for the Principate, while abolishing political freedom, averts civil war and preserves the non political classes. Liberty

ccess or to idealize the men who win wealth and honours through civil war . The history of this age is highly controversia

the end of a century of anarchy, culminating in twenty years of civil war and military tyranny. If despotism was the price,

an sentiments even submission to absolute rule was a lesser evil than war between citizens. 1 Liberty was gone, but only a

regards with indulgence both the political orator who fomented civil war to save the Republic and the military adventurer

established (60 B.C.). Tacitus in his Histories told of a great civil war , the foundation of a new dynasty, and its degener

ginning. The breach between Pompeius and Caesar and the outbreak of war in 49 B.C. might appear to open the final act in

s, as you will. Caesar the Dictator bears the heavier blame for civil war . In truth, Pompeius was no better ‘occultior non

and murder of the best men; for the ambitions of the dynasts provoked war between class and class. Naked power prevailed. 4

the end of the Free State; and a re-alignment of forces precipitated war and revolution ten years later. Amicitia presup

ionaries were a host of clients, looking to their leader for spoil in war and estates in Italy when their campaigns were ov

name of freedom and justice. On the Bellum Italicum supervened civil war . The party led by Marius, Cinna and Carbo was def

and the dispossessed was a permanent menace. The long and complicated war in Italy had barely ended. The Samnites, Sulla’s

less rule. The Empire broke it. The repercussions of the ten years’ war in Italy echoed over all the world. The Senate wa

amilies had earned or confirmed their title of nobility by command in war against the Samnites and the Carthaginians: some

finally to dangerous elevations. Such were the men who directed in war and peace the government after Sulla, owing prima

ight save and justify the rule of class and privilege. The ten years’ war in Italy not merely corrupted their integrity: it

nd his army for personal ends and played an ambiguous game when civil war broke out between Marius and Sulla. Brutal, corru

areer of Pompeius opened in fraud and violence. It was prosecuted, in war and in peace, through illegality and treachery. H

g back to Rome after six years of absence, when he had terminated the war in Spain against Sertorius, Pompeius combined wit

the hungry sons of a poor and populous region. Devoted attachment in war and politics to the baronial family of Picenum wa

soldier L. Afranius commanded armies for Pompeius in Spain and in the war against Mithridates. 5 Among other Picene partisa

rity on goats (ib. 2, 3, 1), who had been a legate of Pompeius in the war against the Pirates (ib. 2, praef. 6). Another me

o vindicate the sacred rights of the Roman People. Men feared a civil war . When Pompeius asked that the consular elections

rough Pompeius, helped by the lieutenants of Pompeius in peace and in war , and now Caesar had become a rival political lead

ulate, or Caesar’s victory and the rewards of greed and ambition in a war against the Sullan oligarchy. Italy began to stir

tactics of Curio. In the autumn men began to speak of an inevitable war . Fortune was arranging the scene for a grand and

Sulpicius Rufus (cos. 51) was very mild and loath to provoke a civil war (Dio 40, 59, 1; Ad fam. 4, 3, 1, &c.); L. Aem

is command. Magnus, it might seem, was strong enough to prevent civil war , free to negotiate without being accused of ignob

political caution than for public splendour or conspicuous ability in war and peace. They sought to profit by help from Pom

d to employ the leading nobiles to destroy Caesar, whether it came to war or not, in either way gaining the mastery. They w

. 51) and Ser. Sulpicius Rufus (cos. 51), dismayed by the outbreak of war or distrustful of Pompeius, took no active part a

influence and example of Cato spurred on the nobiles and accelerated war . Helped by the power, the prestige, and the ill

ne. His work done, the Dictator resigned. The conquest of Gaul, the war against Pompeius and the establishment of the Dic

simple to be historical. Caesar strove to avert any resort to open war . Both before and after the outbreak of hostilitie

is armies. 2 Caesar knew how small was the party willing to provoke a war . As the artful motion of a Caesarian tribune had

would be able to deal with Pompeius later. It might not come to open war ; and Pompeius was still in their control so long

my in the field. Upon Caesar they had thrust the choice between civil war and political extinction. But Caesar refused to j

ecurity and the feeling of guilt, added to inadequate preparation for war , may have impaired his decision. 3 Yet his plan w

enemies of Caesar had counted upon capitulation or a short and easy war . They had lost the first round. Then a second b

