ending of the

e ancient colony of Norba, P-W xvii, 926. Canidius may be the man who was with Cato in Cyprus in 57 B.C. (Plutarch, Cato Mi

occeius Nerva (never consul): the new Fasti have shown which Cocceius was consul in 39. See also below, p. 267. 5 From Na

aeus (cos. suff. 35), cf. below, p. 235. M. Herennius (cos. suff. 34) was presumably Picene, cf. above, p. 92. Another hist

bove, p. 92. Another historical nonentity, of better descent however, was Sex. Pompeius (cos. 35 B.C.), the grandson of Pom

imself had only recently passed his twentieth birthday: Agrippa’s age was the same to a year. Salvidienus, the earliest and

eatest of his marshals, of origin no more distinguished than Agrippa, was his senior in years and military experience. His

experience. His example showed that the holding of senatorial office was not an indispensable qualification for leading ar

le qualification for leading armies of Roman legions. But Salvidienus was not unique: foreigners or freed slaves might comp

and confiscation. The best men were dead or proscribed. The Senate was packed with ruffians, the consulate, once the rew

Caesar. Pietas prevailed, and out of the blood of Caesar the monarchy was born. NotesPage=>201 1 Seneca, Suasoriae 7

h to maintain the acts of Caesar the Dictator. More than this, Caesar was enrolled among the gods of the Roman State. 1 In

s enrolled among the gods of the Roman State. 1 In the Forum a temple was to be built to the new deity, Divus Julius; and a

. Antonius and Octavianus proposed to follow. Their colleague Lepidus was left behind in nominal charge of Rome and Italy.

hile Pollio held the Cisalpina with a strong army. 4 At first there was delay. Octavianus turned aside to deal with Sex.

ck of ships frustrated an invasion of the island. As for Antonius, he was held up at Brundisium by a hostile navy under the

n admiral Staius Murcus. When Octavianus arrived, the Caesarian fleet was strong enough to force the passage. Their supre

leet was strong enough to force the passage. Their supremacy at sea was short-lived. Pompeius, it is true, did not interv

202 1 Dio 47, 18, 3. 2 The Lex Rufrena, ILS 73 and 73 a. Rufrenus was a Caesarian (Ad fam. 10, 21, 4, above, p. 189).

Laodicaea in Syria. In despair Dolabella took his own life: Trebonius was avenged. Except for Egypt, whose Queen had helped

and Caesarians, the doubtful prospect of a long and ruinous struggle was a potent argument for concord. Brutus and Anton

extermination of the Liberators had not been Antonius’ policy when he was consul. But with Caesar’s heir there could be no

o establish a military dictatorship and inaugurate a class-war, there was no place left for hesitation. Under this convicti

n the brother of Antonius. When Brutus heard of the end of Cicero, it was not so much sorrow as shame that he felt for Rome

ίᾳ μ λλον ἣ τ ν τυραννούντων. PageBook=>204 cause, it is held, was doomed from the beginning, defeat inevitable. Not

as doomed from the beginning, defeat inevitable. Not only this Brutus was prescient and despondent, warned by the ghost of

ndent, warned by the ghost of Caesar. On the contrary, Brutus at last was calm and decided. After the triumph of the Caesar

itution of the proscriptions he knew where he stood. Brutus himself was no soldier by repute, no leader of men. But offic

n Syria more than eighteen months earlier, and rallied promptly. That was the only weak spot in the forces of the Republic:

prospects of Brutus and Cassius left little to be desired. Their plan was simple to hold up the enemy and avoid battle. The

afford to resign to Antonius the sole credit of victory. The battle was indecisive. Brutus on the right flank swept over

ept over the Caesarian lines and captured the camp of Octavianus, who was not there. A certain mystery envelops his movemen

, 422. 2 Even admitted by the apologetic Velleius (2, 70, 1), There was plenty to be explained away in the Autobiography,

ccount runs, through a defect of his eyesight1 and believing that all was lost, Cassius fell upon his sword. Such was the f

t1 and believing that all was lost, Cassius fell upon his sword. Such was the first Battle of Philippi (October 23rd). 2

vantage gradually passed to the Caesarians. Otherwise their situation was desperate, for on the day of the first Battle of

ian Sea intercepted and destroyed the fleet of Domitius Calvinus, who was conveying two legions to Dyrrhachium. 3 It was no

Domitius Calvinus, who was conveying two legions to Dyrrhachium. 3 It was not the ghost of Caesar but an incalculable hazar

mies of the Republic ‘Romani bustum populi’. 4 This time the decision was final and irrevocable, the last struggle of the F

l that the soul and spirit of Rome. No battle of all the Civil Wars was so murderous to the aristocracy. 5 Among the fall

and Ahenobarbus on the Ionian Sea and Sex. Pompeius in Sicily. 8 It was a great victory. The Romans had never fought such

satisfy the demands of their soldiers for land and money. Octavianus was to return to Italy to carry out the settlement of

retained Comata, however, and took Narbonensis from Lepidus. Lepidus was also despoiled of Spain, for the advantage of Oct

pain, for the advantage of Octavianus, most of whose original portion was by now in the hands of Pompeius. As for Africa, s

oo weak to proceed. 2 Rumour spoke freely of his death. The rejoicing was premature: Senate and People steeled themselves t

ns. Of the acts and policy of the dynasts, the share of Caesar’s heir was arduous, unpopular and all but fatal to himself.

o excite the suspicions of the soldiery. Riots broke out and his life was in danger. Rome and all Italy was in confusion,

ery. Riots broke out and his life was in danger. Rome and all Italy was in confusion, with murderous street battles betwe

local magnates armed in self-protection. The opposition to Octavianus was not merely a revolt of middle-class opinion again

ed justice and liberty, Italy rose against Rome for the last time. It was not the fierce peoples of the Apennine as in the

lleague, and from the consul P. Servilius, Octavianus got no help. He was actively hindered by the other consul, L. Antoniu

n be reserved for Antonius for the prestige of the victor of Philippi was overwhelming. On the other side, they championed

e. Octavianus, while prosecuting the policy of the Caesarian party, was in danger of succumbing to just such an alliance

confidential agent, Caecina of Volaterrae, and L. Cocceius Nerva, who was a personal friend of Antonius, on an urgent missi

later, putting her person and her acts in a hateful light; and there was nobody afterwards, from piety or even from perver

propaganda. Officers intervened and called a conference. A compromise was reached, but the more important articles were nev

reached, but the more important articles were never carried out. War was in the air. Both sides mustered troops and seized

of the adversaries at Gabii, half-way between Rome and Praeneste. It was arrested by mutual distrust and an interchange of

dignitas. 2 The consul marched on Rome, easily routing Lepidus. He was welcomed by the populace and by the Senate with a

grippa in his company, had retired to southern Etruria. His situation was precarious. He had already recalled his marshal S

was precarious. He had already recalled his marshal Salvidienus, who was marching to Spain with six legions to take charge

and their combined armies succeeded in dealing with L. Antonius, that was the least of his difficulties. He might easily be

and last hope. The Triumvir’s own province, all Gaul beyond the Alps, was held for him by Calenus and Ventidius with a huge

ge force of legions: they, too, had opposed Salvidienus. 2 But that was not all. The Republican fleets dominated the seas

y and on the seas adjacent would have destroyed Octavianus. But there was neither unity of command nor unity of purpose amo

e in the Sabine land, held out for freedom under Tisienus Gallus, but was forced to a capitulation. 5 These were episodes:

but was forced to a capitulation. 5 These were episodes: L. Antonius was the central theme. He sought to break away to the

a brief siege, expecting prompt relief from Pollio and Ventidius. He was quickly undeceived. Octavianus at once invested P

l no sign came from the East. In Perusia the consul professed that he was fighting in the cause of his brother, and his sol

es to Fulvia and to the bald head of L. Antonius. 2 No less outspoken was the propaganda of the principals. Octavianus in v

ged. Ventidius and Pollio were ready to fight. The caution of Plancus was too strong for them. 5 There was no mutual conf

y to fight. The caution of Plancus was too strong for them. 5 There was no mutual confidence in the counsels of the Anton

led him a muleteer and a brigand; and Pollio hated Plancus. But there was a more potent factor than the doubts and dissensi

e his governor in Spain, where he shortly died. 6 The city of Perusia was destined for pillage. The soldiery were thwarted

izen, whose ostentatious pyre started a general conflagration. 7 Such was the end of Perusia, an ancient and opulent city o

own estates. It may be supposed that the escape of the greater number was not actively impeded. The remainder were put to d

fore the people when he marched upon Rome for the first time. 1 Death was also the penalty exacted of the town council of P

consul for the illustrious year of Pollio had begun. Yet Octavianus was in no way at the end of his difficulties. He was

un. Yet Octavianus was in no way at the end of his difficulties. He was master of Italy, a land of famine, desolation and

master of Italy, a land of famine, desolation and despair. But Italy was encompassed about with enemies. Antonius was No

n and despair. But Italy was encompassed about with enemies. Antonius was NotesPage=>212 1 Dio 48, 14, 4; Appian, BC

aptured Sardinia; 1 in Hispania Ulterior Octavianus’ general Carrinas was faced by the invasion of a Moorish prince whom L.

st T. Sextius, the former governor, who had remained in the province, was at last overcome and killed. 3 Caesar’s heir woul

y and gave pledge of his sentiments by taking to wife Scribonia,4 who was the sister of that Libo whose daughter Sex. Pompe

that Libo whose daughter Sex. Pompeius had married. But Pompeius, as was soon evident, was already in negotiation with Ant

aughter Sex. Pompeius had married. But Pompeius, as was soon evident, was already in negotiation with Antonius. Once agai

s already in negotiation with Antonius. Once again the young Caesar was saved by the fortune that clung to his name. In G

Calenus opportunely died. His son, lacking experience or confidence, was induced to surrender all Gaul and eleven legions.

friend. When Octavianus returned towards the end of the summer, it was to find that Antonius had come up from the East a

he summer, it was to find that Antonius had come up from the East and was laying siege to Brundisium, with Ahenobarbus and

l, the Queen of Egypt, to render account of her policy. 2 Cleopatra was alert and seductive. 3 Antonius, fresh from the C

hyra,4 succumbed with good will but did not surrender. The Queen, who was able to demonstrate her loyalty to the Caesarian

him to Cleopatra more closely than to Glaphyra, there neither is, nor was , any sign at all. Nor did he see the Queen of Egy

of their confrontation. 4 Appian, BC 5, 7, 31; Martial 11, 20. She was the mistress of the dynast of Comana. 5 Appian,

l Caesarian leader, might well seem to cry out for an explanation. It was easy and to hand Antonius was besotted by drink,

seem to cry out for an explanation. It was easy and to hand Antonius was besotted by drink, the luxury of Alexandria and t

an alien queen,1 or else his complicity in the designs of his brother was complete but unavowed. The alternative but not in

f winter. Of the earlier stages of the dissensions in Italy, Antonius was well apprised. He could not intervene the confisc

lippi could not forswear his promises and his soldiers. His own share was the gathering of funds in the East in which perha

t in which perhaps he had not been very successful. 2 He felt that he was well out of the tangle. Of subsequent events in I

departure, when sailing to Cyprus and to Athens. 3 The War of Perusia was confused and mysterious, even to contemporaries.

ferred to wait upon events. 5 At last he moved. The Parthian menace was upon him, but the Parthians could wait. Antonius

