between 60 B.C. and A.D. 14. It is composed round a central narrative that records the rise to power of Augustus and the est

angible, whatever may be the name or theory of the constitution. To that end, the space (and significance) allotted to the

apidly over certain sections, for example the two chapters (v and vi) that analyse the composition of the Caesarian party in

nd preserves the non political classes. Liberty or stable government: that was the question confronting the Romans themselve

tion from the ‘traditional’ and conventional view of the period. Much that has recently been written about Augustus is simpl

unity to acknowledge the constant encouragement and the generous help that I have received from Mr. Last, the Camden Profess

he more so, precisely, because there is so much in the present volume that will make him raise his eyebrows. Its imperfectio

son and son by adoption of Augustus, consort in his powers. Not until that day was the funeral of the Free State consummated

t lasted for forty years. No astrologer or doctor could have foretold that the frail youth would outlive, by a quarter of a

eady taken shape, firm and manifest, as early as the year 23 B.C., so that a continuous narrative may run down to that date,

y as the year 23 B.C., so that a continuous narrative may run down to that date, thence to diverge into a description of the

te of the person and acts of Augustus. It was the avowed purpose of that statesman to suggest and demonstrate a sharp line

ties, the second of constitutional government. So well did he succeed that in later days, confronted with the separate perso

n of a specious title, the change in the definition of authority, all that made no difference to the source and facts of pow

ts of a military leader or subservient agents of arbitrary power. For that reason ‘Dux’ became ‘Princeps’. He did not cease

and Triumviral, cannot be annulled. When the individuals and classes that have gained wealth, honours and power through rev

ies of Roman political life has sometimes induced historians to fancy that the Principate of Caesar Augustus was genuinely R

events and culmination, either melancholy or exultant. The conviction that it all had to happen is indeed difficult to disca

ction that it all had to happen is indeed difficult to discard. 1 Yet that conviction ruins the living interest of history a

ar lack of adverse testimony from contemporary sources. Yet for all that , the history of the whole revolutionary period co

affinity goes much deeper than words. Nor would it be rash to assert that Pollio was closely akin both to Sallustius and to

tocracy, they all became deeply imbued with the traditional spirit of that order; and all were preoccupied with the fall of

e consulate of Metellus and Afranius, in which year the domination of that dynast was established (60 B.C.). Tacitus in his

s degeneration into despotism; in his Annals he sought to demonstrate that the Principate of the Julii and Claudii was a tyr

Italic stock, hating pomp and pretence, he wrote of the Revolution as that bitter theme demanded, in a plain, hard style. It

er theme demanded, in a plain, hard style. It is much to be regretted that he did not carry his History of the Civil Wars th

so constrained to omit the period of the Triumvirate when he observed that he could not treat his subject with freedom and w

ution and its sequel, the Principate of Caesar Augustus, in a fashion that has now become unconventional, NotesPage=>00

lass over a long period of years, in the attempt to combine and adapt that cumbrous theme to a consecutive narrative of even

ecutive narrative of events. Nor is it only the biography of Augustus that shall be sacrificed for the gain of history. Pomp

but intervened only to punish. 5 Against the blind impersonal forces that drove the world to its doom, human forethought or

is true, stand like a solid rampart to bar all intruders. No need for that the conservative Roman voter could seldom be indu

a magistracy, more binding than any compact of oath or interest. Not that women were merely the instruments of masculine po

and extortion in the provinces. Crassus was in the habit of observing that nobody should be called rich who was not able to

1 Yet he had ever to be on the alert, jealous to guard his dignitas, that is, rank, prestige and honour, against the attack

rtue, no share in the splendour and pride of the governing class. For that surrender they were scorned by senators. They did

Pisonem 86. 4 Lucullus, owner of a palace at Tusculum, pointed out that he had a knight and a freedman for neighbours (Ci

no accident, no mere manifestation of Roman conservatism or snobbery, that the leaders of revolution in Rome were usually im

of revolution in Rome were usually impoverished or idealistic nobles, that they found support in the higher ranks of the ari

Among the old nobility persisted a tradition of service to the State that could transcend material interests and combine cl

iers. The Roman constitution was a screen and a sham. Of the forces that lay behind or beyond it, next to the noble famili

s one of the principes. Cicero lacked the full equipment. He imagined that oratory and intrigue would suffice. A programme,

an politician had to be the leader of a faction. Cicero fell short of that eminence both when a consul and when a consular,

(cos. 76), a man of capacity and repute, came of a senatorial family that had not previously reached the consulate. 5 Phi

overning coalition is revealed in the relations and alliances between that house and two other groups. The first is the Clau

ous matches and an evil repute. 5 Second and more important by far is that enigmatic faction soon to be led by a man who nev

, related by marriage. 2 The virtue and integrity of Catulus, rare in that age, earned general recognition: brilliance and v

pus; and he formed a connexion with the Metelli. 1 The lust of power, that prime infirmity of the Roman noble, impelled him

oth principle to give inner coherence and courage to make the reforms that might save and justify the rule of class and priv

the Metelli seemed to be passing. Leadership might therefore fall to that part of the oligarchy which was concentrated abou

. PageBook=>024 prime. 1 But Servilia would not be thwarted by that accident. She cast about for other allies. About

te, pressed his candidature, championing all popular causes, but none that were hopeless or hostile to the interests of prop

pular favour the paramount office in the religion of the Roman State, that of pontifex maximus. 5 The same year furnished an

7). PageBook=>026 high assembly. But the speech and authority that won the day was Cato’s.1 Aged thirty-three and on

, this man prevailed by force of character. Cato extolled the virtues that won empire for Rome in ancient days, denounced th

parody, Cato the Censor. But it was not character and integrity only that gave Cato the primacy before consulars: he contro

ainst the military dynast now returning from the East he would oppose that alliance of stubborn spirit and political craft w

n or pretended of Pompeius; to reject a bill, no argument needed save that the measure was aimed at the People’s general. 2

alienate Pompeius utterly. Crassus used his patronage to demonstrate that he was still a force in politics and to embarra

t at Rome. By armed force he might have established sole rule, but by that alone and not in solid permanence. The nobiles we

ch aristocratic distinction. Pompeius’ mother was a Lucilia, niece of that Lucilius from Suessa Aurunca whose wealth and tal

Described as ‘humili atque obscuro loco natus’ (In Verrem 11, 5, 181) that is, simply a novus homo. PageBook=>031 lic

(Caesar, BC 1, 15, 2; Silius Italicus, Punica 10, 34). The assumption that Labienus was a Pompeian partisan from the beginni

ok Metella’s daughter, Aemilia. 1 When Aemilia died, Pompeius kept up that connexion by marrying another woman of that house

ia died, Pompeius kept up that connexion by marrying another woman of that house. 2 The alliance with the Metelli, by no mea

ghts of the Roman People. Men feared a civil war. When Pompeius asked that the consular elections be postponed to permit the

fray, and slashed the bill to pieces. Yet he claimed at the same time that he was doing a good service to Pompeius. 1 Cicero

ius 21; Plutarch, Caesar 14; Pompeius 47). Münzer (RA, 338 f.) argues that this is no other than Brutus, adopted by his mate

Brutus 5, &c.) and gave rise to the vulgar and untenable opinion that Brutus was Caesar’s son. 2 In alliance, namely,

9, 1. On his influence with Pompeius (at a later date), comparable to that of the Greek Theophanes, cf. Ad Alt. 9, I, 3; 11,

ar’s consulate was only the beginning. To maintain the legislation of that year, and perpetuate the system, Pompeius needed

orce his own influence, his prospect of praetorship and consulate. To that end he promulgated popular laws and harried Pompe

The younger, P. Crassus, was married by now to Cornelia, daughter of that P. Scipio who, adopted by Metellus Pius, became Q

Domitius Ahenobarbus came forth with his candidature and loud threats that he would deprive Caesar of army and provinces. So

compact, with a second consulate for Pompeius and Crassus and, after that , Spain and Syria respectively for five years; Cae

ivalries might have been tolerated in a small city-state or in a Rome that was merely the head of an Italian confederation.

be shown up. Then his cousin C. Lucilius Hirrus announced a proposal that NotesPage=>038 1 Below, p. 45. (??) 1 Ad

is body in the Forum, burned it on a pyre in the Curia, and destroyed that building in the conflagration. Then they streamed

7 Measures were passed to check flagrant abuses. One law, prescribing that provinces be granted, not at once and automatical

for the party in control of the government. Nor was it at all likely that the dynast would abide by letter or spirit of his

ius or the enemies of Caesar might prevail at the consular elections, that was no unmixed advantage. The Marcelli were rash

r’s provinces and confounding the oligarchy by pertinacious proposals that both dynasts should surrender their armies and sa

denounced the apathy of senators as submission to tyranny, protested that Caesar was already invading Italy, and took actio

ebat et suis et rei publicae copiis confidebat. ’ 6 The expectation that Labienus would desert Caesar was probably an impo

eud was not bitter or beyond remedy: the Metelli were too politic for that . Three years later Nepos was consul, perhaps with

Despite five consulates in twenty-three years, the Metelli soon found that their power was passing. Death took off their con

once been hangers-on of the Scipiones. But the power and splendour of that imperial house, the conquerors of Carthage and of

e tribunes of Pompeius. It was later claimed by their last survivor that the party of the Republic and camp of Pompeius em

kewise the father of Marcellinus (cos. 56), cf. P-W IV, 1390. 2 Not that they were all, or consistently, allies of Pompeiu

22) had been largely responsible for the conquest and organization of that province. Hence the spread of the name ‘Domitius’

the mastery. They were not duped they knew Pompeius: but they fancied that Pompeius, weakened by the loss of his ally and of

. Claudius Pulcher certainly took place in 54 B.C. (Ad fam. 3, 4, 2), that of Cn. Pompeius probably about the same time (ib.

ce of nearly five years, force was his only defence against the party that had attacked a proconsul who was fighting the war

mpeius and the establishment of the Dictatorship of Caesar are events that move in a harmony so swift and sure as to appear

en as though Caesar set the tune from the beginning, in the knowledge that monarchy was the panacea for the world’s ills, an

ernment and perhaps reform the State. Caesar’s enemies were afraid of that and so was Pompeius. After long wavering Pompeius

the rights of the tribunes and the liberties of the Roman People. But that was not the plea which Caesar himself valued most

tioned around the court, would bring in the inevitable verdict. After that , nothing for Caesar but to join the exiled Milo a

led Milo at Massilia and enjoy the red mullet and Hellenic culture of that university city. 3 Caesar was constrained to ap

a vast majority in the Senate, in Rome, and in Italy. They pretended that the issue lay between a rebellious proconsul and

d swiftly. Even Cato was dismayed. 1 It had confidently been expected that the solid and respectable classes in the towns of

of the authority of the Senate and the liberties of the Roman People, that all the land would rise as one man against the in

rs, avid for gain and advancement, some for revolution. Yet for all that , in the matter of Caesar’s party the contrast of

mprehensive powers and freedom from the tribunician veto. Caesar knew that secret enemies would soon direct that deadly weap

e tribunician veto. Caesar knew that secret enemies would soon direct that deadly weapon against one who had used it with su

prolonged to a tenure of ten years, an ominous sign. A gleam of hope that the emergency period would be quite short flicker

atorship for life. About the same time decrees of the Senate ordained that an oath of allegiance should be taken in his name

repair the ravages of civil war and promote social regeneration. For that there was sore need, as both his adherents and hi

of the oppressed, whether Roman, Italian or provincial. He had shown that he was not afraid of vested interests. But Caesar

d classes, a drastic reduction of debts and a programme of revolution that should be radical and genuine. 3 Only the usurers

er Wiss., phil.-hist. Abt., N.F. 15 (1937), 32 ff. Premerstein argues that this was a general oath, not confined to senators

ublica ’it was only a name: Sulla, by resigning supreme power, showed that he was an ignorant fellow’. 3 Caesar postponed

st designs of Caesar the Dictator. It has been supposed and contended that Caesar either desired to establish or had actuall

e simplification of long and diverse ages of history seems to suggest that Caesar alone of contemporary Roman statesmen poss

2, 110, however, is a difficult passage. Yet it can hardly be proved that Caesar devised a comprehensive policy of ruler-wo

erested device of the leaders of the Caesarian party. It might appear that subsequent accounts have been guilty of attributi

guilty of attributing a part at least of the cult of Divus Julius to that very different person, Caesar the Dictator. The

foreign king at Rome since the Tarquinii’. 2 It was to silence rumour that Caesar made an ostentatious refusal of the diadem

of reconciled Pompeians whose good sense should guarantee peace. For that period, at least, a salutary pause from political

ed the Roman State and baffled itself in the end. 4 Of the melancholy that descended upon Caesar there stands the best of te

end plausible colouring to such a theory. Yet it is in no way evident that the nature of Brutus would have been very differe

48, 36): Brutus, invoking the sanctity of contracts, might have urged that , after all, they had ‘hired the money’. PageBoo

pirit, upright and loyal, in manner grave and aloof, seemed to embody that ideal of character, admired by those who did not

son to hate Pompeius, schemed for the Caesarian alliance and designed that Brutus should marry Caesar’s daughter. 2 Her plan

ng his cousin Porcia, Bibulus’ widow. No mistake about the meaning of that act; and Servilia disapproved. There were deeper

all, to Brutus as to Cato, who stood by the ancient ideals, it seemed that Caesar, avid for splendour, glory and power, read

Roman aristocrat, a friend and a benefactor, for better reasons than that . They stood, not merely for the traditions and th

, as privilege and vested interests. It is not necessary to believe that Caesar planned to establish at Rome a ‘Hellenisti

lish at Rome a ‘Hellenistic Monarchy’, whatever meaning may attach to that phrase. The Dictatorship was enough. The rule of

gt;060 Without a party a statesman is nothing. He sometimes forgets that awkward fact. If the leader or principal agent of

d Catilina as his agent. Catilina could not, or would not, understand that reform or revolution had no place in the designs

orship for life and the sworn allegiance of senators, it seemed clear that he had escaped from the shackles of party to supr

overnment in a transformed State. The composition and vicissitudes of that party, though less dramatic in unity of theme tha

>061 CAESAR, who took his stand on honour and prestige, asserted that Pompeius was disloyal. Caesar had made enemies th

rance, the lack of consulars, while precluding the personal rivalries that disturbed the camp and counsels of Pompeius,4 and

urned with alacrity to a politician whose boast and reputation it was that he never let down his friends. Where Pompeius los

bribe decided C. Scribonius Curio, so history records and repeats but that was not the only incentive, for Clodius’ widow, F

ed and repressed frauds in the waterworks at Rome, composing a memoir that became a classic in the administration of the Emp

ir allegiance. 1 Not only senators chose Caesar, but young nobiles at that , kinsmen of the consulars who supported Pompeius

tever the event. The bond of personal allegiance may be compared to that of the family. It was often stronger. Whatever th

he son of Philippus joined the Caesarian tribunes. 4 Old associations that might have appeared negligible or tenuous were fa

Crassus; the younger son was dead, the elder followed Caesar, for all that his wife was a Caecilia Metella. 6 NotesPage=&g

nights and municipal aristocrats. 3 Certain distinguished families of that party had not been proscribed; and some rallied s

e now Pompeians P. Sulpicius Rufus, a kinsman, it may be presumed, of that eloquent and high-minded tribune whose legislatio

ic enemies of the dominant oligarchy took heart again. It was evident that Caesar would restore and reward his friends and p

ho strove to expel Curio from the Senate. His colleague Piso thwarted that move, but was unable or unwilling to save the Cae

e enemies of Ap. Claudius could have incriminated the stern censor on that count. Further, Caesar brought back the three d

otected Clodius), praetor in 59, cf. P-W VI, 204 ff. For a defence of that much-maligned character P. Vatinius see L. G. Poc

., Asconius 33 = p. 37 Clark, &c. PageBook=>067 testimony, that of his enemies, so convincingly reveals: he had d

e hands of the Syrians and the Jews, nations born to servitude. 1 For that enormity Gabinius himself was sacrificed to the p

social distinction nobiles, members of reputable senatorial families that had not reached the consulate and sons of Roman k

-Groebe, Gesch. Roms III2, 700 f. 6 For the provincial governors of that period, E. Letz, Die Provinsialverwaltung Caesars

ei commendatio conciliaretur ad consulatus petitionem. ’ The history that never happened was the consulate of Caesar and La

allegiance. 1 Caesar’s following was dual in composition. The fact that he took up arms against the party in power, had b

atter Caesar’s faction numbered not only many senators but nobiles at that . Most conspicuous of all is the group of nobile

Sulla, was a patrician and proud of it. He boasted before the people that his house was descended from the immortal gods an

cerdotal family. 4 Sulla and Caesar, both members of patrician houses that had passed through a long period of obscurity, st

protector of the oligarchy. More numerous were the decayed patricians that pinned their hopes on Caesar, and NotesPage=&

69 not in vain. In the time of Sulla the Fabii have declined so far that they cannot show a consul. A Fabius Maximus follo

anus (cos. 62). An inscription from Cos (L’ ann. ép., 1934, 84) shows that P. Servilius’ wife was a Junia, daughter of Decim

ied in a Roman triumph. From obscure years of early manhood some said that he served as a common soldier Ventidius rose to b

a treatise upon horticulture and domesticated a new species of apple that bore his name. 6 Tireless and inseparable, Oppi

mentioned as an army commander in the Gallic campaigns; and some find that his style is not very military. 5 Ad fam. 9, 20

. Cornelius Lentulus Crus, above, p. 44, n. 4. 3 It may be presumed that he had a hand in the pact of 60 B.C. In December

be presumed that he had a hand in the pact of 60 B.C. In December of that year he sought to bring Cicero into it, Ad Att. 2

uracy and face the future with equanimity. It is much to be regretted that his letters to apprehensive clients have not been

e bankers were already personal friends of Caesar: it may be presumed that he gave them guarantees against revolution. They

