ve entirely, from this illuminating work—in an earlier form and draft they were the substance of lectures delivered at Oxfor

ts of peace and by the apparent termination of the revolutionary age, they were willing to acquiesce, if not actively to sha

devise a formula, revealing to the members of the governing class how they could co-operate in maintaining the new order, os

d power through revolution emerge as champions of ordered government, they do not surrender anything. Neglect of the convent

ome and governed provinces; new-comers to the senatorial aristocracy, they all became deeply imbued with the traditional spi

alliances and the feuds of the dynasts, monarchic faction- leaders as they were called, the Free State perished NotesPage=

PageBook=>010 WHEN the patricians expelled the kings from Rome, they were careful to retain the kingly power, vested i

of six NotesPage=>010 1 Along with Claudii, Aemilii and Manlii they formed an aristocracy within the patriciate itsel

in the splendour and pride of the governing class. For that surrender they were scorned by senators. They did not mind. 1 So

r spoke against these ‘homines honestissimi’ and never let them down: they were in the habit of requiting his services by lo

volution in Rome were usually impoverished or idealistic nobles, that they found support in the higher ranks of the aristocr

to enlist them on the side of the dominant oligarchy. He failed, and they rose against Rome in the name of freedom and just

e houses suffered defeat in the struggle for power, and long eclipse, they were saved from extinction by the primitive tenac

of kinship and reciprocal interest. They called themselves Optimates: they might properly be described, in contemporary defi

on and murder, and growing ever fatter on the spoil of the provinces, they lacked both principle to give inner coherence and

ndicates, probably deriving their origin from Picenum, a region where they possessed large estates and wide influence. 1 Cn.

n, managed the negotiations between tribunes and army commanders when they united to overthrow the constitution of Sulla. 4

ely the head of an Italian confederation. In the capital of the world they were anachronistic and ruinous. To the bloodless

in the Curia, and destroyed that building in the conflagration. Then they streamed out of the city to the villa of Pompeius

who emulated the Scipiones in their great age: obscure for a century, they emerge again into sudden prominence with three co

ined a sacred vendetta against Pompeius. For Cato or for the Republic they postponed vengeance, but did not forget a brother

e the father of Marcellinus (cos. 56), cf. P-W IV, 1390. 2 Not that they were all, or consistently, allies of Pompeius: Le

to war or not, in either way gaining the mastery. They were not duped they knew Pompeius: but they fancied that Pompeius, we

way gaining the mastery. They were not duped they knew Pompeius: but they fancied that Pompeius, weakened by the loss of hi

il the end of the year 49 B.C. are still matters of controversy. 1 If they were ever clear, debate and misrepresentation soo

o long as he was not at the head of an army in the field. Upon Caesar they had thrust the choice between civil war and polit

ae ad Caesarem senem could be taken as genuine, or even contemporary, they would provide valuable evidence of strong anti-ca

d posterity has seen fit to condemn the act of the Liberators, for so they were styled, as worse than a crime a folly. The v

suasion and by no means a fanatic. 2 As for the tenets of the Stoics, they could support doctrines quite distasteful to Roma

invoking the sanctity of contracts, might have urged that, after all, they had ‘hired the money’. PageBook=>058 oliga

Libertas. Dubious history and irrelevant. 1 The Liberators knew what they were about. Honourable men grasped the assassin

Sulla restored the oligarchic rule of the nobiles. Thirty years later they clustered around Pompeius, from interest, from am

erred upon the Roman plebs:3 he could also appeal to the duties which they owed to birth and station. The plebs would not ha

rivals and by the rise of dynastic plebeian houses like the Metelli, they remembered their ancient glory and strove to reco

not in vain. In the time of Sulla the Fabii have declined so far that they cannot show a consul. A Fabius Maximus followed C

his, Dio 40, 63, 5.) PageBook=>070 constitution did not matter they were older than the Roman Republic. It was the am

st his enemies Caesar appealed to the legions, devoted and invincible they could tear down the very heavens, so he told peop

arantees against revolution. They had more to fear from Pompeius, and they knew it. Caesar’s party had no monopoly of the ba

ty and consecrated among the uncontested memorials of history. Sulla, they said, put common soldiers into the Senate: but th

pulent and cultivated natives of dynastic families, Hellenized before they became Roman, whose citizenship, so far from bein

rateful clients. Balbus, Oppius and Matius had not entered the Senate they did not need to, being more useful elsewhere. But

in the army superintending supply or commanding regiments of cavalry, they had acquired varied and valuable experience, now

had acquired varied and valuable experience, now to be employed when they governed provinces and led armies of Roman legion

ia, the aristocracy retained in civic and urban garb the predominance they had enjoyed in a feudal or tribal order of societ

