he oligarchy of government therefore emerges as the dominant theme of political history, as the binding link between the Republic

ead, the noble houses of Rome and the principal allies of the various political leaders enter into their own at last. The method

e Principate has to be accepted, for the Principate, while abolishing political freedom, averts civil war and preserves the non p

abolishing political freedom, averts civil war and preserves the non political classes. Liberty or stable government: that was t

ric, whether ingenuous or edifying. Yet it is not necessary to praise political success or to idealize the men who win wealth and

None the less, the main elements in the party of Augustus and in the political system of the Principate had already taken shape,

, they do not surrender anything. Neglect of the conventions of Roman political terminology and of the realities of Roman politic

ventions of Roman political terminology and of the realities of Roman political life has sometimes induced historians to fancy th

e stands a notable exception. To one of the unsuccessful champions of political liberty sympathy has seldom been denied. Cicero w

icero, however, are one thing: quite different is the estimate of his political activity when he raised up Caesar’s heir against

. Posterity, generous in oblivion, regards with indulgence both the political orator who fomented civil war to save the Republi

olten underneath. 2 An enemy of Octavianus, Pollio had withdrawn from political life soon after 40 B.C., and he jealously maintai

e, without allies, without a following. That axiom holds both for the political dynasts of the closing age of the Republic and fo

ing class was broken, its composition transformed. Italy and the non- political orders in society triumphed over Rome and the Rom

ssing of the Rubicon, but with the compact of 60 B.C., devised by the political dynasts Pompeius, Crassus and Caesar to control t

l magistrates; and though compelled in time to admit the plebeians to political equality, certain of the great patrician houses,

d vanity blinded him to the true causes of his own elevation. 5 The political life of the Roman Republic was stamped and swayed

Three weapons the nobiles held and wielded, the family, money and the political alliance (amicitia or factio, as it was variously

line policy. Far from it: the daughters of the great houses commanded political influence in their own right, exercising a power

nt by the nobiles, for their own ends, of the true character of Roman political life, Römische Adelsparteien u. Adelsfamilien (19

der in state and society, the Roman knights, converted into a ruinous political force by the tribune C. Gracchus when he set them

or electoral corruption, to risk station, fortune and life in futile political contests. Averse NotesPage=>013 1 Tacitus,

and ties of personal allegiance contracted in every walk of life, the political dynast might win influence not merely in Rome but

untry-towns of Italy and in regions not directly concerned with Roman political life. Whether he held authority from the State or

he forces of dissolution represented by the army-commanders and their political agents. It took shape at first in his consulate a

life by the party of the Gracchi and converted into a means of direct political action, negative with the veto, positive with the

With the Gracchi all the consequences of empire social, economic and political —broke loose in the Roman State, inaugurating a

members of the ruling group, or, more properly, personal ambition and political intrigue, constrained them, in mastering these ma

, 6, &c. PageBook=>018 As an oligarchy is not a figment of political theory, a specious fraud, or a mere term of abuse

a Cornelius, did his best to restore the patriciate, sadly reduced in political power in the previous generation, not so much thr

nce double issue, five children of diverse note, among them the great political lady Servilia and the redoubtable leader of the o

ar, marked the acme of a man’s life and often changed the tone of his political professions. Short of the consulate, it was given

from C. Marius, strained every nerve and effort through long years of political intrigue to maintain the dignitas of the Julii an

that gave Cato the primacy before consulars: he controlled a nexus of political alliances among the nobiles. The Optimates stoo

ng from the East he would oppose that alliance of stubborn spirit and political craft which his ancestor used to break the power

) that is, simply a novus homo. PageBook=>031 licence to write political satire with impunity. 1 Pompeius was also related

nces and armies gave resources of patronage and mutual obligation for political ends. Men went out to serve under Pompeius as qua

eligion of the State which his enemies exploited and converted into a political contest. 2 Pompeius Magnus trod warily and please

or of the world. The triumphal robe of Magnus seemed chill comfort in political defeat. 4 Cato went too far. When the knights w

btrusive and barely to be perceived through the tumultuous clamour of political life at Rome under Caesar’s consulate, several pa

next year, L. Calpurnius Piso, a cultivated aristocrat with no marked political activities, and A. Gabinius, a Pompeian partisan

ius Philippus and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus, were not strong political men. But Philippus had recently married Caesar’s

ere the proletariat of Italy, the revolution became social as well as political . The remedy was simple and drastic. For the hea

ts of Pompeius in peace and in war, and now Caesar had become a rival political leader in his own right. In every class of societ

inst the Sullan oligarchy. Italy began to stir. In the city of Rome political contests and personal feuds now grew sharper. Ap.