Roman dead at Pharsalus, half in patriot grief for the havoc of civil war , half in impatience and resentment. 1 They had ch

emency. They were members of his own class: he had not wished to make war upon them or to exterminate the Roman aristocracy

his Dictatorship. His rule began as the triumph of a faction in civil war : he made it his task to transcend faction, and in

e. He was not mistaken. Yet he required special powers: after a civil war the need was patent. The Dictator’s task might we

was disquieting. Little had been done to repair the ravages of civil war and promote social regeneration. For that there w

by providential death had been spared the experience of another civil war after a brief respite of precarious peace. 2 In a

e consulars who supported Pompeius and of Cato’s partisans. 2 Civil war might cut across families: as this was a contest

on revived the party of Marius and the battle-cries of the last civil war , only thirty years before. The memory of Sulla wa

n 51 (Ad fam. 8, 6, 1), so he had little choice when it came to civil war . Caesar designated him for the consulate of 44: h

upts and terrorists; 2 while Pompeians and their leader himself, when war broke out, made savage threats of Sullan proscrip

oman People by personal ties of allegiance. In the imminence of civil war , Rome feared from Caesar’s side an irruption of b

as a reward the Roman citizenship; his brother likewise served in the war against Mithridates. His son, Pompeius Trogus, wa

76 nor the native tribe of the Gaetuli had forgotten Marius and the war against Jugurtha. 1 In the East kings, dynasts

e indeed of tota Italia. The reality was very different. 2 The recent war of Italy against Rome must not be forgotten. When

hostility to Rome as yet unappeased, by the memory of oppression and war , of defeat and devastation. Only forty years befo

ey nearly succeeded. Not until they had been baffled and shattered in war did the fierce Italici begin to give up hope. An

d reason to fear a social revolution. Before peace came another civil war supervened, into which Etruria was dragged along

t till 80 B.C., Livy, Per. 89. PageBook=>088 After a decade of war Italy was united, but only in name, not in sentim

his municipal legislation. 6 Whoever succeeded to power after a civil war would be confronted with the task of creating a

n 41 B.C.3 But before these dispositions could all take effect, civil war broke out again and the military leaders accelera

y in the Senate, whether Caesarian or neutral. The Senate, thinned by war and recently replenished by the nominees of the D

essed the will and the resources for action, and eventually for civil war , is another question. Their generous ardour was n

Pompeius knew and as some of his allies did not. The price was civil war . Even had the Liberators been willing to pay it,

arian governors in the far West. In Syria Bassus had stirred up civil war two years before, seizing the strong place of Apa

egrity (ib. 13, 46) and took his own life rather than prolong a civil war (Hist. 2, 47), and L. Vitellius: ‘eo de homine ha

ramble for honours and emolument, to break out at the last into civil war again. Deplored by the Liberators, the lack of le

Sex. Peducaeus and A. Allienus carried no weight; and only another war would bring rapid distinction to Carrinas, Calvis

the Roman constitution, their reluctance to provide a cause of civil war and their proud conviction that wherever they wer

ehind him. It was clear that many a man followed Caesar in an impious war from personal friendship, not political principle

lements could venture openly to advocate sedition, violence and civil war , Octavianus would have to take the lead and act.

s forces around the city of Mutina and held Brutus entrapped. Civil war had begun, but winter enforced a lull in hostilit

ay beyond the constitution and beyond the laws. When Caesar went to war with the government, avid and desperate men in hi

an impressive company. 1 Senators who had come safely through civil war or who owed rank and fortune to one revolution we

d by an anti-Caesarian faction and forced into the conduct of a civil war . Hirtius was accessible to the sinister influence

and lapse into timorous inactivity under the imminent threat of civil war or during the contest. He exerted himself for med

ius 2, 48, 5. PageBook=>138 stronger. Not that Cicero expected war and when war came, even Cato seemed willing to go