Groag, Klio XIV (1914), 43 ff. 3 W. W. Tarn, CAH x, 41 f. 4 There was even a theory that Octavianus and L. Antonius wer

rom a port in Epirus, the fleet of Ahenobarbus, superior in strength, was descried bearing down upon them. Antonius drove o

ngth, was descried bearing down upon them. Antonius drove on: Plancus was afraid. Ahenobarbus struck his flag and joined An

r, unveiled and implacable. Antonius, however, a former public enemy, was now invading Italy with what remained of the Repu

Italy with what remained of the Republican armed forces. His admiral was Ahenobarbus, Cato’s nephew, under sentence of dea

f death for alleged complicity in the murder of Caesar; his open ally was Pompeius, in whose company stood a host of noble

ntonius. PageBook=>217 Salvidienus with the armies of all Gaul was in negotiation and ready to desert. If anybody, S

of men, for Octavianus by the diplomatic Maecenas. L. Cocceius Nerva was present, a friend of Antonius but acceptable to t

ptable to the other party. 2 Under their auspices a full settlement was reached. 3 The Triumvirate was re- established. I

Under their auspices a full settlement was reached. 3 The Triumvirate was re- established. Italy was to be common ground, a

settlement was reached. 3 The Triumvirate was re- established. Italy was to be common ground, available for recruiting to

ed fighting between generals of dubious party allegiance. The compact was sealed by a matrimonial alliance. Fulvia, the wif

he opportune death of her husband, C. Marcellus, in this year. Such was the Pact of Brundisium, the new Caesarian allianc

but innocent and peaceful. The darker the clouds, the more certain was the dawn of redemption. On several theories of co

was the dawn of redemption. On several theories of cosmic economy it was firmly believed that one world-epoch was passing,

heories of cosmic economy it was firmly believed that one world-epoch was passing, another was coming into being. The lore

nomy it was firmly believed that one world-epoch was passing, another was coming into being. The lore of the Etruscans the

r 43 B.C. bear symbols of power, fertility and the Golden Age. 3 It was in this atmosphere of Messianic hopes, made real

edentials or none at all may summarily be dismissed. A definite claim was early made. Pollio’s son Gallus (born perhaps in

arned Asconius that, as a matter of fact, none other than he, Gallus, was the wonder-child:3 no evidence that Asconius beli

le the world, no indication in the poem that the consul there invoked was shortly to become a father. The sister of Octavia

tavianus had a son, Marcellus, by her consular husband; but Marcellus was born two years earlier. 6 In 40 B.C. Octavianus h

, had contracted a marriage with Scribonia; Julia, his only daughter, was born in the following year. But there was a mor

Julia, his only daughter, was born in the following year. But there was a more important pact than the despairing and imp

hed peace for the world. It is a fair surmise that the Fourth Eclogue was composed to announce the peace, to anticipate the

sequences of the wedding of Antonius and Octavia. 7 Pollio the consul was Antonius’ man, and Pollio had had a large share i

.C.), the compact of the dynasts a mere respite in the struggle. That was not to be known. At the end of 40 B.C. the domina

e time if he came to Rome to assume the insignia of his consulate, it was not to wear them for long, for a new pair of cons

onsulate, it was not to wear them for long, for a new pair of consuls was installed before the end of the year, Balbus the

eir new alliance, Antonius revealed the treachery of Salvidienus; who was arraigned for high treason before the Senate and

ned for high treason before the Senate and condemned to death. 6 This was the end of Q. Salvidienus Rufus the peer of Agrip

of the senators they had sought to defend Caesar the Dictator when he was assailed by the Liberators. 1 In the eyes of co

bition, but lacked a party and devoted legions. His style of politics was passing out of date. Antonius, however, was still

ns. His style of politics was passing out of date. Antonius, however, was still the victor of Philippi; military repute sec

n clouded by disturbances in the city of Rome. The life of Octavianus was endangered. Unpopular taxes, high prices and th

: Sex. Pompeius expelled Helenus the freedman from Sardinia, which he was trying to recapture for Octavianus,2 and resumed

virate to include a fourth partner. Pompeius, possessing the islands, was to receive Peloponnesus as well. To recognition w

sing the islands, was to receive Peloponnesus as well. To recognition was added compensation in money and future consulates

rs transferred their allegiance to Antonius, who, though a Caesarian, was one of themselves, a soldier and a man of honour.

at of Italy, and represented Caesarism and the Revolution in all that was most brutal and odious. Their reasoned aversion w

ution in all that was most brutal and odious. Their reasoned aversion was shared by the middle class and the men of propert

antage. It waned with the years and absence in the East. Octavianus was able to win over more and more of the leading sen

of domesticity and the mild recreations of a university town. Athens was Antonius’ headquarters for two winters and the gr

lkans, perhaps seven legions. 2 The western frontier of his dominions was the sea. He maintained a large fleet here, protec

ting the coast from Albania down to Peloponnesus. One of its stations was the island of Zacynthus, held by his admiral C. S

acynthus, held by his admiral C. Sosius. 3 But the Balkan peninsula was in no way the chief preoccupation of Antonius.

in no way the chief preoccupation of Antonius. Eastwards the Empire was in chaos. The War of Perusia encouraged the Parth

oconsul fled for refuge to an Aegean island,5 and the defence of Asia was left to Roman partisans in the Greek cities or to

amage and the disgrace were immense. But the domination of the nomads was transient. Brundisium freed the energies of Rome.

Pollio’s short-lived and dubious infant, Saloninus. Pollio’s province was clearly Macedonia, not Illyricum, which lay in th

ck at Zacynthus, BMC, R. Rep. 11, 500; 504; 508; 524. Not that Sosius was there all the time he governed Syria for Antonius

, 41, 1; Josephus, AJ 14, 393 ff. PageBook=>224 place. There was delay and allegations that Ventidius had taken br

rding to the ordination of Antonius. 5 The predominance of Antonius was secured and reinforced; but the execution of his

Antonius was secured and reinforced; but the execution of his policy was already being hampered by the claims and acts of

him. Not that he had either the desire or the pretext for war, but he was in an angry mood. Once again for the benefit of a

he Antonian C. Fonteius Capito and a troupe of rising poets. 1 Pollio was not present. If invited, he refused, from disgust

iplomacy of Maecenas were exhausted. At last the mediation of Octavia was invoked to secure an accommodation between her br

n accommodation between her brother and her husband or so at least it was alleged, in order to represent Antonius in an agg

of the previous year. Nobody had bothered about that. The Triumvirate was now prolonged for another five years until the en

rolonged for another five years until the end of 33 B.C.3 By then, it was presumed, the State would have been set in order

is a long period in a revolutionary epoch. Octavianus felt that time was on his side. For the present, his colleague was c

vianus felt that time was on his side. For the present, his colleague was constrained to support the war against Pompeius.

were Virgil, Horace and L. Varius Rufus Virgil’s friend Plotius Tucca was with them and a certain Murena, presumably the br

ther his predominance nor his prestige were gravely menaced and there was work to be done in the East. Antonius departed fo

His future and his fate lay in the East, with another woman. But that was not yet apparent, least of all to Antonius Note

men of some consequence now or later. 1 There were others: yet there was no rapid or unanimous adhesion to the new master

reign lands had lapsed by now to the Caesarian party. Sextus’ brother was dead, as were those faithful Picenes, Afranius an

tives, friends or adherents of his family. 1 Scaurus his step-brother was with him, and Libo his wife’s father. 2 Likewise

pardon from Caesar’s heir, no return to Rome. But the young Pompeius was despotic and dynastic in his management of affair

he young Pompeius might be a champion of the Republican cause. But it was only a name that the son had inherited, and the f

d, and the fame of Pompeius Magnus belonged to an earlier age. Pietas was not enough. Greek freedmen were his counsellors,

ur and name of Neptune; 4 the Roman plebs might riot in his honour it was only from hatred of Caesar’s heir. In reality an

venturer, Pompeius could easily be represented as a pirate. 5 Peace was not kept for long upon the Italian seas. Before t

Peace was not kept for long upon the Italian seas. Before the year was out mutual accusations of bad faith were confirme

. The Sentii were related to Libo (ILS 8892). 2 M. Aemilius Scaurus was the son of Mucia, Pompeius’ third wife, by her se

day of his death. For once in his life he surrendered to emotion: it was with political advantage. He fell in love with Li

elf in the direct line of the Claudii (her father, slain at Philippi, was a Claudius adopted in infancy by the tribune Livi

armed bands of Octavianus to take refuge with Sex. Pompeius. 3 Livia was about to give birth to another son no obstacle, h

ic response, and the husband showed himself complaisant. The marriage was celebrated at once, to the enrichment of public s

lcher, one of the consuls of the year. 5 One of the suffect consuls was L. Marcius Philippus, who had probably followed t

hrough diplomacy, hoped to get him an early consulate. 6 His ambition was now satisfied, his allegiance beyond question. Wh

ars insoluble, cf. recently E. Groag, PIR2, C 1395. Her first husband was Cn. Lentulus Marcellinus (cos. 56 B.C.). The seco

d. His best men, Agrippa and Calvinus, were absent. Lepidus in Africa was silent or ambiguous. Ambition had made him a Caes

till exert the traditional policy of family alliances, though the day was long past when that alone brought power at Rome.

weight if still alive. 1 Lepidus, married to a half-sister of Brutus, was connected with certain eminent Republicans now in

in the alliance of Antonius, above all Ahenobarbus; 2 and his own son was betrothed to a daughter of Antonius. Again, Repub

e the need to destroy Pompeius without delay. For the moment Antonius was loyal to the Caesarian alliance; but Antonius, wh

d C. Calvisius Sabinus devised a plan for invading Sicily. The result was disastrous. Pompeius attacked Octavianus as his s

bears the name of Domitia Lepida. PageBook=>231 Caesar’s heir was damaged and discredited. The military glory of An

ar’s heir was damaged and discredited. The military glory of Antonius was revived in the triumph which his partisan Ventidi

ters of Octavianus into high and startling relief. 1 The young Caesar was now in sore need both of the generalship of Agrip

of Maecenas. Lacking either of them he might have been lost. Antonius was induced to come to Tarentum in the spring of the

arentum in the spring of the following year (37). The uneasy alliance was then perpetuated. Antonius lent fleets and admira

Bibulus, M. Oppius Capito, and L. Sempronius Atratinus; 2 and Lepidus was conciliated or cajoled, perhaps through Antonius.

the Bay of Naples. The year 37 passed in thorough preparations. There was to be no mistake this time. Agrippa devised a gra

ttacking Sicily from three directions in the summer of 36: Octavianus was to sail from Puteoli, Statilius Taurus from Taren

fourteen legions strong. Operations began on July 1st. The fighting was varied and confused. Agrippa won a victory at Myl

d and confused. Agrippa won a victory at Mylae but Octavianus himself was defeated in a great battle in the straits, escapi

m footing in the island. They soon overran the greater part. Pompeius was forced to risk all on the chance of another sea-f

ns in Messana, offered to surrender. Lepidus, overriding Agrippa, who was present, accepted the capitulation in his own per

e camp of Lepidus, with the name of Caesar as his sole protection: it was enough. 4 The soldiers had no opinion of Lepidus

ion: it was enough. 4 The soldiers had no opinion of Lepidus and this was Caesar’s heir, in audacious deed as well as in na

audacious deed as well as in name. Once again the voice of armed men was heard, clamorous for peace, and once again the pl

riumviral powers but retaining the title of pontifex maximus, Lepidus was banished to Circeii, in which mild resort he surv

h little risk to its author but a fine show of splendid courage. 6 It was easier to deal with generals than with soldiers.

