inforce their verdict and reveal a certain unity in the character and policy of Triumvir, Dux and Princeps. 2 Whether the Pr

up from the wreckage of other groups and superseding them all. The policy and acts of the Roman People were guided by an ol

exercise. The two consuls remained at the head of the government, but policy was largely directed by ex-consuls. These men rul

es. Marriage with a well-connected heiress therefore became an act of policy and an alliance of powers, more important than a

or interest. Not that women were merely the instruments of masculine policy . Far from it: the daughters of the great houses c

resources which ambition required to win power in Rome and direct the policy of the imperial Republic as consul or as one of t

reformers, enemies of misrule and corruption, liberal in outlook and policy . Moreover, the tribunate could be employed for co

Even in numbers there was a poor showing of consulars to guide public policy : only a few venerable relics, or recent consuls w

in requital. From of old the Claudii were the great exponents of this policy ; and the Claudii remained on the alert, expecting

perhaps fell short of his designs. 1 Then arose a question of foreign policy , the restoration of Ptolemy Auletes the King of E

5. He had ample cause to complain of Appius. PageBook=>046 The policy arose from the brain and will of Marcus Cato. His

sage. Yet it can hardly be proved that Caesar devised a comprehensive policy of ruler-worship. PageBook=>055 in misunde

n-senatorial or even anti-senatorial elements in his party and in his policy . The majority of the leading consulars was massed

adily to restore the dignity and power of her family. In her dynastic policy she ruthlessly employed the three daughters of he

gnitas, he would have requited them. ’2 No empty words this trait and policy of Caesar was patent to contemporaries. 3 Justice

nus counted all Spain in his clientela. Suitably adopting a Scipionic policy of exploiting help from Spain to his own advantag

esar’s nominees not only leads to misconceptions about the Dictator’s policy , domestic and imperial, but renders it hard to un

as largely solicited by Roman politicians. Not only could he sway the policy of his city or influence a whole region of Italy3

the novus homo. No evidence, however, that he was generous in act and policy , no man from remoter Italy whom he helped into th

een integral members of the Roman State. It was no part of Cicero’s policy to flood the Senate with municipal men and captur

memory of Antonius has suffered damage multiple and irreparable. The policy which he adopted in the East and his association

te conduct of a statesman cannot entirely be divorced from his public policy and performance, Roman aristocratic standards, ol

own security and the maintenance of order dictated the same salutary policy . By force of argument and personal authority, Ant

erior ambitions of Antonius. In the light of his subsequent Caesarian policy and final contest for the dominion of the world,

power with the populace and the veterans, Antonius was forced into a policy that alarmed the Senate and gave his enemies a pr

s heir was merely a nuisance, not a factor of much influence upon the policy of Antonius. The consul had already decided to ta

ence of a Caesarian rival might well force Antonius back again to the policy which he had deserted by the legislation of June

tbid his rival the consul went farther with his Caesarian and popular policy . In the Senate on September 1st Antonius propos

from the veterans and from Octavianus. In pursuance of his Caesarian policy , Antonius caused to be set up in the Forum a stat

and the first revolutionary venture has been narrated as the deed and policy of Octavianus. In himself that young man had not

The help of the bankers was private and personal, not the considered policy of a whole class. Octavianus needed the Senate as

actions of others. Even a nonentity is a power when consul at Rome. A policy they had, and they might achieve it to restore co

ervilius, L. Piso and Cicero: they are described as neutrals, their policy dishonest. 2 No word here of the consulars Philip

ir young kinsman. 4 But the situation was complicated, and Philippus’ policy was ambiguous. Even if stirred by the example of

Octavianus. That was all they had in common in character, career and policy the three consulars were discordant and irreconci

return to Rome late in the summer Servilius embarked upon a tortuous policy , to enhance his power and that of his clan. His f

ve, his earliest acts caused discomfort to Antonius he criticized the policy of the consul on September 2nd. When Octavianus m

stood firm: he refused to come to Rome and condone Caesar’s acts and policy by presence in the Senate. Courage, but also fear

vil wars. 3 After March 17th, the sharp perception that neither the policy nor the party of Caesar had been abolished brough

adversaries were destined never to meet. By venturing to attack the policy of Antonius, Cicero, it might be argued, came out

of the Caesarian party: yet clearly of a kind to influence the public policy of Antonius. When he made his decision to retur

oice between capitulation and destruction. Six years before, the same policy precipitated war between the government and a pro

ublic he set forth the lineaments and design, not of any programme or policy in the present, but simply the ancestral constitu

logist, when he passes from the character of the orator to defend his policy . It is presumptuous to hold judgement over the de

the impression that their valiant author stood in sole control of the policy of the State. The situation was much more complic