PageBook=>138 stronger. Not that Cicero expected war and when war came, even Cato seemed willing to go back upon hi

ory and all his energies for the struggle against Antonius, eager for war and implacable, he would hear no word of peace or

ation and destruction. Six years before, the same policy precipitated war between the government and a proconsul. Fanatic

o’s ideas and preoccupations in the summer and autumn of 44 B.C. With war impending, Atticus took alarm and dissuaded him f

this matter all too perspicacious a judge of men and politics. Civil war was an abomination. Victory could only be won by

afraid of peace’, to be ‘enemies of peace’. 1 In detestation of civil war , Republicans might honestly hold an unjust peace

The friends of peace had to abandon their plea when they spoke for war . Peace should not be confused with servitude; 4 n

able5 they might impair the resolution of the patriotic front. 6 Then war became just and heroic: rather than seek any acco

r to fight and to fall, as becomes a Roman and a Senator. 7 In open war the language of peace and goodwill might still su

r obeyed the call of duty and loyalty, even to the extremity of civil war . Among Caesar’s allies Pollio was not the only on

es of Sulla his Sullan enemies, partly to palliate the guilt of civil war . Almost at once he composed a propaganda-letter,

ulation: the gist of it was to announce a new style of ending a civil war clemency and generosity. 3 When the tide of battl

rce civibus’. 4 It was repeated and imitated in twenty years of civil war . Zealous to avoid the shedding of Roman blood, ge

tion of power by the Senate or rather, by a faction in the Senate and war against the proconsul Antonius. That prospect was

d bitter complaint of Cicero through the months when he clamoured for war . 4 ‘The consuls are excellent, the consulars a sc

bate. It lasted for four days. Calenus spoke for Antonius, Cicero for war ; 1 and L. Piso twice intervened on the plea of

wers. The Senate had granted before now imperiutm and the charge of a war to a man who had held no public office. But there

For the friends of Antonius, however, it meant that a declaration of war had been averted; for the advocates of concord, a

negotiations with a contumacious proconsul and plunged the world into war . The lesson must have provided arguments against

s against the adoption of irrevocable measures. Under the threat of war a compromise might save appearances: which did no

ays been an advocate of peace. But this was different a just and holy war . Thus to the Senate: to Octavianus and to D. Brut

Senate: to Octavianus and to D. Brutus, letters of exhortation. The war needed men and money, vigour and enthusiasm. Levi

weak and emaciated from his bed of sickness, set out for the seat of war and marched up the Flaminia to Ariminum but not t

d decrees. The men of Firmum took the lead in promising money for the war , the Marrucini (or perhaps rather a faction among

osius. ’ 3 Phil 8, 27. 4 Phil. 9. PageBook=>171 A state of war was then proclaimed. It existed already. For the

emotions of the moment. On a long view, the future was ominous with a war much more formidable than that which was being so

uff Cicero’s proposal to confer upon Cassius the commission of making war against Dolabella, with an extraordinary command

days was decreed to the immortal gods unprecedented and improper in a war between citizens, and never claimed by Sulla or b

ravages of a long siege. That was not the worst. The conduct of the war by the two consuls had overshadowed for a time th

ted an ovation, Decimus Brutus, however, a triumph, the charge of the war and the legions of the dead consuls. 2 Orations

toic Favonius, the friend of Cato and of Brutus, who pronounced civil war to be the worst of evils, worse even than submitt

itterly the influence of the veterans. 4 The veterans had no wish for war they had NotesPage=>166 1 Ad fam. 10, 24.

e hostage. Brutus had been desperately unwilling to provoke a civil war , ready even to go into voluntary exile for the sa

Macedonia and an army meant for Brutus not so much an instrument for war as security and a basis for negotiation. He was r

d honour commanded a Republican to resist the worst excesses of civil war . Lepidus was a Caesarian: but Brutus refused to c

session of Africa at this time was dubious, disputed in a local civil war for several years. 5 As for the islands, it may a

ime command assigned to him by the Senate earlier in the year for the war against Antonius. NotesPage=>189 1 Ad fam.