with Metelli and Scipiones recalled ancient history and revealed the political decline of two great houses. The Pompeii had once

The patrician Cornelii Lentuli were noted more for pride of birth and political caution than for public splendour or conspicuous

g Pompeius in a foul and treacherous fashion. Ahenobarbus was a great political dynast in his own right, born to power. The Pact

Sulpicius Rufus, a timid and respectable jurist lacking in pronounced political opinions, and two novi homines, the Pompeian gene

nd misrepresentation soon clouded truth and equity. The nature of the political crisis is less obscure. Caesar and his associates

e field. Upon Caesar they had thrust the choice between civil war and political extinction. But Caesar refused to join the long r

imate. The terms ‘rex’ and ‘regnum’ belong to the vocabulary of Roman political invective, applicable alike to the domination of

uld guarantee peace. For that period, at least, a salutary pause from political activity: with the lapse of time the situation mi

about the supreme virtue of tyrannicide, blind to the true nature of political catch-words and the urgent needs of the Roman Sta

mple personality but passionate, intense and repressed. 1 Nor was his political conduct wholly to be predicted. Brutus might well

ash, self-righteous tribune when he plunged into illegal courses. The political dynast Crassus used Catilina as his agent. Catili

ecarious front of security and vested interests led by the Dictator’s political deputy until a new leader, emerging unexpected, a

pite his youth, won rank by vigour and acerbity among the greatest of political orators. 5 Caesar’s generosity, revealed in cor

Caesar’s side, holding commands in the Civil Wars, without any strong political ties to explain NotesPage=>063 1 For examp

ies, confiscated their property and deprived their descendants of all political rights. Caesar, advocating clemency from humanity

r, advocating clemency from humanity and class-feeling as well as for political effect, secured the restitution of Norbanus, Cinn

es in intrigue and illegal activities or, more simply, the victims of political justice, whatever their deserts. The Catilinarian

commands of Pompeius in the West and in the East furnished scope for political patronage as well as for military experience. His

from 56 B.C. onwards) from the company of his relatives, friends and political associates, varying widely in social distinction

>068 and the glory of Caesar. Labienus left Caesar, but not from political principle he returned to an old allegiance. 1 C

mposed. 2 The Aemilii and the Servilii occupy a special rank in the political history of Rome, patrician houses which seem to h

le at Hispalis, misguided Spaniards. 4 The centurions were allies and political agents as well as officers. At Pharsalus the stur

claims of friendship and influence or the hope of procuring gain and political advancement, military experience was not confined

ort. 3 Among Caesar’s friends were his secretaries, counsellors and political agents, many of them notable for literary tastes

issions before and after the outbreak of the Civil War to confirm the political allies of the proconsul, to win over influential

surely have no enemies. 4 Balbus won. But for the failure of certain political intrigues, the fate of Balbus and the role of Cic

peius: Theophanes of that city was his friend, domestic historian and political agent. 2 But Caesar, too, had his partisans in th

een. 4 Along with the sons of the proscribed and the victims of Roman political justice, partisans of all categories secured admi

northwards to Etruria and south into Campania. 5 The concession of political equality at Rome by the patricians in the middle

ere taken up and brought in by certain patrician houses for their own political ends and for Rome’s greater power; though Notes

e strove in defiance of the nobiles to secure the consulate. In their political careers he may have encouraged or defended certai

ation, with Rome as its capital, was not consummated by orators or by political theorists: the slow process of peaceful change, t

s the earliest consuls that convey the visible evidence of social and political revolution. The party of Caesar shows a fair bu

duals like D. Turullius or Cassius of Parma, whose former history and political activity evade detection, certain of the marshals

on delivered by Antonius (March 20th) may not have been intended as a political manifesto of the Caesarian party; and the results

imid and the untrustworthy. Cicero, who had lent his eloquence to all political causes in turn, was sincere in one thing, loyalty

he head of a consortium of bankers. 5 Atticus, anxiously avoiding all political entanglements, refused and wrecked the venture. F

in word and action. As the coalition of March 17th corresponded with political facts and with personal interests, it was not alt

iolence, heroism or principle. The salutary respite from politics and political strife so firmly imposed by the Dictatorship migh

ined Antonius, but a fatal chain of miscalculations both military and political , and a sentiment of loyalty incompatible with the