rigin but united by their appetite for bounties and lands. Octavianus was generous but firm. 1 The veterans of Mutina and P

ands and founding colonies more on provincial than Italian soil. That was politic and perhaps necessary. Of the legionari

he Roman constitution there could be no rational hope any more. There was ordered government, and that was enough. Privat

be no rational hope any more. There was ordered government, and that was enough. Private gratitude had already hailed th

d the young Caesar with the name or epithet of divinity. 5 His statue was now placed in temples by loyal or obedient Italia

6 At Rome the homage due to a military leader and guarantor of peace was enhanced by official act and religious sanction.

ce was enhanced by official act and religious sanction. Caesar’s heir was granted sacrosanctity such as tribunes of the ple

restored by land and sea. 1 The formulation, though not extravagant, was perhaps a little premature. But it contained a pr

in the sincerity of such professions. That did not matter. Octavianus was already exploring the propaganda and the sentimen

le part, it is true, had been the work of his lieutenants. His health was frail, scanty indeed his military skill. But craf

ight at the time of the War of Perusia has already been described. He was saved in war and diplomacy by his daring and by t

Salvidienus were not even senators. Again, at Brundisium his position was critical. Caesar’s heir had the army and the pleb

admitted to honours by Caesar, commanded armies for the Dictator, and was the first triumviral consul. 3 The noble Calvinus

consul. 3 The noble Calvinus is a solitary and mysterious figure. It was from his house that Caesar set forth on the Ides

dson of the proscribed Marian consul, be accorded this rank: Norbanus was the general who along with Saxa opened the operat

nus. 3 Sex. Peducaeus, who had served under Caesar in the Civil Wars, was one of Octavianus’ legates in the Spanish provinc

ctavianus, were among the Dictator’s new senators. The younger Balbus was probably in Spain at the same time as Peducaeus;

Appian, BC 5, 54, 229 f., cf. Münzer, P-W XIX, 46 f. and 51. This man was present, along with Agrippa and Balbus, at the de

62. 6 Appian, BC 5, 54, 229, cf. Groag, PIR2, C 1331. If or when he was consul is uncertain, for Velleius describes him a

elf, nothing is recorded between 40 and 19 B.C. 7 Dio 48, 30, 7. He was later an admiral at Actium (Velleius 2, 85, 2).

in the Virgilian Lives and in the scholiasts, the allegation that he was a land-commissioner. The political affiliations o

soldiers of fortune Salvidienus and Fango were dead: the young leader was short of partisans. The compact with Antonius, hi

C.), one of Caesar’s officers and a senator before the assassination, was a loyal Caesarian, at first a partisan of Antoniu

aesarian, at first a partisan of Antonius. 5 L. Cornificius (cos. 35) was the astute careerist who undertook to prosecute t

i, Riv. di fil. LXVI (1938), 113 FF. 3 Pliny, NH 7, 138. Proculeius was the half-brother of Murena, to whose sister Teren

ius was the half-brother of Murena, to whose sister Terentia Maecenas was married (Dio 54, 3, 5). Other persons later promi

stated, from the detailed narratives of Dio and Appian. 5 Calvisius was an Antonian in 44 B.C. (Phil. 3, 26). There is no

ere long to a place in war and administration second only to Agrippa was T. Statilius Taurus (cos. suff. 37); he owed his

essalla, ‘fulgentissimus iuvenis’, fought for liberty at Philippi and was proud of it. He then followed Antonius for a time

g is known of his family or attachments: there is no evidence that he was related to Q. Cornificius. 2 Apart from the nar

ut Q. Laronius is a tile from Vibo in Bruttium (CIL X, 804118), which was presumably his home, cf. ILS 6463. 3 In whose c

tavianus before 36 B.C. The reason given for his change of allegiance was naturally disapproval of Antonius’ conduct with C

uff. 43) belonged to the family of Messalla (ib. 35, 21). 6 Lepidus was not an admiral: but he was in the company of Octa

mily of Messalla (ib. 35, 21). 6 Lepidus was not an admiral: but he was in the company of Octavianus in 36 B.C(Suetonius,

any of Octavianus in 36 B.C(Suetonius, Divus Aug. 16, 3). 7 Pulcher was an Antonian in 43 B.C., but willing to be recomme

earliest naval triumph. 1 For Agrippa, the greatest of the admirals, was devised an excessive honour, a golden crown to be

crammed full with the partisans of the Triumvirs. No matter Messalla was created an augur extraordinary. 5 Octavianus enri

ure; 6 and the contraction of marriage-alliances with birth or wealth was a sign and pledge of political success. Paullus A

of political success. Paullus Aemilius Lepidus married a Cornelia, as was fitting, of the stock of the Scipiones. 7 For the

ambition or for survival in a dangerous age. The young revolutionary was becoming attractive and even respectable or rathe

Laronius is ‘imp. II’, even on a tile (CIL X, 804118). 4 Calvisius was septemvir epulonum and curio maximus (ILS 925), i

vir epulonum and curio maximus (ILS 925), in which latter function he was probably succeeded by Taurus, who was also augur

5), in which latter function he was probably succeeded by Taurus, who was also augur (ILS 893a). Taurus held ‘complura sace

alerii, cf. PIR2, C 982. On Messalla, below, p. 423. 8 The marriage was contracted with the active approval of M. Antoniu

osed to Antonius; and his Republican following, already considerable, was augmented when the last adherents of Sex. Pompeiu

ex. Pompeius passed into his service. None the less, the young Caesar was acquiring a considerable faction among the aristo

d in the hands of the Triumvirs, Octavianus, by his presence at Rome, was in a position of distinct advantage over the dist

party of Antonius, by contrast, became more and more Pompeian. That was not the only advantage now resting with Octavianu

disium or Tarentum with the fleets and armies of the East, whether it was peace or war in the end, Octavianus could face hi

to learn: as a military leader he needed to show the soldiery that he was the peer of the great Antonius in courage, Note

ntonius in courage, NotesPage=>239 1 In the years 36-32 Africa was governed by Taurus and Cornificius in succession,

depreciated; his own achievements would be visible and tangible. It was on the north-east that Italy was most vulnerable,

would be visible and tangible. It was on the north-east that Italy was most vulnerable, over the low pass of the Julian

and the eastern frontier of the Empire between the Alps and Macedonia was narrow, perilous and inadequate. Encouraged by Ro

from northern Italy by way of Belgrade to Salonika or Byzantium: such was the principal and the most arduous of the achieve

reign policy of the long Principate of Augustus. But Octavianus’ time was short, his aims were restricted. In the first cam

peius Magnus. By Octavianus’ foresight and strategy the double object was triumphantly achieved. 1 Not only this. A gener

Caesarian qualities or retain the monopoly of martial valour. This was the young Caesar that Italy and the army knew aft

hat Italy and the army knew after the campaigns of 35 and 34 B.C. His was the glory. NotesPage=>240 1 It has sometim

rate (as it may still be called despite the disappearance of Lepidus) was due to lapse. Then the trial would come. After

struggle. It had begun some six years before. 2 At first Octavianus was outshone. Antonius’ men celebrated triumphs in Ro

lo; Ahenobarbus the admiral built or repaired a shrine of Neptune, as was right, even though he did not hold a triumph. A

was right, even though he did not hold a triumph. Apollo, however, was the protecting deity of the young Caesar, and to

of Agrippa is attested by Appian, Ill. 20; Dio 49, 38, 3 f. Messalla was also there (Panegyricus Messallae 108 ff.); and T

s of Italy: in both he advertised and extended his power. L. Vinicius was one of the new consuls: he had not been heard of

ome and to provide the inhabitants with pure water or cheap food that was not enough. The services of Agrippa, the soldier

inister Maecenas had been working more quietly and to set purpose. It was his task to guide opinion gently into acceptance

cceptance of the monarchy, to prepare not merely for the contest that was imminent but for the peace that was to follow vic

e not merely for the contest that was imminent but for the peace that was to follow victory in the last of all the civil wa

icius (tribune in 51 B.C.) of equestrian stock from Cales. L. Flavius was an Antonian (Dio 49, 44, 3). None of these men ev

son of C. Memmius (pr. 58 B.C.) and of Fausta, Sulla’s daughter (Milo was her second husband). Ch. XVIII ROME UNDER THE T

usband). Ch. XVIII ROME UNDER THE TRIUMVIRS PageBook=>243 IT was ten years from the proscriptions, ten years of Tr

after the end of all the wars. Though a formidable body of interests was massed in defence of the new order, it lacked inn

ies of the kindred peoples of Italy. As for the consular Balbus, that was beyond words. The lower ranks of the revolution

e pained and afflicted by moral and by social degradation. True merit was not the path to success and success itself was un

egradation. True merit was not the path to success and success itself was unsafe as well as dishonourable. 1 New men emergi

But not without rivals: a different conception and fashion of speech was supported and defended by reputable champions, vi

can. ’ 4 And although P. Alfenus Varus (cos. suff. 39) possessed or was to acquire fame as a jurist (Gellius 7, 5, 1), th

possessed or was to acquire fame as a jurist (Gellius 7, 5, 1), that was not the reason of his promotion. PageBook=>2

e dry, tenuous and tedious. 1 Caesar’s style befitted the man; and it was generally conceded that Brutus’ choice of the pla

s generally conceded that Brutus’ choice of the plain and open manner was no affectation but the honest expression of his s

Republican vigour and independence, little of their grace. His style was dry and harsh, carrying avoidance of rhythm to th

anation of the nature of things or any comfort in adversity. Stoicism was a manly, aristocratic and active creed; but the d

m an interest in Pythagoreanism, or in any other belief and practice, was sustained by an insatiable curiosity, a tireless

own stores of learned books were plundered, the indefatigable scholar was not deterred. At the age of eighty, discovering,

not deterred. At the age of eighty, discovering, as he said, that it was time to gather his baggage for the last journey,3

y-one books, appears to have been composed in the years 55–47 B.C. It was dedicated to Caesar. 2 Suetonius, Divus Iulius

volutionary period from the death of Sulla onwards. Though Sallustius was no blind partisan of Caesar, his aim, it may be i

lustius was no blind partisan of Caesar, his aim, it may be inferred, was to demonstrate how rotten and fraudulent was the

aim, it may be inferred, was to demonstrate how rotten and fraudulent was the Republican government that ruled at Rome betw

n of Italy but the violent ascension and domination of Pompeius, that was the end of political liberty. Sallustius studie

pters of Thucydides. He could not have chosen better, if choice there was , for he, too, was witness of a political contest

s. He could not have chosen better, if choice there was, for he, too, was witness of a political contest that stripped away

ur of moral pessimism and utter lack of political illusions the Roman was eminently qualified to narrate the history of a r

in collocation of words, hard and archaic NotesPage=>248 1 He was proconsul of Africa Nova in 46‖45 B.C. 2 Dio 43

n justice to the merits of Senate and People in earlier days. 2 There was no idealization in his account of a more recent p

houghts and darker operations, which it never lost so long as the art was practised in the classical manner of the Roman an

came forward to protect the memory of their friend and patron. 1 Nor was Sallustius unmindful of his own political career

iverse kingdoms with the hazardous support of mercenary armies. There was fair evidence at hand to confirm the deeply- root

, adorned in the past by the names of a Fabius, a Cato, a Calpurnius, was so patently the pride and monopoly of the senator

urnius, was so patently the pride and monopoly of the senator that it was held a matter of note, if not of scandal, when an

read such august precincts: a freedman, the tutor of Pompeius Magnus, was the first of his class. 1 So popular had history

rn a verse with ease, or fill a volume, set no especial value. But it was now becoming evident that poetry, besides and abo

a, the learned author of an elaborate and obscure poem called Smyrna, was torn to pieces by the Roman mob in mistake for on

egies and an epic, were probably now alive. The origin of these poets was diverse. Lucretius stands solitary and mysterious

ets was diverse. Lucretius stands solitary and mysterious, but Calvus was a nobilis and Cornificius was born of reputable s

nds solitary and mysterious, but Calvus was a nobilis and Cornificius was born of reputable senatorial stock. The rest all

ck. The rest all came from the province of Gallia Cisalpina, Cato, it was alleged (perhaps falsely), a freedman,2 the other