and refusing to recognize the Triumvirate. He then became involved in war with T. Sextius, the governor of Africa Nova. P

The decadence of legal authority and the ever-present threat of civil war enhanced the value of the personal tie and led me

5 The ambition of generals like Pompeius and Caesar provoked civil war without intending or achieving a revolution. Caes

as now carried out, in two stages, the first to provide money for the war , the second to reward the Caesarian legions after

ect or indirect. But now Rome and Italy had to pay the costs of civil war , in money and land. There was no other source for

men recall the Dictatorship of Caesar as an age of gold. 4 Thinned by war and proscription, the Senate was now replenished

without notable accessions Hirtius, Pansa and Dolabella had fallen in war , and the consul Q. Pedius succumbed early in his

LS 6204. 6 Appian, BC 4, 37, 155. PageBook=>198 When a civil war seemed only a contest of factions in the Roman no

of equestrian rank, such as the banker C. Flavius, with no heart for war but faithful to the end. 4 At Athens he found a w

the faction of Octavianus invited those who had nothing to lose from war and adventure, among the ‘foundation-members’ bei

e sign of the avenging of Caesar, the Caesarian armies made ready for war . The leaders decided to employ twenty-eight legio

mplete eclipse in the East. Brutus and Cassius now took counsel for war . Even when Antonius joined Lepidus and Plancus, B

ome. 2 For good reasons Brutus and Cassius decided not to carry the war into Italy in winter or even in summer, but to oc

. 1 Manius produced or invented a letter from M. Antonius sanctioning war , if in defence of his dignitas. 2 The consul ma

a; Pollio and Ventidius followed, slow but menacing, in his rear. The war had already broken out in Italy. 3 Etruria, Umbri

te perception of their own interests as well as a strong distaste for war : it would be plain folly to fight for L. Antonius

usia and in shame at Nursia. On the monument erected in memory of the war the men of Nursia set an inscription which procla

urion Fuficius Fango, fighting with valour and resource in a confused war against T. Sextius, the former governor, who had

be doubted; and, despite the loss of the Gallic legions, the odds of war were on the side of the great Antonius. NotesPa

s were already current: he soon learned that a new and alarming civil war had broken out between his own adherents and the

hampioned his cause and won Republican support, but even raised civil war with a fair prospect of destroying the rival Caes

hat he was well out of the tangle. Of subsequent events in Italy, the war in Etruria and the investment of Perusia, it may

hat Octavianus and L. Antonius were acting in collusion, forcing on a war to facilitate and excuse confiscations (Suetonius

With this moral support Antonius confronted his Caesarian rival. For war , his prospects were better than he could have hop

o destroy Rome. Her own strength and her own sons laid her low. 1 The war of class against class, the dominance of riot and

nate Isles beyond the western margin of the world, without labour and war , but innocent and peaceful. The darker the clou

d him the larger share of credit for making peace when the fortune of war had been manifestly on his side. The complacenc

ned to settle the affairs of the East upon an enduring basis and make war , for revenge, for prestige and for security, agai

g up trouble. Octavianus soon found it advisable or necessary to make war upon Sex. Pompeius. He invited Antonius to come t

d not admit him. Not that he had either the desire or the pretext for war , but he was in an angry mood. Once again for the

s side. For the present, his colleague was constrained to support the war against Pompeius. From his fleet Antonius resigne

o Scribonia, before 40 B.C. PageBook=>230 Octavianus now had a war on his hands earlier perhaps than he had planned.

ius would not support his colleague. The young man went on with his war , encouraged by an initial advantage one of the mo

s protecting deity: in Rome the mob rioted against Octavianus and the war . NotesPage=>230 1 Lepidus’ son Marcus marr

ome; 3 and there had been disturbances in Etruria. 4 The cessation of war , the freedom of the seas and the liberation of Ro

ime of the War of Perusia has already been described. He was saved in war and diplomacy by his daring and by the services o

nt history nothing at all is known. 2 Destined ere long to a place in war and administration second only to Agrippa was T.