necessary to forget both the Philippics and the War of Actium. The political advocate and the verdict of conventional history

t least might have been admitted by the friends of Brutus, to salvage political concord and public order. The Liberators were cer

eserves of patronage. Their employment in the first place for his own political interests calls neither for surprise nor for excu

the pontifex maximus. This looked well. Naturally, it was a piece of political jobbery: Lepidus was chosen. Further, there was a

contemporaries and almost all posterity into a false estimate of his political capacity. We are left with slander or romantic bi

a nomini debes. ’ PageBook=>114 Exorbitant ambition mated with political maturity is not enough to explain the ascension o

he had got into touch with persons of influence and had surveyed the political situation. By the middle of April his presence wa

ial command, that Brutus and Cassius would be able to return to Roman political life. 4 NotesPage=>117 1 Ad Att. 15, 2, 3,

y theories of the moderns sometimes obscure the nature and sources of political power at Rome. They were patent to contemporaries

e difference between words and facts, a brief acquaintance with Roman political behaviour that he possessed and that was all he n

as all he needed. It is a common belief, attested by the existence of political science as a subject of academic study, that the

a man followed Caesar in an impious war from personal friendship, not political principle. The devotion which Caesar’s memory evo

ulgence in chivalry or clemency; he perfected himself in the study of political cant and the practice of a dissimulation that had

PageBook=>123 AT the beginning of the month of August certain political intriguesIX went wrong, and hopes of concord or o

oyalty among his troops. Out of Rome and liberated from the snares of political intrigue, the Caesarian soldier recovered his con

and policy of Octavianus. In himself that young man had not seemed a political factor of prime importance when he arrived in Ita

has money, troops and a following. Whence came his adherents and his political funds? Family and kinsmen provide the nucleus o

father Philippus inherited comfortable tastes, a disposition towards political neutrality and a fair measure of guile. 1 During

e young man was much in the company of his step-father: the profit in political counsel which he derived was never recorded. Ph

r: Caesar’s heir secured almost at once the financial secretaries and political agents of the Dictator. Among the first Caesarian

es that the pair made a secret compact with Cicero, Cicero to provide political support for Octavianus while enjoying the protect

on any excuse. Piso replied, no doubt with some effect. 3 Nor did any political enemy or ambitious youth come forward to arraign

consulars must have aspired as due recognition of public service and political wisdom. The mild and humane doctrines of the Ep

cus, the son of a conservative and highly respected parent, began his political career under the auspices of Cato. 2 Most of his

o Brutus, to Cassius and to Lepidus he might become the link in a new political alignment between Caesarians and Republicans. Tha

ian party. Cicero claimed that he had always been consistent in his political ideal, though not in the means he adopted to atta

et it would be perverse and unjust to rail and carp at an aspirant to political honours who, after espousing various popular caus

f an extraordinary command to Pompeius, from honest persuasion or for political advancement, afterwards became more conservative

rested. Pompeius was the stronger from the earliest years of Cicero’s political career he seemed to have dominated the stage and

August 1st and some prospect that Brutus and Cassius might return to political life. 1 Cicero turned back. Near Velia on Augus

enate had already and repeatedly witnessed more ferocious displays of political invective, as when he contended with L. Piso ten

ar: yet the existence of Antonius’ rival must have been reckoned as a political factor by Cicero and P. Servilius when they attac

itting one of the assassins of Caesar to be elected tribune7 merely a political gesture, easily made and easily revoked. More sig

us would be intolerable. ’9 Cicero was all too often deluded in his political judgements. No easy optimism this time, however,

e repulsed in the interests, not of Octavianus, but of the truth. The political alliance between Octavianus and Cicero was not me

ning opinion of his own sagacity: it had ever been his hope to act as political mentor to one of the generals of the Republic. Wh

mbition. The Second Philippic, though technically perfect, is not a political oration, for it was never delivered: it is an exe

s hostility towards Antonius was declared and ferocious. But Cicero’s political feuds, however spirited at the outset, had not al

rogative, of his own merits. Again, the law-courts were an avenue for political advancement through prosecution, a battle-ground

ncement through prosecution, a battle-ground for private enmities and political feuds, a theatre for oratory. The best of argumen

part of the Republican virtue of libertas, to be regretted more than political freedom when both were abolished. For the sake of

ritten constitution: that is to say, according to the canons of Greek political thought, no constitution at all. This meant that

