Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover

onsolidation of the revolutionary process. Emphasis is laid, however, not upon the personality and acts of Augustus, but up

ugustus is simply panegyric, whether ingenuous or edifying. Yet it is not necessary to praise political success or to ideal

t of elaborate argumentation. Further, the bibliography at the end is not intended as a guide to the whole subject: it mere

position of the Princeps as a party-leader naturally owe much, but do not derive entirely, from this illuminating work—in a

even genealogical tables it will sometimes reveal facts or connexions not explicitly mentioned in the text. In some way or

raise his eyebrows. Its imperfections are patent and flagrant. It has not been composed in tranquillity; and it ought to be

mistakes of fact or attribution, and to remove some blemishes. It was not possible to register, still less to utilize, the

rius, stepson and son by adoption of Augustus, consort in his powers. Not until that day was the funeral of the Free State

of civil war and military tyranny. If despotism was the price, it was not too high: to a patriotic Roman of Republican sent

mination of the revolutionary age, they were willing to acquiesce, if not actively to share, in the shaping of the new gove

ulian the Apostate invoked philosophy to explain it. The problem does not exist: Julian was closer to the point when he cla

int when he classified Augustus as a chameleon. 2 Colour changed, but not substance. Contemporaries were not deceived. Th

chameleon. 2 Colour changed, but not substance. Contemporaries were not deceived. The convenient revival of Republican in

stood pre-eminent, in virtue of prestige and authority tremendous and not to be defined. Auctoritas is the word his enemies

potentia. They were right. Yet the ‘Restoration of the Republic’ was not merely a solemn comedy, staged by a hypocrite.

stensibly as servants of the Republic and heirs to a great tradition, not as mere lieutenants of a military leader or subse

s of arbitrary power. For that reason ‘Dux’ became ‘Princeps’. He did not cease to be Imperator Caesar. There is no breac

through revolution emerge as champions of ordered government, they do not surrender anything. Neglect of the conventions of

t of history and precludes a fair judgement upon the agents. They did not know the future. Heaven and the verdict of hist

olized for all time in the Battle of Philippi, it was a long process, not a single act. Sallustius began his annalistic rec

anded, in a plain, hard style. It is much to be regretted that he did not carry his History of the Civil Wars through the p

to omit the period of the Triumvirate when he observed that he could not treat his subject with freedom and with veracity.

the more sharply be revealed by unfriendly presentation. But it is not enough to redeem Augustus from panegyric and revi

State. It will therefore be expedient and salutary to investigate, not merely the origin and growth of the Caesarian par

er could have any history at all and only the ruling city: only Rome, not Italy. 1 In the Revolution the power of the old g

ear to open the final act in the fall of the Roman Republic. That was not the opinion of their enemy Cato: he blamed the or

llio set out to narrate the history of the Roman Revolution he began, not with the crossing of the Rubicon, but with the co

s largely directed by ex-consuls. These men ruled, as did the Senate, not in virtue of written law, but through auctoritas;

applied to the more prominent of the consulars. 2 The consulate did not merely confer power upon its holder and dignity f

’s definition (Die Nobilität, 21 ff.) is here accepted. ‘Nobilis’ may not be quite a technical term, but its connotation is

activity or fame in a singularly well-documented epoch of history. Not mere admission to the Senate but access to the co

rare combination of merit, industry and protection. The nobilitas did not , it is true, stand like a solid rampart to bar al

ive Roman voter could seldom be induced to elect a man whose name had not been known for centuries as a part of the history

gates. Cicero would have preserved both dignity and peace of mind had not ambition and vanity blinded him to the true cause

5 The political life of the Roman Republic was stamped and swayed, not by parties and programmes of a modern and parliam

ot by parties and programmes of a modern and parliamentary character, not by the ostensible opposition between Senate and P

iving their names to its epochs. There was an age of the Scipiones: not less of the Metelli. Though concealed by craft

than a magistracy, more binding than any compact of oath or interest. Not that women were merely the instruments of masculi

a landed proprietor, great or small. But money was scarce and he did not wish to sell his estates: yet he required ready c

s in the habit of observing that nobody should be called rich who was not able to maintain an army on his income. 2 Crassus

competition was fierce and incessant. Family influence and wealth did not alone suffice. From ambition or for safety, polit

fety, politicians formed compacts. Amicitia was a weapon of politics, not a sentiment based on congeniality. Individuals ca

itia presupposes inimicitia, inherited or acquired: a statesman could not win power and influence without making many enemi

hout making many enemies. The novus homo had to tread warily. Anxious not to offend a great family, he must shun where poss

unconstitutional action. The dynast required allies and supporters, not from his own class only. The sovran people of a f

he friendly offices of lowly agents such as influential freedmen were not despised. Above all, it was necessary to concilia

t’s son from a small town, succumbed to his talents and his ambition. Not so T. Pomponius Atticus, the great banker. Had At

ce could easily have procured a seat in the Senate. 4 But Atticus did not wish to waste his money on senseless luxury or el

as accessible to the ‘industria ac virtus’ of all citizens. There was not even a property-qualification. The letter of the

ing class. For that surrender they were scorned by senators. They did not mind. 1 Some lived remote and secure in the enjoy

would therefore arrest revolution or even reform, for these men could not be expected to have a personal interest in redist

th vice and corruption, obscurantism and oppression. The knights must not be left out of the indictment. Among the old nobi

ty with a high ideal of Roman patriotism and imperial responsibility. Not so among the financiers. The Roman constitution

acted in every walk of life, the political dynast might win influence not merely in Rome but in the country-towns of Italy

e not merely in Rome but in the country-towns of Italy and in regions not directly concerned with Roman political life. Whe

ith Roman political life. Whether he held authority from the State or not , he could thus raise an army on his own initiativ

o the State; military service was for livelihood, or from constraint, not a natural and normal part of a citizen’s duty. Th

oil in war and estates in Italy when their campaigns were over. But not veterans only were attached to his cause from his

The traditional contests of the noble families were complicated, but not abolished, by the strife of parties largely based

, muzzled the tribunate, and curbed the consuls. But even Sulla could not abolish his own example and preclude a successor

, 1, 67 m; 69; 77, 6, &c. PageBook=>018 As an oligarchy is not a figment of political theory, a specious fraud,

riciate, sadly reduced in political power in the previous generation, not so much through Marius as from internal disasters

was to prevail. The patricians in the restored oligarchy held rank not so much from resources of their own as from allia

al families of the Licinii, great soldiers and distinguished orators, not to mention other houses of repute. 4 The Marcii,

), a man of capacity and repute, came of a senatorial family that had not previously reached the consulate. 5 Philippus s

st, Hist. I, 77 M); and he secured for Pompeius the command in Spain, not ‘pro consule’ but ‘pro consulibus’ (Cicero, Phil.

husband of women of the Metelli. 4 The dynasty of the Metelli could not rule alone. Both the framework and the bulk of th

ove, n. 1 and p. 20, n. 5. The wife of M. Terentius Varro Lucullus is not known. PageBook=>022 the right wing when S

on of a competent orator and assiduous himself as an advocate, though not brilliant cautious and crafty in habit, he might

justify the rule of class and privilege. The ten years’ war in Italy not merely corrupted their integrity: it broke their

no weight. NotesPage=>022 1 The family of his wife Tertulla is not known. But his elder son, M. Crassus, married Cae

the arts and graces of private leisure: he transmitted to posterity, not the memory of talent and integrity, but the etern

Münzer, RA, 336 ff. PageBook=>024 prime. 1 But Servilia would not be thwarted by that accident. She cast about for

nd the Claudii remained on the alert, expecting three consulates, but not unaided. 4 Against novi homines the great famil

oscribed, Caesar spoke for family loyalty and for a cause. But he did not compromise his future or commit his allegiance fo

to recall the aristocracy to the duties of their station. 2 This was not convention, pretence or delusion. Upright and aus

ry, claimed to be a realist of traditional Roman temper and tenacity, not inferior to the great ancestor whom he emulated a

stor whom he emulated almost to a parody, Cato the Censor. But it was not character and integrity only that gave Cato the p

his kinsmen NotesPage=>026 1 This was notorious. Cicero could not deny it, cf. Ad Att. 12, 21, 1. 2 Sallust, BC 5

eld a command in Africa against Marian remnants and triumphed, though not a senator, adding ‘Magnus’ to his name. After sup

e Empire was immune from his control. Four years before, Pompeius had not even been a senator. The decay of the Republic, t

s who had publicly spoken for the Lex Manilia were Cicero and Caesar, not ceasing to solicit and claim the support of Pompe

he other lent his services to Crassus. But alliance with Crassus need not alienate Pompeius utterly. Crassus used his patro

ated its empire abroad. Pompeius never forgave Cicero. But Cicero was not the real enemy. It was the habit of Pompeius to

devising before long a novel title, ‘the warden of earth and sea’. 2 Not so menacing to outward show, but no less real and

phos ante deum princeps. 3 Pompeius was Princeps beyond dispute but not at Rome. By armed force he might have established

rmed force he might have established sole rule, but by that alone and not in solid permanence. The nobiles were much too st

omoted through patronage of the Scipiones. 4 Subsequent alliances had not brought much aristocratic distinction. Pompeius’

consulate. The lieutenants of Pompeius in the eastern wars comprised not only personal adherents like Afranius and Gabiniu