3 with the aristocracy of the capital. Like the patricians of Rome, they asserted descent from kings and gods, and through

dynastic families it could in truth be proved as well as stated that they had always been there. The Caecinae of Etruscan V

or power at Rome, the patricians were ready to enlist allies wherever they might be found. They spread their influence among

plebeian houses might acquire wealth and dynastic power at Rome, but they could never enter the rigid and defined caste of

to Latin or Volscian history. The Junii could not rise to a king, but they did their best, producing that Brutus, himself of

the patricians much purer. They did not need to descend to fraud, and they could admit an alien origin without shame or comp

l inscr. CIEtr. 1, 272. Also the Calpurnii (Schulze, LE, 138), though they faked a descent from the Sabine Numa (Plutarch, N

y service he might enter the senatorial order under their protection: they never fancied that he would aspire to the consula

e forefront, without whom no triumph had ever been celebrated whether they fought against Rome or for her. 4 The Marsi provi

oniuratio of eight peoples against Rome, in the name of Italy. Italia they stamped as a legend upon their coins, and Italia

mped as a legend upon their coins, and Italia was the new state which they established with its capital at Corfinium. 1 This

ort a privilege but to destroy Rome. They nearly succeeded. Not until they had been baffled and shattered in war did the fie

ed the memory of Cato and of Marius but it was for himself, as though they were his own ancestors. 3 He desired that the sen

last. The Paeligni have to wait a generation yet, it is true, before they can show a senator; 4 the leading families of the

nsurgent leaders in the Bellum Italicum, gain from Caesar the dignity they deserved but otherwise might never have attained.

may sometimes be detected in the alien roots of their names, to which they give a regular and Latin termination not so the m

nly deed but a childish lack of counsel. ’2 Brutus and Cassius, since they were praetors, should have usurped authority and

r; for the august traditions of the Roman Senate and the Roman People they had no sympathy at all. The politicians of the pr

ervative or revolutionary, despised so utterly the plebs of Rome that they felt no scruples when they enhanced its degradati

despised so utterly the plebs of Rome that they felt no scruples when they enhanced its degradation. Even Cato admitted the

n house, descended from the kings of Rome and from the immortal gods; they buried his daughter Julia with the honours of a p

gods; they buried his daughter Julia with the honours of a princess; they cheered at the games, the shows and the triumphs

esar’s defiance of the Senate and his triumph over noble adversaries, they too had a share of power and glory. Discontent, i

hout excuse: their Imperator, in defence of whose station and dignity they took up arms against his enemies, had been treach

and May lurked in the little towns of Latium in the vicinity of Rome, they gathered adherents’ from the local aristocracies.

price was civil war. Even had the Liberators been willing to pay it, they could find little to encourage them abroad. The e

tempt to secure a majority of the army commanders for their cause and they did not think that it was necessary. At the time

s plotted real revolution instead of the mere removal of an autocrat, they would clearly have failed. Yet even now, despite

me and in Italy rather than with the troops and in the provinces. Yet they were nothing new or alarming in the holders of of

ersonal friendship. 3 He had no quarrel with the Liberators providing they did not interfere with the first object of his am

d along with the principes a source of intrigue and feuds. Pompeius they might have tolerated for a time, or even Caesar,

for different reasons, the Caesarian young men Curio and Caelius, had they survived for so long the inevitable doom of bri

and Cassius to an extraordinary commission for the rest of the year: they were to superintend the collection of corn in the

, taking their stand upon their principles and their personal honour: they told Antonius that they valued their own libertas

n their principles and their personal honour: they told Antonius that they valued their own libertas more than his amicitia

immediate intentions the Liberators said no word in their edict. But they now prepared to depart from Italy. They had hesit

provide a cause of civil war and their proud conviction that wherever they were, there stood Rome and the Republic. 2 Cassiu

house certain of the veteran soldiers of his bodyguard, alleging that they had been suborned by Octavianus to assassinate hi

rious person called L. Pinarius Scarpus were nephews of the Dictator: they received a share of his fortune through the will,

ictator: they received a share of his fortune through the will, which they are said to have resigned to Octavianus. 4 Nothin

ve sided with Marius in the civil wars, suffering in consequence. But they could not be stripped of their ancestors Octavian

men in his party terrified the holders of property. But not for long they were a minority and could be held in check. The c

eight men of senatorial rank can be discovered among his generals and they are not an impressive company. 1 Senators who h

vianus sought when he arrived in Campania. Friends of Caesar, to whom they owed all, they would surely not repel his heir. Y

hen he arrived in Campania. Friends of Caesar, to whom they owed all, they would surely not repel his heir. Yet these men, m

of others. Even a nonentity is a power when consul at Rome. A policy they had, and they might achieve it to restore concord

en a nonentity is a power when consul at Rome. A policy they had, and they might achieve it to restore concord in the Caesar

Roman State. They would gladly see Antonius curbed but not destroyed: they were not at all willing to be captured by an anti

ertain other names are mentioned, P. Servilius, L. Piso and Cicero: they are described as neutrals, their policy dishonest

rhaps. The subtle intriguers were now showing their hand. In November they were clearly working for their young kinsman. 4 B

ht be said to have encouraged the designs of Octavianus. That was all they had in common in character, career and policy the

wisdom. The mild and humane doctrines of the Epicureans, liable as they were to the easy and conventional reproach of neg

ctions of the consul. His observations were negative and provocative: they called forth from Antonius complaints of violated

inevitable clash: on the contrary, relations of friendship, to which they could each with justice appeal. In 49 B.C. Antoni

e been reckoned as a political factor by Cicero and P. Servilius when they attacked the consul. However that may be, by th

won power, the acta of Caesar would be more decisively confirmed than they were on March 17th; if he failed, Antonius would

n Etruria, Brutus in the Cisalpina, contumacious against a consul. As they were both acting on private initiative for the sa

ere both acting on private initiative for the salvation of the State, they clamoured to have their position legalized. The o

settlement based upon compromise were neither fools nor traitors. If they followed Cicero there was no telling where they w

ools nor traitors. If they followed Cicero there was no telling where they would end. When Republicans both distrusted the p

s, or for peace. The new consuls had a policy of their own, if only they were strong enough to achieve it. Public pronou