Curtius, is designated as a leader of the equestrian order: not only that Curtius was ‘fortissimus et maximus publicanus’,

aximus publicanus’, which should suffice. Eloquent advocacy proclaims that this person conducted financial operations, not f

Dessau (Hermes XLVI (1911), 613 FF.) has rendered it highly probable that the Caesarian Curtius, or Curtius Postumus, is th

ficers and friends of Pompeius; 3 and it will not have been forgotten that his father had secured Latin rights for the Trans

ather of L. Calpurnius Piso was a business man called Calventius from that colony, Cicero, In Pisonem fr. II = Asconius 4 (p

mily, cf. also BG 7, 65, 2. 2 Ad fam. 10, 32, 5, where it is stated that Gallus has in his possession a dramatic poem writ

n Antipater. Mytilene was in the clientela of Pompeius: Theophanes of that city was his friend, domestic historian and polit

full of them, it was alleged. Only ignorance or temerity will pretend that the Dictator promoted partisans from the ranks of

s as centurions only one is sufficiently attested. 1 Worse than all that , Caesar elevated men from the provinces to a seat

so the Etruscan Cafo, JRS XXVII (1937), 135, though it is not certain that he was a senator. 2 Suetonius, Divus Iulius 80,

en or centurions, their proportion must have been tiny in an assembly that now numbered about nine hundred members. The inca

Hispania Ulterior under Pollio, who reports, among other enormities, that he had a Roman citizen burned alive and an auctio

s, Bell. Afr. 28, 2, cf. Münzer, P- W VI A, 1557. For the possibility that there were one or two provincial senators even be

ional concentration had been established. Cicero shuddered to think that he would have to sit in the Senate in the sight a

nd dependents. 4 Many cities of Italy traced an origin earlier than that of Rome: their rulers could vie in antiquity, and

produced ignoble revelations to counter the ostensible derivation of that municipal family from Faunus and the goddess Vite

ncient and extinct patrician house of the early Republic. 2 Some said that Cicero’s father was a dyer of clothes: others car

local dynastic families it could in truth be proved as well as stated that they had always been there. The Caecinae of Etrus

tells of cities or nations, often with neglect of the dynastic houses that ruled them in a feudal fashion. NotesPage=>0

lways disdained the aristocracies of other cities. Tradition affirmed that monarchs of foreign stock had ruled at Rome. More

ce in Etruria, cf. Münzer, RA, 55 f. 6 Münzer, RA, 56 ff. He argues that the Atilii came from Campania (58 f.), the Otacil

to obtrude an ancestor upon the list of the kings, Ancus Marcius; and that dubious figure, Marcius of Corioli, ostensibly an

he Junii could not rise to a king, but they did their best, producing that Brutus, himself of Tarquin blood, who expelled th

enter the senatorial order under their protection: they never fancied that he would aspire to the consulate. Marius nursed r

the government, attested and intelligible even in towns and families that had long since been incorporated in the Roman Sta

ise of the virtue and vigour of the novus homo. No evidence, however, that he was generous in act and policy, no man from re

was for himself, as though they were his own ancestors. 3 He desired that the sentiment and voice of Italy should be heard

ed classes. 6 Caesar had numerous partisans in the regions of Italy that had suffered from participation in the Bellum Ita

arius and the insurrections of Lepidus and Catilina. It is not merely that so many of his soldiers and centurions were recru

um honoured Pompeius as its patron:2 but the men of Auximum protested that it would be intolerable to refuse admittance to t

Caesar’s man; and it was more than the obstinate folly of Ahenobarbus that brought on the capitulation of the neighbouring c

ken long before it was manifest and announced. It is evident enough that Caesar’s new senators, some four hundred in numbe

g Pompeius raised his private army, he had to expel the Ventidii from that city. Picenum was the scene of faction and intern

The union of the alien and discordant stocks of Italy into something that resembled a nation, with Rome as its capital, was

f.; ib. XXVII, 48 ff. PageBook=>093 res publica constituta and that , after the Bellum Italicum and the enfranchisemen

onsuls bearing these names all belong, as is appropriate, to families that furnished prominent partisans to the cause of Mar

4 obscure men. 1 That might be expected: it is the earliest consuls that convey the visible evidence of social and politic

reviving the party of Marius, might promise change. 2 Cicero claimed that in the space of thirty years he was the first kni

t other novi homines, socially more eminent, had not been debarred in that period; and Cicero was soon to witness the consul

ulates of Murena and of Pompeius’ men, Afranius and Gabinius. 3 After that , no more novi homines as consuls on the Fasti of

cus, of a reputable family from Tibur; 2 and Caesar probably intended that M. Brutus and C. Cassius should be consuls in 41

uls as well. For all their admitted talents, it is by no means likely that the Dictator would have given the consulate to Ve

head of the government. The Ides of March could make no difference to that . When the tyrant fell and the constitution was re

olabella arrayed in the insignia of a consul; for Caesar had intended that Dolabella should have the vacant place when he re

ee E. Schwartz, P-W II, 230), but is suspect. It is by no means clear that it suited his plans to make a violent demonstrati

receding note), it would not prove, though it might support, the view that Antonius intended to cause trouble. D. Brutus wri

y been done. Not the funeral of Caesar but the session of March 17th, that was the real calamity. 1 Both the acts and the pa

principles and nature of the conspiracy: the slaying of a tyrant, and that action alone, was the end and justification of th

d the Senate to meet upon the Capitol, it was afterwards urged. 3 But that was treason. They should not have left the consul

e was no pretext or desire for a reign of terror. Brutus had insisted that Antonius be spared. 4 Had the faction of Brutus a

ed from its citadel. The facts and elements of power were larger than that . To carry through a Roman revolution in orderly f

n one thing, loyalty to the established order. His past career showed that he could not be depended on for action or for sta

conservative or revolutionary, despised so utterly the plebs of Rome that they felt no scruples when they enhanced its degr

sorders, Brutus appears to have persisted in irrational fancies about that Roman People which he had liberated from despotis

mate: it may not be measured by optimistic and partisan proclamations that describe the Liberators as guarded by the devoted

a recrudescence of the irregular cult of Caesar at Rome: it was hoped that he might be induced to support the Liberators. 1

ssed his firm disapproval. 3 Antonius was apprised. When he requested that the bands of Republican partisans be dissolved, B

ajority of the army commanders for their cause and they did not think that it was necessary. At the time of Caesar’s death,

e time of Caesar’s death, the armies were held by his partisans, save that certain arrangements were still pending the Dicta

before the Dictator’s acta were ratified on March 17th, it was feared that the consul would not allow them to take over thei

would clearly have failed. Yet even now, despite the deplorable fact that the Republicans did not dare to show themselves b

appointed consul in 46 and Master of the Horse: no evidence, however, that Caesar prized him above Antonius for loyalty or f

s was to take over a province in 44, and Antonius, elected consul for that year, would be left in charge of the government w

active and imposing façade certain defects of character and judgement that time and the licence of power were to show up in

ulnerable to the moral and patriotic propaganda of his rival. Most of that will be coolly discounted. From the influence of

is Cicero, Phil. 2, 71 ff, which betrays its own inadequacy. The fact that Antonius, unlike gallant young Dolabella, did not

holders of office and power at Rome. In the end it was not debauchery that ruined Antonius, but a fatal chain of miscalculat

t of loyalty incompatible with the chill claims of statesmanship. But that was later. To gain a fair estimate of the acts an

inconsistency on this point. 2 It would not be paradoxical to assert that Antonius felt respect and understanding for Brutu

d to smile upon the Roman State and upon Antonius. It had been feared that the assassination of Caesar would have wide and r

ωµα inimicissimum oti, id est Bruti. ’ 5 Hence Cicero’s indignation that under the pretext of concord Caesarian partisans

e Dictatorship was to be abolished for ever. Thoughtful men reflected that its powers could easily be restored one day under

n laws passed in the consulate of Antonius. It is by no means clear that the behaviour of Antonius went beyond the measure

, 9, 3 (April 18th). 3 Below, p. 130. PageBook=>108 one, and that not without consulting an eminent adversary of th

gt;108 one, and that not without consulting an eminent adversary of that exile; 1 he recognized the seizure of territory b

ed the seizure of territory by an eastern monarch subject to Rome not that it mattered much; 2 and he bestowed Roman citizen

Nor are there sufficient grounds for the partial and exaggerated view that posterity has been tempted to take of the ulterio

d final contest for the dominion of the world, it was easy to pretend that Antonius strove from the beginning to set himself

nce of Antonius was a given and inescapable fact. Certain of his acts that lend colour to the charge of tyranny may be defen

rty was now his: but he might have to fight to retain it. More than that , Antonius was consul, head of the government, and

eld by a glorious and remembered ancestor; 1 he also sought to attach that ambiguous person by betrothing his daughter to Le

1 Cf. Cicero, Phil. 13, 15 2 Below, p. 136. PageBook=>110 that bore down the heads of the nobilitas, the fierce

t the communications to Gaul and Spain. Antonius was ready to parry that danger he would take that region for his own cons

ul and Spain. Antonius was ready to parry that danger he would take that region for his own consular province and with it

ad received Macedonia. Before the end of April, however, it was known that Antonius intended to propose on June 1st to take

Caesarian but also a kinsman of Brutus, hence a potential danger. But that province was soon to be stripped of its legions.

but came to nothing. When he returned, it was to discover with dismay that a new and incalculable factor had impinged upon R

sisters. On the paternal side the youth came of a respectable family that lacked nobility: his grandfather, a rich banker e

gal designation of C. Julius Caesar Octavianus. It will be understood that the aspirant to Caesar’s power preferred to drop

rstood that the aspirant to Caesar’s power preferred to drop the name that betrayed his origin, and be styled ‘C. Julius Cae

ar never, it is true, referred to himself as ‘Octavianus’; the use of that name, possessing the sanction of literary traditi

fortune. 2 Italy and the world accepted him as Caesar’s son and heir; that the relationship by blood was distant was a fact

conventions are baffled and defied by Caesar’s heir. Not for nothing that the ruler of Rome made use of a signet- ring with

ng, his sense for realities was unerring, his ambition implacable. In that the young man was a Roman and a Roman aristocrat.

r and the glory along with the name of Caesar. Whether his insistence that Caesar be avenged and the murderers punished deri

ment at the thwarting of his own legitimate aspirations is a question that concerns the ultimate nature of human character a

5 the sun, a portent of royalty. Octavianus without delay announced that he accepted the adoption and persuaded a tribune,

with the populace and the veterans, Antonius was forced into a policy that alarmed the Senate and gave his enemies a pretext

igues current during his absence in Campania, he now made up his mind that Brutus and Cassius should leave Italy. Antonius h

re might well alarm the moderates NotesPage=>115 1 He objected that a lex curiata ratifying the adoption had not yet

Octavianus, in the meantime, acquired a mastery of the demagogic arts that must have reinforced his native distrust and Roma

1st to a strengthening of the coalition of March 17th, and, more than that , to a firm pact with the Liberators. Brutus and C

ing new courage, may have gone too far. It was known before the event that there would be criticism of the consul at the mee

ice. Sanguine informants from Rome reported at Rhegium an expectation that Antonius might surrender his provincial command,

an expectation that Antonius might surrender his provincial command, that Brutus and Cassius would be able to return to Rom

content of Piso’s proposal there is no evidence: perhaps he suggested that Cisalpine Gaul should cease to be a province at t

primum coeperim cogitare. ’ So at least on the surface, which is all that we know. Yet Antonius may have spoken as he did i

der to force his enemies to come out into the open. Nor was it likely that he would consent to surrender his command, hardly

been Piso’s proposal (cf. Appian, BC 3, 30, 115). It must be repeated that the only clear account of the speeches and negoti

d upon their principles and their personal honour: they told Antonius that they valued their own libertas more than his amic

reluctance to provide a cause of civil war and their proud conviction that wherever they were, there stood Rome and the Repu

k for the friends of settled government. Octavianus did not belong to that class. The rhetoric of the ancients and the par

te, the command of an army, the auctoritas of a senior statesman, all that was too long and too slow. He would have to wait

bribery, intrigue, and even violence; for the short and perilous path that Octavianus intended to tread, such resources woul

long line of demagogues. Rumours went about in the July days at Rome that Octavianus, though a patrician, had designs upon

no time for an ideal and patriotic appeal. Such were the resources that Octavianus gathered in late summer and autumn of

words and facts, a brief acquaintance with Roman political behaviour that he possessed and that was all he needed. It is a

ief acquaintance with Roman political behaviour that he possessed and that was all he needed. It is a common belief, atteste

by the existence of political science as a subject of academic study, that the arts of government may be learned from books.

less the need for faithful friends and a coherent party. For lack of that , the great Pompeius had been forced at the last i

Caesar had been saved because he had a party behind him. It was clear that many a man followed Caesar in an impious war from

e examples; 1 and it was not merely from lust of adventure or of gain that certain intimate friends of the dead autocrat at

two of his associates, so it was recorded, were ever thrown over, and that was for treachery. 2 NotesPage=>121 1 For

, courage. By nature, the young man was cool and circumspect: he knew that personal courage was often but another name for r

lf in the study of political cant and the practice of a dissimulation that had been alien to the splendid and patrician natu

ius, the young revolutionary needed an army in the first place, after that , Republican allies and constitutional backing. He

h Octavianus did not improve. Neither trusted the other. To counter that danger and outbid his rival the consul went farth

nd popular policy. In the Senate on September 1st Antonius proposed that a day in honour of Caesar should be added to the

his house certain of the veteran soldiers of his bodyguard, alleging that they had been suborned by Octavianus to assassina

isquieting news came to Rome through private sources. It was reported that the legions at Alexandria in Egypt were riotous,

It was reported that the legions at Alexandria in Egypt were riotous, that Cassius was expected there. 3 Further, Cassius mi

ht appeal to the large armies in Syria. It was probably at this point that Dolabella, without awaiting the end of his consul

r 28th the Senate met by night upon the Capitol. It was later alleged that a consular was ready on the side of Antonius with

nly his soldiers but his partisans were being seduced a report came that another legion, the Fourth, under Antonius’ quaes

re has been narrated as the deed and policy of Octavianus. In himself that young man had not seemed a political factor of pr

e of his stepson as Caesar’s heir put all his talents to the test. On that subject he preserved monumental discretion, givin

suaded the taking up of the inheritance: the fact comes from a source that had every reason to enhance the courageous and in

k, deriving his descent on the maternal side from the Cilnii, a house that held dynastic power in the city of Arretium from

doption. PageBook=>131 Invective asserts, and history repeats, that the consul Antonius embezzled the sum of seven hu

f Ops. 1 Only the clumsy arts of an apologist reveal the awkward fact that Octavianus at Brundisium in April, for a time at

of the annual tribute from the provinces of the East. 2 It is alleged that he duly dispatched these moneys to Rome, to the T

hat he duly dispatched these moneys to Rome, to the Treasury, holding that his own inheritance was sufficient. 3 His own pat

e slips out of history for four years: the manner of his return shows that he had not been inactive. 5 The Caesarian Rabiriu

la who had written pantomimes, the Spaniard Decidius Saxa. 2 The fact that Octavianus was deemed to be on the side of the Re

d Marcellus. Another source, though likewise not of the best, alleges that the pair made a secret compact with Cicero, Cicer

the devious Marcellus wholly to be neglected he had family connexions that could be brought into play, for the Caesarian cau

trast, the mansions of Cicero. 3 Though it demands faith to believe that ‘Sallust’, In Ciceronem, a brief, vigorous and co

6 of more use to the Commonwealth than the more elevated principles that were professed, and sometimes followed, with such

urse of events: to few, indeed, among his contemporaries was accorded that double and melancholy satisfaction. Piso was an

r Servilius embarked upon a tortuous policy, to enhance his power and that of his clan. His family connexions would permit a

Caesarian adventurer to destroy the Caesarian party. Cicero claimed that he had always been consistent in his political id

rigid adherence to principle and denial of compromise; and he claimed that he had been abandoned by the allies of Cato. Towa

Cicero surrendered to the obsession. Otherwise there were many things that might have brought Cicero and Caesar together a c

fam. 16, 12, 2; Velleius 2, 48, 5. PageBook=>138 stronger. Not that Cicero expected war and when war came, even Cato

een influenced by circumstantial rumours. It was by no means unlikely that Caesar would be entangled and defeated in Spain b

and concord. Peace calls for constant vigilance. Cicero later claimed that from that day forward he never deserted his post.

d. Peace calls for constant vigilance. Cicero later claimed that from that day forward he never deserted his post. 1 Facts r

ational of all civil wars. 3 After March 17th, the sharp perception that neither the policy nor the party of Caesar had be

e provinces. Early July brought well-authenticated reports from Spain that Sex. Pompeius had come to terms with the governme

here would be a meeting of the Senate on August 1st and some prospect that Brutus and Cassius might return to political life

o thought it best not to turn up. He salved his dignity by the belief that he was in danger of his life, and by the composit

rence. 1 Cicero’s return provoked an incident, but gave no indication that the day of September 2nd would be a turning- poin

ular and the revolutionary adventurer. There is a danger, it is true, that the relations of Cicero and Octavianus may be dat

l. 2 Then nothing more for six weeks. In June, however, he recognized that the youth was to be encouraged and kept from ally

politics. Events were moving swiftly. In his account of the reasons that moved him to return, Cicero makes no mention of t

Antonius. When he made his decision to return, Cicero did not know that unity had been restored in the Caesarian party. A

r by Cicero and P. Servilius when they attacked the consul. However that may be, by the beginning of October Caesar’s heir

ictator, a revolutionary under the sign of the avenging of Caesar. Of that purpose, no secret, no disguise. To be sure, he o

as to play the Laelius. Again, on his return from exile, Cicero hoped that Pompeius could be induced to go back on his allie

pril of the year 44 B.C. he wrote to Dolabella a letter which offered that young man the congratulations, the counsels, and

lations, the counsels, and the alliance of a senior statesman. 2 Of that persistent delusion, Cicero cannot be acquitted.