Pompeius 44; Cato minor 30. Cf. Münzer, RA, 349 ff. 2 That it need not have been a serious matter is shown by Ad Att. 1,

ncour. To maintain power, the government needed consuls. The men were not easy to find. Cato gathered a great fund to car

r, with no discredit to either. Caesar’s choice was still open had it not been for Cato; and Caesar’s daughter was betrothe

ough special laws. Gabinius and Piso were the most conspicuous, but not the only adherents of the dynasts, whose influenc

. As a demonstration and a warning, Cicero was sacrificed to Clodius. Not content thus to satisfy both personal honour and

rs, L. Marcius Philippus and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus, were not strong political men. But Philippus had recently

n, Mithr. 95; S1G3 750). 3 Crassus was in alliance with the Metelli not only through his elder son (ILS 881). The younger

y modest and patriotic principes. 2 Which was harmless enough, had he not been emboldened to announce in the Senate an atta

5 The speeches Pro Balbo and De prov. cons.: the latter is probably not the παλινῳδία to which he refers in Ad Att. 4, 5,

rs of the edifice. The principes strove for prestige and power, but not to erect a despotic rule upon the ruins of the co

ed the desire as well as the pretext to march on Rome; and Caesar did not conquer Gaul in the design of invading Italy with

a breach between Pompeius and his ally might appear imminent. It was not so in reality. Pompeius had not been idle. Though

is ally might appear imminent. It was not so in reality. Pompeius had not been idle. Though proconsul of all Spain, he resi

heck flagrant abuses. One law, prescribing that provinces be granted, not at once and automatically after praetorship and c

irit of his own legislation. NotesPage=>039 1 The proposal was not published until 53, when Hirrus was tribune. Cato

ence. Detected, he made tardy and questionable amends. The dynast was not yet ready to drop his ally. He needed Caesar for

ambiguous, with hints of going to Spain, but forced by the Optimates, not altogether against his will, to demand a legion f

roclaimed submission to the Senate as a solemn duty. 3 The legion was not withdrawn, however, until the next year, along wi

stwards were in the hands of men loyal to the government, or at least not dangerous; 3 and all the kings, princes and tetra

nian faction. Rising to power with support from the Metelli, though not without quarrels and rivalry, Pompeius broke the

h the Catonian faction to attack and harry Pompeius. But the feud was not bitter or beyond remedy: the Metelli were too pol

152). PageBook=>044 Pompeius and alliance with the Lentuli may not unfairly be surmised. 1 The patrician Cornelii

peius. For Cato or for the Republic they postponed vengeance, but did not forget a brother and father slain by the young Po

. Likewise the father of Marcellinus (cos. 56), cf. P-W IV, 1390. 2 Not that they were all, or consistently, allies of Po

peius’ elder son, another to Cato’s nephew Brutus. 3 Cato himself had not reached the consulate, but two consulars followed

ploy the leading nobiles to destroy Caesar, whether it came to war or not , in either way gaining the mastery. They were not

r it came to war or not, in either way gaining the mastery. They were not duped they knew Pompeius: but they fancied that P

ded if recalcitrant. NotesPage=>044 1 Cicero, Phil. 13, 28 f.: not veracious, however, for two of the alleged Pompei

audatory epithets here attached by Cicero to the other consulars will not mislead: too much is known about these people.

ook=>047 SULLA was the first Roman to lead an army against Rome. Not of his own choosing his enemies had won control

in the East. Sulla had all the ambition of a Roman noble: but it was not his ambition to seize power through civil strife

proconsul’s proposals as conveyed to the Senate were moderate and may not be dismissed as mere manoeuvres for position or f

s of the tribunes and the liberties of the Roman People. But that was not the plea which Caesar himself valued most it was

of Pompeius. They would be able to deal with Pompeius later. It might not come to open war; and Pompeius was still in their

o open war; and Pompeius was still in their control so long as he was not at the head of an army in the field. Upon Caesar

tiest politician of the day: he was declared a public enemy if he did not lay down his command before a certain day. By inv

d by politicians at Rome forbade intervention in a struggle which was not their own. 2 Pompeius might stamp with his foot i

blow. No less complete the military miscalculation: the imperator did not answer to his repute as a soldier. Insecurity and

7, 7, 5; 8, 16, 1. 3 Pompeius’ illness in the summer of 50 B.C. may not have been wholly due to physical causes. 4 Cf.

ue glory of a Roman aristocrat to contend with his peers for primacy, not to destroy them. His enemies had the laugh of him

y them. His enemies had the laugh of him in death. Even Pharsalus was not the end. His former ally, the great Pompeius, glo

e Senate by honourable men, at the foot of his own statue. That was not the point. The cause of Pompeius had become the b

oint. The cause of Pompeius had become the better cause. Caesar could not compete. Though interest on each side claimed mor

n at its kernel a small group of men paramount in social distinction, not merely nobiles but patrician; on the outer fringe

ng several eminent consulars, some of whom Caesar won to sympathy, if not to active support, by his studious moderation. To

and ostentatious clemency. They were members of his own class: he had not wished to make war upon them or to exterminate th

to exterminate the Roman aristocracy. But these proud adversaries did not always leap forward with alacrity to be exhibited

g the rights of the tribunes, the liberty of the Roman People. He was not mistaken. Yet he required special powers: after a

essed, whether Roman, Italian or provincial. He had shown that he was not afraid of vested interests. But Caesar was not a

had shown that he was not afraid of vested interests. But Caesar was not a revolutionary. He soon disappointed the rapacit

F. 15 (1937), 32 ff. Premerstein argues that this was a general oath, not confined to senators. 3 If the Sallustian Epist

PageBook=>053 Caelius complained quite early in the Civil War. 1 Not everybody was as outspoken or as radical as Caeli

ious mastery of men and events, as before in Gaul. Easy victories but not the urgent needs of the Roman People. About Cae

inion, but no certainty. The acts and projects of his Dictatorship do not reveal them. For the rest, the evidence is partis

he affected to inherit from Caesar, the halo. The god was useful, but not the Dictator: Augustus was careful sharply to dis

(Suetonius, Divus Iulius 42 f.): the title of praefectus moribus did not make him any more popular (Ad fam. 9, 15, 5). 3

to point a contrast with Pompeius or Augustus as though Augustus did not assume a more than human name and found a monarch

hough Pompeius, the conqueror of the East and of every continent, did not exploit for his own vanity the resemblance to Ale

, 597. 4 As W. Warde Fowler points out, his Roman contemporaries do not seem to have taken much interest in the matter, R

a military demagogue. If Caesar must be judged, it is by facts and not by alleged intentions. As his acts and his writin

he company of his intimates and secretaries: the Senate voted but did not deliberate. As the Dictator was on the point of d

at he was unpopular he well knew. 1 ‘For all his genius, Caesar could not see a way out’, as one of his friends was subsequ

he words were remembered. The most eloquent of his contemporaries did not disdain to plagiarize them. 5 The question of u

mate intentions becomes irrelevant. Caesar was slain for what he was, not for what he might become. 6 The assumption of a D

nunc reperiet? ’ 3 As the Historia Augusta, pertinent for once but not perhaps authentic, reports of an Emperor (SHA Sev

class in an aristocratic and republican state. Hellenic culture does not explain Cato; 3 and the virtus about which Brutus

the virtus about which Brutus composed a volume was a Roman quality, not an alien importation. The word means courage, t

De officiis (Seneca, Epp. 95, 45). The code was certainly narrow but not by contemporary standards. Brutus’ good repute ha

senators. The figure of interest demanded (48 per cent.) was high but not unparalleled in such transactions (SIG3 748, 36):

f, seemed to embody that ideal of character, admired by those who did not care to imitate. His was not a simple personality

l of character, admired by those who did not care to imitate. His was not a simple personality but passionate, intense and

a friend and a benefactor, for better reasons than that. They stood, not merely for the traditions and the institutions of

dered, on a cool estimate, as privilege and vested interests. It is not necessary to believe that Caesar planned to estab

f the Roman State. It was going to last and the Roman aristocracy was not to be permitted to govern and exploit the Empire

nd exploit the Empire in its own fashion. The tragedies of history do not arise from the conflict of conventional right and

tus each had right on his side. The new party of the Liberators was not homogeneous in origin or in motive. The resentmen

e political dynast Crassus used Catilina as his agent. Catilina could not , or would not, understand that reform or revoluti

nast Crassus used Catilina as his agent. Catilina could not, or would not , understand that reform or revolution had no plac

gh Pompeius and now Pompeius had joined them. 1 A just complaint, but not integral truth: a Sullan partisan before turning

to Caesar or to the State. During the previous three years Caesar had not been able to influence the consular elections to

mediate between Caesar and Pompeius; and during the Civil Wars he did not abate his sincere efforts in the cause of concord

r many former opponents, sons of the nobiles or of Roman knights, and not for the worst of reasons. A huge bribe decided C.

ided C. Scribonius Curio, so history records and repeats but that was not the only incentive, for Clodius’ widow, Fulvia, w