appeal to custom or tradition. Knowledge of the vocabulary of Roman political life derives in the main from the speeches of Cic

itably rendered. Not, indeed, a complete emptiness of content in this political eloquence. The boni, after all, did exist the p

ts of Italy as a whole. An aspiration rather than a programme. If the political literature of the period had been more abundantly

o peculiar monopoly of Cicero, no unique revelation of patriotism and political sagacity. It was easier to formulate an ideal t

hampions of the existing order the advantage of nomenclature. 2 The political cant of a country is naturally and always most st

rends the veil. But the Revolution did not impede or annul the use of political fraud at Rome. On the contrary, the vocabulary wa

lows that libertas, like regnum or dominatio, is a convenient term of political fraud. Libertas was most commonly invoked in defe

ing party. To establish concord among citizens, the most dishonest of political compacts and the most flagrant treacheries were g

ch ethical qualities as standards of an order in society or labels of political allegiance. Virtus itself stands at the peak of t

self stands at the peak of the hierarchy, transcending mores. Roman political factions were welded together, less by unity of p

ly was older than the State; and the family was the kernel of a Roman political faction. Loyalty to the ties of kinship in politi

cius added Pietas to his name as the most convincing demonstration of political solidarity. 5 Men of honour obeyed the call of

d superfluous to appeal to constitutional sanctions in carrying out a political mandate, a wider appeal thus lay ready to hand. A

d Calpurnii make a firm bid for leadership in the Commonwealth. Two political groups were conspicuously absent from the Senate

e, if not for the Republic: his uncompromising honesty was welcome in political negotiations where the diplomacy of a Cicero or a

nd Ser. Sulpicius, a respectable and cautious jurist without strong political ties or sentiments. In the north winter still hel

without the military resource of the best general of the day and the political maturity of the youth Octavianus. The unnatural c

Servilius, for to this summer, if not earlier, belongs a significant political fact, the betrothal of his daughter to the young

itions of youth. It had ever been Cicero’s darling notion to play the political counsellor to a military leader; and this was but

ho had married his own half-sister. Family ties had prevailed against political hostility in civil wars before now when waged by

ty. 4 Yet it was not their principal purpose to wipe out utterly both political adversaries and dissentient neutrals; and the tot

and warning enough. For the Triumvirs it was expedient to drive their political enemies out of the land, thus precluding any arme

t was soon to fight them in the East. But the struggle was not purely political in character: it came to resemble a class-war and

a peculiar levy upon capital. As in Sulla’s proscription, nobiles and political adversaries might head the list: the bulk is made

jority of whom were absent from Rome, ailing in health or remote from political interests. 2 The interval of a year carried off t

us and the oligarchy; but they would not tolerate Caesar’s ostensible political heirs and the declared enemies of their own class

his relatives Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus and M. Licinius Lucullus,3 by political adherents like the inseparable Favonius and by hi

cy. The Triumvirs had expelled from Italy not only the nobiles, their political enemies, but their victims as well, men of substa

of Caesar the Dictator, must be a province no longer but removed from political competition by being made a part of Italy. 1 So A

memory. (For a temperate view of Fulvia, the last survivor of a great political family, cf. Münzer, P-W VII, 283 f.) Further, L

He argues that Antonius committed a serious and irreparable error of political calculation which is not so certain. 6 The envo

ches of the agreement. Marriage and divorce were the public tokens of political pacts or feuds. NotesPage=>228 1 Appian (B

is death. For once in his life he surrendered to emotion: it was with political advantage. He fell in love with Livia Drusilla, a

n the scholiasts, the allegation that he was a land-commissioner. The political affiliations of this mysterious character are not

common in the civil wars, when piety or protection might triumph over political principle, saving lives and property. 6 The earli

n of marriage-alliances with birth or wealth was a sign and pledge of political success. Paullus Aemilius Lepidus married a Corne

illors in their municipia. 1 Hence certain symptoms of consolidation, political and social. There were to be no more proscription

to overcome the recalcitrance of armed men or allay the suspicions of political negotiators in secret conclave. Few indeed of the

ung men of promise, C. Licinius Calvus, who stood in the forefront of political speakers, and the spirited Caelius, were by no me

a cultivated harmony and a gentle elegance well suited to a period of political calm. The signs of the melancholy future of eloqu

e (Jerome, Chron., p. 164 H). 4 Sallust, BJ 4. PageBook=>248 political activity, a turbulent tribune in the third consul

the violent ascension and domination of Pompeius, that was the end of political liberty. Sallustius studied and imitated the cl