llence of his own plan: it may be doubted whether at any time he felt that he could trust Octavianus. Neither was the dupe.

of the obligations which a citizen should render to the Commonwealth, that is, a manual of civic virtue. Once again the idea

he would be the leader of the Optimates. It might fairly be claimed that Cicero made ample atonement for earlier failures

made ample atonement for earlier failures and earlier desertions, if that were the question at issue. It is not: a natural

class and station. Yet it was precisely in the eyes of contemporaries that Cicero was found wanting, incompetent to emulate

yalty and constancy, of Roman virtus and aristocratic magnitudo animi that would have justified the exorbitant claims of his

Swift, confident and convincing, the Philippics carry the impression that their valiant author stood in sole control of the

the policy of the State. The situation was much more complicated than that , issues entangled, factions and personalities at

ther suppress the arguments of the other side, whether they employ to that end calumny or silence: they often betray what th

military despotism, entered into the possession of its rights again: that is to say, behind the scenes private ambition, fa

weapons; and victory no less than defeat would be fatal to everything that an honest man and a patriot valued. But Brutus wa

irtius brought to completion the commentaries of Caesar, he confessed that he could see no end to civil strife. 1 Men recall

claimed office as a reward, boasting loudly of ancestors or, failing that prerogative, of his own merits. Again, the law-co

ercising the ill-famed profession of auctioneer:5 or stay, worse than that , he had immigrated thither from the land of trous

f Vatinius and Gabinius have not been preserved. One learns, however, that the strange garb of Vatinius was merely the badge

isguided policy of conciliation; and casual evidence reveals the fact that Piso’s Epicurean familiar was no other than the u

onius. From youth he had revelled in cruelty: such had been his lusts that no modest person could mention them. 2 In the p

ad he been on the right side, he would have been praised no less than that man from Gades, the irreproachable Balbus. Would

ed no less than that man from Gades, the irreproachable Balbus. Would that all good men and champions of Rome’s empire might

enemies. Ventidius was called a muleteer:8 the fullest elaboration on that theme belongs to a time when it could do him no h

al. Merely to accuse one’s opponents of aiming at regnum or dominatio that was too simple, too crude. It had all been heard

sely the question at Rome where and what was the legitimate authority that could demand the unquestioning loyalty of all goo

g loyalty of all good citizens? Rome had an unwritten constitution: that is to say, according to the canons of Greek polit

canons of Greek political thought, no constitution at all. This meant that a revolution could be carried through without any

endering of advice to magistrates, was widened to cover a declaration that there was a state of emergency, or that certain i

idened to cover a declaration that there was a state of emergency, or that certain individuals by their acts had placed them

se of this prerogative, but not its validity. 1 The Romans believed that they were a conservative people, devoted to the w

st the propertied classes; and it was presumably in their interests that an alliance between the wealthiest members of the

f property and avert revolution. Further, it was an attractive theory that the conduct of affairs in Rome should not be narr

the period had been more abundantly preserved, it might be discovered that respect for law, tradition and the constitution p

ion and the constitution possessed a singular unanimity of advocates; that phrases like concordia ordinum and consensus Ital

champions of the People’s rights but hardly the belief and conviction that popular sovranty was a good thing in itself. Once

e notion freedom from the rule of a tyrant or a faction. 1 It follows that libertas, like regnum or dominatio, is a convenie

rty in power. It was open to their opponents to claim and demonstrate that a gang (or factio), in control for the moment of

n its own interests. Hence the appeal to liberty. It was on this plea that the young Pompeius raised a private army and resc

28), I ff. PageBook=>156 It is the excuse of the revolutionary that the Republic has succumbed to tyranny or to anarc

tled government’; and the crown of the work is summed up in the claim that the Free State has been ‘preserved’, ‘established

peace, a cause which all parties professed with such contentious zeal that they were impelled to civil strife. The non-party

much talk was there of peace and concord in the revolutionary period that a new term makes its appearance, the word ‘pacifi

ast battle in Spain:2 and the younger son of Pompeius took a cognomen that symbolized his undying devotion to the cause, cal

e loyalties surrendered, for the public good. Cicero had descended to that language years before when he explained the noble

ded to that language years before when he explained the noble motives that induced him to waive his hostility against the ru

cause with a public enemy. Lepidus duly uttered the exemplary prayer that private feuds should be abandoned. 4 Plancus had

that private feuds should be abandoned. 4 Plancus had assured Cicero that no personal grounds of enmity would ever prevent

ei publicae causa, quis me tandem iure reprehendet? ’ Cicero explains that he was not really, despite appearances, an ‘inimi

que incolumitatis causam suscipere, ut vere dicam, coegit. ’ He urged that ‘misericordia’ should not be regarded as criminal

t;160 own head. After the end of all the wars the victor proclaimed that he had killed no citizen who had asked for mercy:

oops in Italy on his own initiative, privato consilio, it was claimed that the Senate could at once legalize treason, condon

good; 4 when the legions of a consul deserted, it was taken to prove that the consul was not a consul. 5 The author of this

is expressly invoked ‘the ordinance enacted by Heaven itself, namely that all things advantageous for the State are right a

f the constitution8 but they might be necessary to save the State. Of that the Senate was supreme judge. What if it had not

sanction? Why, true patriots were their own Senate. 9 It is evident that res publica constituta or libertas restituta lend

’ PageBook=>161 not everything. A leader or a party might find that the constitution was being perversely invoked aga

ere announced as though any individual or party wished to strike down that worthy and innocuous pair, Hirtius and Pansa. The

ring a solemn and patriotic panegyric upon treason. 1 He demonstrated that if a private army was raised against Antonius, if

consulis iure et imperio debent esse provinciae’ (ib. 4, 9). But was that the point? The fact that Cicero uses this argumen

debent esse provinciae’ (ib. 4, 9). But was that the point? The fact that Cicero uses this argument to demonstrate that Ant

hat the point? The fact that Cicero uses this argument to demonstrate that Antonius is not really a consul at all should exc

llia Cisalpina, namely the plebiscite of June 1st. Explicitly or not, that law may have permitted him to take over the provi

rovince before the end of his consular year. Nothing extraordinary in that . Compare, in the next year, what P. Lentulus says

lth. Two political groups were conspicuously absent from the Senate that fought against Antonius. The assassins of Caesar

the gaps. 3 This dearth explains the prominence, if not the primacy, that now at last fell to Cicero in his old age, after

e Curia. The remaining five Cicero did not count as consulars at all: that is to say, they were Caesarians. His harsh verdic

ttitude was ambiguous and disquieting: it was scarcely to be expected that the generals and the veterans of Caesar would len

of the correspondents of Cicero perhaps he indulged in mild parody of that smooth exemplar. Plancus, who had served as Caesa

y in the days following the Ides of March; and he will have reflected that next to Antonius he was the most hated of the Cae

rs, hated and despised for lack of the splendour, courage and ability that would have excused his ambitions. 1 The Aemilian

etition. One of the earliest acts of Cicero in January was to propose that , in grateful memory of the services of Lepidus to

ded statue should be set up on the Rostra or in any part of the Forum that Lepidus should choose. Lepidus could afford to wa

io found his loyalties at variance or out of date: it is pretty clear that he had no use for any party. He knew about them a

ismissal after the campaign and estates in Italy. It was also decided that governors should continue to hold their provinces

by conservative politicians and widely admitted by their adversaries that in emergencies the Senate enjoyed special discret

ot been done even for Pompeius. That the free vote of the People, and that alone, decided the choice of magistrates and henc

hen proconsul, his position, though not so strong, was valid in this, that he held his extraordinary command in virtue of a

m and menacing demand. For the friends of Antonius, however, it meant that a declaration of war had been averted; for the ad

ncia, which fixed two years as the tenure of a consular province: but that might have been contested, for Antonius’ command

Secondly, the law had been passed in defiance of the auspicia: but that plea was very weak, for the authority of sacred l

nd neutrals alike may have expected the swift fall of Mutina. Against that fait accompli nothing could be done, and Antonius

es and generals. No need for timidity or compromise. As for the terms that the adversary would offer, he conjectured that An

mise. As for the terms that the adversary would offer, he conjectured that Antonius might yield the Cisalpina but cling to G

picius, who had perished on the arduous journey, and announcing terms that aroused Cicero to anger. ‘Nothing could be more s

:3 he would give up Cisalpine Gaul, but insisted on retaining Comata: that province he would hold for the five years followi

should have become consuls and have vacated their consular provinces, that is, until the end of the year 39 B.C., probably t

isan question, he required guarantees: it was not merely his dignitas that he had to think of, but his salus. The sole secur

ignitas that he had to think of, but his salus. The sole security for that was the possession of an army. To give up his arm

army. To give up his army and surrender at the discretion of a party that claimed to be the government, that was folly and

ender at the discretion of a party that claimed to be the government, that was folly and certain extinction. Considering the

hens and was seen at the lectures of philosophers. It may be presumed that his agents were at work in Macedonia and elsewher

able to prevent his legions from passing over. Such was the situation that confronted C. Antonius when he landed at Dyrrhach

11, 1; Plutarch, Brutus 25). P. Lentulus, Trebonius’ quaestor, claims that he helped Cassius (Ad fam. 12, 14, 6). 5 On the

ong view, the future was ominous with a war much more formidable than that which was being so gently prosecuted in the Cisal

salpina. Cicero pressed his advantage. Early in March came the news that Dolabella, passing through Asia on his way to Syr

loited their advantage with allegations of atrocities it was affirmed that Dolabella had applied torture to the unfortunate

ttempts were made in March. In Rome Piso and Calenus carried a motion that an embassy be sent to treat with Antonius. Five c

iled. They protested loyalty to the Republic, devotion to concord. To that end they urged an accommodation. Servilius spoke

and Octavianus, spirited, cogent and menacing. Antonius warned them that they were being used by Pompeians to destroy the

being used by Pompeians to destroy the Caesarian party, assured them that the generals stood by him, and reiterated his res

s slain’, wrote Pollio from Spain. 3 Cicero had boasted in the Senate that the Caesarian veterans were on the wane, no match

RCH ON ROME PageBook=>162 THE public enemy was on the run. All that remained was to hound him down. If Lepidus and Pl

wo days, for D. Brutus went to consult Pansa at Bononia, only to find that the consul had succumbed to his wounds; Antonius

to take orders from Caesar’s assassin: nor, if he had, is it certain that the troops would have obeyed. 1 And so Ventidius

ius slipped through. Before long Octavianus received news from Rome that amply justified his decision: he was to be discar

by certain Republicans in the Senate (Ad M. Brutum 1, 15, 9). However that may be, the Autobiography of Augustus, in self-ju

sly promised to the patriotic armies, choosing a commission to effect that salutary economy. Octavianus was not among its me

aesarian cause, and soon to Caesar’s heir. Antonius had warned him of that , and Antonius was uttering a palpable truth. 2 On

. 2 On a rational calculation of persons and interests, it was likely that Antonius would regain the support of Lepidus and

the Senate to accept his mediation; and Antonius publicly asseverated that Lepidus was on his side. Their palpable community

by the renascence of the Republican and Pompeian cause, was so strong that the loyal dispatches which Lepidus continued to s

nius instead of opposing his invasion of Narbonensis. Lepidus alleged that he was pained by their behaviour but merciful ‘no

f his earlier proposals for peace and concord. 2 It was on May 30th that Antonius and Lepidus carried out their peaceful c

lancus feared a trap he knew his Lepidus; 3 and Laterensis warned him that both Lepidus and his army were unreliable. So Pla

legions from Hispania Ulterior. Earlier in the year he had complained that the Senate sent him no instructions; nor could he

se men, if judged they must be, it would be sufficient to demonstrate that they acted as they did from a reasoned and balanc

by faction and to fight against their fellow-citizens had the result that they were described as ‘Madmen’ by the adversarie

serve him from the armed violence of an unnatural coalition. In Italy that coalition had already collapsed; Caesar’s heir tu

stern provinces. As Cicero wrote late in May, the Senate was a weapon that had broken to pieces in his hands. 4 The prime

rian party. Octavianus did not intend to be removed; and the emphasis that open enemies and false friends laid upon his extr

his policy, and the value of the results thereby achieved, in hoping that Octavianus would still support the constitutional

ping that Octavianus would still support the constitutional cause now that it had become flagrantly Pompeian and Republican.

ornandum, tollendum. ’ Cicero (ib. 11, 21, 1) does not expressly deny that he said so. 2 Above, p. 143. 3 Ad M. Brutum 1

t ut eum in perpetuum modestiorem sperem fore. ’ PageBook=>169 that Cicero would usurp the vacant place. 1 Later, aft

er, after both consuls had fallen, Brutus in Macedonia heard a report that Cicero had actually been elected. 2 Of a later pr

d Octavianus were to be joint consuls. It might fairly be represented that the mature wisdom of a senior statesman was best

to a military leader; and this was but the culmination of the policy that he had initiated in the previous autumn. Brutus

r C. Antonius, whom Brutus had captured in Macedonia. Cicero insisted that the criminal should be put to death: there was no

utarch, Cicero 45 f. If Plutarch is to be believed, Augustus admitted that he had played upon Cicero’s ambition to be consul

ly and Caesar’s heir marching on Rome will have convinced him at last that there was no room left for scruple or for legalit

e. 4 Octavianus was a greater danger to the Republic than Antonius; that was the argument of the sombre and perspicacious

aster. Brutus for his part will continue the fight against all powers that set themselves above the law. ’6 On receipt of

. 6 Ib. I, 17. PageBook=>171 ‘Read again your words and deny that they are the supplications of a slave to a despot

are the supplications of a slave to a despot. ’1 Cicero had suggested that Octavianus might be induced to pardon the assassi

he alliance with Caesar’s heir. He asseverated his responsibility for that policy. But his words belied him he did not cease

mission to stand for the consulate in absence8 a move of conciliation that may have been NotesPage=>171 1 Ad M. Brutu

8 Dio 46, 44, 2. PageBook=>172 due to Cicero, still trusting that the adventurer could be won to legitimate methods

w there were some who did not lose hope. In the evening came a rumour that the two legions which had deserted the consul for

emned him to death. 3 The milder version of the fate of Q. Gallius is that he departed on a voyage. Pirates or shipwreck too

sarians Servilius and Calvinus were consulars already, and nobiles at that . Political compacts among the nobiles were neve

ispania Citerior, augmented with Hispania Ulterior for Pollio gave up that province. To Octavianus fell a modest portion Afr

slands, it may already have been feared, and it was soon to be known, that some of them had been seized by the adventurer Se

allies did not claim to be the government or the State: it was enough that their rivals should be thwarted and impotent. Cae

summoned from Etruria. Of these experts the most venerable exclaimed that the ancient monarchy was returning and died upon

e composed his own autobiography; other apologists artfully suggested that the merciful reluctance of Octavianus was overbor

stinctions between the three terrorists, it was hardly for Octavianus that they invoked indulgence and made allowances. Regr

6; Brutus 27; Antonius 20) presumably senators. It is to be regretted that there is such a lack of evidence for the signific

d that there is such a lack of evidence for the significant category, that of knights. In all, nearly 100 names of the prosc

Appian, BC 4, 47, 202 f. 3 Pro Balbo 53; cf. ILS 3700 (an aedile of that family). 4 Appian, BC 4, 40, 170: for later enm

edile of that family). 4 Appian, BC 4, 40, 170: for later enmity of that family towards Plancus, cf. Velleius 2, 83, 3. be

e cemented with the blood of citizens and buttressed with a despotism that made men recall the Dictatorship of Caesar as an

ulate from the Triumvirs (41 B.C.), like his first from Caesar: after that he is not heard of again. Antonius’ adherent Q. F

sarian nobilis Cn. Domitius Calvinus prolonged an active career after that date, the solitary relic of a not very distant pa

s Q. Marcius Crispus, if he be the Marcius who also was cos. suff. in that year. Nothing is known of the services to the Tri

gin or influence, cf. W. Schulze, LE, 531 ff. Münzer, however, argues that he came from the ancient colony of Norba, P-W xvi

n. 7 About L. Caninius Gallus (cos. 37 B.C.) nothing is known, save that his father married a first cousin of M. Antonius

, was his senior in years and military experience. His example showed that the holding of senatorial office was not an indis

he period be described. But the Caesarians claimed a right and a duty that transcended all else, the avenging of Caesar. Pie

Brutus heard of the end of Cicero, it was not so much sorrow as shame that he felt for Rome. 2 For good reasons Brutus and

Wiener Studien xxxv (1913), 280 f. Agrippa and Maecenas did not deny that Octavianus lurked in a marsh (Pliny, NH 7, 148).

as one account runs, through a defect of his eyesight1 and believing that all was lost, Cassius fell upon his sword. Such w

the ghost of Caesar but an incalculable hazard, the loss of Cassius, that brought on the doom of the Republic. Brutus could

of the Caesarians and impatient of delay, officers and men clamoured that he should try the fortune of battle again. Moreov

e, a tradition and a class narrow, imperfect and outworn, but for all that the soul and spirit of Rome. No battle of all t

the best of the principes were already dead, and the few survivors of that order cowered ignominious and forgotten in Rome o

der cowered ignominious and forgotten in Rome or commanded the armies that destroyed the Republic along with their new allie

Pompeius. As for Africa, should Lepidus make complaint, he might have that for his share. These engagements were duly record

lar and all but fatal to himself. No calculation could have predicted that he would emerge in strength and triumph from the

tisfy the soldiery were not slow to make open protest: they suggested that the imposition should be spread out and equalized

e. Before the veterans they laid the blame upon Octavianus, insisting that a final decision be reserved for Antonius for the

idienus, who was marching to Spain with six legions to take charge of that region. Even if Salvidienus returned in time and

time and their combined armies succeeded in dealing with L. Antonius, that was the least of his difficulties. He might easil

a huge force of legions: they, too, had opposed Salvidienus. 2 But that was not all. The Republican fleets dominated the