, cannot altogether suppress the arguments of the other side, whether they employ to that end calumny or silence: they often

f the other side, whether they employ to that end calumny or silence: they often betray what they strive most carefully to c

er they employ to that end calumny or silence: they often betray what they strive most carefully to conceal. But certain top

chants may be styled the flower of society, the pride of the Empire:3 they earn a dignitas of their own and claim virtues ab

fficiis I, 150 f. is instructive: if business men retire and buy land they become quite respectable. 4 Pro C. Rabino Postu

this prerogative, but not its validity. 1 The Romans believed that they were a conservative people, devoted to the worshi

s had restored the power of the tribunate, Roman politicians, whether they asserted the People’s rights or the Senate’s, wer

asserted the People’s rights or the Senate’s, were acting a pretence: they strove for power only. 1 Sallustius soon went dee

, a cause which all parties professed with such contentious zeal that they were impelled to civil strife. The non-party gove

erisive ring. 3 The friends of peace had to abandon their plea when they spoke for war. Peace should not be confused with

with servitude; 4 negotiations with an enemy must be spurned because they were dangerous as well as dishonourable5 they mig

must be spurned because they were dangerous as well as dishonourable5 they might impair the resolution of the patriotic fron

blic good was supported by the profession of private virtues, if such they should NotesPage=>156 1 Ad Att. 14, 21, 2;

th excited emulation among the generals of the western provinces when they decided to desert the government, making common c

ealth. The legionaries at least were sincere. From personal loyalty they might follow great leaders like Caesar or Antoniu

onal loyalty they might follow great leaders like Caesar or Antonius: they had no mind to risk their lives for intriguers su

their superiors; and the plea of patriotism was all-embracing surely they could help the State on whichever side they stood

was all-embracing surely they could help the State on whichever side they stood. 2 The conversion of a military leader mi

traordinary commands were against the spirit of the constitution8 but they might be necessary to save the State. Of that the

eparted with their kinsman and leader M. Junius Brutus, whether or no they had been implicated in the Ides of March. Like Br

toritas, so custom prescribed, should direct the policy of the State: they are suitably designated as ‘auctores publici cons

s much less. Various in character, standing and allegiance, as a body they revealed a marked deficiency in vigour, decision

aining five Cicero did not count as consulars at all: that is to say, they were Caesarians. His harsh verdict is borne out b

e was still no certain knowledge at Rome at the end of the year. That they would in fact not go to their trivial provinces o

st. The friends and relatives of Brutus and Cassius at Rome, whatever they knew, probably kept a discreet silence. Macedonia

friend of Antonius, was adopted. Envoys were to be sent to Antonius; they were to urge him to withdraw his army from the pr

le the Senate negotiated with Antonius, Brutus and Cassius had acted: they seized the armies of all the lands beyond the sea

y protested loyalty to the Republic, devotion to concord. To that end they urged an accommodation. Servilius spoke against i

ctavianus, spirited, cogent and menacing. Antonius warned them that they were being used by Pompeians to destroy the Caesa

he south-east of Bononia, at Claterna and at Forum Cornelii. In March they moved forward in the direction of Mutina, passing

have subjugated the strong Caesarian sympathies of officers and men: they followed Lepidus not from merit or affection but

and lack of principle. They had no quarrel with Antonius; it was not they who had built up a novel and aggressive faction,

was impossible to discover. For the judgement on these men, if judged they must be, it would be sufficient to demonstrate th

n, if judged they must be, it would be sufficient to demonstrate that they acted as they did from a reasoned and balanced es

hey must be, it would be sufficient to demonstrate that they acted as they did from a reasoned and balanced estimate of the

rly the influence of the veterans. 4 The veterans had no wish for war they had NotesPage=>166 1 Ad fam. 10, 24. On Oc

action and to fight against their fellow-citizens had the result that they were described as ‘Madmen’ by the adversaries of

ntonius deprived Brutus and Cassius of the praetorian provinces which they had refused to take over (P-W x, 1000). This date