2 Suetonius, De gram. 11. 3 Catullus came from Verona. That Brixia was the home of Cinna has been inferred from fr. 1 of

s, as they were called, possessed a common doctrine and technique: it was their ambition to renovate Latin poetry and exten

s ally Caesar and their creature Vatinius. With Caesar reconciliation was possible, but hardly with Pompeius. Cornificius,

extend his patronage to others. Under the rule of the Triumvirate he was known to be composing tragedies about the monarch

Julii in Gallia Narbonensis, a province not unknown to Greek culture, was an innovator in the Hellenistic vein, renowned as

orth after Philippi; and Pollio is the earliest patron of Virgil, who was the son of an owner of property from the town of

ious statements concerning the date and occasion when Virgil’s estate was confiscated, the manner and agents of its recover

pleting his Eclogues while Pollio governed Macedonia for Antonius. It was about this time, in the absence of Pollio, that h

r Antonius. It was about this time, in the absence of Pollio, that he was ensnared by more powerful and perhaps more seduct

sthetic tastes were genuine and varied, though not always creditable, was on the watch for talent. He gathered an assortmen

ic and military age demanded an epic poem for its honour; and history was now in favour. Bibaculus and the Narbonensian poe

ad sung of the campaigns of Caesar; 3 and a certain Cornelius Severus was writing, or was soon to write, the history of the

ampaigns of Caesar; 3 and a certain Cornelius Severus was writing, or was soon to write, the history of the Bellum Siculum

history of the Bellum Siculum as an epic narrative. 4 But the poet was reluctant, the patron too wise to insist. Yet som

ctant, the patron too wise to insist. Yet something might be done. It was folly not to exploit the treasures of erudition t

agriculture had newly appeared; men had bewailed for years that Italy was become a desert; and the hardships imposed by the

an scenery of Ecl. 10 could not safely be invoked to show that Gallus was in Greece. 2 In Ecl. 8, 6-13 Virgil addresses P

life of the farmer in a grave, religious and patriotic vein. Virgil was not the only discovery of Maecenas. Virgil with s

e to meet not far away at Tarentum (37 B.C.). 2 Q. Horatius Flaccus was the son of a wealthy freedman from Venusia, a cit

Venusia, a city of Apulia, who believed in the value of education and was willing to pay for the best. The young man was se

value of education and was willing to pay for the best. The young man was sent to prosecute higher studies at Athens. The a

enthusiasm in a city that honoured the memory of tyrannicides. Horace was swept from the lectures of philosophers into the

at Philippi, for the Republic but not from Republican convictions: it was but the accident of his presence at a university

ed satires but not in the traditional manner of Lucilius. His subject was ordinary life, his treatment not harsh and trucul

ace had come to manhood in an age of war and knew the age for what it was . Others might succumb to black despair: Horace

th in style and in subject, already setting forth in practice what he was later to formulate as a literary theory a healthy

f common sense and social stability. In Rome under the Triumvirs it was more easy to witness and affirm the passing of th

beneath, no confidence yet or unity, but discord and disquiet. Italy was not reconciled to Rome, or class to class. As aft

ng order for the government, kept open the wounds of civil war. There was material for another revolution: it had threatene

vernment. After the end of the campaigns in Sicily, Calvisius Sabinus was appointed to a special commission to restore orde

nfidence from the language, habits and religion of his own people. It was much more than the rule of the nobiles that had c

ule of the nobiles that had collapsed at Philippi. The doom of empire was revealed the ruling people would be submerged in

grippa in 33 B.C. expelled astrologers and magicians from Rome,3 that was only a testimony to their power, an attempt of th

e the control of prophecy and propaganda. Yet in some classes there was stirring an interest in Roman history and antiqui

restoration of political stability and national confidence. The need was patent but the rulers of Rome claimed the homage

uise of divinity, Caesar’s heir as Apollo, Antonius as Dionysus. 5 It was by no means evident how they were to operate a fu

Aemilia may belong to Paullus’ work in 34 B.C. (Dio 49, 42, 2): there was , however, a restoration after damage by fire in 1

e old and the new. Despite the losses of war and proscriptions, there was still to be found in the higher ranks of the Sena

when Rome yet displayed the name and the fabric of a free state. That was not so long ago. But they had changed with the ti

have foretold the power and splendour of the future monarch. Antonius was absent from Italy, but Antonius was the senior pa

r of the future monarch. Antonius was absent from Italy, but Antonius was the senior partner. His prestige, though waning,

ly, but Antonius was the senior partner. His prestige, though waning, was still formidable enough in 33 B.C.; and it is fat

the strength and popularity that by now had accrued to Octavianus. It was great, indeed, not so much by contrast with Anton

h by contrast with Antonius as with his earlier situation. Octavianus was no longer the terrorist of Perusia. Since then se

r the terrorist of Perusia. Since then seven years had passed. But he was not yet the leader of all Italy. In this NotesP

f. Octavianus wrote to him almost every day (ib. 20, 2): yet Atticus was also in sustained correspondence with M. Antonius

). A few years earlier the infant granddaughter of Atticus, Vipsania, was betrothed to Ti. Claudius Nero, the step-son of O

sar’s heir, none could have foreseen by what arts a national champion was to prevail and a nation be forged in the struggle

on was to prevail and a nation be forged in the struggle. One thing was clear. Monarchy was already there and would subsi

d a nation be forged in the struggle. One thing was clear. Monarchy was already there and would subsist, whatever princip

ear. Monarchy was already there and would subsist, whatever principle was invoked in the struggle, whatever name the victor

uggle, whatever name the victor chose to give to his rule, because it was for monarchy that the rival Caesarian leaders con

Brundisium the prestige of Antonius stood high, and his predominance was confirmed by the renewal of the Triumvirate at Ta

ear 37-36 in counsel and carouse. 1 The invasion of Media and Parthia was designed for the next summer. The dependent kin

ived kingdoms. Other arrangements were made from time to time, but it was not until the winter of 37-36 B.C. that the princ

and Syria. For the rest, the greater part of the eastern territories was consigned to four kings, to rule as agents of Rom

ed control of the north-east, holding Pontus and Armenia Minor. Herod was the fourth king. The policy and the choice of the

g. The policy and the choice of the agents goes beyond all praise: it was vindicated by history and by the judgement of Ant

the island of Cyprus and some cities of Cilicia Aspera. The donation was not magnificent in extent of territories, for Cle

eived no greater accession than did other dynasts ; 2 but her portion was exceedingly rich. Her revenues were also swollen

ing the realm of Ptolemy Philadelphus except for Judaea. The occasion was to be celebrated in Egypt and reckoned as the beg

ding names of Alexander Helios and Cleopatra Selene; 2 her next child was to bear the historic and significant name of Phil

and wide influence in Asia, founding thereby a line of kings. 6 It was not enough to acquire the adherence of influentia

dowed with liberal foresight would seek to demonstrate that the Roman was not a brutal conqueror but one of themselves, dis

raeus and Menedemus (ib.). 6 Cf. PIR1, P 835. (Strabo, p. 949.). He was worth twelve million denarii. His daughter was to

(Strabo, p. 949.). He was worth twelve million denarii. His daughter was to marry Polemo, King of Pontus. PageBook=>2

y to Pompeius Magnus but also to his client Theophanes. 2 The example was nothing novel or untimely: it revealed a habit an

nius advertised the favour he enjoyed from Dionysus; and his own race was fabled to descend from Heracles. Both gods brough

poets and orators, actors and philosophers. The style of his oratory was ornate and pompous, veritably Asianic, the fashio

ι καὶ єὐєρλέ|τᾳ και κτιστά δєυ|τέρω τᾶζ πατρ ὶδ ζ. This sort of thing was described by Tacitus as ‘Graeca adulatio’ (Ann. 6

reduced the peoples beyond Armenia towards the Caucasus, and Canidius was waiting with his legions. In the neighbourhood of

e client princes above all the Armenian horse of Artavasdes, for this was essential. Of his Roman partisans Antonius took

staff of Antonius, though known for talents of another kind. 2 Sosius was left in charge of Syria, Furnius of Asia. Ahenoba

arbus had been governor of Bithynia since the Pact of Brundisium: who was his successor in that province, and who held Mace

ry. Antonius, lacking light horse, could not bring them to battle. It was already late in the season when he appeared befor

the walls of Phraaspa, dangerously late when, after a vain siege, he was forced to retreat. The winter was upon him. Worn

y late when, after a vain siege, he was forced to retreat. The winter was upon him. Worn by privations and harried on their

rom Armenia he marched without respite or delay to Syria, for Armenia was unsafe. He postponed the revenge upon Artavasdes.

or Armenia was unsafe. He postponed the revenge upon Artavasdes. It was a defeat, but not a rout or a disaster. The Roman

whole army. 1 Higher estimates can be discovered the failure in Media was soon taken up for propaganda and the survivors we

itical advantage, to the discredit of their old general. 2 Antonius was delayed in the next year by the arrival of Sex. P

colleague sent seventy ships: of ships Antonius had no need. Octavia was instructed by her brother to bring a body of two

to bring a body of two thousand picked men to her husband. Antonius was confronted with damaging alternatives. To accept

band. Antonius was confronted with damaging alternatives. To accept was to condone Octavianus’ breach of a solemn agreeme

fuse, an insult to Octavia and to Roman sentiment. Once again Octavia was thrown forward as a pawn in the game of high poli

profit of her brother, whichever way the adversary moved. 3 Antonius was resentful. He accepted the troops. Octavia had co

r to go back to Rome, unchivalrous for the first time in his life. He was dealing with Octavianus: but he learned too late.

ealing with Octavianus: but he learned too late. Octavianus, however, was no more ready yet to exploit the affront to his f

re a large army under the tried general Canidius. With Media Antonius was now on good terms, for Mede and Parthian had at o

and conferred with the King of Media. Of an invasion of Parthia, hope was deferred or abandoned. A larger decision was loom

nvasion of Parthia, hope was deferred or abandoned. A larger decision was looming. With Armenia a Roman province and the Me

strong kingdoms of Egypt and Judaea in the south and south-east, Rome was secure on that flank and could direct her full ef

uld soon be evident in the Balkans and on the Black Sea coasts. Nor was the preponderance of Antonius less evident in his

governor in this period). Cyrene, of little importance as a province, was perhaps governed by M. Licinius Crassus, compare

Miletus); and Q. Didius, attested in Syria in 31 B.C. (Dio 51, 7, 3), was perhaps appointed by Antonius. There is no eviden

5 ff. (Sosius, Proculeius and Canidius Crassus): Proculeius, however, was surely coining for Octavianus on Cephallenia afte

r. M. Grant on the aes coinage of the period. PageBook=>267 It was later remarked that certain of his most intimate

gnated for a consulate. 4 Prominent, too, in the counsels of Antonius was the eloquent Furnius, in the past an ally and pro

e, M. Titius and C. Furnius; and a Nerva, perhaps one of the Cocceii, was an intimate, perhaps a legate, of Plancus in 43 B

of Titius is unknown possibly Picene, cf. CIL IX, 4191 (Auximum). He was cos. suff. in 31 B.C. 5 P-W VII, 375 ff. He was