ave chosen better, if choice there was, for he, too, was witness of a political contest that stripped away all principle, all pre

h experience of affairs, candour of moral pessimism and utter lack of political illusions the Roman was eminently qualified to na

had to contend with rivals for empire, he imitated Greek doctrines of political development and did more than justice to the meri

re than the public transactions of men and cities, the open debate of political assemblies or the marching of armies. From Sallus

ot edifying. Men turned to history for instruction, grim comfort or political apology, raising dispute over the dead. The contr

of their friend and patron. 1 Nor was Sallustius unmindful of his own political career and arguments of defence or apology: his t

e invective, could be made an instrument of government by conveying a political message, unobtrusive, but perhaps no less effecti

ant: which suited his own temperament. Nor would the times now permit political satire or free attack upon the existing order in

d practices of Rome would powerfully contribute to the restoration of political stability and national confidence. The need was p

a and the survivors were not loath to exaggerate their sufferings for political advantage, to the discredit of their old general.

ipated youth in the circle of Clodius. 4 Of this literary, social and political tradition there was also a reminder in the person

erred, for it has been doubly buried, in erotic romance as well as in political mythology. Of the facts, there is and was no auth

though fertile with twin offspring, lapsed after a winter, leaving no political consequences. By 33 B.C., however, the ambition o

disprove paternity. 4 The Republican Messalla turned his eloquence to political advantage; 5 he was soon to be requited with the

en Triumvir for ten years (Res Gestae 7). A master in all the arts of political fraud did not need to stoop to trivial and pointl

ome. 4 Plancus had never yet been wrong in his estimate of a delicate political crisis. The effect must have been tremendous, ali

by now; and certain consular diplomats or diplomatic marshals, whose political judgement was sharper than their sense of persona

t had begun, a geographical expression. Italia was first invoked as a political and sentimental notion against Rome by the people

nate and People, no word. The oath of allegiance bound followers to a political leader in a private quarrel against his enemies,

tonius could not take the offensive, for every reason, not merely the political damage of an invasion of Italy in the company of

ched his belongings after him. 3 Plancus and Titius had departed on a political calculation. Now the military situation was despe

of competence, a new regulation was required. No source records any political repercussions of the clash with Crassus, any hint

Actium was the last and the greatest of them all. It could also fit a political leader—dux partium. But warfare and party politic

was not always given in praise, for the princeps was all too often a political dynast, exerting illicit power, or ‘potential for

enty-three raised a private army, through special commands abroad and political compacts at home, devised to subvert or suspend t

y to men who recalled in their own experience—it was not long ago—the political activity of Cicero in the last year of his life.

A. Oltramare, Rev. ét. lat. X(1932), 58 ff. PageBook=>319 the political doctrine of Cicero. In the years of failure and d

an anachronism: the theorists of antiquity situated their social and political Utopias in the past, not in the future. It is a m

like Pompeius. For the rest, it might pertinently be urged that the political doctrine of Cicero was couched in phrases so vagu

cess the traditional concepts and the consecrated vocabulary of Roman political literature, much of it, indeed, in no way peculia

tus which was hidden from contemporaries. In so far as Cicero had a political programme, he advocated the existing order, refor

ould not be harried by tribunes or constrained to speak in defence of political adventurers and ministers of despotism. There wer

powers, on precedents in constitutional practice or anticipations in political theory can only lead to schematism and a dreary d

ations. Above all, he stood at the head of a large and well organized political party as the source and fount of patronage and ad

, or to trace from age to age the transmission of perennial maxims of political wisdom; it is more instructive to discover, in an

out from Rome towards the middle of the year 27. In absence, distinct political advantages. Caesar the Dictator intended to spend

also loyalty to Rome a high and sombre patriotism could prevail over political principle, if such existed, or private dislike. Y

the fact that he was the leader of a party. At the core of a Roman political group are the family and most intimate friends of

they might destroy him. The marriage with Livia Drusilla had been a political alliance with the Claudii, though not that alone.