Ib. I, 17. PageBook=>171 ‘Read again your words and deny that they are the supplications of a slave to a despot. ’1

andate of the army and the proposals of Caesar’s heir. For themselves they asked the promised bounty, for Octavianus the con

the promised bounty, for Octavianus the consulate. The latter request they were able to support with a wealth of historical

legions from Africa arrived at Ostia. Along with a legion of recruits they were stationed on the Janiculum and the city was

ted Caesar’s clemency. 1 The Caesarian leaders had defied public law: they now abolished the private rights of citizenship n

d-lust of Fulvia. It may be doubted whether contemporaries agreed. If they had the leisure and the taste to draw fine distin

tions between the three terrorists, it was hardly for Octavianus that they invoked indulgence and made allowances. Regrets t

ss, logical and concordant. On the list of the proscriptions all told they set one hundred and thirty senators and a great n

out of the land, thus precluding any armed insurrection in Italy when they settled accounts with the Liberators. Cicero coul

existing order. Nor would Antonius and his associates have behaved as they did, could security and power be won in any other

s. The proletariat of Italy, long exploited and thwarted, seized what they regarded as their just portion. A social revoluti

le through a more equitable division of landed property in Italy; now they were companions in adversity. The beneficiaries o

ting. From virtue or from caution, men refused to purchase estates as they came upon the market. Money soared in value. The

publican personage for leader, the daughter of the orator Hortensius, they abated their demands a little, but did not Note

tator: with the ignominy of the new senators of the Triumviral period they could not have competed. Not only aliens or men o

ropriety were now cast off in the choice of magistrates, nominated as they were, not NotesPage=>196 1 Appian, BC 4, 3

cellus had played their part for Caesar’s heir and served their turn: they departed to die in peace. Lepidus’ brother, the p

Italy, were with the Liberators or with Sex. Pompeius. With Pompeius they found a refuge, with Brutus and Cassius a party a

inction chose Caesar in preference to Pompeius and the oligarchy; but they would not tolerate Caesar’s ostensible political

hed Antonius with generals and diplomats and secured two consulates:4 they were Umbrian in origin. 5 These were among the ea

r. The leaders decided to employ twenty-eight legions. Eight of these they dispatched in advance across the Adriatic under C

Italy and the Balkans. The communications of the Caesarians were cut: they must advance and hope for a speedy decision on la

d avoid battle. They commanded both the Ionian Sea and the Aegean. If they were able to prolong the campaign into the winter

ng back the advance guards of the Caesarians under Norbanus and Saxa, they arrived in the vicinity of Philippi, where they t

er Norbanus and Saxa, they arrived in the vicinity of Philippi, where they took up a strong position astride the Via Egnatia

use were led before the victorious generals, Antonius, it is alleged, they saluted as imperator, but reviled Octavianus. A n

m L. Calpurnius Bibulus and M. Valerius Messalla. 6 After negotiation they made an honourable capitulation to Antonius, some

e East and exact the requisite money. About the provinces of the West they made the following dispositions, treating Lepidus

llowing dispositions, treating Lepidus as negligible. Cisalpine Gaul, they NotesPage=>206 1 Velleius 2, 71, 2 f.: the

rked down to satisfy the soldiery were not slow to make open protest: they suggested that the imposition should be spread ou

cient wrong. Political contests at Rome and the civil wars into which they degenerated were fought at the expense of Italy.

his absent brother. 1 They played a double game. Before the veterans they laid the blame upon Octavianus, insisting that a

estige of the victor of Philippi was overwhelming. On the other side, they championed liberty and the rights of the disposse

r such as can have attended none of his more recent predecessors when they had liberated Rome from the domination of a facti

s held for him by Calenus and Ventidius with a huge force of legions: they , too, had opposed Salvidienus. 2 But that was n

tion with Plancus and relieve Perusia. Marching across the Apennines, they were arrested by Agrippa and Salvidienus at Fulgi

the veterans of Philippi were Octavianus’ share in a policy for which they were jointly responsible. The victor of Philippi

re L. Scribonius Libo and Sentius Saturninus (Appian, BC 5, 52, 217): they brought with them Julia, the mother of Antonius,

nius; some turned back. 4 Octavianus might command a mass of legions: they were famished and unreliable, and he had no ships

s, were a visible reminder of Caesarian loyalty alone of the senators they had sought to defend Caesar the Dictator when he

ad and peace. Following the impeccable precedent set by the soldiers, they constrained the Caesarian leaders to open negotia

Triumvirs and Pompeius met near Puteoli in the summer of the year 39: they argued, bargained, and banqueted on the admiral’s

e horsemen swept over Syria, killing Decidius Saxa the governor; then they overran southern Asia as far as the coast of Cari

lready been made by Antonius. During the course of the following year they were modified and completed. It will be convenien

red or the position of the Caesarian leaders so far consolidated that they could dispense with the dictatorial and invidious

ompeius, many took service under Antonius and remained with him until they recognized, to their own salvation, the better ca

f Pompeius without reluctance; and few Republicans could preserve, if they had ever acquired, sufficient faith in the princi

th in the principles of any of the Pompeii, into whose fatal alliance they had been driven or duped. Ahenobarbus kept away f

pany of Sex. Pompeius might be able to influence Antonius or Lepidus: they had done so before. For Octavianus there subsiste

PageBook=>232 generals of Antonius. Gradually and relentlessly they hunted him down, Furnius, Titius and the Galatian

a great number, being servile in origin, lacked any right or status: they were handed over to their former masters or, fail

=>239 remunerated for their daring and their foresight. As yet they were conspicuous by their rarity. The vanquished

were commended by no known military service to the Triumvirs. Nor did they achieve great fame afterwards, either the nobiles

dignity, recent creations almost all. By the end of the year 33 B.C. they numbered over thirty, a total without precedent.