the campaigns in Sicily were advertised not as a civil but a foreign war , soon to become a glorious part of Roman history.

y two remaining the alternatives seemed to be fast friendship or open war . Of the former, the chances grew daily less as Oc

entum with the fleets and armies of the East, whether it was peace or war in the end, Octavianus could face him, as never y

tive tribes up to the line of the Dinaric Alps, but not beyond it. If war came, he would secure Italy in the north-east fro

almatia. These dangers had been threatened or experienced in Caesar’s war against Pompeius Magnus. By Octavianus’ foresight

rial would come. After the termination of the Sicilian and maritime war the military exploits in Illyricum enhanced the p

bertas Pollio ever paid homage, and literature meant more to him than war and politics; Sosius (who triumphed in 34) constr

ies now, admitted in the main for personal distinction and service in war . ‘Ex virtute nobilitas coepit. ’5 Then Rome’s war

s. It would have been vain to point in extenuation to their valour in war , to urge that many of the upstarts derived their

nister to despotism. 3 The pursuit of oratory, interrupted by civil war , languished and declined under the peace of the T

studied and imitated the classic document for the pathology of civil war , the sombre, intense and passionate chapters of T

y all principle, all pretence, and showed the authentic features of a war between classes. Through experience of affairs, c

n the contemporary features of a Caesarian military leader. 5 Civil war , tearing aside words, forms and institutions, gav

, Cinna, and others of their friends were found on Caesar’s side when war came. 1 The men were dead, and their fashion of

been recorded. PageBook=>253 abandoned poetry for a career of war and politics, disappearing utterly from historica

t. 1, 5. PageBook=>255 Horace had come to manhood in an age of war and knew the age for what it was. Others might

e maintaining order for the government, kept open the wounds of civil war . There was material for another revolution: it ha

hings a strange mixture of the old and the new. Despite the losses of war and proscriptions, there was still to be found in

others. 1 Plancus, the uncle of Titius, may have seen service in this war on the staff of Antonius, though known for talent

s Caesar’s heir or neutrality with safeguards, in fear of a new civil war between rival leaders. NotesPage=>266 1 Di

ies rather than by a programme and a cause, would stand the strain of war . The clash was now imminent, with aggression co

e of the War of Actium is quite simple, consistent and suspect a just war , fought in defence of freedom and peace against a

ent and salutary belief. Octavianus was in reality the aggressor, his war was preceded by a coup d’état: Antonius had the

aggressor. The situation and the phraseology recur in the history of war and politics whenever there is a public opinion w

o the end by honour and by principle as well as by the necessities of war . Like Caesar, he never deserted his friends or hi

aimed, feared Cleopatra but did not fear Antonius: she was planning a war of revenge that was to array all the East against

t was designed and contrived by the party of Octavianus. It was not a war for domination against Antonius Antonius must not

or all that, the contest soon assumed the august and solemn form of a war of ideas and a war between East and West. Antoniu

ntest soon assumed the august and solemn form of a war of ideas and a war between East and West. Antonius and Cleopatra see

violence was not enough: he still lacked the moral justification for war , and the moral support of the Roman People. The c

the defensive and therefore, it might be represented, for peace. For war his prestige and his power were enormous. It is i

y leaders, sharpened by personal enmities and rivalries. In a civil war fleets and legions are not the most important thi

g to the men, the money and the ships that Cleopatra provided for the war . 2 Canidius prevailed: it was alleged that he had

his amicitia with Octavianus, was the equivalent of a declaration of war ; and war would have ensued, Cleopatra or no Cleop

itia with Octavianus, was the equivalent of a declaration of war; and war would have ensued, Cleopatra or no Cleopatra. But

s stood by Cleopatra. Ahenobarbus hated the Queen and was averse from war . Yet it was not Ahenobarbus who ran away, but Pla

ing. 2 ‘Quo, quo scelesti ruitis? ’3 Another, yet another, criminal war between citizens was being forced by mad ambition