&c 6 Ad fam. 8, 14, 3 PageBook=>064 their allegiance. 1 Not only senators chose Caesar, but young nobiles at

f members of the same noble house on opposing sides will be explained not always by domestic discord and youth’s intoleranc

tta (cos. 65) was still alive (cf. Suetonius, Divus Iulius 79, 4) but not very conspicuous in public. 4 Caesar, BC 1, 6,

sistent in his politics as in his friendships. His earliest ties were not forgotten; and his ascension revived the party of

cipal aristocrats. 3 Certain distinguished families of that party had not been proscribed; and some rallied soon or late to

lied soon or late to the Sullan system and the cause of Pompeius. But not all were now Pompeians P. Sulpicius Rufus, a kins

for his personal ambition. Like his father before him, Pompeius could not be described as a consistent party politician, fo

count. Further, Caesar brought back the three disgraced consulars, not all dubious characters. Gabinius, at least, an ol

istinction nobiles, members of reputable senatorial families that had not reached the consulate and sons of Roman knights:

eached the consulate and sons of Roman knights: the latter class does not show a conspicuously high proportion. 5 Whatever

PageBook=>068 and the glory of Caesar. Labienus left Caesar, but not from political principle he returned to an old al

consulars was massed against him. No matter Caesar’s faction numbered not only many senators but nobiles at that. Most co

l to the duties which they owed to birth and station. The plebs would not have given preference and votes against Caesar fo

iles Iuliei’). 5 Münzer, RA, 356; 358 f.; 424. PageBook=>069 not in vain. In the time of Sulla the Fabii have decl

ia’s own clan which had passed over to the plebeians long ago but had not forgotten its patrician origin. P. Servilius was

of some competence: Lepidus had influence but no party, ambition but not the will and the power for achievement. Caesar, o

elative of his, Dio 40, 63, 5.) PageBook=>070 constitution did not matter they were older than the Roman Republic. I

rait and policy of Caesar was patent to contemporaries. 3 Justice has not always been done to the generous and liberal trad

the Rubicon. Though equestrian officers, whether senators’ sons or not , commonly owed their commissions less to merit th

of procuring gain and political advancement, military experience was not confined to centurions, their social inferiors th

abinus in Virgil, Catalept. 10, cf. Münzer in P-W I A, 1592 ff. It is not really very plausible. Ventidius was perhaps, lik

my commander in the Gallic campaigns; and some find that his style is not very military. 5 Ad fam. 9, 20, 2. 6 Pliny, N

in the ancient Punic city of Gades in Spain. L. Cornelius Balbus was not a citizen by birth he received the franchise for

isinterested motives, to break the power of money in the Roman State. Not so Crassus and Caesar. The faction of Pompeius wa

is much to be regretted that his letters to apprehensive clients have not been preserved. Many of the bankers were already

ather, C. Curtius, is designated as a leader of the equestrian order: not only that Curtius was ‘fortissimus et maximus pub

t advocacy proclaims that this person conducted financial operations, not for any personal profit, but to acquire the means

ht be found among the officers and friends of Pompeius; 3 and it will not have been forgotten that his father had secured L

em long ago: as proconsul he encouraged their aspirations, but he did not satisfy them until the Civil War had begun. In

the survivors expected an accession of wealth, dignity and power. Had not Sulla enriched his partisans, from senators down

esse Pompeio. ’ 5 Suetonius, Divus Iulius 76, 3. Possibly ‘Rufio’, not ‘Rufinus’, cf. Münzer in P-W IA, 1198. 6 At lea

albus aedificat. τί γἀ⍴ αùτῷ µέλ∊ι’; 3 Dio 43, 47, 3. The total may not really have been quite so large. 4 Ib. 43, 49,

efore juryman, officer or man of affairs, the progenitor, when he was not the heir, of a family with municipal repute and s

not the heir, of a family with municipal repute and standing at least not all centurions were rustic and humble in origin.

ower of Italy, the pride and bulwark of the Roman State. 3 That would not avail to guard these new Italians, whether belong

llus’ family would perhaps have been eligible for senatorial rank, if not Virgil’s as well. Among Caesar’s nominees may be

n or two earlier. Caesar’s friends Troucillus, Trogus and Gallus were not the only members of this class, which, lacking fu

80, n. 1; also the Etruscan Cafo, JRS XXVII (1937), 135, though it is not certain that he was a senator. 2 Suetonius, Div

as an immigrant or colonial Roman. Balbus, the Gaditane magnate, was not a Roman by birth, but a citizen of an alien commu

birth, but a citizen of an alien community allied to Rome. Balbus did not yet enter the Senate. His young nephew, courageou

isan opinions about the origin and social status of Caesar’s nominees not only leads to misconceptions about the Dictator’s

embly now harboured many other clients whom Cicero had once defended, not , as Gabinius, under pressure from the masters of

, loyal associates or grateful clients. Balbus, Oppius and Matius had not entered the Senate they did not need to, being mo

lients. Balbus, Oppius and Matius had not entered the Senate they did not need to, being more useful elsewhere. But L. Aeli

me, BSR Papers XIV (1938), 4 ff.; 23 f. To support this view one need not appeal merely to general statements like ‘cetera

they governed provinces and led armies of Roman legions. Rabirius did not merely declaim about fleets and armies, vexing Ci

the municipal aristocrat was largely solicited by Roman politicians. Not only could he sway the policy of his city or infl

armis coeptum. ’ PageBook=>084 The governing class at Rome had not always disdained the aristocracies of other citie

ity at Rome by the patricians in the middle of the fourth century did not portend the triumph of the Roman plebs. The earli

e earliest new families to reach the consulate are plainly immigrant. Not merely the towns of Latium even Etruria and Campa

migrant. Not merely the towns of Latium even Etruria and Campania, if not Beneventum in the Samnite country, reinforced the

period. For the evidence, P-W III, 2662 ff. Doubt about the date need not prejudice the fact. 2 For the Valerii, cf. Val.

liest consular Fasti and the annals of Regal and Republican Rome were not immune from their ambitious and fraudulent device

haps belongs more truly to Latin or Volscian history. The Junii could not rise to a king, but they did their best, producin

blic. 4 Pride kept the legends of the patricians much purer. They did not need to descend to fraud, and they could admit an

ersial. In itself, the process is natural enough; and it is confirmed not a little by subsequent and unimpeachable history.

abine Numa (Plutarch, Numa 21). The origin of the Caecilii Metelli is not known. Caeculus, the god who founded Praeneste, i

t these are exceptions rather than examples. The governing oligarchy, not least the dynastic houses of the plebeian nobilit

truria, Umbria and the Sabellic peoples of the central highlands, had not belonged to the Roman State at all, but were auto

of the Roman franchise, but the spirit and practice of government had not altered to fit a transformed state. Men spoke ind

ality was very different. 2 The recent war of Italy against Rome must not be forgotten. When Caesar invaded Italy he could

ssociate of certain local dynasts,2 the Italians took up arms. It was not to extort a privilege but to destroy Rome. They n

not to extort a privilege but to destroy Rome. They nearly succeeded. Not until they had been baffled and shattered in war

ys may have weakened the insurgents by encouraging desertion, but did not arrest hostilities everywhere. Samnium remained

ties everywhere. Samnium remained recalcitrant. 3 The contest was not only brutal and bloody, with massacres of captive

dherents in the Etruscan towns; and all the Samnites marched on Rome, not from loyalty to the Marian cause, but to destroy

k=>088 After a decade of war Italy was united, but only in name, not in sentiment. At first the new citizens had been

e vanquished party in the Bellum Italicum and the Marian sedition was not richly represented in the Roman Senate, even by r

prises of Marius and the insurrections of Lepidus and Catilina. It is not merely that so many of his soldiers and centurion

s before, provided the nucleus of the movement this time largely, but not wholly, disappointed Sullan veterans. There were

impoverished; 5 and most of the great landowners in Samnium now were not of Samnite stock. 6 But the Caesarian general L.

e Marrucini, fell in battle fighting for Italia. 9 But the family did not perish or lapse altogether into poverty or obscur

d M. Cusinius (Phil. 3, 25 f.). The gentilicium‘Vehilius’ is rare and not noticed by Schulze: compare, however, the early i

ὲĸ τῆς ‘Іταλίας έξέβαλ∊. 7 ILS 885, nr. Sulmo of the Paeligni, but not his home, for the first Paelignian senator comes

r Ventidius in 39 B.C., Dio 48, 41, 1. On‘Poppaedius’, the true form ( not ‘Pompaedius’), cf. W. Schulze, LE, 367, and the i

m that city. Picenum was the scene of faction and internecine strife. Not only the Italici are hostile to Pompeius and the

me. Caesar has a mixed following, some stripped from Pompeius, others not to be closely defined: an origin from the towns o

into something that resembled a nation, with Rome as its capital, was not consummated by orators or by political theorists:

1 Ad fam. 10, 31, 2 f. He prosecuted C. Cato (Tacitus, Dial. 34, 7), not , however an important person. The powerful enemie

at, after the Bellum Italicum and the enfranchisement of Italy, could not be confined to Rome, but must embrace all Italy.