new nobility. No record stands of the sentiments of the nobiles when they contemplated the golden crown worn by a man calle

lity or by craft. 2 The marshals might disappear, some as suddenly as they had arisen, but the practice of diplomacy engende

for their taste. 3 Of those great exemplars none had survived; and they left few enough to inherit or propagate their fam

is successors, the breaking of his empire into separate kingdoms; and they could set before them the heirs and the marshals

the birth-place of Bibaculus. PageBook=>252 The new poets, as they were called, possessed a common doctrine and tech

ogues themselves, not from ascertained and well- authenticated facts: they cannot be employed in historical reconstruction.

en, diplomatists and other poets, such as the tragedian Varius Rufus, they journeyed together to Brundisium, at that time wh

The Triumvirs were powerless to oppose subservient to popular favour, they built a temple, consecrated to the service of the

eir as Apollo, Antonius as Dionysus. 5 It was by no means evident how they were to operate a fusion NotesPage=>256 1

he name and the fabric of a free state. That was not so long ago. But they had changed with the times, rapidly. Of the Repub

een her for nearly four years. Fonteius brought her to Antioch, where they spent the winter of the year 37-36 in counsel and

o not seem to have excited alarm or criticism at Rome: only later did they become a sore point and pretext for defamation. F

162, &c. 4 It is seldom possible, however, to determine whether they got the franchise from Caesar or from Augustus.

t and detail cannot be recovered: the resplendent donations, whatever they were, made no difference at all to provincial adm

he place of proconsuls and publicara meant order, content and economy they supplied levies, gifts and tribute to the rulers

narchs impotent or ridiculous. Pompeius or Caesar might have annexed: they wisely preferred to preserve the rich land from s

an followers (a nephew and a grandson of Cato were still with him) as they were to Octavianus’ agents and to subsequent hist

nius or of Cleopatra were not the true cause of the War of Actium ; 4 they were a pretext in the strife for power, the magni

ice on January 1st. They did not read the dispatch of Antonius, which they had received late in the preceding autumn. They m

ously have made a compromise with Octavianus:1 it is more likely that they were afraid to divulge its contents. Antonius ask

ked with the timid and the time-serving, ready to turn against him if they dared: it was a bad sign that more than three hun

ir allegiance on a calculation of interest, or preferred to lapse, if they could, into a safe and inglorious neutrality. Yet

ion against Rome by the peoples of Italy, precisely the Italiciy when they fought for freedom and justice in 90 B.C That was

. PageBook=>289 oath was imposed. In the military colonies and they were numerous there can have been little difficul

le difficulty. Though many of the veterans had served under Antonius, they had received their lands from his rival, regarded

luence to induce the municipal senates to pass patriotic resolutions; they persuaded their neighbours, they bribed or bullie

nates to pass patriotic resolutions; they persuaded their neighbours, they bribed or bullied their dependents, just as that

o-nets and all the apparatus of oriental luxury. That was absurd; and they knew what war was like. On a cool estimate, the s

at Pharsalus, but finally and fatally at Philippi. They knew it, and they knew the price of peace and survival. There was

PageBook=>293 the Senate and a large number of Roman knights: they followed him from conviction, interest or fear. H

ss the Adriatic a force superior to his own—still less feed them when they arrived. Fighting quality was another matter. Sin

ere inferior to Italians, it is true, but by no means contemptible if they came from the virile and martial populations of M

ty of Caesarian legions to a general of Caesar’s dash and vigour; but they lacked the moral advantage of attack and that sti

a mastery that neither Pompeius nor the Liberators had achieved when they contended against invaders coming from Italy. I

he gentilicia of a number of soldiers of eastern origin the fact that they were given the Roman franchise on enlistment by c

ntest for power had intended that there should be a serious battle if they could help it. So it turned out. Actium was a sha

, CAH X, 113 ff. PageBook=>301 children of Cleopatra, whatever they might be and whatever they were worth, Octavianus

=>301 children of Cleopatra, whatever they might be and whatever they were worth, Octavianus naturally cancelled; for t

30 B.C.). 2 The other provinces of the East, not so important because they lacked permanent garrisons of legions, were in th

Octavianus had skilfully worked upon such apprehensions. Once aroused they would be difficult to allay: their echo could sti

itself to the wishes of the chief men in his party. For loyal service they had been heavily rewarded with consulates, triump

iends and allies—and perhaps with neutral politicians. They knew what they were about. In name, in semblance and in theory t

d. Moreover, the chief men of his party were not jurists or theorists— they were diplomats, soldiers, engineers and financier

itically forgotten, buried in fraudulent laudations of the dead. What they required was not the ambitious and perfidious dyn

adventurers and ministers of despotism. There were none of them left— they had all joined the national government. Cicero wo

and provided from his own pocket the bounty for the legionaries when they retired from service. NotesPage=>322 1 Res

ius, Crassus and Caesar took a large share of provinces. From 55 B.C. they held Gaul, Cisalpine and Transalpine, Spain and S

n his provincia rather than as governors of provinces. To begin with, they are praetorian in a majority. That was to be expe

n of Sulla the Dictator, the public provinces were ten in number. Now they were only eight, about as many as the Senate coul

thers had consular ancestors—if their parents were senatorial at all, they were obscure and low in rank. These legates were

w merely a matter for the lot, was no less happy and inspired than if they were legates of Augustus instead of proconsuls, i

felt the force of Roman arms; and in the confusion of the Civil Wars they extended their raids and their domination southwa

tter will never be known: it was known to few enough at the time, and they preferred not to publish a secret of state. The i

the absence of a full measure of mutual trust or of mutual affection they knew too much for that, and revolutionaries are n

is intentions, the Princeps restored certain provinces to proconsuls: they were merely Narbonensis and Cyprus, no great loss