, for Antonius, for Octavianus, or for peace. The new consuls had a policy of their own, if only they were strong enough to

rong enough to achieve it. Public pronouncements on matters of high policy , however partisan in tone, cannot altogether supp

dly asserting his responsibility for the actions of Octavianus. 2 His policy violated public law with what chance of success o

monster murder and debauchery of every degree. Clodius inherited his policy and his character; and Clodia committed incest wi

of a good citizen, only to lapse before long, damned for a misguided policy of conciliation; and casual evidence reveals the

and political sagacity. It was easier to formulate an ideal than a policy . The defenders of the Senate’s rule and prerogati

chy, it is his ideal to bring back order again. The decisive act in a policy of treason may be described as ‘laying the founda

ex-consuls, whose auctoritas, so custom prescribed, should direct the policy of the State: they are suitably designated as ‘au

and the constitutional party in Rome on the contrary, discordance of policy and aim. The programme of Cicero had already be

=>175 victory at Mutina was deceptive and ruinous. The ingenious policy of destroying Antonius and elevating Caesar’s hei

ic counsels. No new consuls were elected. There was no leadership, no policy . A property-tax had been levied to meet the deman

happy invention epitomized all too faithfully the subtle and masterly policy of using Caesar’s heir to wreck the Caesarian par

e most palpable evidence, he persisted in asserting the wisdom of his policy , and the value of the results thereby achieved, i

nsellor to a military leader; and this was but the culmination of the policy that he had initiated in the previous autumn. B

ty of temperament was aggravated by a complete divergence of aims and policy . This is made evident by two incidents. Already C

liance with Caesar’s heir. He asseverated his responsibility for that policy . But his words belied him he did not cease to urg

owed its revolutionary character by its composition as well as by its policy . The Triumvirs had expelled from Italy not only t

Caesar and the extermination of the Liberators had not been Antonius’ policy when he was consul. But with Caesar’s heir there

ns of Philippi, the remnants of twenty-eight legions. Of the acts and policy of the dynasts, the share of Caesar’s heir was ar

ich he scarcely seemed to desire. Octavianus, while prosecuting the policy of the Caesarian party, was in danger of succumbi

ned an important vassal, the Queen of Egypt, to render account of her policy . 2 Cleopatra was alert and seductive. 3 Antoniu

ment of lands to the veterans of Philippi were Octavianus’ share in a policy for which they were jointly responsible. The vict

ance of Antonius was secured and reinforced; but the execution of his policy was already being hampered by the claims and acts

rcius Philippus, who had probably followed the discreet and ambiguous policy recommended by the examples of a father and a gra

mpeius or the Caesarian leaders, he might still exert the traditional policy of family alliances, though the day was long past

was the principal and the most arduous of the achievements in foreign policy of the long Principate of Augustus. But Octavianu

p. 196. PageBook=>245 existence, for the transactions of high policy were conducted by the rulers in secret or at a di

Agrippa, the husband of Caecilia Attica. 2 The lineaments of a new policy had become discernible, the prime agents were alr

ast, holding Pontus and Armenia Minor. Herod was the fourth king. The policy and the choice of the agents goes beyond all prai

mple was nothing novel or untimely: it revealed a habit and created a policy . At Ephesus all Asia proclaimed Caesar as a god m

the great and inimitable’. 4 Thus did Antonius carry yet farther the policy of Pompeius and Caesar, developing and perhaps st

f the Dictator and the contriving of a new cult, that was Octavianus’ policy and work, not his. The contrast did not escape th

y. Both sides were preparing. The cause or rather the pretext was the policy which had been adopted by Antonius in the East an

en if there were, it would be necessary further to speculate upon the policy and intentions of Antonius, the domination which

abolition of another Roman province. 3 The Triumvir pursued the same policy , to its logical end. The province of Cilicia was

ing in Egypt. But that does not prove the substantial identity of his policy with that of Antonius. There was Cleopatra. Anton

n lands instead of the western fallen by partition to Octavianus, his policy would hardly have differed from that of Antonius.