of the enlarged state is a fair notion, but perhaps anachronistic and not the true motive of Caesar’s augmentation of the S

oman, the native magnate from Spain or Narbonensis. They represented, not regions, but a class in society and a party in po

ts of their names, to which they give a regular and Latin termination not so the more recent, with foreign endings; and the

nent partisans to the cause of Marius. 3 Another termination is found not only in these regions but extends to Picenum and

cial and political revolution. The party of Caesar shows a fair but not alarming proportion of non-Latin names. The famil

family and repute of certain Italici now admitted to the Senate must not obscure the numerous new senators from certain ol

ul. He was correct but other novi homines, socially more eminent, had not been debarred in that period; and Cicero was soon

tator would have given the consulate to Ventidius or to Balbus he did not gratify the expectations of Rabirius; and who at

military man Ser. Sulpicius Galba alleged personal resentment: he had not been made consul. 5 To the Picene landowner L. Mi

ot been made consul. 5 To the Picene landowner L. Minucius Basilus, a not altogether satisfactory person, Caesar refused th

us was a nobilis, Galba a patrician. Yet the opposition to Caesar did not come in the main from the noble or patrician elem

l followed and bewilderment. Sympathizers came to the Capitol but did not stay long, among them the senior statesman Cicero

ol the next day likewise fell flat. The mob was apathetic or hostile, not to be moved by the logical, earnest and austere o

rent, how fiery a speech would Cicero have composed; 2 but Cicero was not present. The Liberators remained ensconced upon t

, who demanded special honours for the tyrannicides. Yet Antonius did not strive to get them condemned. Rejecting both ex

th design. The funeral oration delivered by Antonius (March 20th) may not have been intended as a political manifesto of th

e earliest contemporary evidence (Ad Att. 14, 10, 1, April 19th) does not definitely incriminate him. By October, however,

ated immediately after the funeral (see the preceding note), it would not prove, though it might support, the view that Ant

assassins and to their sympathizers. The harm had already been done. Not the funeral of Caesar but the session of March 17

that action alone, was the end and justification of their enterprise, not to be altered by wisdom after the event and the v

Capitol, it was afterwards urged. 3 But that was treason. They should not have left the consul Antonius alive. But there

ies in the provinces would have been too strong. The Liberators had not planned a seizure of power. Their occupation of t

tol was a symbolical act, antiquarian and even Hellenic. But Rome was not a Greek city, to be mastered from its citadel. Th

quiescence of the Senate were requisite. Of the consuls, Antonius was not to be had, Dolabella an uncertain factor. The con

ge and confidence. The majority was for order and security. They were not to be blamed. Of consulars, the casualties in the

oyalty to the established order. His past career showed that he could not be depended on for action or for statesmanship; a

depended on for action or for statesmanship; and the conspirators had not initiated him into their designs. The public supp

nts of the Dictator. Promises were added and privileges, generous but not carrying full conviction. 1 Nor were the veterans

n merely by material advantage. They became truculent and tumultuous. Not without excuse: their Imperator, in defence of wh

tradition, and for the constitution might appear to survive in Italy. Not everywhere, or among all classes. When Brutus and

f sympathy for the Republican cause defies any close estimate: it may not be measured by optimistic and partisan proclamati

ntually for civil war, is another question. Their generous ardour was not put to the test. NotesPage=>101 1 Appian,

were made to convert Hirtius to their cause. 2 But Dolabella, though not impervious to flattery, was fortified by distrust

ered in the provinces, as Pompeius knew and as some of his allies did not . The price was civil war. Even had the Liberators

secure a majority of the army commanders for their cause and they did not think that it was necessary. At the time of Caesa

acta were ratified on March 17th, it was feared that the consul would not allow them to take over their provinces. 1 What h

d. Yet even now, despite the deplorable fact that the Republicans did not dare to show themselves before the Roman People,

cans did not dare to show themselves before the Roman People, all was not lost. The Dictator was dead, regretted by many, b

ople, all was not lost. The Dictator was dead, regretted by many, but not to be avenged; an assertion of liberty had been a

corresponded with political facts and with personal interests, it was not altogether foolish to hope for normal and ordered

eBook=>104 on the field of Pharsalus. But Antonius’ talents were not those of a mere soldier. Caesar, a good judge of

he Horse, for more than a year. The task was delicate, and Caesar may not have been altogether satisfied with his deputy. Y

adequacy. The fact that Antonius, unlike gallant young Dolabella, did not participate in the African and Spanish campaigns,

bella, did not participate in the African and Spanish campaigns, will not be put down to his cowardice or to Caesar’s distr

cial title. PageBook=>105 Empire, whose unofficial follies did not prevent them from rising, when duty called, to se

suppress a timid and perhaps perverse admiration. A blameless life is not the whole of virtue, and inflexible rectitude may

larming in the holders of office and power at Rome. In the end it was not debauchery that ruined Antonius, but a fatal chai

he same historian’s cool treatment of the virtuous Emperor Galba will not escape notice (Hist, 1, 49) ’magis extra vitia qu

was later to be taunted with inconsistency on this point. 2 It would not be paradoxical to assert that Antonius felt respe

riendship. 3 He had no quarrel with the Liberators providing they did not interfere with the first object of his ambition,

. The Liberators were certainly a problem; yet Antonius was amicable, not exploiting his position unduly. In these April

an exile but only NotesPage=>107 1 Phil, 1, 2 ff. Cicero does not mention here, among the ‘Republican’ measures of

3 (April 18th). 3 Below, p. 130. PageBook=>108 one, and that not without consulting an eminent adversary of that e

gnized the seizure of territory by an eastern monarch subject to Rome not that it mattered much; 2 and he bestowed Roman ci

d to sole and supreme power at Rome as though the fate of Caesar were not a warning. Moreover, Antonius may have lacked the

long designs: the earlier months of his guidance of Roman politics do not provide convincing evidence. From his career and

aggression are terms of partisan interpretation. Though Antonius may not have desired to set himself in’ Caesar’s place, h

ntonius may not have desired to set himself in’ Caesar’s place, he is not thereby absolved from ambition, considered or rec

ove a bond of alliance between the Caesarians and the Liberators; and not Lepidus only there was P. Servilius his brother-i

Pompeius they might have tolerated for a time, or even Caesar, but not Antonius and young Dolabella, still less the resp

d firm on principle, he would have been a nuisance to any government: not less so, but for different reasons, the Caesarian

sed the melancholy incompleteness of the glorious Ides of March could not justly complain if the Caesarian consul solicited

veterans of Caesar had to be attended to, with urgent and just claims not to be disregarded, as the Liberators themselves w

nal grounds. All conventions are baffled and defied by Caesar’s heir. Not for nothing that the ruler of Rome made use of a

geBook=>114 Exorbitant ambition mated with political maturity is not enough to explain the ascension of Octavianus. A

to accompany the Dictator on the Balkan and eastern campaigns. He was not slow in reaching a decision. Crossing the Adriati

ives. For the moment, however, Caesar’s heir was merely a nuisance, not a factor of much influence upon the policy of Ant

>115 1 He objected that a lex curiata ratifying the adoption had not yet been passed (cf. esp. Dio 45, 5, 3; Appian, B

e Architect of the Roman Empire 1 (1928), 192 ff. Even if June 1st be not the day of the passing of the law (cf. M. A. Levi

itting all ex-centurions, whether of the standing of Roman knights or not , to serve on juries, and another agrarian bill, o

lished an edict conceived in fair terms, probably with honest intent, not merely to deceive; about the same time, Antonius

of Crete and Cyrene. Brutus left Italy towards the end of the month, not before publishing a last edict. He affirmed the l

tlook was black for the friends of settled government. Octavianus did not belong to that class. The rhetoric of the ancie

soldiers and officers of Caesar’s great army of the Balkans. They did not forget him, nor did he neglect opportunities on h

got soon or late from the cultivation of the plebs and the soldiers. Not less the need for faithful friends and a coherent

any a man followed Caesar in an impious war from personal friendship, not political principle. The devotion which Caesar’s

d among his friends was attested by impressive examples; 1 and it was not merely from lust of adventure or of gain that cer

his prestige, his honour, the rights due to his name and station. But not to excess: Octavianus took a firm stand upon dign

tancy in all the paths of duplicity. A change of front in politics is not disastrous unless caused by delusion or indecisio

an help, to betray the Republicans. The calculation was hazardous but not hopeless on the other side, certain moderates and

s of concord or of dissension were frustrated. Brutus and Cassius did not return to Rome and the rival Caesarian leaders we

bewildered, impatient and tactless. His relations with Octavianus did not improve. Neither trusted the other. To counter

e of Cicero’s first public appearance since March 17th. The Curia did not see him again for more than three months. The imp

the stand made by the two consulars, though negative, irresolute and not followed by action of any kind, was certainly a c

nce. The truth of the matter naturally eludes inquiry. Antonius did not press the charge perhaps it was nothing more than

vianus. 1 Nothing came of this perhaps the situation was too serious. Not only his soldiers but his partisans were being se