Agrippa. Augustus could not afford to alienate all three. In alliance they had made him, in alliance they might destroy him.

ord to alienate all three. In alliance they had made him, in alliance they might destroy him. The marriage with Livia Drus

udius Nero and Nero Claudius Drusus. For them she worked and schemed; they had already received dispensations allowing them

3), becoming quaestor in the next year. PageBook=>341 Even had they not been the step-sons of the Princeps, Tiberius

nd Drusus were pledged to a brilliant career in war and politics, for they were the direct heirs of one branch of the patric

New State with a vengeance. The nobiles were helpless but vindictive: they made a point of not attending the funeral games o

oint of not attending the funeral games of Agrippa, dead earlier than they could have hoped. 4 Of Agrippa, scant honour in

kept his secret and never told his true opinion about the leader whom they all supported for Rome’s sake. The service of the

Tiberius after him, he was constrained to stifle his sentiments. What they thought of their common taskmaster was never reco

Book=>345 Though the patrician Claudii were held to be arrogant, they were the very reverse of exclusive, recalling wit

. 3 Absurd for the aftermath of Actium, when the lines were composed, they are not even appropriate to a later date, when Ag

ted the danger of any premature manifestation of hereditary monarchy; they had restored unity by secret compulsion, with Agr

erius and Drusus would be available to second or to replace him. Even they would not suffice. It would be necessary, behind

to retain senatorial rank, in name at least. As soon as a census came they would forfeit it, if they had lost their fortunes

in name at least. As soon as a census came they would forfeit it, if they had lost their fortunes. After Actium certain cit

onius, Saxa slain by the Parthians, Ventidius of a natural death. Had they survived from good fortune or a better calculatio

d they survived from good fortune or a better calculation in treason, they would have held pride of place among the grand ol

the quaestorship). Ex-centurions would naturally not be excluded, if they had acquired the financial status of knights (whi

eedmen soon occupy military posts; 7 and, just as under the Republic, they are attested as senators in the purified Senate o

oo often been a political nuisance. When at variance with the Senate, they endangered for gain the stability of the Commonwe

ey endangered for gain the stability of the Commonwealth: in alliance they perpetuated abuses in Italy and throughout the pr

ena), an intimate friend of the Princeps in earlier days. Augustus, they said, once thought of giving his daughter Julia i

egion from Etruria eastwards towards Picenum and the Sabine land. Now they came from all Italy in its widest extension, from

fidence of the municipia had been invoked in the crisis of civil war: they were not to be neglected in peace. Augustus encou

ying of Italy may with propriety be taken to commend and justify, but they do not explain in root and origin, the acts of Ca

n from the provinces entered the legions of the Roman People, whether they already possessed the Roman franchise or not. Hen

and prosperous regions, were loyal to the government of Rome now that they had passed from the clientela of the Pompeii to t

administrative hierarchy in the first century of the Principate until they set a provincial emperor upon the throne and foun

the provinces served as officers in the equestris militia; 3 further, they held procuratorships and high equestrian posts un

hen extended to colonies of full citizen-rights in the provinces, for they are an integral part of the Roman State, wherever

provinces, for they are an integral part of the Roman State, wherever they may be Corduba, Lugdunum, or even Pisidian Antioc

Amastris). 5 A. Stein, Der r. Ritterstand, 291 ff. 6 And, should they possess the Jus Italicum, they are treated as a p

. Ritterstand, 291 ff. 6 And, should they possess the Jus Italicum, they are treated as a part of Italy, even for fiscal p

e magistracies: it is therefore hard to discern under what conditions they were liberated from control and restored to Repub

l their patronage, he conveniently revived the Republic to be used as they had used it. To the People Augustus restored free

red by the magnificence of their champion, the plebs of Rome knew how they were expected to use that freedom. On the other h

nt or absent, should assume the title of Dictator. When he refused, they persisted in the next best thing, leaving vacant

ually developed into a series of separate commands, it was right that they should be regarded and governed as separate provi

approved of by Augustus; 3 the other, a critic of exacting taste, so they said, had Ovid’s poems by heart. 4 Nobiles did

the consulate did not matter so much. Enemies were dangerous only if they had armies and even then they would hardly be abl

so much. Enemies were dangerous only if they had armies and even then they would hardly be able to induce the soldiers to ma

mpete. Even if lucky enough to have retained their ancestral estates, they were now deprived of the ruinous profits of polit

wer, debarred from alliances with those financial interests with whom they once had shared the spoils of the provinces. Augu

leges had naturally been filled with partisans during the Revolution: they continued thus to be recruited. 3 Calvisius and T

ty members. The sons of the slain would be available before long. But they would not suffice. Augustus at once proceeded to

g: active, though studiously masked under the Principate of Augustus, they grow with the passage of dynastic politics into m