1 Still no sign came from the East. In Perusia the consul professed that he was fighting in the cause of his brother, and

n the counsels of the Antonian generals. The soldierly Ventidius knew that Plancus had called him a muleteer and a brigand;

Martial (11, 20) praises their ‘Romana simplicitas’, quoting examples that are quite convincing. 4 Macrobius 2, 4, 21: ‘at

f liberty and the protection of their own estates. It may be supposed that the escape of the greater number was not actively

stute person who in Rome had secured for himself a seat upon the jury that condemned to death the assassins of Caesar. 2 The

mory of the war the men of Nursia set an inscription which proclaimed that their dead had fallen fighting for freedom. Oct

a time against the generals of Octavianus. Then all is a blank, save that he negotiated with the Republican admiral Ahenoba

of his sentiments by taking to wife Scribonia,4 who was the sister of that Libo whose daughter Sex. Pompeius had married. Bu

with Antonius. Once again the young Caesar was saved by the fortune that clung to his name. In Gaul Calenus opportunely di

hen Octavianus returned towards the end of the summer, it was to find that Antonius had come up from the East and was laying

left Egypt in the early spring of 40 B.C. That he had contracted ties that bound him to Cleopatra more closely than to Glaph

y, the most disquieting rumours were already current: he soon learned that a new and alarming civil war had broken out betwe

t between his own adherents and the Caesarian leader. 5 The paradox that Antonius went from Syria to Egypt and lurked in E

the East in which perhaps he had not been very successful. 2 He felt that he was well out of the tangle. Of subsequent even

in Italy, the war in Etruria and the investment of Perusia, it may be that he had no cognizance when he arrived at Tyre in F

envoys, with offer of alliance. 6 Failing a general compact and peace that would NotesPage=>215 1 Dio 48, 27, 1: ὑπό

914), 43 ff. 3 W. W. Tarn, CAH x, 41 f. 4 There was even a theory that Octavianus and L. Antonius were acting in collusi

s, Divus Aug. 15). 5 So E. Groag, Klio xiv (1914), 43 ff. He argues that Antonius committed a serious and irreparable erro

Rome and the Roman People perished, while a world-empire as great as that of Alexander, torn asunder by the generals strugg

Appian, BC 5, 65, 274 4 An approximate date is provided by the fact that the magistrates of the colony of Casinum set up a

emption. On several theories of cosmic economy it was firmly believed that one world-epoch was passing, another was coming i

phers might conspire with some plausibility and discover in the comet that appeared after Caesar’s assassination, the Fulium

e real by the coming of peace and glorious with relief and rejoicing, that the poet Virgil composed the most famous and the

Roman matron. 1 The identification of the child of destiny is a task that has exercised the ingenuity and revealed the cred

o which prophetic literature by its very nature is peculiarly liable, that of subsequent manipulation when exact fulfilment

’s son Gallus (born perhaps in 41 B.C.) informed the learned Asconius that , as a matter of fact, none other than he, Gallus,

fact, none other than he, Gallus, was the wonder-child:3 no evidence that Asconius believed him. The Virgilian commentators

us may be called into doubt; 5 further, there is no reason to imagine that Pollio expected a son of his to rule the world, n

io expected a son of his to rule the world, no indication in the poem that the consul there invoked was shortly to become a

in concord and established peace for the world. It is a fair surmise that the Fourth Eclogue was composed to announce the p

d by W. W. Tarn, JRS xxii (1932), 135 ff. The widely prevalent belief that Virgil must have been writing about a child of Oc

rship of the Caesarian party, should in truth have ruled over a world that had been pacified by the valour of his father p

ly known to historical record. Octavianus now learned of the danger that had menaced him. In a moment of confidence in the

ad held as yet no senatorial office the wars had hardly left time for that . But Octavianus had designated him as consul for

s. desig. ’ (BMC, R. Rep. 11, 407 f.) It will not be necessary to add that we possess only the ‘Official version’ of Salvidi

erning his provinces were the most prominent and most able members of that party, the consulars Pollio, Plancus and Ventidiu

etariat of Italy, and represented Caesarism and the Revolution in all that was most brutal and odious. Their reasoned aversi

r Gindarus, he marched to Samosata on the Euphrates and laid siege to that NotesPage=>223 1 CIL 12, p. 50; Dio 48, 41

), were struck at Zacynthus, BMC, R. Rep. 11, 500; 504; 508; 524. Not that Sosius was there all the time he governed Syria f

393 ff. PageBook=>224 place. There was delay and allegations that Ventidius had taken bribes from the prince of Com

s sailed with a large fleet from Athens to Italy. Once again he found that Brundisium would not admit him. Not that he had e

o Italy. Once again he found that Brundisium would not admit him. Not that he had either the desire or the pretext for war,

st. Caesar’s heir journeyed to the encounter, taking a varied company that included Maecenas and L. Cocceius Nerva (still pe

un out with the close of the previous year. Nobody had bothered about that . The Triumvirate was now prolonged for another fi

repaired or the position of the Caesarian leaders so far consolidated that they could dispense with the dictatorial and invi

five years is a long period in a revolutionary epoch. Octavianus felt that time was on his side. For the present, his collea

d them. Antonius departed. Before long the conviction grew upon him that he had been thwarted and deceived. He may have ho

ew upon him that he had been thwarted and deceived. He may have hoped that his military genius as well as his ships would

be enlisted to deal with Pompeius. But Octavianus would have none of that . Further, from duty to his ally and to the Caesar

Octavia back to Italy. He may already have tired of Octavia. Anything that reminded him of her brother must have been highly

ful. His future and his fate lay in the East, with another woman. But that was not yet apparent, least of all to Antonius

3 To the defeated of Philippi and Perusia it had seemed for a time that the young Pompeius might be a champion of the Rep

s might be a champion of the Republican cause. But it was only a name that the son had inherited, and the fame of Pompeius M

esome character. 1 He then contracted with unseemly haste an alliance that satisfied head, heart and senses, and endured uni

ns. Lacking authority with the armies and a provincial clientela like that of Pompeius or the Caesarian leaders, he might st

itional policy of family alliances, though the day was long past when that alone brought power at Rome. His brother-in-law t

o help. Antonius disapproved, and Sex. Pompeius for his part believed that Antonius would not support his colleague. The y

e for the next year as his reward, did not choose to hold the triumph that would have thrown the disasters of Octavianus int

guage and sentiments of Lepidus’ contemporaries. 6 Appian indicates that the soldiers had carefully been worked upon (BC 5

seas and the liberation of Rome from famine placated the urban plebs that had rioted so often against the Triumvirs. Their

berty, had at least maintained a semblance of peace in the four years that had elapsed since the Pact of Brundisium. Of gove

could be no rational hope any more. There was ordered government, and that was enough. Private gratitude had already haile

ed for ceremonial purposes or governmental proclamations also decreed that a golden statue should be set up in the Forum wit

statue should be set up in the Forum with an inscription to announce that , after prolonged NotesPage=>233 1 Dio 49,

s remitted debts and taxes; and he gave public expression to the hope that the Free State would soon be re-established. 2 It

r. Octavianus was already exploring the propaganda and the sentiments that might serve him later against Antonius, winning f

and by the services of three friends. Agrippa held the praetorship in that year, but Maecenas and Salvidienus were not even

e Calvinus is a solitary and mysterious figure. It was from his house that Caesar set forth on the Ides of March; 4 and Caes

k=>235 his deputy in the Dictatorship, magister equitum. 1 After that , no word or hint of this eminent consular until h

um (Velleius 2, 85, 2). 8 Porphyrio on Horace, Sat. 1, 3, 130, says that he came from Cremona. Virgil dedicated to him the

: hence, in the Virgilian Lives and in the scholiasts, the allegation that he was a land-commissioner. The political affilia

. Nothing is known of his family or attachments: there is no evidence that he was related to Q. Cornificius. 2 Apart from

ates (Ad fam. 12, 25, 1: ‘Minotauri, id est Calvisi et Tauri’): after that , nothing till his consulate and service as an adm

nct advantage over the distant Antonius. He easily found in the years that followed the men to govern the military provinces

nothing to learn: as a military leader he needed to show the soldiery that he was the peer of the great Antonius in courage,

chievements would be visible and tangible. It was on the north-east that Italy was most vulnerable, over the low pass of t

or retain the monopoly of martial valour. This was the young Caesar that Italy and the army knew after the campaigns of 35

s was the glory. NotesPage=>240 1 It has sometimes been argued that Octavianus in these years made vast conquests in

is efforts, and Rome witnessed a contest of display and advertisement that heralded an armed struggle. It had begun some six

a temple of Hercules. These were some, but not all, of the edifices that already foreshadowed the magnificence of Rome und

g, may perhaps be detected in the composition of the consular list of that year, of unprecedented length: it contains seven

of Rome and to provide the inhabitants with pure water or cheap food that was not enough. The services of Agrippa, the sold

nto acceptance of the monarchy, to prepare not merely for the contest that was imminent but for the peace that was to follow

repare not merely for the contest that was imminent but for the peace that was to follow victory in the last of all the civi

be called) to acquire permanence and stability. The beneficiaries of that violent process, dominant in every order of socie

the Triumvirs; and a mass of Roman knights, by their incorporation in that order, reinforced the bond between the higher cla

rse enough at the best of seasons: Octavianus created new families of that order, for patronage but with a good pretext. 1

ave been vain to point in extenuation to their valour in war, to urge that many of the upstarts derived their origin from an

ocracies of the kindred peoples of Italy. As for the consular Balbus, that was beyond words. The lower ranks of the revolu

as deserved any distinction for peaceful studies earned no honour on that account from a military despotism. Among the earl

. 39) possessed or was to acquire fame as a jurist (Gellius 7, 5, 1), that was not the reason of his promotion. PageBook=&

ous. 1 Caesar’s style befitted the man; and it was generally conceded that Brutus’ choice of the plain and open manner was n

nt of theme would scarcely have retained their hold upon a generation that had lost leisure and illusions and took no pains

ing avoidance of rhythm to the extremity of abruptness and so archaic that one would have fancied him born a century earlier

te life. The revulsion from politics, marked enough in the generation that had survived the wars of Marius and Sulla, now ga

, 6 3 Ib, 18, 5 4 Quintilian 10, 1, 113. PageBook=>247 for that system of ritual, act and formula, necessary in t

olar was not deterred. At the age of eighty, discovering, as he said, that it was time to gather his baggage for the last jo

dicating a programme of order and regeneration for the new government that should replace the narrow and corrupt oligarchy o

w and corrupt oligarchy of the nobiles. 2 In his disillusionment, now that Rome had relapsed under a Sullan despotism, retir

o demonstrate how rotten and fraudulent was the Republican government that ruled at Rome between the two Dictatorships. Not

vasion of Italy but the violent ascension and domination of Pompeius, that was the end of political liberty. Sallustius st

if choice there was, for he, too, was witness of a political contest that stripped away all principle, all pretence, and sh

ssemblies or the marching of armies. From Sallustius history acquired that preoccupation with human character, especially in

e deeply- rooted belief, held among the learned and the vulgar alike, that history repeated itself in cyclical revolutions.

ho compiled brief historical biographies designed for use in schools, that he drew the parallel so clearly when alluding to

, a Calpurnius, was so patently the pride and monopoly of the senator that it was held a matter of note, if not of scandal,

fill a volume, set no especial value. But it was now becoming evident that poetry, besides and above mere invective, could b

omposing tragedies about the monarchs of mythical antiquity; 2 before that , however, he had earned the gratitude of two poet

donia for Antonius. It was about this time, in the absence of Pollio, that he was ensnared by more powerful and perhaps more

might be done. It was folly not to exploit the treasures of erudition that Varro had consigned to public use; if not the nat

s books on agriculture had newly appeared; men had bewailed for years that Italy was become a desert; and the hardships impo

llum Siculum, revealing the dependence of NotesPage=>253 1 Not that there is any definite evidence at all: the Arcadi

: the Arcadian scenery of Ecl. 10 could not safely be invoked to show that Gallus was in Greece. 2 In Ecl. 8, 6-13 Virgil

ses Pollio, anticipating his return and triumph, in a tone and manner that would have been fitting if the whole collection w

the tragedian Varius Rufus, they journeyed together to Brundisium, at that time when the rulers of the world were to meet no

atriot and a friend of liberal pursuits, aroused enthusiasm in a city that honoured the memory of tyrannicides. Horace was s

rian soldiers were tumultuous from pride in their exploits, conscious that by their support the government stood or fell. Gr

gion of his own people. It was much more than the rule of the nobiles that had collapsed at Philippi. The doom of empire was

hen Agrippa in 33 B.C. expelled astrologers and magicians from Rome,3 that was only a testimony to their power, an attempt o

g to break with Antonius a sign and portent of the unheroic qualities that commanded success, and even earned repute, in the

.; and it is fatally easy to overestimate the strength and popularity that by now had accrued to Octavianus. It was great, i

ame the victor chose to give to his rule, because it was for monarchy that the rival Caesarian leaders contended ‘cum se ute

ance was confirmed by the renewal of the Triumvirate at Tarentum when that office lapsed, Antonian consuls would be in power

made from time to time, but it was not until the winter of 37-36 B.C. that the principalities were built up into a solid and

the historic and significant name of Philadelphus. It has been argued that precisely on this occasion Antonius contracted a

garded as paramount and apart, but as one link in a chain of kingdoms that ran north to Pontus and westwards to Thrace, wedg

ius. A ruler endowed with liberal foresight would seek to demonstrate that the Roman was not a brutal conqueror but one of t

or of Bithynia since the Pact of Brundisium: who was his successor in that province, and who held Macedonia with the command

e time to train them: Antonius wanted the twenty thousand legionaries that Octavianus had promised to provide. The faithless

ever, and the crisis in his relations with Octavianus became so acute that Antonius instructed Canidius to bring the army do

s of Egypt and Judaea in the south and south-east, Rome was secure on that flank and could direct her full effort towards th

aes coinage of the period. PageBook=>267 It was later remarked that certain of his most intimate friends had once bee

once been Antonians. 1 Evidence is scanty. Yet it could be guessed that the Cocceii, a new family showing two consuls in

arian. The avenging of the Dictator and the contriving of a new cult, that was Octavianus’ policy and work, not his. The con

and hoped to use Pompeius for the Republic against Caesar. Failing in that , it conspired with dissident Caesarians and assas

, he fought at Philippi. Then, refusing either to agree with Messalla that the Republic was doomed, or to trust, like Murcus

S 9461). He was a Calpurnius Bestia by birth. It is not quite certain that his adoptive parent was descended from noble Semp

outcry of indignant patriotism at once denounce the strange pageantry that Alexandria witnessed in 34 B.C. when Antonius ret

tile propaganda has so far magnified and distorted these celebrations that accuracy of fact and detail cannot be recovered:

onius 54) and Dio (49, 41, 1 ff.) are lavish of detail. It is strange that neither Velleius (2, 82, 2 f.) nor Livy (at least

constitution on his side. 1 It was therefore necessary to demonstrate that Antonius was Morally’ in the wrong and ‘morally’

in fact resign to alien princes any extensive or valuable territories that had previously been provinces of the Roman People

its part in the Roman economy of empire. It was doubly necessary, now that Rome elsewhere in the East had undertaken a fresh

ld never be a menace to the empire of Rome. Ever since Rome had known that kingdom its defences were weak, its monarchs impo

ssal rulers were retained almost wholly by the victorious rival, save that in Egypt he changed the dynasty and substituted h

refore at the same time a magistrate at Rome and a king in Egypt. But that does not prove the substantial identity of his po

. But that does not prove the substantial identity of his policy with that of Antonius. There was Cleopatra. Antonius was no

avianus’ agents and to subsequent historians. It might be represented that Antonius was making provision for the present, no

y partition to Octavianus, his policy would hardly have differed from that of Antonius. The first man in Rome, when controll

be denied a complete monarchic policy of his own, it does not follow that he was merely a tool in the hands of Cleopatra, b

succumbed to the power of her imagination and her understanding. Yet that is not proved. Antonius was compelled to stand by

leopatra but did not fear Antonius: she was planning a war of revenge that was to array all the East against Rome, establish

RS XXII (1932), 141; CAH x, 82 f. PageBook=>275 is not certain that her ambition was greater than this, to secure and

upport for the enterprise it was necessary to invent a foreign danger that menaced everything that was Roman, as Antonius hi

e it was necessary to invent a foreign danger that menaced everything that was Roman, as Antonius himself assuredly did not.

ra beyond all measure and decency. To ruin Antonius it was not enough that she should be a siren: she must be made a Fury

macy of Caesar’s heir and the resurgent nation of Italy. Yet, for all that , the contest soon assumed the august and solemn f

of the whole world. NotesPage=>275 1 Tarn (CAH x, 76) concedes that Antonius himself was not a danger to Rome. 2 Ho

plighted word of covenants, which was a mistake. Antonius complained that he had been excluded from raising recruits in Ita

complained that he had been excluded from raising recruits in Italy; that his own men had been passed over in the allotment

aly; that his own men had been passed over in the allotment of lands; that Octavianus had deposed in arbitrary fashion a col

oets and pamphleteers took the field with alacrity. Antonius asserted that Ptolemy Caesar was the true heir as well as authe

tiseniam aut omnes. an refert, ubi et in qua arrigas? ’ It is evident that this famous fragment, matching in frankness an ea

4 Suetonius, Divus Iulius 52, 2. 5 Pliny, NH 33, 50 an allegation that Antonius like an oriental monarch used vessels of

d of a tribune at the beginning of 32 B.C. may be taken as fair proof that the Triumvirate had come to an end, legally at le

previously have made a compromise with Octavianus:1 it is more likely that they were afraid to divulge its contents. Antoniu

e Senate was over a thousand. PageBook=>279 Octavianus alleged that he suffered them to depart freely and openly. 1 T

e dynasts, whether legal or personal, were no novelty to a generation that could recall the misrepresentation and invective

e-serving, ready to turn against him if they dared: it was a bad sign that more than three hundred senators had decided to j

war his prestige and his power were enormous. It is in no way evident that the mishap in Media had ruined his reputation, wh

tion of Octavianus, or for Egypt and Egypt’s Queen? Ahenobarbus urged that Cleopatra be sent back to Egypt. Canidius the mar

s the marshal dissented, pointing to the men, the money and the ships that Cleopatra provided for the war. 2 Canidius prevai

Cleopatra provided for the war. 2 Canidius prevailed: it was alleged that he had been bribed. The compromising ally remaine

sed from Ephesus to Samos and from Samos to Athens. Now it might seem that Cleopatra had finally triumphed. Antonius formall

was there: Antonius stood as her ally, whatever the nature of the tie that bound them. 3 Antonius had presumed too much up

them. 3 Antonius had presumed too much upon the loyalty of a party that was united not by principle or by a cause but by

er family tradition and the prospects of his own son, made him insist that the party of Antonius should be Roman, not regal.