Octavianus, a tribune would surely have vetoed the measure: he could not afford a fresh conflict with the Senate and a fre

tonius. On the following day, after a solemn review at Tibur, where not only the troops but a great part of the Senate an

s and occupy Cisalpine Gaul. Fresh levies were needed. Octavianus had not carried all Campania with him: two old Caesarians

and martial territory of Picenum. 3 The coalition of March 17th had not merely been split and shattered: it was being reb

st him. His enemies had drawn the sword: naked force must decide. But not all at once Antonius had not chosen to declare Oc

the sword: naked force must decide. But not all at once Antonius had not chosen to declare Octavianus a public enemy, nor

ion of Arretium. The veterans in the private army of Octavianus would not stand against Antonius, the Caesarian general: ye

nd denounced the levying of a private army as treason and brigandage, not merely Catilinarian but Spartacist. Turning to th

d as the deed and policy of Octavianus. In himself that young man had not seemed a political factor of prime importance whe

rovide the nucleus of a Roman faction. Yet Octavianus’ relatives were not numerous; 2 and he got little NotesPage=>127

ustrious house. Philippus and Marcellus were both desperately anxious not to be openly compromised. They would have to go q

ast command he triumphed at the end of 45 B.C. (CIL 12, p. 50): he is not heard of again until his consulate, August 43 B.C

th Marius in the civil wars, suffering in consequence. But they could not be stripped of their ancestors Octavianus’ friend

aecenas’, which is false (cf. ILS 7848); ‘Maecenas’ is a gentilicium, not merely a cognomen (cf. ‘Carrinas’). For the Cilni

d of conspiracy against the Commonwealth. Octavianus’ following could not raise the semblance even of being a party. It was

and desperate men in his party terrified the holders of property. But not for long they were a minority and could be held i

ing out the obscurer partisans and secret contributors. The party did not appeal to the impecunious only. Its leader needed

The legacies to the plebs were paid after all by Octavianus, perhaps not wholly from his own fortune and the generous loan

and much more than his patrimony. The diversion of public funds was not enough. Octavianus also won the support of privat

tticus, who refused to finance the war-chest of the Liberators, would not have looked at this venture. No matter: Caesar’s

of history for four years: the manner of his return shows that he had not been inactive. 5 The Caesarian Rabirius Postumus

nancier. In November he is discovered on a familiar errand, this time not for Caesar, but for Caesar’s heir a confidential

. 6 Ad Att. 15, 2, 3. 7 Ib. 16, 15, 3. 8 Ib. 16, 8, 2. Probably not the A. Caecina of Ad fam. 6, 5 ff.; 13, 66. 9 N

, If Nicolaus is correct and correctly transmitted we might have here not Maecenas but his father (so Münzer, P-W xiv, 206)

na (Ad fam. 10, 33, 4): who impelled the legion to desert Antonius is not recorded. L. Egnatuleius, Antonius’ quaestor, had

of senatorial rank can be discovered among his generals and they are not an impressive company. 1 Senators who had come

through civil war or who owed rank and fortune to one revolution were not eager to stir up another. But Octavianus wished t

congruously allied. The help of the bankers was private and personal, not the considered policy of a whole class. Octavianu

s. Octavianus needed the Senate as well. He hoped to win sympathy, if not support, from some of the more respectable Caesar

Campania. Friends of Caesar, to whom they owed all, they would surely not repel his heir. Yet these men, mere municipal ari

rpid and bibulous. 2 Hirtius and Pansa might yet save the Republic, not , as some hoped, by action, but by preventing the

and so in the Roman State. They would gladly see Antonius curbed but not destroyed: they were not at all willing to be cap

e. They would gladly see Antonius curbed but not destroyed: they were not at all willing to be captured by an anti-Caesaria

he consulars Philippus and Marcellus. Another source, though likewise not of the best, alleges that the pair made a secret

le enjoying the protection of his financial resources and his army. 3 Not all invention, perhaps. The subtle intriguers wer

way of living to his family tradition and to his fortune, which would not have supported ostentatious display and senseless

s followed, with such robust conviction. Piso, a patriotic Roman, did not abandon all care for his country and lapse into t

with a bribe to his ambition, the consulate of 48 B.C. Servilius may not have been a man of action yet he governed the pro

army against a consul of the Roman People. Servilius, however, was not altogether blameless, while Cicero stood out as t

med that he had always been consistent in his political ideal, though not in the means he adopted to attain it. His defence

nks of the governing oligarchy. Cicero had never been a revolutionary not even a reformer. In the years following his consu

bout Pompeius, little sympathy with his allies. Yet he found himself, not unnaturally, on the side of Pompeius, of the part

Ad fam. 16, 12, 2; Velleius 2, 48, 5. PageBook=>138 stronger. Not that Cicero expected war and when war came, even

Pompeius, without waiting for news of the decision in Spain. 2 It was not passion or conviction, but impatience and despair

iesced in a large measure of authoritative government at Rome. He was not a Cato or a Brutus; and Brutus later remarked ‘as

essing approval of the government. Oppius and Balbus found the result not altogether satisfactory. Rather than emend, Cicer

atisfactory. Rather than emend, Cicero gave it up, gladly. Caesar did not insist. Time was short agents like Balbus were of

enate. In spring and summer the cause of ordered government was still not beyond hope: to save it, what better champion tha

politician? As Antonius had once said to him, the honest neutral does not run away. 2 In the autumn, too late: Cicero retur

oes not run away. 2 In the autumn, too late: Cicero returning brought not peace but aggravation of discord and impulsion to

view of Cicero’s past career (September 19th). Cicero thought it best not to turn up. He salved his dignity by the belief t

history by a resolute defence of the Republic. But Cicero as yet had not committed himself to any irreparable feud with An

rge of Italy, treated Cicero with tact and with respect, advising him not to join Pompeius, but not placing obstacles in hi

ro with tact and with respect, advising him not to join Pompeius, but not placing obstacles in his way. 4 After Pharsalus,

ro preserved none of the letters he received from Octavianus. That is not surprising: the editor knew his business. A neces

policy of Antonius. When he made his decision to return, Cicero did not know that unity had been restored in the Caesaria

nd renew the memory of the glorious Nones of December. 2 Cicero was not to be had. He left Campania and retired to Arpinu

facile and partial interpretation will be repulsed in the interests, not of Octavianus, but of the truth. The political al

f the truth. The political alliance between Octavianus and Cicero was not merely the plot of a crafty and unscrupulous yout

s destroyed. The experience and wisdom of the non-party statesman was not invoked by Caesar the Dictator in his organizatio

use Octavianus against Antonius and discard him in the end, if he did not prove pliable. It was Cato’s fatal plan all over

appointments. In the Republic he set forth the lineaments and design, not of any programme or policy in the present, but si

s lay open to merit as well as to birth; and the good statesman would not be deserted by his peers, coerced by military dyn

traditional but liberal oligarchy in a state where men were free but not equal. He returned to it under the Dictatorship o

ll civilized life. 3 So much for Caesar. But the desire for fame is not in itself an infirmity or a vice. Ambition can be

Pompeius had fallen short of genuine renown. The good statesman will not imitate those military dynasts: but he needs fame

first and sent to Atticus in July (Ad Att. 16, 2, 6), the De officiis not until November (ib. 16, 11, 4). 5 This may perh

res and earlier desertions, if that were the question at issue. It is not : a natural and indeed laudable partiality for Cic

a consular, to pursue gloria as an orator and a statesman, Cicero did not exhibit the measure of loyalty and constancy, of

onal ambition. The Second Philippic, though technically perfect, is not a political oration, for it was never delivered:

rity as well as to its author or its audience. There was another side not Antonius only, but the neutrals. Cicero was not t

here was another side not Antonius only, but the neutrals. Cicero was not the only consular who professed to be defending t

nd personalities at variance. The imperious eloquence of Cicero could not prevail over the doubts and misgivings of men who

us. But Cicero’s political feuds, however spirited at the outset, had not always been sustained with constancy. 1 Cicero mi

etray what they strive most carefully to conceal. But certain topics, not the least important, may never come up for open d

against posterity or the moral standards of another age), Brutus was not only a sincere and consistent champion of legalit

he confessed that he could see no end to civil strife. 1 Men recalled not Caesar only but Lepidus and armies raised in the

XI POLITICAL CATCHWORDS PageBook=>149 IN Rome of the Republic, not constrained by any law of libel, the literature o

ure of politics was seldom dreary, hypocritical or edifying. Persons, not programmes, came before the People for their judg

m 84. PageBook=>150 financiers in Syria. 1 Marcus Antonius was not merely a ruffian and a gladiator, a drunkard and

r or seller of perfumes at Aricia. 4 As for Piso, his grandfather did not come from the ancient colony of Placentia at all

of testimony and miraculous metamorphoses of character. Catilina was not a monster after all: a blended and enigmatic indi

hionable youth. The speeches in defence of Vatinius and Gabinius have not been preserved. One learns, however, that the str

he magnitudo animi of the governing class. 4 Municipal origin becomes not merely respectable but even an occasion for just

of Rome’s empire might become her citizens! Where a man came from did not matter at all at Rome it had never mattered! 7

e of humour, or by skill at retaliation. Certain charges, believed or not , became standard jests, treasured by friends as w

ngs of licence at Caesar’s triumph. 10 The victims of invective did not always suffer discredit or damage. On the contrar

peace and the common good, all power had to pass to one man. That was not the worst feature of monarchy it was the growth o