. Three military provinces, however, were governed by proconsuls. But they too were drawn from his partisans. For the presen

s newly returned from Spain and Gaul. During the last fourteen years, they had seldom been together in the same place. Deman

the viri triumphales of the revolutionary period. After twenty years they were growing old or had disappeared: a new conste

us, Divus Aug. 38. 6 Suetonius, Divus Aug. 38, 2. 7 At this time, they are often, perhaps usually, quaestorian in rank,

tant provinces, one after another. These were among the greatest, but they were not exceptional. Vinicius is a close paralle

, had built up a powerful dominion, was isolated on west and east. If they could with accuracy and completeness be recovered

the only names that mattered in the critical period in question, but they are enough to illuminate the varied composition o

f.: the curatores aedium sacrarum et operum locorumque publicorum, as they were later called. 4 Frontinus, De aq. 99 and 1

in his clientela. 2 Descendants of Pompeius survived: no chance that they would be allowed to hold high command in Spain. T

t questions of policy had been the subject of open and public debate: they were now decided in secret by a few men. 1 He is

council of senators and their inevitable impermanence, restricted as they were to six months of the year, shows clearly tha

tated the conduct of public business or the dispensing of justice but they did not debate and determine the paramount questi

ries later emerge as ministers of State, under Caligula and Claudius: they had been there for a long time. 8 Senators migh

did not decide against whom; the wars, however grandiose and arduous they might be, were not always dignified with that nam

d honoured title of ‘Allies and Friends of the Roman People’: in fact they were the clients of the Princeps, and they knew i

the Roman People’: in fact they were the clients of the Princeps, and they knew it. Their kingdoms were his gift, precarious

he loss of his two most trusty counsellors, Agrippa and Maecenas: had they lived, certain things would never have happened.

ius and Lucius in a private letter Augustus expressed his prayer that they should inherit his position in their turn. 2 Th

mated by war and revolution, swept up into one party and harnessed as they had been to the service of the State, the nobiles

d the origin of Augustus, remembered his past and loathed his person, they could neither compete with the Divi filius nor ho

n People, the master of the legions, the king of kings. For all that, they might flourish in the shadow of the monarchy, pro

commanded armies in the period of Tiberius’ seclusion. None the less, they were personages to be reckoned with especially th

ius Varus, who were not so deeply committed to the court faction that they could not survive, and even profit from, a revuls

l particulars of her misbehaviour, her paramours and her accomplices: they were said to be numerous, of every order of socie

flatterer of Tiberius. 1 If many knew the truth of the whole episode, they were not likely to tell it. It is evident, and it

grippa Postumus, the only surviving grandchildren of the Princeps and they did not survive for long. In A.D. 8 a new scandal

areer, commanding the army of the Balkans after their praetorships; 2 they received the consulate but no consular military p

ere alert to prosecute their advantage. Tiberius Caesar had the power they would not let him enjoy it in security and goodwi

ate, such as Asinius Gallus, played without skill the parts for which they had been chosen perhaps in feigned and malignant

become conscious of their own individual character as a people. While they took over and assimilated all that the Hellenes c

hile they took over and assimilated all that the Hellenes could give, they shaped their history, their traditions and their

eat kings in the eastern lands, the successors of the Macedonian; and they had subdued to their rule nations more intractabl

ould not compete with Greece for primacy in science, arts and letters they cheerfully resigned the contest. The Roman arts w

Augustus, like the historian Tacitus, would have none of them; and so they receive no praise from the poets. 1 Pompeius was

he ancient ideals of duty, piety, chastity and frugality. 4 How could they be restored? About the efficacy of moral and su

h some might show a certain restraint in changing husbands or lovers, they were seldom exemplars of the domestic virtues of

were more often heard in public than was expedient for honest women: they became politicians and patrons of the arts. They

nd a senator. 2 Only law and oratory were held to be respectable. But they must not be left to specialists or to mere schola

tian cults, pervasive and alarmingly popular in the Triumviral period they were banished now from the precincts of the city.

ic as identical in life, habit and ideals with the rough farmers whom they led to battle generals and soldiers alike the pro

bauched grammarian Q. Remmius Palaemon were noted for the rich return they secured from their vines. 1 But the advocates o

cf. above all M. Rostovtzeff, Soc. and Ec. Hist., 50 ff. 4 Not that they were bad farmers. Compare the precepts touching a

lame the efficacy of the Augustan reform or damn its authors, whoever they were. The Augustus of history and panegyric stand

specious charm. Augustus’ own views were narrow and definite. How far they won acceptance it is difficult to say. Of the eff

gour of whose parsimony was not relaxed even by the splendid fortunes they amassed. Vespasian, an emperor from the Sabine co

an peasants, still less for members of the Italian bourgeoisie. 2 But they were a tough and military stock. That was what wa

military men promoted under the New State, there is no evidence that they were interested in fostering letters or the arts.

h their record of recent and contemporary history had been preserved, they would no doubt set forth the ‘lessons of history’

hat Augustus’ historian also spoke with respect of Brutus and Cassius they had fought for the constitution; and even with pr

scations that followed Philippi or the disorders of the Perusine War: they subsequently regained their property, or at least

grown to manhood and to maturity in the period of the Revolution; and they all repaid Augustus more than he or the age could

tion of the Etruscans, and Patavium, the city of the Illyrian Veneti, they cannot be detected in the character or in the pol