(50, 3,2). Velleius, no safe guide about Plancus at any time, alleges that this corrupt character, ‘in omnia et omnibus vena

ht a precious gift, so it is alleged news of the documentary evidence that Octavianus so urgently required. They told him th

umentary evidence that Octavianus so urgently required. They told him that the last will and testament of Antonius reposed i

divorce of Octavia, had served his purpose adequately. Men could see that divorce, like marriage, was an act of high politi

an act of high politics. Now came an opportune discovery so opportune that forgery might be suspected, though the provisions

Caesar, bequeathed legacies to the children of Cleopatra and directed that , when he died, he should be buried beside her in

ssary? and how easily could forgery be detected? PageBook=>283 that Antonius had abruptly left a court of law in the

oquent of the Romans, because Cleopatra was passing by in her litter, that he had bestowed upon his paramour the whole libra

ce; and touching the testament of Antonius, many thought it atrocious that a man should be impugned in his lifetime for post

o defend him openly. Wild rumours pervaded Rome and Italy. Not merely that Antonius and Cleopatra designed to conquer the We

such treason in his right mind. It was therefore solemnly asseverated that Antonius was the victim of sorcery. 6 Antonius

duals were persuaded to offer contributions for the army. The letters that circulated, guaranteed by the seal of the sphinx

spension of belief may safely be recommended. Nor is it to be fancied that all the land rose as one man in patriotic ardour,

a few years of Actium, a patriotic poet revolted at the mere thought that Roman soldiers, captives from the disaster of Cra

. 8, 16, ι; 9, 5, 3. 3 Above, pp. 86 ff. PageBook=>287 Shame that the Marsian and the Apulian could forget the sacr

of Caesar or of Antonius? The Roman constitution might be endangered: that was a name and a deception. Etruria, Picenum and

te country could remember their conquest by Sulla and by the Pompeii: that was a reality. More recently, Perusia. For any

have arisen, total and immediate, from the plebiscite of the year 32: that act was but the beginning of the work that August

plebiscite of the year 32: that act was but the beginning of the work that Augustus the Princeps was later to consummate. It

ork that Augustus the Princeps was later to consummate. It is evident that the most confident as well as the most vocal asse

then, after victory, did men realize to the full the terrible danger that had menaced NotesPage=>287 1 Horace, Odes

nians taken at Gangra in the name of Augustus after the annexation of that region (OGIS 532 = ILS 8781), an oath of allegian

ed their neighbours, they bribed or bullied their dependents, just as that wholly admirable character, L. Visidius, had done

lvisius Sabinus or Statilius Taurus; and it may fairly be conjectured that no opposition confronted Maecenas at Arretium, wh

fronted Maecenas at Arretium, where his ancestors had ruled as kings, that the Appuleii (a family related to Octavianus) and

and Nonius Gallus won over the city of Aesernia in northern Samnium, that the Vinicii could answer for fervid support from

distrust the propaganda of the Caesarian party and refuse to believe that the true cause of the war was the violent attempt

tainly came from Aesernia (ILS 895); and Sex. Appuleius was patron of that town (ILS 894). On the origin of the Vinicii, cf.

nto two parts very easily. It is one of the miracles of Roman history that in subsequent ages the division between West and

The loss of the dominions beyond the sea would be ruinous to an Italy that had prospered and grown rich from the revenues of

into poverty and dishonour. National pride revolted. Was it for this that the legions of the imperial Republic had shattere

s, of which fact Antonius now reminded him. Pollio in reply claimed that in mutual services Antonius had been the gainer:

d for his own dignity but not for any party, still less for the fraud that was made to appear above party and politics. The

, old and new, about Plancus, or about Agrippa. It is to be regretted that no history preserves the opinions of Pollio conce

war as consul himself, for the third time. Antonius was not outlawed that was superfluous. On Cleopatra, the Queen of Egypt

phew were all but monarchic in their native Gades; it may be presumed that the wealthy family of the Annaei commanded adequa

’s dash and vigour; but they lacked the moral advantage of attack and that stimulating dose of patriotic fervour that had be

al advantage of attack and that stimulating dose of patriotic fervour that had been administered to the army of the West. Ye

st their kinsmen. He might be able to employ sea-power with a mastery that neither Pompeius nor the Liberators had achieved

achieved when they contended against invaders coming from Italy. If that was his plan, it failed. Antonius had a great fle

;295 1 As Tarn argues, CQ XXVI (1932), 75 ff. It is clear, however, that provincial levies were heavily drawn upon. Brutus

rom the gentilicia of a number of soldiers of eastern origin the fact that they were given the Roman franchise on enlistment

(1937), 1 ff. Against Tarn’s theory it can be argued, with Kromayer, that Antonius had already been severely defeated at se

staged. Neither of the rivals in the contest for power had intended that there should be a serious battle if they could he

on of all Italy. But the young Caesar required the glory of a victory that would surpass the greatest in all history, Roman

ttle, with lavish wealth of convincing and artistic detail. More than that , Actium became the contest of East and West perso

297 1 For the hypothesis, largely based on Horace, Epodes 9, 19 f., that the whole left wing refused to fight, cf. W. W. T

and patrician tradition. She was the last person of note in a family that claimed descent from the nobility of Alba Longa.

us battle of Actium and the defeat of the greatest soldier of the day that called forth the shrillest jubilation from the vi

his heir, when murder could serve no useful purpose : he even claimed that after his victory he spared all Roman citizens wh

f the Dictator, D. Turullius and Cassius of Parma, closing the series that began with C. Trebo-nius, the proconsul of Asia.

alumny against his leader and suffered a double detraction. They said that he had deserted the legions after Actium, that he

detraction. They said that he had deserted the legions after Actium, that he died without fortitude. 2 Antonius’ eldest son

ories. It had been an essential part of his propaganda to demonstrate that Antonius bestowed upon unworthy and criminal alie

of Actium. Octavianus was not incommoded: he took no steps to recover that region, but invoked and maintained the traditiona

otiated. When a Parthian pretender fled to Syria, he preferred to use that advantage for peace rather than for war. Crassu

CIL I 2, p. 77): none the less his command in Spain may have preceded that of Taurus. He is not mentioned at Actium. As for

erius Messalla. The proconsul of Macedonia, M. Licinius Crassus, held that his successes deserved special honour: he was not

spoil and prerogative of the victors. Already the Senate had voted that the Temple of Janus should be closed, a sign that

he Senate had voted that the Temple of Janus should be closed, a sign that all the world was at peace on land and sea. 5 The

d and sea. 5 The imposing and archaic ceremony did not, however, mean that warfare was to cease: the generals of Rome were a

on of imperial NotesPage=>303 1 Appian (BC 4, 51, 221) records that he became governor of Syria. About the date, no e

n a single thread. Well might men adjure the gods of Rome to preserve that precious life, hunc saltern everso iuvenem succ

on of the cuirass on Augustus’ statue from Prima Porta. Norden argued that Aen. 6, 794 ff. derives from traditional laudatio

n statue in the temple of Quirinus: Caesar’s heir was identified with that god by the poet Virgil. 1 Not by conquest only bu

What Rome and Italy desired was a return, not to freedom—anything but that —but to civil and ordered government, in a word, t

aditionally pertaining to the senator foremost in rank and authority, that of princeps senatus. Further, a comprehensive mea

had resigned the title of Triumvir, but it might have been contended that he continued unobtrusively to exercise the dictat

that he continued unobtrusively to exercise the dictatorial powers of that office, had the question been of concern to men a

n at the time. From 31 B.C onwards he had been consul every year. But that was not all. The young despot not only conceded,

at was not all. The young despot not only conceded, but even claimed, that he held sovranty over the whole State and the who

y over the whole State and the whole Empire, for he solemnly affirmed that in the sixth and seventh consulates he transferre

e and the People. By what right had it been in his hand? He indicates that it was through general consent that he had acquir

it been in his hand? He indicates that it was through general consent that he had acquired supreme power—‘per consensum univ

ensum universorum potitus rerum omnium. ’1 It has often been believed that the words allude to the coniuratio of 32 B.C., wh

achery destroys both the credit and the confidence of any who deal in that commodity. No ruler could have faith in men like

slain the chieftain of the enemy in battle with his own hand, a feat that had fallen to only two Romans since Romulus. Such

tartling relevance of Livy 4, 19 f. All historians before Livy stated that Cornelius Cossus won the spolia opima when milita

us won the spolia opima when military tribune: but Augustus told Livy that he had seen in the temple of Juppiter Feretrius a

er the passage of four centuries, was no doubt invoked to demonstrate that Crassus had no valid claim to the spolia opima be

position he was holding in Gaul (above, p. 302). Dio expressly states that Octavianus took the title of imperator from Crass

his powers were a direct continuation of the Triumvirate, even though that despotic office had expired years before: in law

idence, though not from a pyramid, shows the Roman knight proclaiming that he advanced southwards in conquest farther than a

uld tolerate misdemeanour, crime or vice in his associates, providing that his own supremacy was not assailed. The precise n

:1 it was hardly trivial or verbal, for Suetonius ranks his fall with that of Salvidienus. Octavianus praised the pietas of

ypt in 28 B.C. With the proconsul of Macedonia no link is known, save that each was once a partisan of Antonius. 3 Who had n

Gage, Rev. hist, CLXXI (1933), 1 ff PageBook=>311 A settlement that yielded certain provinces of the Empire, nominall

rd and astringent pill of supreme power with some harmless flavouring that smacked of tradition and custom. The military lea

he military leader wished to be known as a magistrate. An appellation that connoted eminence, but not always sole primacy, w

d, when writing his Fasti, discovered in the word ‘dux’ a convenience that was not merely a matter of metre. 3 Then, after a

law at Rome. To translate the term ‘princeps’ Greeks employed a word that meant ‘dux’. 5 NotesPage=>312 1 Propertius

on of the Senate on January 13th, 27 B.C., when he solemnly announced that he resigned all powers and all provinces to the f

r thanks, to confer honours upon the saviour of the State. They voted that a wreath of laurel should be placed above the doo

r-post of his dwelling, for he had saved the lives of Roman citizens; that in the Senate should be hung a golden shield with

Werden und Wesen des Prinzipats, 229 ff.) follows Mommsen and assumes that it carried imperium maius over the provinces of t

Gestae 34, cf. ILS 82 (a copy at Potentia in Picenum).. 3 Dio says that Augustus himself was eager for the name of Romulu

ran politician, the consular L. Munatius Plancus, proposed the decree that conferred on Caesar’s heir the appellation of Aug

of Caesar Augustus were modest indeed, unimpeachable to a generation that knew Dictatorship and Triumvirate. By consent, fo

g. 7, 2. 3 Dio’s account is anachronistic and misleading. He states that Augustus resigned to the Senate the peaceful prov

ided by the contemporary Strabo (p. 840) free of anachronism. He says that Augustus took as his portion ὅση στρατɩωτɩκῆς φρο

be subjected to the same salutary treatment, for nobody could believe that the frontiers of Illyricum and Macedonia were sat

ended imperium in the past had threatened the stability of the State, that was due to the ruinous ambition of politicians wh

the recent past might properly have been invoked: it is pretty clear that it was not. The Romans as a people were possess

vus’ had an evil ring. Yet the memory of the past reminded the Romans that change had come, though slow and combated. Rome

merstein (Vom Werden und Wesen des Prinzipats, 227), who demonstrates that after 27 B.C. the consulate was reduced to its du

lopment. 2 Augustus himself, so he asserted, accepted no magistracy that ran contrary to the ‘mos maiorum’. 3 He did not n

bris princeps’, for as such he would have himself known. 5 Not only that . The whole career of Pompeius was violent and ill

d. What they required was not the ambitious and perfidious dynast but that Pompeius who had fallen as Caesar’s enemy, as a c

genus qui ducis Olympo, proice tela manu, sanguis meus! 6 Save for that veiled rebuke, no word of Caesar in all the epic

the government. On the whole, better to say nothing of Caesar, or for that matter of Antonius, save as criminal types. The p

he power and domination of Augustus was in reality far too similar to that of the Dictator to stand even a casual reminder,

ment of the Principate of Pompeius, and foreshadowing the ideal state that was realized under the Principate of Augustus. 1

Utopias in the past, not in the future. It is a more convincing view that Cicero, in despair and longing, wrote of an ideal

w that Cicero, in despair and longing, wrote of an ideal commonwealth that had once existed, the Rome of the Scipiones, with

the Rome of the Scipiones, with the balanced and ordered constitution that excited the admiration of Polybius:2 even if the

princeps like Pompeius. For the rest, it might pertinently be urged that the political doctrine of Cicero was couched in p

l doctrine of Cicero was couched in phrases so vague and so innocuous that it could be employed by any party and adapted to

erished. That being so, the resurgence of phrases, and even of ideas, that were current in the previous generation will neit

e and disturbance. Well might he say, when asked his verdict on Cato, that anybody who does not wish the present dispensatio

present dispensation to be altered is a good citizen. 1 Precisely for that end Augustus laboured, to conserve the new order,

controlled libertas or ferocia of Pollio came as a verbal reminder of that tradition. Pollio, it is true, was preserved as a

proclaimed a firm determination to fight to the end against any power that set itself above the laws, would have known the t

e it was not worth submitting to tyranny. 5 Cicero refused to admit that freedom could exist even under a constitutional m

government. Cicero would easily have proved to himself and to others that the new order was the best state of all, more tru

Genuine Pompeians there still were, loyal to a family and a cause—but that was another matter. Insistence upon the legal bas

he wisest of the Greeks (ib., 36). 4 W. Weber (CAH XI, 367) alleges that Augustus had conceived the idea of the rule of th

is’ from Panaetius through Cicero. PageBook=>322 would pretend that internecine war and the proscription of ‘boni vir

s a revolutionary leader who won supreme power through civil war. All that he needed from Cicero he had got long ago, in the

n of property and the active co- operation of the governing class. To that end, he modified the forms of the constitution to

ritten prescription stands auctoritas; it was in virtue of auctoritas that Augustus claimed pre-eminence for himself. 1 Auct

claimed pre-eminence for himself. 1 Auctoritas denotes the influence that belonged, not by law but by custom of the Roman c

st of the principes. It was therefore both appropriate and inevitable that the unofficial title by which he chose to be desi

tus possessed indefinite and tremendous resources, open or secret—all that the principes in the last generation held, but no

med to be their protector against oppression. Free elections returned— that is to say, a grateful people would unfailingly el

portentous and alarming. Yet it would be an elementary error to fancy that the ceremony of January 13th was merely a grim co

tion of the Revolution and the maintenance of peace, it was necessary that the primacy of Caesar’s heir should be strengthen

l’ settlement the beginning of a strict monarchical rule; he observed that the pay of Augustus’ military guard was doubled a

the pay of Augustus’ military guard was doubled at the same time—and that in virtue of the Senate’s decree. 1 The signifi

’2 The words have a venerable and antiquarian ring. That is all; and that is enough to show them up. Suetonius, however,

ities, was a scholar not wholly devoid of historical sense. He states that Augustus twice thought of restoring the Republic—

He states that Augustus twice thought of restoring the Republic— not that he did so. 3 To Suetonius, the work of Augustus w

stance the prospect is fairer. It has been maintained in recent times that Augustus not only employed Republican language bu

imes that Augustus not only employed Republican language but intended that the Republican constitution should operate unhamp

tended that the Republican constitution should operate unhampered—and that it did, at least in the earlier years of his pres

A, 706 ff.). Nor is his nomenclature constant. Yet it is pretty clear that the consul of 23 B.C. ‘A. T[erentius … ] V[ar]ro

me twenty legions. The Cisalpina was no longer a province. Apart from that , Augustus’ portion was closely comparable in exte

ere dead or had lapsed long ago from public notice. Nor was it likely that the ex-Antonians Pollio, Censorinus, C. Sosius an

viri triumphales, only one was to hold command of an army again, and that NotesPage=>327 1 Strabo, p. 840: διαψῶν ἄλ

interested loyalty of partisans of lower standing—and novi homines at that . Hence the conspicuous lack of legates of Augustu

uff. 30) and M. Titius (cos. suff. 31). It must be admitted, however, that full lists of provincial governors in the early y

aetorian provinces gradually developed; and it is by no means certain that it held good for the public provinces from the be

proconsuls of consular rank. In the early years it might be expected that from time to time men of consular rank would be p

ntments of Augustus, responsible to him alone. It will be conjectured that the Senate’s choice of governors for the military

vernment so strong and a body of administrators so large and coherent that nothing should shatter the fabric, that the Commo

trators so large and coherent that nothing should shatter the fabric, that the Commonwealth should stand and endure, even wh

in the Balkans and the East, not merely for warfare and for glory but that consolidation and conciliation should come more e

road, made vocal in the prayers of poets and preserved by historians, that he proposed to invade the distant island of Brita

the armies of the Roman Republic first invaded Spain: the conquest of that vast peninsula was still far from complete. The i

ll but preclude the attempt to reconstruct the true history of a year that might well have been the last, and was certainly

i’). 2 Dio 54, 11, 1 ff. The mendacious Velleius (2, 90, 4) asserts that Augustus in person had achieved the conquest of S

in person had achieved the conquest of Spain (in 26 and 25 B.C.), and that there was no trouble ever after ’postea etiam lat

after ’postea etiam latrociniis vacarent. ’ 3 The fullest account, that of Dio, misdates the trial of Primus and conspira

eover, only one consular list, the Fasti Capitolini, reveals the fact that Murena was consul ordinarius in 23 B.C. All the o

a lack of satisfaction with the ‘felicissimus status’. Worse than all that , it touched the very heart and core of the party.