, however, a more subtle art of misrepresentation, which, if it could not deceive the hardened adept at the game of Roman p

nemies. A popularis could contest the misuse of this prerogative, but not its validity. 1 The Romans believed that they w

worship of law and order. The advocates of change therefore appealed, not to reform or progress, not to abstract right and

he advocates of change therefore appealed, not to reform or progress, not to abstract right and abstract justice, but to so

t and abstract justice, but to something called mos maiorum. This was not a code of constitutional law, but a vague and emo

ey are rather ‘ideals’, to which lip-service was inevitably rendered. Not , indeed, a complete emptiness of content in this

t was an attractive theory that the conduct of affairs in Rome should not be narrowly Roman, but commend itself to the sent

han a policy. The defenders of the Senate’s rule and prerogative were not , it is true, merely a narrow ring of brutal and u

ce, even of belief. Revolution rends the veil. But the Revolution did not impede or annul the use of political fraud at Rom

at corresponded to the Republican constitution was, however, a matter not of legal definition but of partisan interpretatio

ass and the perpetuation of privilege. Yet, even so, libertas could not be monopolized by the oligarchy or by any party i

the Roman People from the domination of a faction’. 3 The term was not novel. Nobody ever sought power for himself and t

iod that a new term makes its appearance, the word ‘pacificatorius’:2 not in a favourable sense. The word ‘pacificator’ alr

peace had to abandon their plea when they spoke for war. Peace should not be confused with servitude; 4 negotiations with a

tore et Romano homine moriamur. PageBook=>157 be called, being not so much ethical qualities as standards of an orde

even to the extremity of civil war. Among Caesar’s allies Pollio was not the only one who followed the friend but cursed t

Lepidus, in word no doubt as well as in deed; Pollio likewise, though not an adept at smooth language. Political intrigue

6 In the heat of civil passion the task of the apostle of concord was not always easy when he had to deal with enemies whom

causa, quis me tandem iure reprehendet? ’ Cicero explains that he was not really, despite appearances, an ‘inimicus’ of Cae

scipere, ut vere dicam, coegit. ’ He urged that ‘misericordia’ should not be regarded as criminal. Cf. Appian, BC 3, 84, 34

gions of a consul deserted, it was taken to prove that the consul was not a consul. 5 The author of this audacious proposal

save the State. Of that the Senate was supreme judge. What if it had not lent its sanction? Why, true patriots were their

us multis iam in rebus ipse sibi senatus fuit. ’ PageBook=>161 not everything. A leader or a party might find that t

ed respect, and the traditional phrases were useful and necessary had not the Republic been rescued from tyranny and restor

when summoning him to surrender the province. That point Cicero could not dispute. He therefore had resort to the most impu

e fact that Cicero uses this argument to demonstrate that Antonius is not really a consul at all should excite suspicion. T

to Gallia Cisalpina, namely the plebiscite of June 1st. Explicitly or not , that law may have permitted him to take over the

of these nobiles had abandoned the cause of Pompeius after Pharsalus. Not so the personal adherents of the dynast, fanatica

authority to fill the gaps. 3 This dearth explains the prominence, if not the primacy, that now at last fell to Cicero in h

ageBook=>165 be seen in the Curia. The remaining five Cicero did not count as consulars at all: that is to say, they w

letters protesting love of peace and loyalty to the Republic who did not ? But Plancus, it is clear, was coolly waiting upo

e found so distasteful. But Pollio was to play his part for peace, if not for the Republic: his uncompromising honesty was

a, the other to secure for him the legions in Egypt. Yet the East was not altogether barren of hope for the Republic. Of th

ain knowledge at Rome at the end of the year. That they would in fact not go to their trivial provinces of Crete and Cyrene

who had held no public office. But there were limits. The Senate did not choose its own members, or determine their relati

be invoked to confer senatorial rank upon a private citizen. It had not been done even for Pompeius. That the free vote o

her democratic or aristocratic, of the Republican state. 1 That was not the only irregularity practised by the party of t

tonius was clearly unassailable; when proconsul, his position, though not so strong, was valid in this, that he held his ex

such grants was to raise a large question in itself, even if it were not coupled with the official sanction given to a pri

th sharp reminder of the fate of the associates of Catilina, it would not do to condemn a Roman citizen unheard. At the ver

ey were to urge him to withdraw his army from the province of Brutus, not to advance within a distance of two hundred miles

ncord, a respite and time for negotiation. Even now the situation was not beyond all hope. NotesPage=>168 1 Pro Sest

(and of his agents) should have been declared null and void. That was not done until early in February. The arguments invok

ovince: but that might have been contested, for Antonius’ command was not a normal consular province, decreed by the Senate

nder the threat of war a compromise might save appearances: which did not meet the ideas of Cicero. That the embassy would

ns. At Rome politics lapsed for the rest of the month. But Cicero did not relent. He proclaimed the revival of the Senate’s

t out for the seat of war and marched up the Flaminia to Ariminum but not to fight if he could avoid it. He might yet baffl

avoid it. He might yet baffle both Cicero and Antonius. But he could not arrest the mobilization. Patriotism and private a

Visidius, who had watched over Cicero’s safety during his consulate, not NotesPage=>169 1 Phil. 6 and 7 2 Ib. 7,

egality a casual or partisan question, he required guarantees: it was not merely his dignitas that he had to think of, but

ave recognized their right to the consulate of 41 B.C. The breach was not yet irreparable. The Senate was obdurate. They

s repute and Republican sentiments. Pansa supported him. Antonius was not declared a public enemy. But Cicero did not abate

pported him. Antonius was not declared a public enemy. But Cicero did not abate his efforts. As a patriotic demonstration h

bt. By the end of the year almost all Macedonia was in his hands; and not only Macedonia Vatinius the governor of Illyric

h a legion. 5 Besiegers and besieged alike joined Cassius. That was not all. The Caesarian A. Allienus was conducting fou

cesses: his usurpation in the East and seizure of a dozen legions was not confirmed until more than two months had elapsed.

ius, on many a Caesarian, and on such honest friends of peace as were not blinded by the partisan emotions of the moment. O

p faith with Lepidus, with Plancus and with Dolabella. 3 Cicero could not resist the challenge to his talent. He quoted, mo

epidus he was abrupt and overbearing ‘in my opinion you will be wiser not to make meddling proposals for peace: neither the

eople approves of them nor does any patriotic citizen. ’5 Lepidus did not forget the insult to his dignitas. Such was the

, Antonius was forced to risk a battle at Mutina. He was defeated but not routed; on the other side, Hirtius fell. In the f

laration of a victory in which his legions had so small a share could not compensate the ravages of a long siege. That wa

a share could not compensate the ravages of a long siege. That was not the worst. The conduct of the war by the two cons

choosing a commission to effect that salutary economy. Octavianus was not among its members but neither was D. Brutus. The

witnessed stranger vicissitudes of alliance. 3 Yet, even if this did not happen, he might be caught between Caesarians in

claring the young man a public enemy. The danger was manifest. It did not require to be demonstrated by the advice which th

e advice which the Caesarian consul Pansa on his death-bed may or may not have given to Caesar’s heir. 4 And now on other

towards the middle of the month. The confrontation with Lepidus was not long delayed. One of the lieutenants of Lepidus d

inius essayed his vigorous oratory on the soldiers of Pompeius. 2 But not for long Labienus NotesPage=>164 M. Junius

). 2 Caesar, BC 3, 19. PageBook=>165 intervened. Lepidus was not as vigilant against the dangers of fraternization

angers of fraternization as had been the generals of Pompeius. He did not wish to be nor could he have subjugated the stron

trong Caesarian sympathies of officers and men: they followed Lepidus not from merit or affection but only because Lepidus

oism and lack of principle. They had no quarrel with Antonius; it was not they who had built up a novel and aggressive fact

, lifted up and lifted off. 1 Cicero may never have said it. That did not matter. The happy invention epitomized all too fa

y of using Caesar’s heir to wreck the Caesarian party. Octavianus did not intend to be removed; and the emphasis that open

h clear perception of the dangers of their equivocal alliance. He had not been deluded then. 2 But during the months after

flagrantly Pompeian and Republican. 3 The consulate lay vacant but not unclaimed. Octavianus aspired to the honour; and

may well have been the ambiguous P. Servilius, for to this summer, if not earlier, belongs a significant political fact, th

ndum adulescentem, ornandum, tollendum. ’ Cicero (ib. 11, 21, 1) does not expressly deny that he said so. 2 Above, p. 143

ro had actually been elected. 2 Of a later proposal there is evidence not lightly to be discarded. 3 Cicero and Octavianus

y distasteful in Cicero’s fanatical feud against Antonius. Brutus had not broken off all relations with M. Antonius he may

adually drove him to a decision. When he left Italy in August, it was not with the plan already conceived of mustering the

t, invading Italy and restoring the Republic through violence. He did not believe in violence. At Athens he looked about fo

out for allies, opened negotiations with provincial governors but did not act at once. The news of armies raised in Italy a