d swore an oath of allegiance to me and chose me as its leader in the war which I won at Actium. ’4 So Augustus wrote in th

vit. ’ The inscr. ILS 5531 (Iguvium) may attest contributions for the war : note the phrase ‘in commeatum legionibus’. 3 H

munities, would pay the price in confiscation of their lands when the war was over. 2 In the constitutional crisis of the

taly then had been foreign, and the activities of Drusus precipitated war . But Italy, become Roman through grant of the fra

rced into a struggle which in time she came to believe was a national war . The contest was personal: it arose from the conf

between Rome and the East, and a nationalism grotesquely enhanced by war and revolution, by famine and by fear, broke out

guage of official inscriptions. 1 For the present, as Italy loathed war and military despotism, the immediate purpose of

the Caesarian party and refuse to believe that the true cause of the war was the violent attempt of a degenerate Roman to

the apparatus of oriental luxury. That was absurd; and they knew what war was like. On a cool estimate, the situation was o

ruler who could hope to hold it together. But Antonius victorious in war with the help of alien allies was another matter.

east of acquiescence. The better sort of people in Italy did not like war or despotic rule. But despotism was already there

id not like war or despotic rule. But despotism was already there and war inevitable. In a restoration of liberty no man co

sensus of all Italy, usurped authority and the conduct of a patriotic war . He proceeded to declare Antonius stripped of his

n aristocratic partisan, Valerius Messalla; and he was to wage Rome’s war as consul himself, for the third time. Antonius w

tra, the Queen of Egypt, the foreign enemy, the Roman leader declared war with all the traditional pomp of an ancient rite.

nd the leadership of Caesar, united in patriotic resolve for the last war of all. Hinc Augustus agens Italos in prolia Ca

e with little loss of Roman blood, as fitted the character of a civil war in which men fought, not for a principle, but onl

break had disturbed the provinces, the repercussions of a Roman civil war would soon be felt. Some at least of the triumphs

and practised the virtue of clemency to extenuate the guilt of civil war . 3 Likewise did his heir, when murder could serve

alien menace, imposed on Caesar’s heir in Italy for the needs of his war and not safely to be discarded in peace, was quie

Yet against Parthia Octavianus neither bore resentment nor threatened war . Instead, he negotiated. When a Parthian pretende

o Syria, he preferred to use that advantage for peace rather than for war . Crassus and the national honour clamoured for

ather than for war. Crassus and the national honour clamoured for a war of revenge; and the last of the dynasts might des

usive from its very lack of order and cohesion, was neither strong in war nor aggressive in policy. Adulation, perversity o

Asia and Syria there was no danger to be apprehended, save when civil war loosened the fabric of Roman rule. There were to

his triumph till July, 27 B.C. When a party has triumphed in civil war , it claims to have asserted the ideals of liberty

rs on coins. 3 Nobody was deceived by this symbol of victory in civil war . What Rome and Italy desired was a return, not to

engross and concentrate on his own person all prestige and success in war , as an almost religious consecration of the rule

nged, and not all of them. As ‘dux’ the young Caesar had fought the war under the national mandate, and ‘dux’ he remained

eral oration delivered by Tiberius). PageBook=>317 and lost in war . 1 His murders and his treacheries were not forgo

uisance—he was not the man to advocate assassination or provoke civil war for the sake of a principle. The authentic Cato,

s through Cicero. PageBook=>322 would pretend that internecine war and the proscription of ‘boni viri’ could ever pr

e the less a revolutionary leader who won supreme power through civil war . All that he needed from Cicero he had got long a

s there (Dio 51, 20, 5). Orosius, however (6, 21, 1), makes Augustus’ war begin in 28 B.C. 4 On these campaigns, AJP LV (

e Roman peace upon a desolated land. Such was the end of a ten years’ war in Spain (from 28 to 19 B.C.)2. Frail and in de

s arraigned in the courts for high treason on a charge of having made war against the kingdom of Thrace without authority.