ago Salvidienus the marshal betrayed his leader and his friend. Since that catastrophe until recently the chief men of the C

measure of mutual trust or of mutual affection they knew too much for that , and revolutionaries are not sentimental. Their l

ed by cold baths, a prescription of the physician Antonius Musa. From that date the Princeps enjoyed a robust health that ba

an Antonius Musa. From that date the Princeps enjoyed a robust health that baffled his doctors and his enemies. On July 1st

onstitutional basis of his authority was altered. More important than that , official standing was conferred upon the ablest

No trace hitherto of their employment. 3 It was not until this year that the Princeps thought of exerting tribunicia potes

stated by Dio, ought never to have been doubted and is confirmed, if that were needed, by the five edicts found at Cyrene (

. C Anderson in JRS XVII, 33 ff.). It is reasonable enough to suppose that the powers granted in this year were sanctioned b

bodied a clear definition and ostensible restriction of his powers in that sense a return to constitutional government, in s

a potestas was elusive and formidable; while imperium is so important that all mention of it is studiously omitted from the

grant of authority over all the East in 23 B.C. can be urged the fact that a few years later, in 20 and 19 B.C., Agrippa is

, 1 ff.). PageBook=>338 It was not for ostentation but for use that the Princeps took a partner and strengthened his

sus and so acquire easy prestige for the new government. 3 Not only that . Syria was the only military province in the East

s were not enough. Piso and Sestius, ex-Republicans in the consulate, that looked well. But it was only a manifesto. PageN

onvincing (22 B.C.). Augustus adopted certain other specious measures that appeared to provide solid confirmation of the ren

celebrated as the inauguration of a New Age. It was perhaps intended that Secular Games should be celebrated precisely in t

perhaps intended that Secular Games should be celebrated precisely in that year; 5 and it is at least remarkable that certai

be celebrated precisely in that year; 5 and it is at least remarkable that certain Odes of Horace (published in the second h

.C.) should contain such vivid and exact anticipations of the reforms that Rome expected and for which Rome had to wait five

had spread their ravages, producing riots in Rome and popular clamour that Augustus should assume the office of Dictator. 6

nment. The constitution is a façade as under the Republic. Not only that . Augustus himself is not so much a man as a hero

mortal, Augustus stood aloof from ordinary mankind. He liked to fancy that there was something in his gaze that inspired awe

inary mankind. He liked to fancy that there was something in his gaze that inspired awe in the beholder: men could not confr

ains elusive, despite the authentic details of his sayings and habits that have been preserved, despite the inferences plaus

que primacy must not obscure the reality from which it arose the fact that he was the leader of a party. At the core of a

a Drusilla had been a political alliance with the Claudii, though not that alone. The cold beauty with tight lips, thin nose

esolute glance had inherited in full measure the statecraft of houses that held power in Rome of their own right, the Claudi

Marcellus. On him the Princeps set his hopes of a line of succession that should be not merely dynastic, but in his own fam

the youth. At his trial, M. Primus the proconsul of Macedonia alleged that he had been given secret instructions by Marcellu

e and his fortune to whomsoever he pleased, but not his imperium, for that was the grant of Senate and People, nor the leade

y Agrippa and other party-magnates would have their word to say about that . Two different conceptions were at war, recalling

Agrippa. Maecenas made a fatal mistake he told Terentia of the danger that threatened her brother. 3 Augustus could not forg

0. 7 Pliny, NH 7, 149: ‘pudenda Agrippae ablegatio. ’ It is evident that Tiberius’ retirement to Rhodes has coloured earli

ome warrant for speaking of a veiled coup d’état. It was bad enough that the young man should become consul at the age of

e age of twenty-three: his adoption would be catastrophic. Not merely that it shattered the constitutional façade of the New

bsurd. Unity was established: it was to a Roman proverb about unity that Agrippa was in the habit of acknowledging a great

res angry, imperious and resolute. There were grounds for the opinion that , if Augustus died, Agrippa would make short work

nobles hated the grim upstart, the ruthless instrument of the tyranny that had usurped their privileges and their power. M.

at aqueducts. He composed and published a memorandum which advocated that art treasures in private possession should be con

’s daughter Vipsania. The match had been contrived long ago by Livia, that astute politician whom her great-grandson called

to Augustus. Livia deserved to succeed. It may fairly be represented that the secret coup d’etat of 23 B.C. was the work of

efore, even when Agrippa subsequently received proconsular power like that of Augustus over all the provinces of the Empire,

that of Augustus over all the provinces of the Empire, and more than that , the tribunicia potestas, he was not in all thing

lly designated to assume the inheritance of sole power, to become all that Augustus had been. The nobiles would not have sto

perance: Octavianus had been too ambitious to be a loyal partner. Now that one man stood supreme, invested with power and wi

s rule allies who would not be rivals. It was hardly to be expected that the qualities requisite for a ruler of the world

ure-head was desirable. Augustus, with his name and his luck, was all that and more. PageNote. 346 (No Notes) PageBook

ght not be a second Caesar: he lacked the vigour and the splendour of that dynamic figure. But he had inherited the name and

ree either had already held the consulate or were later rewarded with that supreme distinction. 1 Caesar the Dictator augm

e had swollen inordinately, to more than a thousand members. In order that the sovran assembly should recover dignity and ef

pa and Taurus, of unknown ancestors. The august and purified assembly that received from the hands of Italy’s leader the res

>350 1 Namely M. Insteius, Q. Nasidius and M. Octavius. But, for that matter, few Triumviral consuls even are at all pr

e passage of time extended the process and abbreviated the stages, so that the sons of knights, knights themselves and final

attered the Roman Republic: none the less, when offered some prospect that their aspirations for land and security would be

alian or provincial, which he had purchased from his own funds. After that , he instituted a bounty, paid in money. 4 Soldier

eligible for equestrian posts; 5 further, it is by no means unlikely that sons of equestrian families from the towns of Ita

raefectus equitum) were reserved for members of the equestrian order, that is to say, for knights (including senators’ sons

ch opportunities arose for service, for distinction and for promotion that in time knights were willing to divest themselves

provoked their resistance. The freedman Isidorus declared in his will that he suffered severe financial losses during the Ci

under Caesar in Spain, Mamurra in Gaul. It might also be conjectured that men like Ventidius, Salvidienus and Cornelius Gal

num served as procurators. 6 Magius was highly respectable. Some said that Vitellius’ father was a freedman no doubt he had

The dedication made by the Tarraconenses will support the conjecture that Magius had been a procurator in Spain. 7 Strabo

s, Agr. 4, 1 (Agricola’s grandfathers). PageBook=>357 Not only that Roman knights could govern provinces, some of the

d the Praetorian Guard. Less important stages in an equestrian career that might culminate in the governorship of Egypt or t

ice and title of consul. That was novel and revolutionary. Not indeed that a sharp line of division had hitherto separated s

promotion of knights to the Senate was no novelty, for it is evident that the Senate after Sulla contained many members of

for the office of the quaestorship and so enter the Senate. Not only that the tribunate was also thus used. 2 To the best o

and Proculeius furnished palpable evidence. Again, it often happened that only one son of a municipal family chose to enter

y chose to enter the Senate. If it was thus in colonies and municipia that had long been a part of the Roman State, or in we

thy cities of old civilization, what of the backward regions of Italy that had only been incorporated after the Bellum Itali

retend to derive from pure Latin stock. 2 Above and before all stands that blatant prodigy of nomenclature, Sex. Sotidius St

mo held the consulate as colleague of Quirinius in 12 B.C.4 But after that the middle period of the Principate of Augustus s

supplied soldiers: the two Poppaei came from an obscure community in that region. 6 Larinum, a small town of criminal notor

llan period?) which show an A. Hirtius and a M. Lollius as censors of that town. For a possibility that Lollius was really o

. Hirtius and a M. Lollius as censors of that town. For a possibility that Lollius was really of noble extraction, adopted b

(L’ann. ép., 1937, 62). Passienus is the first consul with a name of that type, nearly anticipated, however, by Salvidienus

o promote novi homines was patently not a ‘novus mos’. 3 All men knew that the noblest families of the Roman aristocracy wen

and function in the comprehensive, traditional and conservative party that had superseded the spurious Republic of the nobil

empire, to the exclusion of rivals. Nor was it for reasons of theory that Caesar and Augustus attached to their party and p

rous and prosperous regions, were loyal to the government of Rome now that they had passed from the clientela of the Pompeii

of Rome now that they had passed from the clientela of the Pompeii to that of the Julii. Supplying a preponderance, perhaps

and the liberal policy of Caesar: a grave exaggeration, deriving from that schematic contrast between Caesar the Dictator an

stus acquired sole power, the Revolution had already proceeded so far that it could abate its rhythm without any danger of r

ts obscure or even provincial in extraction. In purpose and in effect that measure was neither revolutionary nor outrageous;

arized by Caesar Augustus. Caesar admitted provincials. No evidence that Augustus expelled them all. The descendants of th

n Augustus’ aim to depreciate or retard the provinces of the West and that part of the Roman People which extended far beyon

Augustus (ILS 2676). This person was a XXVIvir. No evidence, however, that he actually entered the Senate. 3 ILS 2688 (Sex

gustus and prevented the adoption of Marcellus; it may be conjectured that certain among them, above all Agrippa, whose poli

that certain among them, above all Agrippa, whose policy prevailed on that occasion, also sought to curb Augustus’ ardent pr

C. Cichorius, R. Studien, 285 ff. 2 The dispensations accorded show that the low age limit was in force before 23 B.C.: it

e Senate from eight hundred to six hundred members. He professed half that size to be ideal and desirable. 1 That would have

their champion, the plebs of Rome knew how they were expected to use that freedom. On the other hand, the candidate, at lea

seek the approbation of the Princeps. He did not nominate candidates that would have been invidious and superfluous. His wi

. Augustus’ intentions may have been laudable and sincere more likely that the Princeps wished to teach the nobiles a sharp

ular election and unrestricted competition. The Roman plebs clamoured that Augustus, present or absent, should assume the ti

ature for the consulate in 19 B.C. Saturninus blocked him, announcing that , even if elected by the people, Rufus should not

the authentic Republic, something very different from the firm order that had prevailed in the first four years of the Prin

ced by M. Vinicius, another of the marshals. Nor will it be forgotten that Taurus was there all the time, with no official s

e Fasti in the middle years of his Principate recall the splendour of that last effulgence before the war of Pompeius and Ca

gradually developed into a series of separate commands, it was right that they should be regarded and governed as separate

programmes or solid merit. Caesar and the Triumvirs had changed all that . None the less, though modified, the old categori

ition. It would be impertinent and pointless to scrutinize the merits that conferred the consulate upon C. Valgius Rufus, an

, Pollio’s ambitious son. What would have happened if Augustus like that great politician, the censor Appius Claudius had

y the daughter, Julia. No less resplendent in its way was the fortune that attended upon other partisans of Augustus. Unfort

on is the care of the State in an oligarchical society, it is evident that sacerdotal preferment will be conferred, not upon

s, Ann. 3, 22. His divorced wife Aemilia Lepida dishonestly pretended that she had borne him a son. 7 Pliny, NH 9, 117 (on

ending against Ahenobarbus. 2 Augustus’ revival of ancient colleges that had lapsed for centuries was not merely a sign of

Saturninus is found next to Augustus as deputy-master of the college that celebrated the Secular Games; 5 and it was C. Ate

crobius 3, 13, II. 2 Cicero, Ad fam. 8, 14, 1. 3 Augustus records that about one hundred and seventy of his adherents in

der the new dispensation his right to designate a praetor every year, that did not matter. There were other ways. The syst

tris militia, thence perhaps into the Senate. It might be conjectured that the patriotic clubs (collegia iuventutis) of the

d well his wife was Aelia Galla, the daughter, it may be presumed, of that Aelius Gallus who was the second Prefect of Egypt

as Sempronia and Servilia down to minor but efficient intriguers like that Praecia to whose good offices Lucullus owed, it w

his friends. 2 When the Princeps, offended, declares in due solemnity that he revokes his favour, the loss of his amicitia m

a were handsomely rewarded by legacies in her will. 1 Much worse than that was suspected and rumoured about Livia poison and

oman of Antonia; 2 and it was to the patronage of the great Narcissus that he owed the command of a legion. 3 The four emper

ll persons conspicuous and influential at Court. Such were the ways that led to wealth and honours in the imperial system,

l pests, the demagogue and the military adventurer. That did not mean that the direction of the government now rested in the

government now rested in the hands of Senate and magistrates not for that , but for another purpose, the solemn and ostensib

ght be designated as the government, ‘auctores publici consilii’. But that government had seldom been able to present a unit

mmand armies, as legates or proconsuls. 1 There were good reasons for that . Rome and Italy could be firmly held for the Pr

had perished and Galba assumed the heritage of the Julii and Claudii, that the great secret was first published abroad an em

nd the effective position of Agrippa were soon augmented in a measure that none of the agents of the drama of 23 B.C. could

Then in 18 B.C. the imperium of Agrippa was augmented, to cover (like that of Augustus since 23 B.C.) the provinces of the S

hat of Augustus since 23 B.C.) the provinces of the Senate. More than that , he received a share in the tribunicia potestas.

t the danger made manifest and alarming during the Triumviral period, that the Empire might split into two parts. By 13 B.

55 ff.: the truth of the matter has often been obscured by the belief that Octavianus in 35 and 34 B.C. conquered the whole

he Save valley down to Belgrade (which no ancient source asserts) and that the operations of Tiberius in 12–9 B.C. were conf

. Vinicius here or under 13 B.C. (54, 28, 1). It might be conjectured that Vinicius was proconsul of Illyricum in 14 and in

ul of Illyricum in 14 and in 13 B.C. presumably the last proconsul of that province. PageBook=>391 In Macedonia M. Lo

n in the winter of 13-12 B.C.2 The design, it may be conjectured, was that Agrippa should prosecute the conquest of Illyricu

ment of an inscr. from Philippi (L’ann. ep. 1933, 85); for L. Tarius, that from the vicinity of Amphipolis (ib., 1936, 18):

. | pontem fecit. ’ He is not described as ‘proconsul’. This may mean that the Princeps had temporarily taken over the provi

. Lollius. 2 Dio 54, 28, I f., cf. Velleius 2, 92, 2. Velleius says that Agrippa and Vinicius began the Bellum Pannonicum,

ding to Seneca (l.c.), Augustus gave Piso ‘secreta mandata’: in order that the legatus Augusti might override at need the pr

peers and rivals have been passed over so as to create the impression that Tiberius was Rome’s sole and incomparable general

ency or to promote a partisan. Galatia-Pamphylia, the vast province that succeeded the kingdom of Amyntas, was first organ

ble and flagrant in Velleius Paterculus. The only military operations that he mentions during the absence of Tiberius are th

iberius are those of M. Vinicius in Germany (c. A.D. 2) and coolly at that (2, 104, 2). Naturally enough, not a word of Ahen

: the garrison may not always have been as small as the single legion that remained there from the last years of Augustus on

s its own inadequacy. It is here assumed, though it cannot be proved, that M. Vinicius was the last proconsul, Tiberius the

, with an inclination to the later years. It could, however, be urged that the new command was set up as a result of the cam

ears. But favour could secure curtailment of legal prescriptions, and that not merely for princes of the blood. Ahenobarbus

arbus when Caesar monopolized Gaul for many years. It does not follow that the wars waged by nobles or politicians were alwa

strous. The Romans were at least preserved from the dreary calamities that so often attend upon the theoretical study of the

ell. 5 So great was the emphasis laid by Augustus on military service that he would even place two senators’ sons in charge

rei militaris peritum (In Pisonem 54). 2 That is, on the assumption that Labienus was, from the beginning, a partisan of P

legate of a definite legion is P. Cornelius Lcntulus Scipio, holding that post in A.D. 22 (ILS 940, cf. Tacitus, Ann. 3, 74

were not exceptional. Vinicius is a close parallel; it is unfortunate that so little is known of the careers of L. Tarius Ru

icious. Design has conspired with accident, for the Princeps intended that the military achievements of his rule should be g

ore prominent in historical record, was not the only Eastern province that called for special treatment. The legates of Gala

proconsul (19-18 B.C.) and governed Gallia Comata (17-16 B.C.)3 After that , a long lapse until Lollius emerges as guide and

d to Thrace with an army, where he was engaged for three years; after that , he was proconsul of Asia; 7 subsequently, it may

B.C., cf. T. Corbishley, JRS XXIV (1934), 43 ff. Strabo (p. 748) says that he was governor at the time of the surrender of t

.C., cf. L. R. Taylor, JRS XXVI (1936), 161 ff. Hence the possibility that M. Titius was legate of Syria on two separate occ

an rule by ordering a census and crushed the insurrection provoked by that alien and distasteful novelty (A.D. 6). 4 M. Pl

ting there and suppressing the mountaineers of Isauria (A.D. 6). 5 In that year the Pannonians and Dalmatians rose in revolt

ia. For the activity of Plautii in the East, cf. Münzer, RA, 43 f. On that family, cf. also below, p. 422. PageBook=>40

may already have been transferred to the legate of Moesia. 5 However that may be, no consulars can be established in this p

acitus, Ann. 4, 44), cf. now E. Groag, PIK2, C 1379, who demonstrates that he is the consul of 14 B.C., not, as hitherto bel

is not certain who followed Tiberius in 6 B.C.1 Before long, however, that important command, with five legions, was held by

3 There was also fighting in Africa. 4 These are not the only names that mattered in the critical period in question, but

ed with ministers of government. But it was not in the provinces only that the principes were trained and yoked to service.