4191 (Auximum). He was cos. suff. in 31 B.C. 5 P-W VII, 375 ff. He was governing Asia for Antonius in 35 (Dio 49, 17, 5;

lius’ changes of side, Seneca, Suasoriae 1, 7; Velleius, 2, 84, 2. He was employed by Antonius on confidential missions, to

the negotiators at Tarentum in 37 B.C. (Horace, Sat. 1, 5, 32 f.), he was sent on a mission to Egypt by Antonius in the fol

. The avenging of the Dictator and the contriving of a new cult, that was Octavianus’ policy and work, not his. The contras

lippi. Then, refusing either to agree with Messalla that the Republic was doomed, or to trust, like Murcus, the alliance wi

ollio won him for Antonius, and he served Antonius well. The alliance was firm with promise for the future his son was betr

onius well. The alliance was firm with promise for the future his son was betrothed to the elder daughter of Antonius. Both

n the new Caesarian and Republican coalition. Another kinsman of Cato was to be found with Antonius, his grandson L. Calpur

us Bibulus, also an admiral; 2 and M. Silanus, a connexion of Brutus, was now an Antonian. 3 NotesPage=>268 1 BMC, R

510 ff. He took a fleet to Sicily in 36 B.C. to help Octavianus, and was governor of Syria in 32, when he died (Appian, BC

of Clodius. 4 Of this literary, social and political tradition there was also a reminder in the person of the young Curio,

, 2, 4 f. (Scaurus). Seneca, De clem. 1, 9, 8, &c. (Cinna): Cinna was the son of Pompeia, daughter of Magnus, by her se

Thessaly describes him as πρєσβєυτάν καὶ ἀντυστράτηγὸν (ILS 9461). He was a Calpurnius Bestia by birth. It is not quite cer

ius Bestia by birth. It is not quite certain that his adoptive parent was descended from noble Sempronii Atratini. 5 Dio,

49 and 48 B.C. (Caesar, JSC 3, 5, 3, &c). The mysterious Metellus was saved by his son after Actium (Appian, BC 4, 42,

936), 229; ABOVE, P. 128. PageBook=>270 were nobiles, yet this was a revolutionary period prizing and rewarding its

y a programme and a cause, would stand the strain of war. The clash was now imminent, with aggression coming from the Wes

ting ally. Both sides were preparing. The cause or rather the pretext was the policy which had been adopted by Antonius in

rated a kind of triumph, in which Artavasdes, the dethroned Armenian, was led in golden chains to pay homage to Cleopatra.

d Armenian, was led in golden chains to pay homage to Cleopatra. That was not all. Another ceremony was staged in the gymna

chains to pay homage to Cleopatra. That was not all. Another ceremony was staged in the gymnasium. Antonius proclaimed Ptol

true son of the Dictator and ruler in conjunction with Cleopatra, who was to be ‘Queen of Kings’ over the eastern dependenc

tions were not immediately exploited by his enemies at Rome. The time was not quite ripe. The official Roman version of t

ence of freedom and peace against a foreign enemy: a degenerate Roman was striving to subvert the liberties of the Roman Pe

le of an oriental queen. An expedient and salutary belief. Octavianus was in reality the aggressor, his war was preceded by

and salutary belief. Octavianus was in reality the aggressor, his war was preceded by a coup d’état: Antonius had the Not

. PageBook=>271 consuls and the constitution on his side. 1 It was therefore necessary to demonstrate that Antonius

n his side. 1 It was therefore necessary to demonstrate that Antonius was Morally’ in the wrong and ‘morally’ the aggressor

romance as well as in political mythology. Of the facts, there is and was no authentic record; even if there were, it would

ugh admirable, were in some respects premature. A province of Cilicia was now shown to be superfluous. With the suppression

ently suitable to be left to the charge of a native prince. 2 Amyntas was the man; and the small coastal tract of Cilicia A

nt until a century had elapsed. A large measure of decentralization was inevitable in the eastern lands. The agents and b

pursued the same policy, to its logical end. The province of Cilicia was broken up entirely. Kings in the place of procons

s and tribute to the rulers of Rome. The Empire of the Roman People was large, dangerously large. Caesar’s conquest of Ga

ade solid, coherent and secure. In the West municipal self-government was already advancing rapidly in Gaul and in Spain; e

impose a severe strain upon the Roman People. If the Roman oligarchy was to survive as a governing class it would have to

rule. Rome could not deal with the East as well as the West. The East was fundamentally different, possessing its own tradi

Egypt might likewise play its part in the Roman economy of empire. It was doubly necessary, now that Rome elsewhere in the

civil. To the population of the eastern lands the direct rule of Rome was distasteful and oppressive, to the Roman State a

rve the rich land from spoliation and ruin by Roman financiers. Egypt was clearly not suited to be converted into a Roman p

sty and substituted his own person for the Ptolemies. Caesar Augustus was therefore at the same time a magistrate at Rome a

e the substantial identity of his policy with that of Antonius. There was Cleopatra. Antonius was not the King of Egypt,1 b

ty of his policy with that of Antonius. There was Cleopatra. Antonius was not the King of Egypt,1 but when he abode there a

s and queens, his dual role as Roman proconsul and Hellenistic dynast was ambiguous, disquieting and vulnerable. Credence m

s and to subsequent historians. It might be represented that Antonius was making provision for the present, not for a long

the East but not to monarchy alone: in any representative of power it was natural and normal. Had the eastern lands instead

2 See the just remarks of Levi, Ottaviano Capoparte 11, 152: Antonius was not βασιλύϛ. 3 W. W. Tarn, JRS XXII (1932), H9

enistic susceptibilities and politic advertisement. With Cleopatra it was different: she was a goddess as well as a queen i

ities and politic advertisement. With Cleopatra it was different: she was a goddess as well as a queen in her own right. Th

rious aspect and perhaps a genuine religious content. Dionysus-Osiris was the consort of Isis. But in this matter exaggerat

nd credulity have run riot. When Antonius met Cleopatra at Tarsus, it was Aphrodite meeting Dionysus, for the blessing of A

ed a complete monarchic policy of his own, it does not follow that he was merely a tool in the hands of Cleopatra, beguiled

a, beguiled by her beauty or dominated by her intellect. His position was awkward if he did not placate the Queen of Egypt

id not placate the Queen of Egypt he would have to depose her. Yet he was quite able to repel her insistent attempts to aug

of Judaea. There is no sign of infatuation here if infatuation there was at all. Antonius the enslaved sensualist belongs

aved sensualist belongs to popular and edifying literature. Cleopatra was neither young nor beautiful. 3 But there are more

r imagination and her understanding. Yet that is not proved. Antonius was compelled to stand by Cleopatra to the end by hon

it has been claimed, feared Cleopatra but did not fear Antonius: she was planning a war of revenge that was to array all t

tra but did not fear Antonius: she was planning a war of revenge that was to array all the East against Rome, establish her

nd inaugurate a new universal kingdom. 4 In this deep design Antonius was but her dupe and her agent. Of the ability of C

1; CAH x, 82 f. PageBook=>275 is not certain that her ambition was greater than this, to secure and augment her Ptol

. The clue is to be found in the character of the War of Actium as it was designed and contrived by the party of Octavianus

ctium as it was designed and contrived by the party of Octavianus. It was not a war for domination against Antonius Antoniu

To secure Roman sanction and emotional support for the enterprise it was necessary to invent a foreign danger that menaced

was necessary to invent a foreign danger that menaced everything that was Roman, as Antonius himself assuredly did not. 1 T

gnified Cleopatra beyond all measure and decency. To ruin Antonius it was not enough that she should be a siren: she must b

uld be a siren: she must be made a Fury ‘fatale monstrum’. 2 That was the point where Antonius was most vulnerable, Rom

ade a Fury ‘fatale monstrum’. 2 That was the point where Antonius was most vulnerable, Roman sentiment most easily to b

entiment most easily to be worked and swayed. Years before, Cleopatra was of no moment whatsoever in the policy of Caesar t

urs, comparable to Eunoe the wife of the prince of Mauretania ; 3 nor was the foreign woman now much more than an accident

ere a pretext in the strife for power, the magnificent lie upon which was built the supremacy of Caesar’s heir and the resu

NotesPage=>275 1 Tarn (CAH x, 76) concedes that Antonius himself was not a danger to Rome. 2 Horace, Odes 1, 37, 21.

is stand upon legality and upon the plighted word of covenants, which was a mistake. Antonius complained that he had been e

trusted adherents. The contents of this missive might be guessed: it was to be imparted to the Senate on the first day of

ed Antonius’ devotion to drink and to Cleopatra. Antonius retorted it was nothing new, but had begun nine years ago: Cleopa

retorted it was nothing new, but had begun nine years ago: Cleopatra was his wife. As for Octavianus, what about Salvia Ti

s took the field with alacrity. Antonius asserted that Ptolemy Caesar was the true heir as well as authentic son of the Dic

Republican Messalla turned his eloquence to political advantage; 5 he was soon to be requited with the consulate which Anto

to the policy of a military despot. To liberty itself the Republic was now recalled, bewildered and unfamiliar, from the

ng before the law, for the triumviral powers had come to an end. 6 He was not dismayed: he took no NotesPage=>277 1

heir powers after the date fixed for their expiry, as in 37 B.C. This was what Antonius did in 32 B.C. On the other, the st

e its contents. Antonius asked to have his acta confirmed. Among them was the conquest of Armenia, a strong argument in his

the conquest of Armenia, a strong argument in his favour. But Armenia was outweighed by the donations of Antonius to Cleopa

ith strong abuse of Octavianus; he proposed a motion of censure which was vetoed by a tribune. That closed the session. O

νєρῶϛ, ὣϛ γє καὶ συμφʋρῶν πoλλῶν πεπειραμένoϛ, ἐνєóχμωσєν. Perhaps he was approached by eminent ex- Republicans in the Caes

n the War of Actium (Res Gestae 25): the total strength of the Senate was over a thousand. PageBook=>279 Octavianus

red them to depart freely and openly. 1 To prevent and coerce consuls was inexpedient, the retirement of his enemies not un

uld be consul with Corvinus, instead of Antonius: one of the suffecti was to be Cn. Pompeius, a great-grandson of Sulla. Hi

given Octavianus an insecure control of Rome and Italy. But violence was not enough: he still lacked the moral justificati

consulate of Antonius and the War of Mutina. A more brutal stimulant was required. Octavianus was in a very difficult po

the War of Mutina. A more brutal stimulant was required. Octavianus was in a very difficult position. The secession of av

enemies by no means left a Senate unreservedly and reliably loyal it was packed with the timid and the time-serving, ready

mid and the time-serving, ready to turn against him if they dared: it was a bad sign that more than three hundred senators

d to have resigned the office of Triumvir, but retained the power, as was apparent, not only to Antonius, but to other cont

nated for office at an earlier date. L. Cornelius Cinna (pr. 44 B.C.) was the husband of Pompeia, daughter of Pompeius Magn

32 may be his son by an earlier marriage (PIR2, C 1338). CN. Pompeius was the son of Q. Pompeius rufus (tr. pl. 52 B.C.), w

CN. Pompeius was the son of Q. Pompeius rufus (tr. pl. 52 B.C.), who was the offspring of the marriage between the son of

mishap in Media had ruined his reputation, while the material damage was compensated by subsequent successes and by the or

est. His enemy would soon have to make a ruinous decision. Antonius was at Ephesus; his army had recently been raised to

been raised to the imposing total of thirty legions1 and a vast fleet was disposed along the coasts. He was confident and r

of thirty legions1 and a vast fleet was disposed along the coasts. He was confident and ready for the struggle but might no

d legions are not the most important things. Under what name and plea was the contest to be fought? For Rome, for the consu

e ships that Cleopatra provided for the war. 2 Canidius prevailed: it was alleged that he had been bribed. The compromising

avia. That act, denoting the rupture of his amicitia with Octavianus, was the equivalent of a declaration of war; and war w