Caesar the Dictator fell, dissension in their ranks, ending in civil war and ruin for Rome. Patriotism conspired with pe

ing disturbances: if backed by a provincial army, it might mean civil war the Varro in charge of Syria was perhaps Murena’s

e Princeps, Tiberius and Drusus were pledged to a brilliant career in war and politics, for they were the direct heirs of o

have their word to say about that. Two different conceptions were at war , recalling the rivalry between Antonius, the depu

s was there. Again, Augustus had neither the taste nor the talent for war : Agrippa might be his minister, the organizer of

the East and perhaps for the western lands as well. Not only this the war in Spain was not yet over. Gaul and the Balkans,

arallel. It was a formidable collection of hard-faced men enriched by war and revolution. NotesPage=>350 1 Namely M.

r’s assassination and augmented yet more by Octavianus to finance his war against Antonius. 2 The spoils of victory and the

was the practice always confined to Egypt elsewhere for the needs of war an equestrian officer might be placed in temporar

and the Marsian Poppaedius. Despite the Revolution and the national war of Actium, the process of creating the unity of I

lia whose name, nation and sentiments had so recently been arrayed in war against Rome. But Italy now extended to the Alps,

f confidence of the municipia had been invoked in the crisis of civil war : they were not to be neglected in peace. Augustus

cident. To replenish the ranks of the nobiles, mercilessly thinned by war and proscriptions, a new generation was growing u

is Principate recall the splendour of that last effulgence before the war of Pompeius and Caesar. He persevered for a long

the Picene intriguer, the loquacious Lollius Palicanus. 3 Service in war might find no higher reward than the praetorship,

ty, ‘militaris industria’ was the most valuable endowment. Service in war and the command of armies brought the highest dis

Augustus appeared to stand alone, sustaining the burden of Empire in war and peace: cum tot sustineas et tanta negotia s

h. Pal. 6, 241. 6 Orosius (6, 21, 22), who assigns to him an Alpine war , and Suetonius (De rhet. 6), describing a case tr

h is lost but which earned him ornamenta triumphalia for a successful war , then proconsul of Asia, then legate again, of Sy

own somewhere. Though ILS 918 could be claimed for Quirinius (and the war which he fought as legate of Galatia- Pamphylia c

tatute of 23 B.C. may not have given the Princeps the power of making war and peace. 2 That was not necessary. Embassies fr

after a suitable rehearsal. The assembly of the People might declare war but the People did not decide against whom; the w

against Fulvia, the wife of Antonius; and Rome had fought a national war against a political woman, the Queen of Egypt. Th

y. The provincial armies elevated Vespasian to the purple after civil war . But the proclamation of a new Emperor in default

The rule of Nerva by its impotence threatened to precipitate a civil war . It might be conjectured that the danger was aver

Julia, protector of the young princes and minister of the Princeps in war and government. The marriage was unwelcome, so go

became consul at the age of twenty-nine but that was after service in war , as a military tribune in Spain, a general in Arm

gain splendour and power from his eclipse. Depressed and decimated by war and revolution, swept up into one party and harne

. Lacking Tiberius, the Claudian party lacked a leader of standing in war and politics. A heavy preponderance of consular n

Claudian was not restored to his dignitas. 2 No honour, no command in war awaited him, but a dreary and precarious old age,

st of the frontier troubles, in which, close upon the gravest foreign war since Hannibal (for so the rebellion of Illyricum

complishments, of literary tastes, yet the victor in a great Thracian war , a hard drinker, the boon companion and intimate

ssus Cornelius Lentulus (cos. 1 B.C.), the distinguished general of a war in Africa, a somnolent and lazy person to outward