Yet even so, the possession of Macedonia and an army meant for Brutus not so much an instrument for war as security and a b

publican lost all patience. NotesPage=>170 1 The evidence does not enable the occupation of Macedonia by Brutus (and

yria by Cassius) to be closely dated. According to Gelzer, Brutus did not act until he had news of the session of November

take over (P-W x, 1000). This date is probably too late, for it does not allow a sufficient margin of time for the passage

ignominy. ’3 Even in mid-July, when the end was near, Cicero would not admit to Brutus the ruinous failure of the allian

d his responsibility for that policy. But his words belied him he did not cease to urge Brutus to return to Italy. After a

hat the adventurer could be won to legitimate methods. Octavianus was not deflected from his march. And now for a moment

defence. Whether the Senate now declared Octavianus a public enemy is not recorded: these formalities were coming to matter

enators advanced to make their peace with Octavianus; among them, but not in the forefront, was Cicero. ‘Ah, the last of my

ds’, the young man observed. 1 But even now there were some who did not lose hope. In the evening came a rumour that the

with Q. Pedius, an obscure relative of unimpeachable repute, who did not survive the honour by many months. The new consul

he founder of Rome. 3 The day was August 19th. Octavianus himself was not yet twenty. NotesPage=>172 1 Appian, BC 3,

not yet twenty. NotesPage=>172 1 Appian, BC 3, 92, 382 perhaps not authentic. 2 Ib. 3, 93, 383 ff. 3 Suetonius,

ageBook=>189 had few partisans of merit or distinction; which is not surprising. Of his lieutenants, Laterensis in sha

g. 62, 1. 4 Unless L. Antonius governed the Cisalpina in 42, Pollio not till 41. On January1st, 41 B.C. L. Antonius inaug

n or secret, of the organs of government. Pompeius and his allies did not claim to be the government or the State: it was e

them perished honour and security, family and friendship. Yet all was not unrelieved horror. History was to commemorate shi

exposed to an iron schooling and constrained through form of law and not in the heat of battle to shed the noblest blood o

man knights. 3 Their victory was the victory of a party. 4 Yet it was not their principal purpose to wipe out utterly both

invented or enhanced by many astute individuals who owed security, if not enrichment, to the Caesarian party. NotesPage=&

riched literature with an immortal theme. 1 But the fugitives could not take their property with them; some of the proscr

ed men to seek powerful protection in advance. The banker Atticus was not put on the list even for form’s sake or as a warn

t Rome as it was soon to fight them in the East. But the struggle was not purely political in character: it came to resembl

he Arruntii were an opulent family at Atina, a Volscian town, perhaps not of senatorial rank. 3 A large number of local ari

uch as the Aelii Lamiae from Formiae or the Vinicii of Cales, who are not known to have been proscribed, either enjoyed pro

by no means homogeneous, and the Dictator stood above parties. He did not champion one class against another. If he had beg

usual, battened upon the blood of citizens. 1 The proscriptions may not unfairly be regarded as in purpose and essence a

p by the names of obscure senators or Roman knights. The nobiles were not necessarily the wealthiest of the citizens: men o

of the orator Hortensius, they abated their demands a little, but did not NotesPage=>195 1 Pliny, NH 35, 201: ‘quos

the ignominy of the new senators of the Triumviral period they could not have competed. Not only aliens or men of low orig

e new senators of the Triumviral period they could not have competed. Not only aliens or men of low origin and infamous pur

re now cast off in the choice of magistrates, nominated as they were, not NotesPage=>196 1 Appian, BC 4, 34, 146; Di

3. A certain Barbarius Philippus actually became praetor (Dig. ib.): not to be identified with M. Barbatius Pollio, quaest

the Triumvirs (41 B.C.), like his first from Caesar: after that he is not heard of again. Antonius’ adherent Q. Fufius Cale

s prolonged an active career after that date, the solitary relic of a not very distant past. Less spectacular than the de

ant past. Less spectacular than the decadence of the principes, but not less to be deplored, were the gaps in other ranks

se Caesar in preference to Pompeius and the oligarchy; but they would not tolerate Caesar’s ostensible political heirs and

of those families had mostly perished, leaving few sons; 2 there was not a single man of consular rank in the party; its r

ition as well as by its policy. The Triumvirs had expelled from Italy not only the nobiles, their political enemies, but th

r posts of subordination, gave sign and guarantee of success, but did not survive. Saxa and Fango were to be cut off in the

d non-Latin termination of their family names. But the Antonians were not the worst. Advancement unheard of now smiled upon

erience. His example showed that the holding of senatorial office was not an indispensable qualification for leading armies

ualification for leading armies of Roman legions. But Salvidienus was not unique: foreigners or freed slaves might compete

. Their supremacy at sea was short-lived. Pompeius, it is true, did not intervene; but Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, coming u

and Cassius had been gathering the wealth and the armies of the East. Not long after the Battle of Mutina, Brutus departed

el for war. Even when Antonius joined Lepidus and Plancus, Brutus may not have abandoned all hope of an accommodation with

e: the avenging of Caesar and the extermination of the Liberators had not been Antonius’ policy when he was consul. But wit

e brother of Antonius. When Brutus heard of the end of Cicero, it was not so much sorrow as shame that he felt for Rome. 2

hat he felt for Rome. 2 For good reasons Brutus and Cassius decided not to carry the war into Italy in winter or even in

cause, it is held, was doomed from the beginning, defeat inevitable. Not only this Brutus was prescient and despondent, wa

now come up though shattered in health and never a soldier, he could not afford to resign to Antonius the sole credit of

over the Caesarian lines and captured the camp of Octavianus, who was not there. A certain mystery envelops his movements:

umenthal, Wiener Studien xxxv (1913), 280 f. Agrippa and Maecenas did not deny that Octavianus lurked in a marsh (Pliny, NH

tius Calvinus, who was conveying two legions to Dyrrhachium. 3 It was not the ghost of Caesar but an incalculable hazard, t

at brought on the doom of the Republic. Brutus could win a battle but not a campaign. Provoked by the propaganda and the ch

nd some of the assassins, such as Tillius Cimber and Q. Ligarius, are not heard of again. 2 As Brutus exclaimed, quoting

The eighteen cities of Italy marked down to satisfy the soldiery were not slow to make open protest: they suggested that th

l magnates armed in self-protection. The opposition to Octavianus was not merely a revolt of middle-class opinion against t

ustice and liberty, Italy rose against Rome for the last time. It was not the fierce peoples of the Apennine as in the Bell

ide, they championed liberty and the rights of the dispossessed again not without reference to the popular name of M. Anton

ges of alliance to Octavianus. She must force him by discrediting, if not by destroying, the rival Caesarian leader, and th

liberated Rome from the domination of a faction. But L. Antonius did not hold the city for long. He advanced northward in

ecision to abolish this province and unite the territory to Italy had not yet, it appears, been carried out, perhaps owing

orce of legions: they, too, had opposed Salvidienus. 2 But that was not all. The Republican fleets dominated the seas, Ah

w with Sex. Pompeius. Pompeius seems to have let slip his opportunity not the only time. A concerted effort of the Antonian

ctavianus in verses of ‘Roman frankness’ derided the absent Antonius ( not omitting a Cappadocian mistress) and insulted his

estates. It may be supposed that the escape of the greater number was not actively impeded. The remainder were put to death

d Italy from the east, Pompeius from the south and west. If this were not enough, all his provinces were assailed at once.

m the Cappadocian charmer Glaphyra,4 succumbed with good will but did not surrender. The Queen, who was able to demonstrate

to Egypt and lurked in Egypt, while in Italy his wife and his brother not NotesPage=>214 1 Appian, BC 5, 4, 15 ff.

14 1 Appian, BC 5, 4, 15 ff. 2 Plutarch, Antonius 25. 3 It will not be necessary to repeat Plutarch’s dramatic and ro

designs of his brother was complete but unavowed. The alternative but not incongruous accusations of vice and duplicity per

ges of the dissensions in Italy, Antonius was well apprised. He could not intervene the confiscations and the allotment of

for which they were jointly responsible. The victor of Philippi could not forswear his promises and his soldiers. His own s

share was the gathering of funds in the East in which perhaps he had not been very successful. 2 He felt that he was well

ted a serious and irreparable error of political calculation which is not so certain. 6 The envoys were L. Scribonius Lib

taly. A complete revolution of alliances transformed the visage but not the substance of Roman politics. Octavianus the

ian by standing for the interests of the legions. But his errors were not fatal Octavianus had great difficulty in inducing

gions: they were famished and unreliable, and he had no ships at all. Not merely did Antonius hold the sea and starve Italy

ch bore as its title the consulate of Pollio and Calvinus. 4 It might not have happened: the armed confrontation of the ang

s pastoral poems. The Fourth Eclogue hails the approach of a new era, not merely to begin with the consulate of his patron

h and conveniently perished almost at once. 4 Yet the very existence, not merely the relevance, of Saloninus may be called

had had a large share in negotiating the treaty he is an agent here, not merely a date. Antonius’ son, heir to the Notes

, the compact of the dynasts a mere respite in the struggle. That was not to be known. At the end of 40 B.C. the domination

me if he came to Rome to assume the insignia of his consulate, it was not to wear them for long, for a new pair of consuls

gend ‘Q. Salvius imp. cos. desig. ’ (BMC, R. Rep. 11, 407 f.) It will not be necessary to add that we possess only the ‘Off

larity. Of Lepidus none took account: he had family influence and did not resign ambition, but lacked a party and devoted l

C. Calvisius Sabinus: clearly, therefore, the consul of 39 B.C., and not his son, as commonly held (e.g. PIR2, C 353). 2

e members of that party, the consulars Pollio, Plancus and Ventidius. Not to mention Ahenobarbus, himself the leader of a p

d dubious infant, Saloninus. Pollio’s province was clearly Macedonia, not Illyricum, which lay in the portion of Octavianus