he influence of Cleopatra? If Antonius be denied a complete monarchic policy of his own, it does not follow that he was merely

nd swayed. Years before, Cleopatra was of no moment whatsoever in the policy of Caesar the Dictator, but merely a brief chapte

mptuous Pythodorus. Created belief turned the scale of history. The policy and ambitions of Antonius or of Cleopatra were no

revelled in a brief renascence as though it were not fettered to the policy of a military despot. To liberty itself the Rep

ing his place between the two consuls, he spoke in defence of his own policy , accusing Sosius and Antonius. None dared to rais

sed in the custody of the Vestal Virgins. Neither the attack upon the policy of Antonius in the East, nor the indignation fome

ast was the plea and profession. The local gentry, who controlled the policy of the towns, could create opinion, produce votes

suppressed. The girl was enlisted as an instrument of Roman imperial policy , being given in marriage to Juba, the prince of t

d in peace, was quietly neglected in the East, where he inherited the policy of Antonius in order to render it more systematic

afford to abandon Armenia and one part of the north-eastern frontier policy of Antonius. His retreat from commitments in the

terly. With the Mede, Antonius’ ally, he began by following Antonius’ policy and even granted him for a time the territory of

; and there was work to do in the West and in the North. To serve the policy of Rome and secure the eastern frontiers, it was

ck of order and cohesion, was neither strong in war nor aggressive in policy . Adulation, perversity or ignorance might elevate

ace of Parthia, like the menace of Egypt, was merely a pretext in his policy . There was a closer danger, his own equals and

he Augurium Salutis was revived (Dio 51, 20, 4). PageBook=>304 policy and an omen of victory was then embodied in the d

nt, the delicate question of his own standing in public law. Like his policy , his powers were a direct continuation of the Tri

e Triumvirate, still gave him the means to initiate and direct public policy at Rome if not to control through consular imperi

ss. To that end, he modified the forms of the constitution to fit his policy , his policy to harmonize with Roman sentiment. Th

end, he modified the forms of the constitution to fit his policy, his policy to harmonize with Roman sentiment. The formulatio

nces it passed almost unnoticed. No change in the foreign or domestic policy of the government, in currency or in economic act

re possessed a voice in the direction of senatorial debate and public policy , a vague and traditional control over all provinc

In the place of the consulate, which gave him a general initiative in policy , he took various powers, above all proconsular im

ctavia had been employed in her brother’s interest before and knew no policy but his. She had a son, C. Marcellus. On him the

gustus, under the guise of restoration, none the less perpetuated the policy of Caesar and of the Triumvirs: ‘occultior, non m

s a ruling aristocracy by no means narrow and exclusive. The generous policy of Caesar and of Augustus could be supported by t

commonly held, lacked both the broad imperial vision and the liberal policy of Caesar: a grave exaggeration, deriving from th

noxious to the understanding of history. 3 The difference between the policy of the two rulers will be explained in large meas

may be conjectured that certain among them, above all Agrippa, whose policy prevailed on that occasion, also sought to curb A

i Maximi. Most of them were entrapped in the matrimonial and dynastic policy of Augustus. 2 While depressing the powers, Aug

lar upon the Fasti. The date is not accidental: the flagrant dynastic policy of Augustus constrained him to bid for the suppor

lgato imperii arcano posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri. ’ 3 On policy and events in the East, cf. above all J. G. C. An

e bank of the river Danube is the cardinal achievement of the foreign policy of Augustus. 2 His own earlier campaigns had been

ably enrolled about this time. 2 For this conception of the foreign policy of Augustus, see CAH x, 355 ff.: the truth of the

Agrippa conducted or at least superintended the foreign and frontier policy of the Empire from close at hand, with long perio

27 B.C. illustrates the change both in administration and in foreign policy . All new conquests or annexations had fallen to

he decade when Tiberius was absent from the conduct of Rome’s foreign policy (6 B.C.-A.D. 4). On the contrary, expeditions wer

es, like the offices of aedile and censor. Two incidents hardened his policy . In 22 B.C. he secured the appointment of a pai

gravated beyond all measure under the Republic the great questions of policy had been the subject of open and public debate: t

t his plans in the company of his intimates. Octavianus inherited the policy and no little part of the personnel, for the name

did not debate and determine the paramount questions of governmental policy . That was the work of other bodies, which kept an

preside over the treasury, but the Senate had no control of financial policy , no exact knowledge of the budget of Empire. The

Prefect of Egypt could furnish information about taxation and fiscal policy to say nothing of the food supply and policing of