; and war would have ensued, Cleopatra or no Cleopatra. But the Queen was there: Antonius stood as her ally, whatever the n

. 3 Antonius had presumed too much upon the loyalty of a party that was united not by principle or by a cause but by pers

nt, heralding the break-up of the Antonian party. Cleopatra, however, was not the prime cause of the trouble. Next to Ant

old Caesarian Plancus, each with a following of his own. Between them was no confidence, but bitter enmity, causing a feud

r enmity, causing a feud with subsequent repercussions. 1 Ahenobarbus was steadfast all through against the blandishments o

ria. 3 Antonius stood by Cleopatra. Ahenobarbus hated the Queen and was averse from war. Yet it was not Ahenobarbus who r

leopatra. Ahenobarbus hated the Queen and was averse from war. Yet it was not Ahenobarbus who ran away, but Plancus. Accomp

. The city of Domitiopolis, in Cleopatra’s portion of Cilicia Aspera, was founded, or at least named, in his honour: this c

consular diplomats or diplomatic marshals, whose political judgement was sharper than their sense of personal obligation,

and in Antonius’ refusal to dismiss Cleopatra. But the Antonian party was already disintegrating. Loyalty would not last fo

ed his purpose adequately. Men could see that divorce, like marriage, was an act of high politics. Now came an opportune di

he died, he should be buried beside her in Alexandria. 2 The signal was given for a renewed attack. Calvisius, the Caesar

dismissed. It is a question not of scruples but of expedience how far was forgery necessary? and how easily could forgery b

speech by Furnius, the most eloquent of the Romans, because Cleopatra was passing by in her litter, that he had bestowed up

d the revelations of the renegade Plancus. 2 None the less the will was held genuine, and did not fail in its working, at

gypt and transfer the capital to Alexandria. 4 Her favourite oath, it was even stated (and has since been believed), was ‘s

Her favourite oath, it was even stated (and has since been believed), was ‘so may I deliver my edicts upon the Capitol’. 5

degenerate could have descended to such treason in his right mind. It was therefore solemnly asseverated that Antonius was

n his right mind. It was therefore solemnly asseverated that Antonius was the victim of sorcery. 6 Antonius for his part

tions of his enemies. Otherwise the situation appeared favourable: he was blamed for not exploiting the given advantage bef

created by propaganda and intimidation a united front. 7 All Italy was in confusion. 8 Antonius’ agents distributed lavi

otesPage=>283 1 Plutarch, Antonius 58. 2 Velleius 2, 83, 3. It was C. Coponius, an ex-Pompeian and one of the proscr

nce in Dio 50, 10, 3 ff.; Plutarch, Antonius 58. PageBook=>284 was compelled to secure the loyalty of his legions by

precedented severity the fourth part of an individual’s annual income was exacted. Riots broke out; and there was widesprea

an individual’s annual income was exacted. Riots broke out; and there was widespread incendiarism. Freedmen, recalcitrant u

d by armed force for the soldiers had been paid. To public taxation was added private intimidation. Towns and wealthy ind

elesti ruitis? ’3 Another, yet another, criminal war between citizens was being forced by mad ambition upon the Roman Peopl

andate to save Rome from the menace of the East. A kind of plebiscite was organized, in the form of an oath of personal all

e against the foreign enemy. Yet, on the other hand, the united front was not achieved merely through intimidation. Of the

ieved merely through intimidation. Of the manner in which the measure was carried out there stands no record at all. The oa

was carried out there stands no record at all. The oath of allegiance was perhaps not a single act, ordered by one decree o

ed a certain appearance of spontaneity. This fair show of a true vote was enhanced NotesPage=>284 1 Dio 50, 10, 4.

ties, would pay the price in confiscation of their lands when the war was over. 2 In the constitutional crisis of the yea

ity were on the side of Antonius. An absurdity the Roman constitution was manifestly inadequate if it was the instrument of

. An absurdity the Roman constitution was manifestly inadequate if it was the instrument of Rome’s enemy. And so Octavianus

justified a Catilinarian venture and armed treason against a consul, was able to invoke the plea of a ‘higher legality’. A

cked and disreputable Senate of the city, but all Italy. The phrase was familiar from recent history, whereas idea and pr

ted by a powerful group of nobiles, yet accused of monarchic designs, was the great exemplar. He was the champion, friend a

nobiles, yet accused of monarchic designs, was the great exemplar. He was the champion, friend and patron of the leading me

esPage=>285 1 Suetonius, Divus Aug. 17, 2; Dio 50, 6, 3. Bononia was in the clientela of the Antonii 2 And some cert

s and to thwart the popular tribune or military dynast. Such at least was the plea and profession. The local gentry, who co

taly long remained as it had begun, a geographical expression. Italia was first invoked as a political and sentimental noti

the Italiciy when they fought for freedom and justice in 90 B.C That was the first coniuratio Italiae. Though the whole la

n 90 B.C That was the first coniuratio Italiae. Though the whole land was enfranchised after the Bellum Italicum, it had no

eternal Vesta! 1 But Horace, himself perhaps no son of Italian stock, was conveniently oblivious of recent Italian history.

esar or of Antonius? The Roman constitution might be endangered: that was a name and a deception. Etruria, Picenum and the

untry could remember their conquest by Sulla and by the Pompeii: that was a reality. More recently, Perusia. For any cont

rrel with Antonius; as for despotism, the threat of oriental monarchy was distant and irrelevant when compared with the arm

et in some way, by propaganda, by intimidation and by violence, Italy was forced into a struggle which in time she came to

e, Italy was forced into a struggle which in time she came to believe was a national war. The contest was personal: it aros

gle which in time she came to believe was a national war. The contest was personal: it arose from the conflicting ambitions

en, total and immediate, from the plebiscite of the year 32: that act was but the beginning of the work that Augustus the P

that act was but the beginning of the work that Augustus the Princeps was later to consummate. It is evident that the most

, Pharsalia 1, 134 f. PageBook=>288 Rome and Italy. The lesson was reiterated in the splendid and triumphant verses

loathed war and military despotism, the immediate purpose of the oath was to intimidate opposition and to stampede the neut

o intimidate opposition and to stampede the neutrals. But the measure was much more than a device invented to overcome a te

n at Tibur to the consul Antonius in a public emergency. 2 The oath was personal in character, with concept and phrasing

n, Vom Werden und Wesen des Prinzipats, 53. PageBook=>289 oath was imposed. In the military colonies and they were n

Caesarian party and refuse to believe that the true cause of the war was the violent attempt of a degenerate Roman to inst

chs, her mosquito-nets and all the apparatus of oriental luxury. That was absurd; and they knew what war was like. On a coo

apparatus of oriental luxury. That was absurd; and they knew what war was like. On a cool estimate, the situation was omino

d; and they knew what war was like. On a cool estimate, the situation was ominous enough. NotesPage=>289 1 Cicero, P

1, 20, 5), certainly came from Aesernia (ILS 895); and Sex. Appuleius was patron of that town (ILS 894). On the origin of t

perator, wishing to secure ratification for his ordering of the East, was in himself no menace to the Empire, but a future

ogether. But Antonius victorious in war with the help of alien allies was another matter. No less disquieting, perhaps, the

al to Italian economy as well as alarming to Italian sentiment. As it was , Antonius’ system of reducing the burdens of empi

ies of family or business. 2 But what if the partition of the world was to be perpetuated? The limit between the dominion

y land, a narrow and impassable strip of the mountains of Montenegro, was the frontier given by nature, by history, by civi

an history that in subsequent ages the division between West and East was masked so well and delayed so long. The loss of t

, 153. 2 As seventeen years before, when Caesar’s invasion of Italy was imminent, bankers and men of property probably re

t of people in Italy did not like war or despotic rule. But despotism was already there and war inevitable. In a restoratio

st thirty years, though liberty perished, peace might be achieved. It was worth it not merely to the middle class, but to t

They knew it, and they knew the price of peace and survival. There was no choice : the Caesarian leader would tolerate n

t in mutual services Antonius had been the gainer: his own conscience was clear. 1 But he refused to support the national m

his own dignity but not for any party, still less for the fraud that was made to appear above party and politics. The exce

ce he allotted to an aristocratic partisan, Valerius Messalla; and he was to wage Rome’s war as consul himself, for the thi

as to wage Rome’s war as consul himself, for the third time. Antonius was not outlawed that was superfluous. On Cleopatra,

as consul himself, for the third time. Antonius was not outlawed that was superfluous. On Cleopatra, the Queen of Egypt, th

edicta Antonii. PageBook=>292 severed his amicitia, their feud was private and personal. But if Antonius stood by hi

already been admitted to the Senate by Caesar the Dictator; and there was an imposing total of Roman knights to be found in

lvisius Sabinus held Gaul and Spain, L. Autronius Paetus (or another) was proconsul of Africa. 5 Maecenas controlled Rome a

could be no turning back. Patrae at the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth was his head-quarters. His forces, fed by corn-ships

pany of Egypt’s Queen. On military calculation, to disembark in Italy was hazardous—the coast lacked good harbours, and Bru

in Italy was hazardous—the coast lacked good harbours, and Brundisium was heavily fortified. Moreover, the invader would sa

nd the western end of the Via Egnatia. That might appear an error: it was probably a ruse. Antonius proposed to leave the a

tonius had the preponderance of strength; as for number of legions it was doubtful whether the enemy could transport across

r to his own—still less feed them when they arrived. Fighting quality was another matter. Since the Pact of Brundisium Anto

onia and Galatia. Perhaps the picked army which he mustered in Epirus was composed in the main of the survivors of his vete

ved when they contended against invaders coming from Italy. If that was his plan, it failed. Antonius had a great fleet a

ch history has preserved no adequate record. Antonius’ admiral Sosius was defeated by Agrippa in a great naval battle; 2 an

tion proved a signal failure. The plan had been turned against him—he was now encompassed and shut in. Famine and disease t

s had departed on a political calculation. Now the military situation was desperate, heralding the end of a great career an

ors or eastern princes, spread to the ships and the legions. Canidius was now in favour of a retreat to Macedonia, to seek

issue there with the help of barbarian allies. 4 The battle of Actium was decided before it was fought. The true story is

elp of barbarian allies. 4 The battle of Actium was decided before it was fought. The true story is gone beyond recall. I

he other side the fleet of Octavianus faced the Antonians. The battle was to be fought under the auspices of Caesar—Caesar’

il, Aen. 8, 680 f. PageBook=>297 But Octavianus, though ‘dux’, was even less adequate in maritime warfare than on la

e in maritime warfare than on land. Agrippa, the victor of Naulochus, was in command, supported by the consul Messalla, by

e part of the fleet of Antonius either refused battle or after defeat was forced back into harbour. 1 Antonius himself with

d to break through and follow Cleopatra in flight to Egypt. Treachery was at work in the land-army. Canidius the commander

thor of treachery to Antonius in the naval battle (if treachery there was ), and avoidance of bloodshed to Rome, is not know

ight be suspected. Certain of the Antonians were executed, but Sosius was spared, at the instance, it was alleged, of L. Ar

e Antonians were executed, but Sosius was spared, at the instance, it was alleged, of L. Arruntius, an ex-Pompeian. 3 Sosiu

d be a serious battle if they could help it. So it turned out. Actium was a shabby affair, the worthy climax to the ignoble

oreign woman— sequiturque, nefas, Aegyptia coniunx. 1 The victory was final and complete. There was no haste to pursue

efas, Aegyptia coniunx. 1 The victory was final and complete. There was no haste to pursue the fugitives to Egypt. Octavi

begin without delay. He had not gone farther east than Samos when he was himself recalled by troubles in Italy. There had

himself recalled by troubles in Italy. There had been a plot—or so it was alleged. It was suppressed at once by Maecenas. 2

by troubles in Italy. There had been a plot—or so it was alleged. It was suppressed at once by Maecenas. 2 The author was

o it was alleged. It was suppressed at once by Maecenas. 2 The author was a son of the relegated Lepidus: his wife, Servili

ely followed him in death, true to noble and patrician tradition. She was the last person of note in a family that claimed

y that claimed descent from the nobility of Alba Longa. More alarming was the news reported by Agrippa—veterans clamorous a

nd the last despondency before death. After brief resistance Antonius was defeated in battle. He took his own life. The arm

le entered the capital city of Egypt on the first day of August. Such was the episode called the Bellum Alexandrinum. Cle

hich at once passed into anecdote and legend. To Octavianus the Queen was an embarrassment if she lived :5 but a Roman impe