, 30). Tiberius did not remove him. That was not from fear of a civil war , as Tacitus reports, but because he could trust t

quam alii mores. ’1 So Tacitus, not deluded by the outcome of a civil war that substituted one emperor for another and chan

and letters they cheerfully resigned the contest. The Roman arts were war and government: tu regere imperio populos, Roma

ory, stamped with the sign of the demagogue, the tyrant and the class war ; and many of the principal actors of the tragedy

he advantage over Caesar in Virgil’s solemn exhortation against civil war . As for Antonius, he was the archetype of foreign

posed to temptation than the stepsons of the Princeps the children of war and revolution, enamoured of ease after trouble,

f the Princeps. For the formation of character equal to the duties of war and government, the sciences, the fine arts and m

rtation, since the Romans had recently tasted the bitter realities of war . Next to the gods, Augustus’ most urgent care was

us acre virum’, a tribe small in numbers but renowned for all time in war . In the exaltation of ‘Itala virtus’ Rome magnifi

over the world. They were united now, and strong, a nation wrought by war out of alien stocks and strange tongues Etruscan

of Virgil were intended to counsel and encourage. The profiteers from war and proscriptions had bought land. Though a numbe

mations with the revealing title of ‘cohortes voluntariorum’. 1 The war in Illyricum was a deadly blow, not merely to the

ation imposed duties to the community. Like the Princeps himself, the war profiteers became respectable. ‘Fortuna non mutât

d or turned back. Announced by Apollo, his path lay through blood and war , bella, horrida bella, et Thybrim multo spuma

which paid the bitter penalty for becoming involved in a Roman civil war : si Perusina tibi patriae sunt nota sepulcra (I

relative had fallen in the War of Perusia. 3 Propertius’ distaste for war was well- founded. He claimed to be the poet of l

theme, or the repeated instances of Maecenas. For all his dislike of war , he could turn away from his love and lover’s mel

Troius Aeneas, pietate insignis et armis. 2 The august motives of war and peace received public and monumental commemor

us. 3 This was the shrine and the setting where the Senate debated on war and peace, where generals offered prayers before

the levies of the chieftains of Gallia Comata and strove to give the war the character of a crusade. To this end Drusus de

, for they had known worse, and could see no prospect of a successful war for liberty against the legions and colonies of R

y, there prevailed a conspiracy of silence about the victims of civil war and proscriptions, except for such as could usefu

nument of military despotism. For the nobiles, no more triumphs after war , no more roads, temples and towns named in their

families down to ruin. 1 A descendant of Pompeius Magnus raised civil war against Claudius. 2 The Cornelii Lentuli grew s

display of civic virtue at home and abroad, for it sought to abolish war and politics. There could be no great men any mor

teed by the constitution of Republican Rome. Worn and broken by civil war and disorder, the Roman People was ready to surre

was dull and narrow. But the historian who had experienced one civil war in his own lifetime, and the threat of another, d

nion:3 Tacitus himself would have thought it impossible after a civil war . Like the historian, the student of oratory was

fair show of phrases, namely, the real and imminent menace of a civil war . It was averted by the adoption of Trajan, the go

at it omits than for what it says. The adversaries of the Princeps in war and the victims of his public or private treacher

65, 287, 306, 442, 490; his party, 18 if.; marries a Metella, 20, 31; war against Marius, 16 f., 65, 87 ff., 249, 491; puni

517; Histories, 5, 507; on the Civil Wars, 9; on the results of civil war , 440, 507, 515; on Pompeius, 9; disapproval of po

ia, 171 f., 184; quarrels with Cicero, 183 f.; his distaste for civil war , 183 f., 203; campaign of Philippi, 203 ff.; his

88, 374. Loyalty, need for, in politics, 120, 157; impaired by civil war , 157 f.; see also Fides. Luca, pact of, 37, 44, 7

, 65, 89 f. Marius, T., soldier from Urvinum, 353, 354. Marmaridae, war against, 399. PageBook=>555 Maroboduus, Ki

exions, 501 f.; character of his rule, 517, 518. Neutrality, in civil war , 5, 51, 62, 64, 139, 291, 517. Nigidius Figulus

proconsul of Bithynia, 303. Thrace, as a client kingdom, 390, 476; war in, 391, 398. Thucydides, on civil war, 154; im

a client kingdom, 390, 476; war in, 391, 398. Thucydides, on civil war , 154; imitated by Cassius Dio, 154; by Sallust, 2