A.D. 14.2 As well as finance, many matters of domestic and foreign policy demonstrated the need for skilled advice and summ

nd legal prerogatives the Senate and People still retained in foreign policy mattered little in comparison with the fact that

rcellus, a heavy calamity and much bewailed, was compensated by a new policy , in which Agrippa and the sons of Livia in turn w

of monarchy the importance of cabinet government is enhanced; secret policy and secret strife in the counsels of the Princeps

nterpretation of this evidence (and consequently of the character and policy of Tiberius), cf. F. Marsh, The Reign of Tiberius

d wealth: men wish to appear virtuous and to feel virtuous. The new policy embodied a national and a Roman spirit. The conta

s own efforts alone: was the ostensible author and prime agent in the policy of regeneration merely perhaps carrying out the i

n Illyricum was a deadly blow, not merely to the foreign and frontier policy of Rome, but to the patriotic pride of Augustus.

mposure. Despite the varied checks and disappointments in Augustus’ policy of moral and patriotic regeneration, the effort h

hosis a frank and generous recognition of the excellence of Augustus’ policy or an unequivocal testimony to the restoration of

In his Odes may be discovered the noblest expression of the Augustan policy of social regeneration and the most illuminating

us: there can be no respite for him, no repose, no union of heart and policy with an alien queen. Italy is his goal ‘hie amor,

hose verse and sentiments harmonized so easily with his own ideas and policy . Here was his tota Italia, spontaneous and admira

e loyalty of the people and inculcating a suitable lesson. The family policy of the New State was vividly and triumphantly adv

arch. All three Triumvirs concurred in the deification of Caesar; the policy was Octavianus’, his too the most intense exploit

ed devotion to the government and seconded the dynastic and monarchic policy of Augustus: a noticeable spread and intensificat

f their own sentiments the themes and forms made standard by official policy in the capital. At Potentia in Picenum a sevir se

whomsoever voted, no doubt in the spirit in which they were granted: policy and system cannot be discovered. Once again Augus

s own purposes. Yet it may be that his real opinion of the character, policy and style of Cicero was not so far from that of P

imacy might be delayed, but not denied for ever. The complex marriage policy of Augustus transmitted a peculiar and blended in

als of Augustus, the flower of Italy, did not respond to his national policy by the production of numerous offspring. Certain

Varus was the official scapegoat for the optimism of Augustus’ German policy . Velleius’ label ‘vir ingenio mitis, moribus quie

me. Since then, fifty-six years had elapsed. Throughout, in act and policy , he remained true to himself and to the career th

Antonius’ relations with, 224, 265, 270; after Actium, 301; Augustus’ policy , 388, 428. Armies, control of, 35 f., 325; in 4

utina, 164, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172; disappears from record, 197; his policy defended, 136; character and philhellenic tastes,

mily, 433; his Antonian blood, 495; the manner of his accession, 415; policy towards the chieftains of Comata, 501 f., and tow

nd Caesarian, 95; in 44 B.C., 97, 99 f., 102, 114, 115, 142, 163; his policy , 133, 176; in the War of Mutina, 167, 169, 173 f.

94 f.; the unification of Italy, 82, 89 ff., 92 ff., 359; his liberal policy , 365 f. His character, 25, 70, 121 f.; insistence

nni, 400, 431. Marius, C. (cos. 107 B.C.), 9, 16, 86, 441, 515; his policy , 86, 94; party, 19, 65, 86, 93 f.; in relation to

ans and bankers, 26; opposes Pompeius, 33 f.; against Caesar, 34; his policy in 52 B.C., 37, 46; misses the consulate, 40; in

Rhosus, 236. Roads, care and repair of, 402; importance in military policy , 413; Via Egnatia, 202, 294, 413; Aemilia, 404; D

, 64, 69, 94; proconsul of Asia, 109, 136; attacks Antonius, 123; his policy , 134, 135, 136, 147; praised by Cicero, 164; quar

, 139 ff.; attacks Antonius, 123; relations with Octavianus, 141 ff.; policy in 44–43 B.C., 143 ff., the Philippics, 104, 140,

policy in 44–43 B.C., 143 ff., the Philippics, 104, 140, 146 f.; his policy and acts in 43 B.C., 167–86; and the consulate, 1

of Mutina, 173 f., 176; alleged death-bed advice, 177; character and policy , 133; his wife, 134; no consular descendants, 498