1 B.C. (55, 10a, 3): possibly Saturninus, if an earlier command than that of A.D. 4-6 could be assumed (cf. Velleius 2, 105

895 (Bracara), cf. CIL II 2581 (Lucus Augusti). If it could be proved that he was legate of Citerior rather than of Ulterior

that he was legate of Citerior rather than of Ulterior, it would show that by now the region of Asturia-Callaecia had been t

aecia had been transferred from the latter province to the former and that the two Spanish armies had by now been fused into

standing. An ancient authority states a reason for these innovations that as many senators as possible should take an activ

calcitrant to the Princeps. They may have suspected, and with reason, that he intended to devolve upon them certain unpopula

hat he intended to devolve upon them certain unpopular functions like that renewed purification of the Senate which he desir

e aediles with a body of fire-fighting slaves it was not until A.D. 6 that he took the step of appointing an equestrian offi

ommission of three members in A.D. 6, or the two curatores annonae of that year and the next, whose function passed at once

ge number of consulars. An anomalous dignity remains to be mentioned, that of praefectus urbi. In the nature of the matter,

of the city which was the capital of Italy and the Empire. He boasted that he found Rome a city of brick and left it a city

his own auspices, might assume the title of imperator. 6 Before long that honour too would be denied. Military glory was

s commemorated the glory and the vanity of the great Pompeius. Of all that , nothing more. Domitius and Titius were the last

and Titius were the last commoners to give their names to cities, and that was in far Cilicia. No senator might depart fro

gions in his clientela. 2 Descendants of Pompeius survived: no chance that they would be allowed to hold high command in Spa

as permitted in 23 B.C. (Dio 53, 32, 5). This does not mean, however, that he exercised proconsular authority in Rome or in

m Principat des Augustus (1935), 93 ff. There can hardly be any doubt that their powers were developed and used, though not

he comes to narrate the Principate of Augustus, Cassius Dio complains that the task of the historian has been aggravated bey

rty, with free elections and free debate in the Senate, it is evident that there would have to be expert preparation and fir

ment has set in. The Senate was no longer a sovran body, but an organ that advertised or confirmed the decisions of the gove

ety, had he needed or cared to justify the various bodies of advisers that are attested in his Principate. No sooner was the

State restored than Augustus hastened to palliate any inconveniences that might arise from that alarming novelty. He instru

ugustus hastened to palliate any inconveniences that might arise from that alarming novelty. He instructed the Senate to app

odest executive powers. It was therefore advisable for the government that is, the Princeps and the party- dynasts to sound

nce, restricted as they were to six months of the year, shows clearly that it was a committee, not a cabinet an organ of adm

re demanded expert counsel and many advisers. It will not be imagined that there was any permanent body of counsellors to th

ers was now available. Knights were eligible for administrative posts that in dignity and power surpassed many magistracies

was no doubt only the residue of the revenues from his own provinces that Augustus paid into the aerarium, which he also su

uch with the Senate but who decided the business to be brought before that convenient and docile committee? The auctoritas o

of the Senate, in show spontaneous and independent. Plancus proposed that the Senate should confer the name of Augustus upo

d confer the name of Augustus upon Caesar’s heir. It will be inferred that the motion was inspired in every sense of the ter

be inferred that the motion was inspired in every sense of the term, that other public proposals of those momentous session

etained in foreign policy mattered little in comparison with the fact that the Princeps, in virtue of his imperium controlle

r grandiose and arduous they might be, were not always dignified with that name and status, but were conveniently regarded a

is not safe to infer from the Lex de imperio Vespasiana, as many do, that Augustus was given this power, explicitly. 3 Jo

y. 3 Josephus, AJ 17, 229. PageBook=>413 It was not intended that there should be foreign wars in the East. But the

late he governed Macedonia and Gaul in succession; it may be presumed that he had formed certain impressions about the probl

n of Cassius Dio, the decision to restore the Republic, or rather, as that historian believed, to consolidate the monarchy,

nce deterred him from the attempt. It would have required imagination that he did not possess and facts that he could never

It would have required imagination that he did not possess and facts that he could never discover. Dio was well aware that

ot possess and facts that he could never discover. Dio was well aware that no authentic record of such momentous transaction

ather at a loss to explain Agrippa’s dispatch to the East. The gossip that so constantly asserted the preponderating influen

oet like Horace. The precaution seems excessive. In a Republic like that of Pompeius, Livia would have been a political fo

ehand. The dominance of Livia was illustrated in a mysterious episode that attracted the inventive fancy of an unknown rheto

cted the inventive fancy of an unknown rhetorician. 1 It was reported that Cn. Cornelius Cinna, a grandson of Pompeius Mag

y). Suetonius and Tacitus know nothing of this ‘conspiracy’. The fact that Cinna was consul in A.D. 5 may have had something

usurpation could be consummated in a peaceful and orderly fashion, so that the transmission of power appeared to be no diffe

, his heir. When the Principate was first transmitted to a successor, that person already held sufficient powers to preclude

otence threatened to precipitate a civil war. It might be conjectured that the danger was averted by a veiled coup d’état on

no unequivocal indication of his ultimate intentions. Rumour asserted that the adoption of Hadrian was managed, when Trajan

y Plotina his wife and by the Prefect of the Guard. 2 It is evident that Augustus and his confidential advisers had given

he government. No less evident the acute differences of opinion about that important matter, and bitter rivalries. The final

Republic. But was Augustus’ design beneficial to the Roman People? Of that , a patriotic Roman might have his doubts. The New

cessity of preserving appearances. 2 Whatever the behaviour of Julia, that was not the prime cause of the crisis of 6 B.C. T

ride had been wounded, his dignitas impaired. But there was more than that . Not merely spite and disappointment made the fir

ant, and, to Tiberius, criminal. It was not until after his departure that Augustus revealed the rapid honours and royal inh

arture that Augustus revealed the rapid honours and royal inheritance that awaited the princes. But that was all in the situ

the rapid honours and royal inheritance that awaited the princes. But that was all in the situation already. Nobody could ha

dy. Nobody could have been deceived. In 6 B.C. there was an agitation that Gaius should be made consul. 2 Augustus expressed

out. Gaius was to have the consulate after an interval of five years ( that is, in A.D. I); and three years later the same di

To Gaius and Lucius in a private letter Augustus expressed his prayer that they should inherit his position in their turn. 2

ion, it is true. Tiberius became consul at the age of twenty-nine but that was after service in war, as a military tribune i

the Alpine campaigns. The stepson of Augustus, he had benefited from that relationship. Yet even had Livia not been the wif

ve reached the consulate in his thirty- third year, like his peers in that generation of nobiles. Privilege and patronage, a

Roman People upon an untried youth in the twentieth year of his age, that was much more than a contradiction of the constit

berius dwelt at Rhodes. His career was ended, his life precarious. Of that , none could doubt who studied dynastic politics a

ger, the very best of them, to predict his return. 3 Much happened in that dark and momentous interval, little can be known.

not long be postponed. A loyal but not ingenuous historian exclaims that the whole world felt the shock of Tiberius’ depar

ce of Augustus. 1 Cinna was one of themselves, noble and patrician at that , and so was Tiberius Augustus had never been. Tho

e Roman People, the master of the legions, the king of kings. For all that , they might flourish in the shadow of the monarch

open political prize was the consulate. In 5 B.C. Augustus assumed that office, after a lapse of eighteen years, with L.

pse of eighteen years, with L. Cornelius Sulla as his colleague. From that year the practice of appointing more than one pai

It would be idle indeed to speculate upon the composition of a body that never came into existence, were there not atteste

5 Suetonius, Nero 4. PageBook=>422 There was more in him than that either prudence or consummate guile: his name fin

Ap. Claudius Caecus in his famous censorship. It is assumed by Münzer that M. Plautius Silvanus (cos. 2 B.C.) and A. Plautiu

ilvanus (cos. 2 B.C.) and A. Plautius (cos.suff. 1 B.C.) descend from that family: which cannot be proved. As perhaps with c

ok=>423 So Livia worked for power. But it is by no means certain that Silvanus was popular with Tiberius. Lacking Tiber

iberius. There were other nobles with influential connexions, such as that mild-mannered person P. Quinctilius Varus, who we

nctilius Varus, who were not so deeply committed to the court faction that they could not survive, and even profit from, a r

e excellent L. Volusius Saturninus will not have forgotten altogether that his father had married a relative of Tiberius. 4

steem of Tiberius. 6 NotesPage=>424 1 The family of Piso, like that of Messalla, is a nexus of difficult problems. Pr

ius may be the father of L. Volusius Saturninus (cos. suff. 12 B.C.); that consul’s wife was Nonia Polla (OGIS 468). 5 Obj

eutral or discreet, while Quirinius trimmed artfully. 5 It is evident that the political crisis in Rome and defeat of the Cl

en transgression against the Leges Juliae: the punishment went beyond that , and the procedure was probably a trial for high

ry Rostra from which the Princeps her father had promulgated the laws that were to sanction the moral regeneration of Rome.

claimed the prerogatives of her station and family8 was it necessary that there should be public scandal? NotesPage=>4

age=>426 1 Velleius alone (2, 100, 4 f.) gives the list. He says that there were others, both senators and knights. 2

Dio 55, 10, 15; Tacitus, Ann. 1, 10; 4, 44. Velleius (2, 100, 4) says that he took his own life. The difference is not mater

. Like the early Christian, it was not the ‘flagitia’ but the tornen’ that doomed him. Iullus Antonius may have aspired to t

ulia and Antonius, it was not from tenderness for Tiberius. It may be that through the ruin of his daughter he sought finall

stas; and he was still the Princeps’ son-in-law. Augustus might think that he knew his Tiberius. Still, he preferred to run

red to run no risks. The disgrace of Julia would abolish the only tie that bound Tiberius to the reigning house. Tiberius wa

, Ann. 1, 53, describes him as ‘pervicax adulter’, alleging a liaison that went back to the time when Julia was the wife of

e East (13 B.C.,) C. Sentius Saturninus and P. Quinctilius Varus. But that was not enough. Gaius was sent out, accompanied b

e futility of a Parthian War. On his staff there was a varied company that included L. Aelius Seianus and the military tribu

and it is demonstrated by another incident nearly twenty years later, that the task of controlling a crown prince in the Eas

dissension and political intrigue. 2 Against Lollius it was alleged that he had taken bribes from eastern kings3 in itself

robably in A.D. 3, he got Aemilia Lepida for his wife. Groag suspects that Livia had something to do with the match (P-W IV

ve was perhaps the work of political influences and powerful advisers that evade detection. But even now, return was conditi

ility to which he was doomed by his implacable master:4 it is alleged that he asked for permission to dwell in the East in a

bove, p. 418, n. 2. Cf. E. Hohl, Klio xxx (1937), 337 ff., who argues that the conspiracy of L. Aemilius Paullus, husband of

ruin of high ambitions. It was expedient to demonstrate without delay that he was indispensable to the safety of the Empire

the services of Vinicius as his personal attachment to the family of that general could with decency permit. 4 The soldiers

e Empire was absent, might turn into a political catastrophe. Against that risk the Princeps and the chief men of the govern

Divus Aug. 19, 1) is undated. The scholiast on Juvenal 6, 158, states that Julia was relegated after her husband had been pu

and accompanied by varied exaggerations of rumour. Men even believed that the frail septuagenarian, accompanied only by his

ommemorated in history for his loyalty to Tiberius perhaps the son of that Lucilius who was the friend of Brutus and of Anto

generation, but not their own sons the young men inherited nobility, that was enough. Caution, abetted by the memory of old

indeed of the nobiles, the rivals and equals of Tiberius, could hope that their sons would govern provinces with legionary

r A. Caecina Severus (cos. suff. 1 B.C.) was in charge of Moesia (now that Macedonia had lost its army). 2 In the three year

on of the range and character of Tiberius’ party. Members of families that hitherto had not risen to the consulate are promi

PageBook=>437 They never let out a secret. It will be recalled that Seius Strabo had a wife from one branch of the pa

cere, alii cupere. ’2 So Tacitus, but he proceeds at once to demolish that impression. Velleius Paterculus, however, paints

as governed by the proconsul L. Nonius Asprenas, who was succeeded in that office by L. Aelius Lamia. 2 On August 19th, A.

ront of the Mausoleum. These were official documents. It is evident that Augustus had taken counsel with the chief men of

th transference of the supreme power. As in 27 B.C., it was necessary that the Principate should be conferred by consent upo

to a principate:5 none the less, it must be demonstrated and admitted that there could be no division of the supreme power.

for loyalty or merit and firm rule in Rome, Italy and the provinces, that was not enough. Peace came, and order; but the

iritual regeneration as well as for material reform. Augustus claimed that a national mandate had summoned him to supreme po

oned him to supreme power in the War of Actium. Whatever the truth of that contention, he could not go back upon it, even if

alii mores. ’1 So Tacitus, not deluded by the outcome of a civil war that substituted one emperor for another and changed t

idual character as a people. While they took over and assimilated all that the Hellenes could give, they shaped their histor

f the martial Republic. They were emboldened to doubt it. 2 More than that , the solid fabric of law and order, built by the

nace but for how long? Could Rome maintain empire without the virtues that had won it? 4 A well-ordered state has no need

c vitia non Romana’. 2 It was not merely the vices of the principes that barred them from recognition. Their virtues had

to aristocratic breeding and sentiment. The Roman matron could claim that she needed no written law to guide her, no judge

on of the young Claudii: fortes creantur fortibus et bonis. 1 But that was not enough, even in the Claudii: the poet pro

t of Secular Games in 22 B.C., disappointed perhaps in the censors of that year. He departed to the eastern provinces. At on

his year, conspirators punished. 3 Legislation concerning the family, that was a novelty, but the spirit was not, for it har

2 Carmen saeculare 57 ff. 3 Dio 54, 15, 1 ff. 4 Cicero desired that censors should forbid celibacy (De legibus 3, 7):

in the past had established Rome’s power in Italy on the broad basis that alone could bear it, was accompanied by certain g

aximus, living in seclusion at Circeii. Augustus did not strip him of that honour, ostentatious in scruple when scruple cost

en scruple cost him nothing. He could wait for Lepidus’ death. Better that he should in recent history the dignity of pontif

e, in invoking the better sort of Greek deities on the right side, so that the War of Actium could be shown as a sublime con

t here than has sometimes been believed. 4 It will suffice to observe that Augustus for his part strove in every way to rest

alve, magna parens frugum, Saturnia tellus, magna virum ! 2 Where was that peasant now to be found? In the course of two cen

been born, or had lived, on country estates; and it will be recalled that such apparently sophisticated types of urban huma

his, cf. above all M. Rostovtzeff, Soc. and Ec. Hist., 50 ff. 4 Not that they were bad farmers. Compare the precepts touch

1 But these were not the days of Romulus or of Cato the Censor; and that shaggy Cato himself, of peasant stock and a farme

roperty and an absentee landlord. It was observed with malicious glee that neither of the consuls who gave their names to th

e of a noble Samnite family now reconciled to Rome: it might be added that the other was a Picene. That was no palliation. T

. These men before all others should have provided the ‘Itala virtus’ that was held to be lacking in the decadent, pleasure-

ruth their offence was political rather than moral. Nor is it certain that the Princeps himself was above reproach, even wit

llegations of Antonius, the scandal about Terentia and all the gossip that infests the back-stairs of monarchy. PageNotes.

in the social programme of the Princeps is evident enough. More than that , the whole conception of the Roman past upon whic

eek theories about primitive virtue and about the social degeneration that comes from wealth and empire. The Italian peasant

also narrow and grasping, brutal and superstitious. Nor is it evident that the Roman aristocrat of the golden age of the Sci

t of the golden age of the Scipiones was always the paragon of virtue that Cicero and his contemporaries affected to admire.

and his contemporaries affected to admire. There was another side to that . Yet the strong suspicion of fraud is not enoug

nts? It was not Rome alone but Italy, perhaps Italy more than Rome, that prevailed in the War of Actium. The Principate it

2 Dio 56, 10, 3. PageBook=>454 That will not suffice to prove that the Princeps was merely a docile instrument in th

ian middle class. No less genuine his patriotism: it might be guessed that his favourite line of verse was Romanos rerum d

e typical Roman virtue. Augustus might observe with some satisfaction that he had restored a quality which derived strength

man aristocracy was evident to the historian Tacitus; no less evident that it was slow in operation and due to other causes

u victuque’, effected much by his personal example. Yet more than all that , the sober standards prevalent in the society of

3 If Augustus was disappointed in the aristocracy, he might reflect that Rome was not Italy; and Italy had been augmented

lbus. But there were many other towns in Spain and Gallia Narbonensis that soon might send to Rome their local aristocrats,

able romanticism of a prosperous age, based upon the convenient dogma that it retained liberty while discarding licence and

legions of the West in the Principate of Augustus, it may be presumed that men from Spain and Narbonensis would be discovere

. For example, Narbonensis supplies only two auxiliary regiments; and that province is early evident in the Guard (ILS 2023)

gustus. In dejection he thought of making an end of his life. But for that disaster he could have borne the loss of Varus’ t

their own interest and for their own defence, were made to understand that wealth and station imposed duties to the communit

d in the revolutionary period. 2 The New State did its best to refute that archaic prejudice: in pretio pretium nunc est;

in the Forum or at the theatre, rallying in defence of a constitution that meant nothing to them, and leaping with avidity u

nt nothing to them, and leaping with avidity upon any dramatic phrase that fitted the domination of Pompeius: nostra miseria

estimony to the restoration of public liberty; but it does not follow that the poets and historians who lent their talent to

ry and Roman, devoid of pomp and verbosity; and he skilfully made out that his adversaries were petty, vindictive and unpatr

l Hirtius; and the reluctant Cicero was coerced into writing a letter that expressed some measure of approval. Constructive

ations with patience and even with benevolence. He insisted, however, that his praises should be sung only in serious effort

beian military men promoted under the New State, there is no evidence that they were interested in fostering letters or the

m’. 5 On whom see esp. C. Cichorius, R. Studien, 325 ff. The theory that the Ars Poetica was written at a late date in Hor

ace’s life and was dedicated to two sons of this Piso is so plausible that it can dispense with the support of Porphyrio.