at war, recalling the rivalry between Antonius, the deputy-leader and political successor of Caesar the Dictator, and Octavianus,

t opprobrious form of banishment. 7 There is no truth in this fancy a political suspect is not placed in charge of provinces and

eriving perhaps from purely military needs as well as from social and political causes namely the practice of placing centurions

hts, indeed, is the cardinal factor in the whole social, military and political structure of the New State. In the last generatio

st generation of the Republic the financiers had all too often been a political nuisance. When at variance with the Senate, they

who was commended by a blameless character and a healthy distaste for political ambition. 4 In itself, the promotion of knights

rchies of antiquity has been observed with disapproval by students of political science, especially by such as take the rule of t

s for office and for glory: behind the façade of the constitution the political dynasts dealt out offices and commands to their p

iles to take up a popular candidate for fear of something worse, or a political dynast was insistent to promote a deserving parti

e more fair and honest. There were also deeper and better reasons for political advancement in the Principate. The game of politi

arian party continued to be the certain avenue of advancement. Of his political adherents, a number were unamiable, or at least u

trained and unconsummated union with a stepdaughter of Antonius and a political alliance with the unlovable Scribonia to the adva

ia, his daughter by Scribonia, was consigned in wedlock as suited the political designs of the Princeps, to Marcellus, to Agrippa

young generation of nobiles grew up and passed through the avenue of political honours to the consulate, an imposing collection

to gratify soldiers and plebs, to adorn the city and to subsidize his political allies. Corruption had been banished from elector

r ancestral estates, they were now deprived of the ruinous profits of political power, debarred from alliances with those financi

palace. Cicero had acquired an imposing mansion from his profits as a political advocate money from P. Sulla went to pay for it.

ed, not upon the pious and learned, but for social distinction or for political success. From cult and ritual the priests turned

, Statilii Sec. PageBook=>383 The acts and devices whereby the political dynasts of the previous age disposed of provincia

in praise for the government and bitter in rebuke of lost causes and political scapegoats. The work was dedicated to the grandso

rite and minister of Tiberius. Seianus himself became the leader of a political faction. NotesPage=>384 1 Velleius 2, 69,

ister were quietly at work all the time women and freedmen. The great political ladies of the Republic, from the daughters of con

the New State; and the freedmen who managed the private finances and political machinations of the dynasts, such as Pompeius’ ag

power of the People was broken. No place was left any more for those political pests, the demagogue and the military adventurer.

t that government had seldom been able to present a united front in a political emergency. Against Catilina, perhaps, but not aga

s and novi homines. They had hitherto been kept in the background for political or dynastic reasons, for the glory of the Princep

was not lost. Augustus perpetuated the premium on specialization, for political no less than for military reasons: elderly novi h

ertinent and suggestive. The problems of the eastern provinces were political rather than administrative. The legate of Syria

erent of the eastern lands (17-13 B.C.). That was one solution of the political danger. But Agrippa departed in 13 B.C. M. Titius

full record of wars and generals in the north would reveal momentous political facts. 1 When Tiberius went from Illyricum to the

aged on monopolistic principles. The first Prefect had succumbed to a political intrigue, the second had been unsuccessful in his

hraseology to disguise them and all the elaborate setting of a solemn political show. The taciturn and business-like Agrippa woul

a, the wife of Antonius; and Rome had fought a national war against a political woman, the Queen of Egypt. The moral programme of

cessive. In a Republic like that of Pompeius, Livia would have been a political force, comparable to her kinswoman Servilia. When

l result was not attained without dissensions in the cabinet, several political crises and several political murders. NotesPage

hout dissensions in the cabinet, several political crises and several political murders. NotesPage=>415 1 Groag inclines t

acquire a handsome share of the power and the profits. The most open political prize was the consulate. In 5 B.C. Augustus ass

us’ own niece Antonia, and thus more highly favoured in the matter of political matches than any save Drusus (the husband of the

that either prudence or consummate guile: his name finds record in no political transactions, intrigues or conspiracies. The tumu

was the great Republican admiral. The Aemilii perpetuated their old political alliance with the Caesarian cause, but not throug

r grace of form nor intellectual promise. But even he could serve the political ambitions of his grandmother; so the young Claudi

and a career. Silvanus became consul along with Augustus in 2 B.C. A political alliance with the Plautii was good Claudian tradi

discreet, while Quirinius trimmed artfully. 5 It is evident that the political crisis in Rome and defeat of the Claudian faction

sion of Sentius in Syria by Varus in 6 B.C. may, or may not, have had political causes. No doubt, however, about the significance

succession of Gaius and Lucius, her sons. The motive must have been political , the charges of vice a convenient and impressive

ther wanton or merely traduced, Julia was not a nonentity but a great political lady. Her paramours the five nobiles are not inno

wn prince in the East was peculiarly open to friction, dissension and political intrigue. 2 Against Lollius it was alleged that