Roman politician. The adversary must have been redoubtable indeed! It was not the glorious battle of Actium and the defeat

eir fathers; 6 M. Aemilius Scaurus, the half-brother of Sex. Pompeius was pardoned, likewise Cn. Cornelius Cinna. 7 Scribon

pardoned, likewise Cn. Cornelius Cinna. 7 Scribonius Curio, however, was executed—perhaps this true son of a loyal and spi

after Actium, that he died without fortitude. 2 Antonius’ eldest son was also killed. The children of Cleopatra presente

reserved to walk in a Roman triumph. The boy is not heard of again—he was probably suppressed. The girl was enlisted as an

h. The boy is not heard of again—he was probably suppressed. The girl was enlisted as an instrument of Roman imperial polic

nce of the Numidian royal stock who became King of Mauretania. Such was the fate of Egypt’s Queen and her children, crown

ceroy, jealously excluding Roman senators. The first Prefect of Egypt was C. Cornelius Gallus, a Roman knight. 5 For the

er of petty dynasts or city tyrants. The greater vassals, however, he was eager to attach to his own clientela. 6 As heir t

, the territory in Asia Minor and Syria directly administered by Rome was considerably smaller than it had been after Pompe

man provinces in Asia, namely Asia, Bithynia-Pontus and Syria. Such was the sober truth about the much advertised reconqu

aly for the needs of his war and not safely to be discarded in peace, was quietly neglected in the East, where he inherited

of the East as well, manifest and monarchic. 2 The frontier itself was not an urgent problem. Armenia had been annexed b

Antonius, but Armenia fell away during the War of Actium. Octavianus was not incommoded: he took no steps to recover that

frontier policy of Antonius. His retreat from commitments in the East was unobtrusive and masterly. With the Mede, Antonius

Octavianus had his own ideas. It might be inexpedient to defy, but it was easy to delude, the sentiments of a patriotic peo

hough not as great as many believed, were sobering lessons; and there was work to do in the West and in the North. To serve

rth. To serve the policy of Rome and secure the eastern frontiers, it was enough to invoke the arts of diplomacy and the th

t to an invader and elusive from its very lack of order and cohesion, was neither strong in war nor aggressive in policy. A

of arms—or even of diplomacy. Of an invasion of Asia and Syria there was no danger to be apprehended, save when civil war

rule. There were to be no more civil wars. So much for the East. It was never a serious preoccupation to its conqueror du

uring his long rule. The menace of Parthia, like the menace of Egypt, was merely a pretext in his policy. There was a clo

like the menace of Egypt, was merely a pretext in his policy. There was a closer danger, his own equals and rivals, the p

wn equals and rivals, the proconsuls of the military provinces. Egypt was secure, or deemed secure, in the keeping of a Rom

knight. But what of Syria and Macedonia? Soon after Actium, Messalla was put in charge of Syria :3 Octavianus’ first gover

ctavianus’ first governor of Macedonia is nowhere attested—perhaps it was Taurus. 4 But Messalla and Taurus departed to the

ace, Odes 1, 12, 53 ff.; 3, 5, 2 ff.; Propertius 2, 10, 13 ff. 2 It was an especial habit of the Greeks to make much of P

3 Dio 51, 7, 7, cf. Tibullus 1, 7, 13 ff. 4 No evidence—but Taurus was an honorary duovir of Dyrrhachium, ILS 2678. 5

ome against a foreign enemy. The martial glory of the renascent state was also supported in the years following by the triu

Licinius Crassus, held that his successes deserved special honour: he was not allowed to celebrate his triumph till July, 2

, it claims to have asserted the ideals of liberty and concord. Peace was a tangible blessing. For a generation, all partie

that the Temple of Janus should be closed, a sign that all the world was at peace on land and sea. 5 The imposing and arch

The imposing and archaic ceremony did not, however, mean that warfare was to cease: the generals of Rome were active in the

but it portended no slackening of martial effort. The next generation was to witness the orderly execution of a programme o

belong to the years 29 and 28. 3 C Norbanus Flaccus, cos. 38 B.C., was proconsul of Asia soon after Actium(Josephus, AJ

and a certain Thorius Flaccus, otherwise unknown (but from Lanuvium), was proconsul of Bithynia c. 28 B.C. (P-W VI A, 346).

tae 13. At the same time the ancient ceremony of the Augurium Salutis was revived (Dio 51, 20, 4). PageBook=>304 pol

d (Dio 51, 20, 4). PageBook=>304 policy and an omen of victory was then embodied in the dedication of the Ara Pads A

y was then embodied in the dedication of the Ara Pads Augustae. Which was not unfitting. To the Roman, peace was not a vagu

f the Ara Pads Augustae. Which was not unfitting. To the Roman, peace was not a vague emollient: the word ‘pax’ can seldom

ldom be divorced from notions of conquest, or at least compulsion. It was Rome’s imperial destiny to compel the nations to

eds of the empire, fewer than thirty would be ample: any larger total was costly to maintain and a menace to internal peace

s being settled in colonies in Italy and in the provinces. The land was supplied by confiscation from Antonian towns and

sed from the war-booty, especially the treasure of Egypt. 2 Liberty was gone, but property, respected and secure, was now

e of Egypt. 2 Liberty was gone, but property, respected and secure, was now mounting in value. The beneficial working of

rom Egypt became everywhere apparent. 3 Above all, security of tenure was to be the watchword of the new order. 4 Italy lon

des et Vesta, Remo cum fratre Quirinus iura dabunt. 1 Caesar’s heir was veritably a world-conqueror, not in verse only, o

xander, he had spread his conquest to the bounds of the world; and he was acclaimed in forms and language once used of Alex

d he was acclaimed in forms and language once used of Alexander. 2 He was now building for himself a royal mausoleum beside

consul. 3 The avenging of Caesar, and with it his own divine descent, was advertised by the inauguration of the temple of D

abandoning the destined seat of empire for a new capital. 7 Camillus was hailed as Romulus, as a second founder and saviou

ia. ’ 7 Livy 5, 51 ff. 8 Ib. 5, 49, 7. PageBook=>306 there was to hand an authentic native hero, a god’s son and

mself elevated to heaven after death as the god Quirinus. Full honour was done to the founder in the years after Actium. Ca

aesar had set his own statue in the temple of Quirinus: Caesar’s heir was identified with that god by the poet Virgil. 1 No

did a hero win divine honours in life and divinity after death. That was the lesson of Romulus: it was enunciated in prose

in life and divinity after death. That was the lesson of Romulus: it was enunciated in prose as well as in verse. 2 The

of wars abroad or faction at home. Peace had been established, there was only one faction left—and it was in power. The

e. Peace had been established, there was only one faction left—and it was in power. The pleasing legend Libertalis P. R.

he pleasing legend Libertalis P. R. Vindex appears on coins. 3 Nobody was deceived by this symbol of victory in civil war.

d by this symbol of victory in civil war. What Rome and Italy desired was a return, not to freedom—anything but that—but to

be interpreted. Hopeful signs were not wanting in 28 B.C Octavianus was consul for the sixth time with Agrippa as his col

zipats, 8 ff. 3 BMC, R. Emp. 1, 112. 4 Dio 53, 1, I ff. That this was done in virtue of censoria potestas is shown by t

s shown by the Fasti of Venusia, ILS 6123. The increase of patricians was sanctioned by a Lex Saenia (Tacitus, Ann. 11, 25)

ans was sanctioned by a Lex Saenia (Tacitus, Ann. 11, 25). L. Saenius was cos. suff. in 30 B.C. PageBook=>307 meanin

of princeps senatus. Further, a comprehensive measure of legislation was promoted to annul the illegal and arbitrary acts

e depended upon the will and convenience of the government. How far was the process of regulating the State to go, under

the time. From 31 B.C onwards he had been consul every year. But that was not all. The young despot not only conceded, but

e People. By what right had it been in his hand? He indicates that it was through general consent that he had acquired supr

. But he could not rule without the help of an oligarchy. His primacy was precarious if it did not accommodate itself to th

a, Calvisius and Taurus, to any extremity. But the military oligarchy was highly variegated. There was scarce a man among t

ny extremity. But the military oligarchy was highly variegated. There was scarce a man among the consulars but had a Republ

ith in men like Plancus and Titius. Ahenobarbus the Republican leader was dead; but Messalla and Pollio carried some author

ed a monopoly. The opportune discovery, or forgery, of an inscription was enlisted to refute the claim of Crassus. 2 Fraud

d since Actium to other proconsuls, and to one commander at least who was perhaps not a proconsul and was certainly not of

ls, and to one commander at least who was perhaps not a proconsul and was certainly not of consular standing. 3 NotesPage

rail and venerable relic, intact after the passage of four centuries, was no doubt invoked to demonstrate that Crassus had

strate that Crassus had no valid claim to the spolia opima because he was not fighting under his own auspices. The relevanc

evance of the dispute to the constitutional settlement of 28– 27 B.C. was first emphasized by E. Groag, P-W XIII, 283 ff.