Greece, a twin pillar to support the civilization of a world- empire that was both Roman and Greek. The War of Actium was s

cs completed (c. 30 B.C.), Virgil was engaged in writing an epic poem that should reveal the hand of destiny in the earliest

avianus. It was the fashion to be Pompeian rather than Caesarian, for that was the ‘better cause’. 2 It may be presumed that

than Caesarian, for that was the ‘better cause’. 2 It may be presumed that Augustus’ historian also spoke with respect of Br

irgil and Horace had lost their paternal estates in the confiscations that followed Philippi or the disorders of the Perusin

nd Virgil had private and material reasons for gratitude to Augustus, that fact may have reinforced, but it did not pervert,

national devotion to Rome. Further, as might be expected of a region that had only recently become a part of Italy, the nam

again. He came from Asisium, neighbour city to unhappy Perusia, from that Italy which paid the bitter penalty for becoming

hard, flashy and hollow. 2 Propertius belonged to an old civilization that knew and honoured the majesty of death and the de

ans, et habet sua castra Cupido. 3 It was not merely improper verse that incurred the displeasure of Augustus. Poetry, it

e of Augustus. Poetry, it was agreed, should be useful. Ovid accepted that principle and turned it inside out. He might have

he joke. Like the early Germans depicted by Tacitus, he did not think that moral laxity was a topic of innocent amusement. 4

s the home of an erotic poet. Augustus did not forget. It was in vain that Ovid interspersed his trifles with warm praise of

, her husband and her ostensible paramours, and create the impression that injured morality was being avenged. The auctorita

his son-in-law had constructed for the people. 1 He could have added that there were now public baths as well. But complain

aleigh Lecture, 1937). PageBook=>470 It is a little surprising that the rich vocabulary of politics was not more freq

d features were reproduced in Rome and over all the world. It is true that he caused no fewer than eighty silver statues in

he Empire pacified and new conquests about to begin, the Senate voted that an altar of Pax Augusta should be set up. The mon

Aeneas appears in the act of sacrifice after he has seen the portent that promises to his family an abiding home in Italy.

ho had held triumphs or received the ornamenta triumphalia in lieu of that distinction. In the temple itself three deities w

on and heir. This dynastic monument is a reminder, if such be needed, that Dux was disguised but not displaced by Princeps.

ld could first speak, he bade the frogs be silent. No frog croaked in that place ever again. When Caesar’s heir entered Rome

thet was rhetorical, not religious: he also applied it to the legions that had deserted the consul Antonius, ‘heavenly legio

eavenly legions’. But the orator would have been shocked had he known that the testimony of his earlier dreams would be pres

o kings was an ingrained habit and inevitable fashion, it was natural that the ruler should be an object of veneration, with

ured in the traditional fashion of the eastern lands. The language of that ‘Graeca adulatio’ so loathsome to Republican sent

oint worship of Augustus and the Goddess Rome. 2 Asia is incited by that loyal proconsul, the patrician Paullus Fabius Max

e birthday of the Princeps as the beginning of its calendar-year; for that day announced good tidings to the world. 3 Asia s

l memories were not strong in the western lands: in the East the fact that the Principate was a monarchy guaranteed its read

4, 5, 1. 3 Ib. 56, 16, 3. 4 Seneca, De ira 2, 5, 5 (an allegation that L. Valerius Messalla Volesus, proconsul of Asia c

. They demonstrated against the moral code and later clamoured loudly that Julia should be restored from exile. 5 Too pruden

had once honoured Pompeius Magnus as its patron. 6 Now Titius usurped that position. 7 Auximum could do nothing but the Roma

e people arose in indignation and drove him forth. 8 Many years later that edifice witnessed a similar spectacle. Aemilia Le

e East a salutary reminder to the Senate. It was only from members of that body that serious opposition to the new régime wa

alutary reminder to the Senate. It was only from members of that body that serious opposition to the new régime was at all l

h Julia was banished and Iullus Antonius killed these were all events that threatened the dynasty at its heart and core and

ry. The nobiles were unable or unwilling to overthrow the New State that had been built up at their expense. They had no i

doubt widely believed: they belong to a category of literary material that commonly defies historical criticism. To turn fro

m. To turn from the scandalous to the ridiculous, it will be observed that the Princeps was by no means as majestic and mart

under-shirts, not to mention puttees round his legs. It may be added that the garments of the First Citizen were uniformly

r hostile propaganda, it will have to be conceded, at the very least, that his native caution was happily seconded by fortun

his successors, but by no means widely distributed. Augustus alleged that in the Civil Wars he had put to death no citizen

s he had put to death no citizen of his enemies’ armies who had asked that his life be spared. 3 The claim was impudent: it

n historians who, praising the ‘lenitas ducis’ after Actium, exclaims that he would have behaved precisely so in earlier war

s killed though begging for life. 5 It was a commonplace of antiquity that Princeps was more clement than Dux. Some dismisse

ounding to death of the assassins of Caesar. It was no doubt recalled that Caesar’s heir had been willing, for the ends of p

s heir had been willing, for the ends of political ambition, to waive that solemn duty in the autumn of 44 B.C. when he made

of the cardinal virtues, justice, it was necessary to say much about that . Less advertised by the government, but no less d

a jest. 3 For Augustus it was inexpedient to suppress any activity that could do him no harm. Tiberius was alarmed at the

praefectus urbi almost at once; and it was his habit to boast openly that he had always followed the better cause in politi

salla who proposed in the Senate, with moving and patriotic language, that Augustus should be hailed as pater patriae (2 B.C

nsulars. 5 Labeo, it is also recorded, brought to ridicule a proposal that a bodyguard of senators should keep watch outside

of the times, intelligent to anticipate the future. He did not intend that his retirement from politics should be either ing

iticians had not delayed to produce their memoirs: it may be presumed that they were not alarmingly outspoken about the care

ise on the august theme of ‘tantae molis erat’. It is to be regretted that Pollio’s comments upon this interesting document

s might permit the cult of Cicero for his own purposes. Yet it may be that his real opinion of the character, policy and sty

nion of the character, policy and style of Cicero was not so far from that of Pollio. Pollio’s native distrust of fine words

revealed the naked realities of politics. It is in no way surprising that Pollio, like Stendhal, became the fanatical expon

had practical experience of affairs; and it will be a fair inference that Pollio, the eminent consular, like the senator Ta

e to history from the study of rhetoric. That was not the only defect that Pollio could discover in Livy. Pollio, so it is

ilian, criticized Livy for ‘Patavinitas’. 3 It is by no means certain that Quintilian himself understood the point of the at

t upon a historian from Patavium than the obvious and trivial comment that his speech showed traces of his native dialect. P

Severus, neither of whom possessed the social and material advantages that rendered Pollio secure from reprisals as well as

his works, he would ostentatiously omit certain passages, explaining that they would be read after his death. 4 The last

enia cessere. ’7 Not history only, but poetry and eloquence also, now that Libertas was no more. The Principate inherited ge

aimed it for its own: it could not produce a new crop. The generation that grew to manhood in the happy prime of the restore

an historiography, flattery and detraction. 1 Horace assured Augustus that the envy incurred by the great ones of earth in t

rus and Labienus returned to public circulation; 2 and it was alleged that the Princeps proposed to banish the writings of V

e dead and the helpless. Quintilian, a professor of rhetoric, claimed that this form of composition was peculiarly and wholl

named in their honour and commemorating the glory of the great houses that were the Republic and Rome. The faction-wars of

beian Claudii Marcelli were also among the group of consular families that supported Pompeius. Their main line lapsed with M

o resplendent fortune or to a brief renascence before the end. Others that survived proscription and battle by good fortune,

and lasted into the reign of Augustus produced no more consuls after that time. That was not all. To Roman and aristocrat

ime. That was not all. To Roman and aristocratic pride the families that waned and died in the last generation of the Free

e abruptly extinguished in the Revolution had a better fate than some that prolonged an ignoble existence for a generation o

aurus was spared after Actium. PageNotes. 492 1 It is not certain that the delator Porcius Cato (Tacitus, Ann. 4, 68 ff.

ce. Their morals were impugned: it was their name or their ambition that ruined them. Two young patricians, the last Scipi

n and the ignoble life of a retail trader in Africa and Sicily, found that obscurity and commercial pursuits were no protect

ugh both parents, could look back through the annals of the family to that Appius Claudius who had promoted the aristocratic

early youth. Like Brutus originally an enemy of Pompeius, and through that feud brought into conflict with Caesar, he follow

in the reign of Nero. 5 Such was the end of ancient patrician houses that recalled the earliest glories of the infant Repub

the Julii and Claudii, their rivals and social equals. It was fitting that they should all end with the end of a period. C

Silani, with four brothers all to perish by violent ends, among them that irreproachable and academic Piso whom Galba unwis

State were by no means exempt from the infertility or the ill fortune that attended upon the progeny of consulars. Their rec

onsuls Afranius and Gabinius. Cicero had been the great novus homo of that age: the family ended with his bibulous son. Th

turninus (cos. 12 B.C.,) himself of an ancient and respectable family that had not risen above the praetorship. 6 Even und

, the Aelii Lamiae. 7 The last Lamia was consul in 116, by which time that name stood for the bluest blood. 8 The descendant

under Hadrian. 9 For prudence and for success, it might have seemed that all would be outdone by the Cocceii, Antonian par

rect, the maternal uncle of Nerva married Rubellia Bassa, daughter of that Rubellius Blandus who was the husband of Julia th

ius, a statue was erected in the Forum at Rome bearing an inscription that commemorated his unswerving loyalty ’pietatis imm

ood of Augustus; 4 the other enjoyed a brief tenure of the Principate that Augustus had founded. Ambition, display and dis

simply an incapacity to adopt the meaner virtues and ignoble devices that brought success in a changed and completely pluto

s Balbus and Seneca were the real enemies. It is in every way fitting that Spain and Narbonensis should have supplied the fi

. 2 The origin of Burrus is revealed by ILS 1321. It is no accident that the governors of Lower Germany early in Nero’s re

3 Nero and his advisers had made a prudent choice. They also thought that they could safely entrust a military province, Hi

suls: only one man of this class commands an army, and a small one at that . He was Ti. Plautius Silvanus Aelianus, an old ma

re to assert their lack of ability; and much of the hostile testimony that could be adduced is nothing more than the perpetu

he acute consciousness of personal insecurity and political impotence that depressed and perverted the morale of the aristoc

re is hard to establish. E. Stein (Hermes LII (1917), 564 ff.) argues that it applies to families consular before A.D. 14 th

of prosecutors and informers. The position of Augustus was so strong that the evil found little encouragement. Tiberius, ho

of the nobiles was spiritual as well as political. It was not merely that the Principate engrossed their power and their we

hat the Principate engrossed their power and their wealth: worse than that , it stole their saints and their catchwords. Desp

g the martyrs in the cause of Libertas. Of the authentic champions of that ideal, Brutus and Cassius, who had fought against

, when servility and adulation took the place of libertas and virtus, that was hard for a patriot and an honest man to bear.

he rigour of despotism as the servility and degeneracy of the nobiles that moves Tacitus to the sublimest indignation. Tiber

but believed in ordered government, wrote a history of the civil wars that his own generation had witnessed. He had no illus

itnessed. He had no illusions about the contestants or the victors in that struggle ’solum id scires, deteriorem fore qui vi

m the Revolution had brought to power deserved any public repute, and that was Agrippa, so some held. 1 Candid or malignant

us, M. Vinicius and P. Silius. 2 More good fortune perhaps than merit that their characters should be colourless and innocuo

left no consular sons as objects of fear or flattery. It is evident that a traditional Roman prejudice, sharpened under th

its of novi homines. The nobiles were comparatively immune. But for that , the aristocratic partisans of Augustus would hav

e revolutionary age, learned from adversity no lesson save the belief that poverty was the extremest of evils. Hence avarice

avarice or rapacity to repair their shattered fortunes, and the hope that the Princeps would provide: Rome owed them a debt

mained but little of the Catonian faction or of the four noble houses that supported Pompeius. The patrician Lentuli were nu

ntuli were numerous, but by no means talented in proportion. The fact that L. Domitius Ahenobarbus was the grandfather of th

l for agility, deserted every side at the right moment. It is curious that Horace should have felt impelled to remind him of

lancus to take comfort from wine, Horace contemplates the possibility that Plancus may go to the wars again. 6 No chance of

the possibility that Plancus may go to the wars again. 6 No chance of that : in the cool shade of Tibur Plancus could take hi

ur Plancus could take his ease and reflect with no little complacency that throughout his campaigns, for all his title of im

LS 212 11, 1. 24 f. Commentators on this speech have failed to notice that Persicus was not only notorious for vice but was

886 gives the inscription on this monument. PageBook=>512 With that to his credit Plancus could smile at the impotent

l liberty, it could be maintained, was doomed if not dead long before that . Pollio knew the bitter truth about the last gene

régime when the power was to pass from Augustus to Tiberius, remarks that few men were still alive that remembered the Repu

pass from Augustus to Tiberius, remarks that few men were still alive that remembered the Republic ’quotus quisque reliquu

iotism. With the Principate, it was not merely Augustus and his party that prevailed it meant the victory of the non-politic

the benefit of the legions. That was over. The Republic was something that a prudent man might admire but not imitate: as a

imental cult, most fervently practised among the members of the class that owed everything to the Empire. The senator Helvid

nt to the more irresponsible type of serious-minded person. No danger that they would be challenged to put their ideals into

or history. Well might Tacitus look back with melancholy and complain that his own theme was dull and narrow. But the histor

orce of arms and established dominatio. Pompeius was no better. After that , only a contest for supreme power. 2 Tacitus does

the closing days of the Republic. 4 He might pause when he reflected that great oratory is a symptom of decay and disorder,

of state was spared these evils. Well-ordered commonwealths, lacking that ‘licence which fools call liberty’, left no recor

nt from the monarchies of the East. The Romans had not sunk as low as that . Complete freedom might be unworkable, but comple

as the respect for constitutional forms. Indeed, it was inconceivable that a Roman should live under any other dispensation.

ncipate. All too long, soul and body had been severed. It was claimed that they were united in the Principate of Nerva which

citus announced an intention of writing in his old age the history of that happy time, when freedom of thought prevailed and

l mostly upon his immediate entourage. 5 The Roman had once boasted that he alone enjoyed libertas while ruling others. It

hat he alone enjoyed libertas while ruling others. It was now evident that obedience was the condition of empire ’idemque hu

itus, Ann. 15, 31. 5 Hist. 4, 69, 18 M (not invalidated by the fact that it occurs in the letter of an oriental despot).

nceps’. He might easily have adopted the title of ‘Optimus princeps’: that was left for Trajan. At the very beginning of Aug

official or conventional, were already there. It was not until 2 B.C. that Augustus was acclaimed pater patriae. Horace hint

ames dici pater atque princeps. 4 The notion of parent brings with it that of protector: optime Romulae custos gentis. 5

dominion over all the world. To the Roman People his relationship was that of Father, Founder and Guardian. Sulla had strive

be described as organic rather than arbitrary or formal. It was said that he arrogated to himself all the functions of Sena

Senate, magistrates and laws. 7 Truly but more penetrating the remark that he entwined himself about the body of the Commonw

ver more monarchic. Yet with all this, Augustus was not indispensable that was the greatest triumph of all. Had he died in t

as steady and continuous. It had been Augustus’ most fervent prayer that he might lay the foundations of the new order dee

foundations of the new order deep and secure. 2 He had done more than that . The Roman State, based firmly on a united Italy

renovated, with new institutions, new ideas and even a new literature that was already classical. The doom of Empire had bor

incipate as something permanent and enhancing his own prestige beyond that of a mortal man, while it consolidated his own re

c scandals and by disasters on the frontiers of empire. 1 Yet for all that , when the end came it found him serene and cheerf

immortality. 3 During the Spanish wars, when stricken by an illness that might easily have been the end of a frail life, A

erpetuate his glory, have composed the first draft of the inscription that was to stand outside his monument, the Res Gestae

his monument, the Res Gestae]5 or at the least, it may be conjectured that some such document was included in the state pape

memorated. 2 Most masterly of all is the formulation of the chapter that describes the constitutional position of the Prin

, cf. the edition of J. Gagé (Paris, 1935), 23 ff Dessau’s insistence that the inscription was primarily designed to be read

out, in act and policy, he remained true to himself and to the career that began when he raised a private army and ‘liberate

us (Asprenas) and a fragmentary name of which enough survives to show that it was Marcius. 35 B.C. The suffecti P. Corneli

and cognomina are added, even when they do not occur in the documents that attest the consulates of the men in question. B

nly prosopographical, and it is draw up according to gentilicia, save that Augustus, members of his family, and Roman empero

marriages of Pompeius Magnus. Neither this table nor any of the six that follow claims to be exhaustive, to give all colla