[rrae] huic imperent regantque nos felicibu[s] voteis sueis. 2 When they died, the town council of Pisa gave vent to patri

h, it may be presumed, was administered to the Eastern provinces when they were reconquered from Antonius. Later at least, s

Pompeius, Antonius and Caesar, along with their clientela, the homage they enjoyed. Caesar accepted honours from whomsoever

cepted honours from whomsoever voted, no doubt in the spirit in which they were granted: policy and system cannot be discove

e cult of their patron, friend and master. They gave cities his name, they erected temples in his honour. 5 One of the earli

ainst the German invader. When the Romans set out to conquer Germany, they intended to employ the levies of the chieftains o

about their rulers or making representations to the Princeps. How far they deemed it safe or expedient to exert their rights

w far they deemed it safe or expedient to exert their rights, if such they were, is another question. The rule of Rome in th

k=>478 Yet on the whole the provinces were contented enough, for they had known worse, and could see no prospect of a s

ad been built up at their expense. They had no illusions about it and they remembered Philippi, with melancholy pride, as th

cracy knew the truth and suffered in bitter impotence, not least when they derived profit and advancement from the present o

1 Tacitus, Ann. 1, 10. 2 According to Suetonius (Divus Aug. 19, 1) they were usually discovered before they had gone very

g to Suetonius (Divus Aug. 19, 1) they were usually discovered before they had gone very far. 3 This is the argument in Ta

variegated vice were freely circulated and no doubt widely believed: they belong to a category of literary material that co

lic, must have been privately canvassed and derided as offensive when they were not palpably fraudulent. His personal courag

tioned the veracity of Caesar; in his contemporaries, especially when they dealt with the period of which he had personal ex

ans had not delayed to produce their memoirs: it may be presumed that they were not alarmingly outspoken about the career of

works, he would ostentatiously omit certain passages, explaining that they would be read after his death. 4 The last years

Crete (A.D. 12?). 3 Even there he was a nuisance: twelve years later they removed him to the barren rock of Seriphus. 4 N

t not the living. Few of them, indeed, survived in Juvenal’s day, and they mattered not at all. The Empire had broken their

ere now dominant in the social and political hierarchy of the Empire, they wore the purple of the Caesars. Juvenal’s poem

mselves. They have left no personal and authentic record to show what they thought of the Principate of Augustus. They were

s. They were preserved, pampered and subsidized by the New State; but they were the survivors of a catastrophe, doomed to sl

aned before the Julii and their allies. The Metelli had backed Sulla: they made a final bid for power when, with the Scipion

: they made a final bid for power when, with the Scipionic connexion, they supported Pompeius. The last in the direct line o

ulii and Claudii, their rivals and social equals. It was fitting that they should all end with the end of a period. Crassu

or the domestic dramas of Augustus’ Principate. Before long, however, they became entangled, not only among themselves, as w

ainst Claudius. 2 The Cornelii Lentuli grew smaller and smaller: if they went on long enough, they would disappear, so a w

rnelii Lentuli grew smaller and smaller: if they went on long enough, they would disappear, so a wit of the Republic observe

n consular names to adorn the Fasti their principal use. For all else they were believed a danger, though often only a nuisa

n the Triumviral period. Though missing the consulate under Augustus, they were favoured by subsequent emperors, down to and

ro and his advisers had made a prudent choice. They also thought that they could safely entrust a military province, Hispani

nobility and a loyal servant of the government, Ser. Sulpicius Galba: they should have been right, for Galba was only the fa

nertia’ of the nobles. The true causes lie deeper: as has been shown, they are political and economic. It was the acute cons

l upstart, Gallus, Lollius or Seianus, went crashing to his fall. But they seldom got away unscathed from such spectacles. T

l consuls. They herald the Empire’s invasion of the Roman government, they seize supreme power but do not hold it for long.

nish the most patent evidence of the intrusion of alien elements; but they indicate the climax rather than the origins of th

on and their feuds, had not merely destroyed their spurious Republic: they had ruined the Roman People. There is something

the more irresponsible type of serious-minded person. No danger that they would be challenged to put their ideals into prac

left no record in the annals of eloquence. 5 Not so Athens and Rhodes they were democracies, and deplorably so. 6 Rome too,

te. All too long, soul and body had been severed. It was claimed that they were united in the Principate of Nerva which succ

died at the age of ninety-three. 2 As for the family of the Cocceii, they had a genius for safety. There could be great m

safety. There could be great men still, even under bad emperors, if they abated their ambition, remembered their duty as R

colony of Pisa showed more restraint, but meant the same thing, when they celebrated the ‘Guardian of the Roman Empire and

ther generals had their memorial in the trophies, temples or theatres they had erected; their mailed statues and the brief i

ibe the Res Gestae as the title-deeds of his divinity. 1 If explained they must be, it is not with reference to the religion

h the full evidence of the texts, epigraphic and literary, from which they derive; and W. Liebenam printed a convenient list

able clue to ready identification; and cognomina are added, even when they do not occur in the documents that attest the con