viour of C. Caesar. 1 The position of Tiberius improved, though his political prospects grew no brighter. His spirit appears

ave way what Livia had been unable to achieve was perhaps the work of political influences and powerful advisers that evade detec

vening when the first man in the Empire was absent, might turn into a political catastrophe. Against that risk the Princeps and t

was a convenient device for removing, as well as for discrediting, a political suspect. This Silanus was a relative of M. Junius

armless and tolerated. Not so Agrippa, of the blood of Augustus. This political encumbrance was dispatched to a suitable island (

existence of others was precarious. The wealth needed to support the political and social dignity of a senatorial family imposed

ius possint maiora discere’ (Cicero, De república 1, 30). No moral or political value ‘nec meliores ob earn scientiam nec beatior

an apprenticeship for military service, opportunities for social and political advancement and centres for the propagation of co

reveal the manner of their operation. That would be inexpedient. The political theorists of antiquity from the spurious Lycurgus

his daughter and his granddaughter though in truth their offence was political rather than moral. Nor is it certain that the Pri

nfidence to persist in the task of moral and social regeneration. The political structure created by the Princeps was solid yet f

State had its lyric poet, technically superb. Personal misfortune and political despair wrung from the youthful Horace the hard a

e Illyrian Veneti, they cannot be detected in the character or in the political sentiments of Virgil and Livy. Both may be taken

wished to make a demonstration perhaps to find a scapegoat whose very political harmlessness would divert attention from the real

some honour to his dead benefactor by the spur of the young Caesar’s political competition, six months after the Ides of March.

of Romulus greeted his capture of Rome in the next year. Cicero in a political speech described his young ally as ‘divinus adule

lia Paullina had a notorious origin. 5 Lollius’ disgrace was due to a political error of calculation, not to any defect of person

o doubt recalled that Caesar’s heir had been willing, for the ends of political ambition, to waive that solemn duty in the autumn

The law courts could still provide scope for oratory, ambition and political intrigue. Augustus was invulnerable. Not so his f

ed but not for such trifles as the Ars amatoria of Ovid. Contemporary political literature provided the cause and the fuel. Thus

endacio candor’. 6 It is lavishly bestowed upon social distinction or political success. Velleius stands revealed in his literary

from Spain and Narbonensis. They were now dominant in the social and political hierarchy of the Empire, they wore the purple of

had been defeated, but a whole class. The contest had been not merely political but social. Sulla, Pompeius and Caesar were all m

r and degradation, ‘illustrium domuum adversa’, the victims of secret political intrigues in the family of the Princeps won unhap

i Lentuli and the Pisones supported Tiberius, furnishing generals and political counsellors. 4 The prominence of the Lentuli, thr

70. Of all noble houses, however, the Acilii Glabriones, not of great political consequence in the early Principate, survive the

ublic, historians invoke a variety of converging forces or movements, political , social and economic, where antiquity was prone t

f the nobles. The true causes lie deeper: as has been shown, they are political and economic. It was the acute consciousness of p

d economic. It was the acute consciousness of personal insecurity and political impotence that depressed and perverted the morale

frivolity and practise with ostentation the sober virtue of quies or political quietism an inheritance from a lower and commerci

a successful prosecution. Under the Empire the law courts became less political , justice less a matter of partisan interpretation

rations earlier when provincials were already equestrian officers and political or financial agents of the government, not merely

d not be arrested. The defeat of the nobiles was spiritual as well as political . It was not merely that the Principate engrossed

on of a loyal and zealous historian. On the other hand, Lollius was a political scapegoat, while Quirinius, Titius and Tarius lef

had ruined the Roman People. There is something more important than political liberty; and political rights are a means, not an

ople. There is something more important than political liberty; and political rights are a means, not an end in themselves. Tha

as well as a careerist. 4 The Republican profession was not so much political as social and moral: it was more often a harmless

>515 The Republic, with its full record of great wars abroad and political dissensions at home, was a splendid subject for h

hat great oratory is a symptom of decay and disorder, both social and political . Electoral corruption, extortion in the provinces

, scorned by senators; and neutrality had seldom been possible in the political dissensions of the last age of the Republic. Few

ho might be admired for Republican independence of spirit but not for political wisdom. 3 Neither Tacitus nor Trajan had been a p

ruinous. Caesar’s heir passed beyond it. What was a special plea and political propaganda in the military plebiscite of 32 B.C.