89s, cf. Dio 51, 20, 5). It is not certain, however, what position he was holding in Gaul (above, p. 302). Dio expressly st

the title he deserved (αὐτʋκράτωρ). PageBook=>309 Yet Crassus was granted the bare distinction of a triumph when a

nly power to which he could appeal if he wished to coerce a proconsul was the consular authority, exorbitantly enhanced. To

tantly enhanced. To preclude disputes of competence, a new regulation was required. No source records any political reper

Spain. Messalla, who triumphed from Gaul on September 25th, 27 B.C., was in command of a great military province at the ti

ur, crime or vice in his associates, providing that his own supremacy was not assailed. The precise nature of Gallus’ viola

ecise nature of Gallus’ violation of amicitia evades conjecture :1 it was hardly trivial or verbal, for Suetonius ranks his

B.C. With the proconsul of Macedonia no link is known, save that each was once a partisan of Antonius. 3 Who had not been?

government at Rome. The denial to Crassus of the title of imperator was not merely a matter of constitutional propriety—o

a matter of constitutional propriety—or rather, impropriety. Crassus was a noble, from a great house, the grandson of a dy

ast who had taken rank with Pompeius and Caesar; in military glory he was a sudden rival to the new Romulus, who tried to e

s consecration of the rule of the sole imperator. 4 Not only prestige was at stake—the armed proconsuls were a menace. Yet

us, Divus Aug. 66, 2. 3 A woman called ‘Licinia P. f. Galli (uxor)’ was buried in the sepulchre of the Crassi (CIL VI, 21

estored liberty, and resigned nothing of value. Ostensible moderation was only a step to greater consolidation of power. An

f the constitution and legal definition of his powers. The term ‘dux’ was familiar from its application to the great genera

ation to the great generals of the Republic; and the victor of Actium was the last and the greatest of them all. It could a

. An appellation that connoted eminence, but not always sole primacy, was ready to hand. The leading statesmen of the Repub

incipes, in recognition of their authority or their power. 1 The name was not always given in praise, for the princeps was

ir power. 1 The name was not always given in praise, for the princeps was all too often a political dynast, exerting illici

Rightly, for the martial glory and martial primacy of the new Romulus was not impaired by the public acts of his sixth and

en writing his Fasti, discovered in the word ‘dux’ a convenience that was not merely a matter of metre. 3 Then, after a cen

or distrustful of the title of ‘princeps’ and eager for warlike glory was flattered when his poets called him ‘dux’ and ‘du

s went through a painless and superficial transformation. The process was completed in a session of the Senate on January 1

es to the free disposal of the Senate and People of Rome. Acclamation was drowned in protest. The senators adjured him not

bed thereon, clemency, valour, justice and piety. 2 He had founded—or was soon to found—the Roman State anew. He might ther

r the omen of twelve vultures had greeted him long ago. 3 But Romulus was a king, hated name, stained with a brother’s bloo

t explicitly mention a grant of proconsular imperium. That such there was , however, is clear enough. Premerstein (Vom Werde

(a copy at Potentia in Picenum).. 3 Dio says that Augustus himself was eager for the name of Romulus (53, 16, 7). Perhap

tus himself was eager for the name of Romulus (53, 16, 7). Perhaps he was warned and checked by wise counsellors. PageBoo

d checked by wise counsellors. PageBook=>314 into Heaven. That was too much like Caesar the Dictator. Moreover, the

hat was too much like Caesar the Dictator. Moreover, the young Caesar was a saviour and benefactor beyond any precedent. A

Caesar was a saviour and benefactor beyond any precedent. A new name was devised, expressing veneration of more than morta

t conferred on Caesar’s heir the appellation of Augustus. 2 Nothing was left to chance or to accident in preparing these

e invested the first citizen with rank and authority. Caesar Augustus was to govern a provincia in virtue of imperium proco

vern a provincia in virtue of imperium proconsulare: as proconsul, he was merely the equal in public law of any other proco

the equal in public law of any other proconsul. In fact, his province was large and formidable, comprising the most powerfu

system be described as a military despotism. Before the law, Augustus was not the commander-in-chief of the whole army, but

w, p. 326. PageBook=>315 For the grant of such a mandate there was plenty of justification. The civil wars were over

imperium in the past had threatened the stability of the State, that was due to the ruinous ambition of politicians who so

of the anarchy out of which his domination had arisen. But Augustus was to be consul as well as proconsul, year after yea

ent past might properly have been invoked: it is pretty clear that it was not. The Romans as a people were possessed by a

hange had come, though slow and combated. Rome’s peculiar greatness was due not to one man’s genius or to NotesPage=>

s Prinzipats, 227), who demonstrates that after 27 B.C. the consulate was reduced to its due and constitutional powers, cf.

of time. 1 Augustus sought to demonstrate a doctrine —Roman history was a continuous and harmonious development. 2 Augu

ians of more recent times. Augustus knew precisely what he wanted: it was simple and easily translated. Moreover, the chief

, under a mandate to heal and repair the body politic. 4 But Pompeius was sinister and ambitious. That princeps did not cur

ure, but only aggravated, the ills of the Roman State. Very different was Augustus, a ‘salubris princeps’, for as such he w

d have himself known. 5 Not only that. The whole career of Pompeius was violent and illicit, from the day when the youth

e years the statesman stole their heroes and their vocabulary. Livy was moved to grave doubts—was the birth of Caesar a b

e their heroes and their vocabulary. Livy was moved to grave doubts— was the birth of Caesar a blessing or a curse? 4 Augu

peror and his historian understood each other. The authentic Pompeius was politically forgotten, buried in fraudulent lauda

tten, buried in fraudulent laudations of the dead. What they required was not the ambitious and perfidious dynast but that

ntonius, save as criminal types. The power and domination of Augustus was in reality far too similar to that of the Dictato

ore remunerative for every purpose; and the blame of his proscription was profitably laid upon Antonius, dead and disgraced

d upon Antonius, dead and disgraced. Augustus bore testimony: ‘Cicero was a great orator—and a great patriot. ’2 But any of

great orator—and a great patriot. ’2 But any official cult of Cicero was an irony to men who recalled in their own experie

of Cicero was an irony to men who recalled in their own experience—it was not long ago—the political activity of Cicero in

d Plancus. That much more than the memory and the oratory of Cicero was revived some fifteen years after his death has be

of the Principate of Pompeius, and foreshadowing the ideal state that was realized under the Principate of Augustus. 1 That

ybius:2 even if the primacy of one man in the State were admitted, it was not for a princeps like Pompeius. For the rest,

, it might pertinently be urged that the political doctrine of Cicero was couched in phrases so vague and so innocuous that

veal to a modern inquirer any secret about the rule of Augustus which was hidden from contemporaries. In so far as Cicero

unction and standing between the different classes of society. 3 Such was also the NotesPage=>319 1 E. Meyer, Caesar

llio came as a verbal reminder of that tradition. Pollio, it is true, was preserved as a kind of privileged nuisance—he was

Pollio, it is true, was preserved as a kind of privileged nuisance—he was not the man to advocate assassination or provoke

e civil war for the sake of a principle. The authentic Cato, however, was not merely ‘ferox’ but ‘atrox’. 4 His nephew Brut

true name and essence of the auctoritas of Augustus the Princeps. Nor was Brutus a good imperialist. As he pronounced when

hen he attacked the domination of Pompeius, for the sake of empire it was not worth submitting to tyranny. 5 Cicero refus

able to a changed order. So Brutus thought. 1 In the New State, which was quite different from Dictatorship, Cicero would b

would easily have proved to himself and to others that the new order was the best state of all, more truly Republican than

all good citizens, for it asserted the sacred rights of property; it was Roman and Republican, for power rested upon the l

ditional functions and respecting legitimate authority. True libertas was very different from licence: imperium was indispe

te authority. True libertas was very different from licence: imperium was indispensable. What fairer blend of libertas and

relics of Cicero in the Republic of Augustus:2 very little attention was paid to him at all, or to Pompeius. Genuine Pompe

ne Pompeians there still were, loyal to a family and a cause—but that was another matter. Insistence upon the legal basis o

ancient constitution to be far the best (De re publica 1, 34); and he was not altogether satisfied with the speculations of

er produce an exemplary kind of citizen. Names might change: Augustus was none the less a revolutionary leader who won supr

policy, his policy to harmonize with Roman sentiment. The formulation was easily found—it reposed not in books of the law o

nd and above all legal and written prescription stands auctoritas; it was in virtue of auctoritas that Augustus claimed pre

and to the individual senior statesmen or principes viri. 2 Augustus was the greatest of the principes. It was therefore b

n or principes viri. 2 Augustus was the greatest of the principes. It was therefore both appropriate and inevitable that th

evitable that the unofficial title by which he chose to be designated was ‘princeps’. Auctoritas has a venerable and imposi

ritas and legally granted powers does not exhaust the count. His rule was personal—and based ultimately upon a personal oat

but now stolen from them and enhanced to an exorbitant degree; and he was Divi filius, destined for consecration in his tur

Divi filius, destined for consecration in his turn. The plebs of Rome was Caesar’s inherited clientela. He fed them with do

des Römertums, 1 ff. 3 Above, p. 284 PageBook=>323 Augustus was by far the wealthiest man in the Empire, ruling E

as allies and clients. A citizen and a magistrate to the senators, he was imperator to the legions, a king and a god to the

al party as the source and fount of patronage and advancement. Such was Caesar Augustus. The contrast of real and persona

uld be an elementary error to fancy that the ceremony of January 13th was merely a grim comedy devised to deceive the ingen

eing in a majority the partisans of Augustus, were well aware of what was afoot. To secure the domination of the Caesarian

the consolidation of the Revolution and the maintenance of peace, it was necessary that the primacy of Caesar’s heir shoul

spiracy of decent reticence about the gap between fact and theory. It was evident: no profit but only danger from talking a

nition. The ‘constitutional’ settlement of the years 28 and 27 B.C. was described in official language as ‘res publica re

on, and therefore the strengthening, of despotic power. Such at least was the conception of Tacitus when he referred elsewh

onarchical rule; he observed that the pay of Augustus’ military guard was doubled at the same time—and that in virtue of th

could be grossly exaggerated by the adulatory or the uncritical. Such was no doubt the opinion of the suspicious Tacitus, e

ough to show them up. Suetonius, however, a student of antiquities, was a scholar not wholly devoid of historical sense.

he Republic— not that he did so. 3 To Suetonius, the work of Augustus was the creation of a ‘novus status’. 4 From a dist

at least in the earlier years of his presidency. 5 Augustus’ purpose was just the reverse. He controlled government and pa

ughness and without opposition. This time the domination of a faction was to be permanent and unshaken: the era of rival mi

‘legitimate’ supremacy. No need to violate the laws: the constitution was subservient. This time the new enactments were ca

supreme magistrates, Augustus and Agrippa. The transition to liberty was carefully safeguarded. It is an entertaining pu

thrice been acclaimed imperator by the legions. 1 A second consulate was not the only reward of loyal service—he was grant

ons. 1 A second consulate was not the only reward of loyal service—he was granted in 30 B.C. the right of nominating each y

noble, but none the less by now a firm member of the Caesarian party, was M. Junius Silanus, of a variegated past, changing

neral, along with Saxa, in the campaign of Philippi. Norbanus himself was married to a great heiress in the Caesarian party

aesarian party, the daughter of Cornelius Balbus. 4 As for Murena, he was the brother-in-law of Maecenas. 5 NotesPage=>

dentified with the ‘Licinius’ of Odes 2, 10, 1. Perhaps his full name was A. Terentius Varro Licinius Murena. PageBook=&g

Transalpine, Spain and Syria, with some twenty legions. The Cisalpina was no longer a province. Apart from that, Augustus’

isalpina was no longer a province. Apart from that, Augustus’ portion was closely comparable in extent and power. The settl

he small adjuncts of Cyprus and Cilicia Campestris); 1 their garrison was a great army of twenty legions or more. In recent

s were men dangerously eminent, from family or from ambition. Crassus was a recent warning. Triumviral authority, succeeded

ly been employed to control the armed proconsuls. But the Triumvirate was abolished, the consulate reduced to normal and le

the consulate reduced to normal and legitimate competence. The remedy was clear. Augustus in 27 B.C. professed to resign

ained, as before, in charge of three military provinces. But Augustus was not surrendering power. Very different his real p

Gaul and Syria, becoming proconsul of all those regions himself. That was NotesPage=>326 1 Dio 53, 12. Dio assigns a

llia Narbonensis as well as Baetica is senatorial. Syria at this time was simply the Antonian province (Syria and Cilicia C

Cilicia Campestris), to which Cyprus, taken from Egypt after Actium, was at first added. 2 L. Ganter, Die Provinzialverw

d praetorian is a subsequent and a natural development. No new system was suddenly introduced in the year 27 B.C.—Augustus’

of provinces. To begin with, they are praetorian in a majority. That was to be expected. Consulars who had governed vast p

of these men were dead or had lapsed long ago from public notice. Nor was it likely that the ex-Antonians Pollio, Censorinu

this impressive and unprecedented array of viri triumphales, only one was to hold command of an army again, and that Note

ageBook=>328 in his old age, twenty years from his consulate. It was Sex. Appuleius, a kinsman of the Princeps. 1 Nor