familiar names. Names of places are included when important for their political allegiance or as the origo of some person: in mos

ovus homo, 375; religious activities, 382; curator aquarum, 403; as a political lawyer, 411 f., 482 f. Atia, niece of Caesar, 3

undi, 358. Augustales, 472. Augustus, the Emperor, his origin and political début, 112 ff.; demagogic activities, 11 6 ff., 1

125 ff., 141 f.; origin of his party, 127 ff.,201, 234 ff., 349 ff.; political funds, 130 f.; relations with Cicero, 114, 134, 1

racicum, 391, 398; proconsul of Asia, 398; praefectus urbi, 404, 436; political and social importance of, 424; connexions, 424, 4

results of, 440, 507, 510, 515; effects on private morality, 249; on political morality, 64, 157 f.; on language, 154, 156; on t

94 B.C.), a novus homo, 94. Cognomina, foreign, 84; adopted to show political loyalty, 157; revived among the aristocracy, 377.

3 ff.; employment in Rome, 403 f.; as counsellors, 407 f., 411 ff.; a political nuisance, 388. Consulate importance of, 11, 24

e results of civil war, 440, 507, 515; on Pompeius, 9; disapproval of political dynasts, 9, 442, 515; on Libertas, 155; on August

et, 251. Corruption, electoral, 12, 13, 25, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 62; political and general, 63, 379 f. Cossinius, L., Pompeian

n with, 522. Dux, 288; as used of Augustus, 311 f., 519. Dynasts, political , their habits and activities, 8 f., 15, 26, 38, 2

s, 135 f., 149 f. Eprius Marcellus, on the Republic, 514. Equality, political , 352. Equites, see Financiers, Knights, Publica

, 492. Hortensius, Q. (cos. 69 B.C.), his character and wealth, 21; political activity, 22, 23, 28, 33, 39; his death, 44, 61;

, 132, 267, 296, 350. Interamnia Praetuttianorum, 362. Invective, political , 127, 149 ff., 211, 250, 276 f., 282 f., 486 f. I

wealthy freedman, 354. Itala virtus, 441, 449 f., 457. Italia, as a political notion, 87, 286. Italici, 86 ff., 94; disliked

sination, 57 ff.; his actions on and after the Ides of March, 97 ff.; political prospects, 99 ff.; his friendship with Antonius,

erature, under the Triumvirs, 247 ff.; under the Principate, 459 ff.; political literature, 149 ff., 486; opposition literature

229; character and ambitions of, 340 f.; her success in 23 B.C., 345; political activities of, 385, 422 f., 425, 427; influence o

Lutatius Catulus, Q. (cos. 78 B.C.), his eminence and virtues, 21; political activities 22, 25, 33; insulted by Caesar, 56; ki

military experience, 396. Marcius Philippus, L. (cos. 91 B.C.), his political actions, 19, 21, 28; his caution and craft, 19, 1

s, 70 f., 353, 356, 395 f.; of senators, 395 ff.; a qualification for political promotion, 374 ff. Militia equestris, 353 ff.,

228, 423, 425, 496 f.; adherents and legates, 31 f., 44 f., 67, 396; political allies, 28 f., 43 ff., 491; freedmen, 76, 385; pr

Postumii, 64. Potamo, of Mytilene, 262. Potentia, 472 f. Praecia, political intriguer, 385. Praefecti, equestrian, 70 f., 353

f. Principes, definition of, 10, 311; ideal principes, 37, 145; as political dynasts, 8 f., etc.; inadequacy of principes in 4

, 352, 514. Propaganda, of Octavianus in 44 B.C., 116 f., 120, 125; political , 154 ff., 208, 218, 256; poetry as, 251 ff., 460

ut by Augustus, 339, 440 ff.; dubious features of, 452 f. Religion, political use of, at Rome, 68, 256; in the East, 263, 273 f

l from Rhosus, 236. Sempronia, daughter of Atratinus, 269. Sempronia, political lady, 384 f. Sempronii, 19, 493. Sempronius A

e, 15 f., 37, 88 f., 319 f.; on tota Italia, 88; on novi homines, 89; political illusions, 143; political theory, 144 f., 318 f.,

.; on tota Italia, 88; on novi homines, 89; political illusions, 143; political theory, 144 f., 318 f., 351; repute under Augustu

, 290, 351; owned by the partisans of Augustus, 380 f., 452. Women, political influence of, 12, 384 ff., 414; position of, 444

AUGUSTUS This tree, which is designed in the main to illustrate the political history and the marriage alliances of the Princip