(32), were struck at Zacynthus, BMC, R. Rep. 11, 500; 504; 508; 524. Not that Sosius was there all the time he governed Sy

before, celebrated in Rome his paradoxical triumph. 1 Ventidius is not heard of again save for the ultimate honour of a

nce in the spring of the year 38. Antonius arrived at Brundisium, but not finding his colleague there, and being refused ad

alleging pressure of Parthian affairs: by letter he warned Octavianus not to break the peace with Pompeius. Octavianus, per

fleet from Athens to Italy. Once again he found that Brundisium would not admit him. Not that he had either the desire or t

ns to Italy. Once again he found that Brundisium would not admit him. Not that he had either the desire or the pretext for

ntonian C. Fonteius Capito and a troupe of rising poets. 1 Pollio was not present. If invited, he refused, from disgust of

future and his fate lay in the East, with another woman. But that was not yet apparent, least of all to Antonius NotesPag

of Caesar, the diplomacy of his friends and his own cool resolution. Not to mention chance and the incompetence of his ene

cy a Republican admiral, Staius Murcus. 3 Defeated at Pharsalus but not destroyed, the family and faction of the Pompeii

nd the fame of Pompeius Magnus belonged to an earlier age. Pietas was not enough. Greek freedmen were his counsellors, his

urer, Pompeius could easily be represented as a pirate. 5 Peace was not kept for long upon the Italian seas. Before the y

ous policy recommended by the examples of a father and a grandfather, not hastening to declare himself too openly for his s

nd question. Whether the discarded Scribonia took another husband has not been recorded. 7 NotesPage=>229 1 Suetoniu

approved, and Sex. Pompeius for his part believed that Antonius would not support his colleague. The young man went on wi

ey were surely employed at an early age for dynastic alliances. It is not known whom Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus married; but

to his credit and the consulate for the next year as his reward, did not choose to hold the triumph that would have thrown

is back, ordered Octavianus to depart from Sicily. But Octavianus had not acquired and practised the arts of the military d

s, order had been restored by land and sea. 1 The formulation, though not extravagant, was perhaps a little premature. But

tors can have believed in the sincerity of such professions. That did not matter. Octavianus was already exploring the prop

held the praetorship in that year, but Maecenas and Salvidienus were not even senators. Again, at Brundisium his position

issioner. The political affiliations of this mysterious character are not unequivocally recorded. PageBook=>236 But

who had proscribed his father) or from a motive of family insurance not uncommon in the civil wars, when piety or protect

ublic and official semblance, the campaigns in Sicily were advertised not as a civil but a foreign war, soon to become a gl

ave come with ships from Antonius as did Bibulus and Atratinus. He is not attested with Octavianus before 36 B.C. The reaso

43) belonged to the family of Messalla (ib. 35, 21). 6 Lepidus was not an admiral: but he was in the company of Octavian

he upstart Laronius and the noble Messalla had to wait for some years not many. High priesthoods were conferred as patron

as now revealed to history, Messalla, Ap. Pulcher and Lepidus were not merely noble but of the most ancient nobility, th

rely noble but of the most ancient nobility, the patrician; which did not in any way hamper them from following a revolutio

amper them from following a revolutionary leader or taking up an ally not of their own class, from ambition or for survival

ven respectable or rather, he already gave signs of becoming equal if not superior in power to Antonius. These aristocratic

12). 7 The daughter of Scribonia, above, p. 229. Pulcher’s wife is not known, but there is a link somewhere with the Val

y of Antonius, by contrast, became more and more Pompeian. That was not the only advantage now resting with Octavianus. H

and subdued the native tribes up to the line of the Dinaric Alps, but not beyond it. If war came, he would secure Italy in

resight and strategy the double object was triumphantly achieved. 1 Not only this. A general secure of the loyalty and th

A general secure of the loyalty and the affection of his troops does not need to show his person in the front of battle. O

rson with ostentation and received honourable wounds. Antonius must not be allowed to presume upon his Caesarian qualitie

41 The work and services of Agrippa and of Taurus in Illyricum were not publicly commemorated. 1 At the end of 33 B.C. th

ilt or repaired a shrine of Neptune, as was right, even though he did not hold a triumph. Apollo, however, was the protec

n. Domitius Calvinus, victorious from Spain, rebuilt the Regia; and not long after, Taurus, returning from Africa and tri

sh triumph (33) repaired a temple of Hercules. These were some, but not all, of the edifices that already foreshadowed th

under the monarchy. More artful than Antonius, the young Caesar built not only for splendour and for the gods. He invoked p

B.C. Octavianus became consul for the second time, and his influence, not total but at least preponderating, may perhaps be

nd extended his power. L. Vinicius was one of the new consuls: he had not been heard of for nearly twenty years. Complete d

and to provide the inhabitants with pure water or cheap food that was not enough. The services of Agrippa, the soldier and

k to guide opinion gently into acceptance of the monarchy, to prepare not merely for the contest that was imminent but for

sand members a preponderance of Caesarians owed status and office, if not wealth as well, to the Triumvirs; and a mass of R

p of the State, stood an array of consulars, impressive in number but not in dignity, recent creations almost all. By the e

n twenty-five men, the earliest consuls of their respective families ( not all, of course, sons of Roman knights: there were

e dynastic houses of the old plebeian aristocracy among the principes not a single Metellus, Marcellus, Licinius, Junius or

ellus, Marcellus, Licinius, Junius or Calpurnius. Those families were not extinct, but many years would have to pass before

er ranks of the revolutionary Senate were in harmony with the higher, not disdaining freedmen’s sons and retired centurions

s Scipio, cos. suff. 35, and perhaps L. Cornelius, cos. suff. 38. 3 Not only Messalla himself, consul with Octavianus for

ined and afflicted by moral and by social degradation. True merit was not the path to success and success itself was unsafe

Cicero, recognized as ultimate and classical even in his own day. But not without rivals: a different conception and fashio

sessed or was to acquire fame as a jurist (Gellius 7, 5, 1), that was not the reason of his promotion. PageBook=>246

illusions and took no pains to conceal their departure. But a direct, not to say hard and truculent manner of speech would

Romans, the parent of knowledge and propagator of many errors, though not averse from an interest in Pythagoreanism, or in

stores of learned books were plundered, the indefatigable scholar was not deterred. At the age of eighty, discovering, as h

publican government that ruled at Rome between the two Dictatorships. Not Caesar’s invasion of Italy but the violent ascens

, the sombre, intense and passionate chapters of Thucydides. He could not have chosen better, if choice there was, for he,

to narrate the history of a revolutionary age. Literary critics did not fear to match him with Thucydides, admiring in hi

oconsul of Africa Nova in 46‖45 B.C. 2 Dio 43, 9, 2 though this may not be convincing evidence, for it may derive from a

n character. The archaisms were borrowed, men said, lifted from Cato; not less so the grave moral tone, flagrant in contras

e Roman and the senator, archaic yet highly sophisticated, sombre but not edifying. Men turned to history for instruction

In Rome of the Triumvirs men became intensely conscious of history, not merely of recent wars and monarchic faction-leade

ide and monopoly of the senator that it was held a matter of note, if not of scandal, when an inferior person presumed to t

me of Cinna has been inferred from fr. 1 of his poems; and Helvii are not unknown on inscriptions of Brixia (above, p. 79).

s, of native stock from Forum Julii in Gallia Narbonensis, a province not unknown to Greek culture, was an innovator in the

tency, appear to derive from inferences from the Eclogues themselves, not from ascertained and well- authenticated facts: t

s, formerly the mistress of Antonius. Her subsequent attachments have not been recorded. PageBook=>253 abandoned poe

s. 2 Maecenas, whose aesthetic tastes were genuine and varied, though not always creditable, was on the watch for talent. H

patron too wise to insist. Yet something might be done. It was folly not to exploit the treasures of erudition that Varro

the treasures of erudition that Varro had consigned to public use; if not the national antiquities, then perhaps the land a

e Bellum Siculum, revealing the dependence of NotesPage=>253 1 Not that there is any definite evidence at all: the A

s any definite evidence at all: the Arcadian scenery of Ecl. 10 could not safely be invoked to show that Gallus was in Gree

mere subsistence. But Virgil intended to compose a poem about Italy, not a technical handbook; he wrote about the country

of the farmer in a grave, religious and patriotic vein. Virgil was not the only discovery of Maecenas. Virgil with short

to Brundisium, at that time when the rulers of the world were to meet not far away at Tarentum (37 B.C.). 2 Q. Horatius F

e army of the Liberators. He fought at Philippi, for the Republic but not from Republican convictions: it was but the accid

nt temperament reasserted its rights. Horace now composed satires but not in the traditional manner of Lucilius. His subjec

onal manner of Lucilius. His subject was ordinary life, his treatment not harsh and truculent, but humane and tolerant: whi

nd society. Republican libertas, denied to the nobiles of Rome, could not be conceded to a freedman’s son. NotesPage=>

eath, no confidence yet or unity, but discord and disquiet. Italy was not reconciled to Rome, or class to class. As after S

er the next subversion of public order it might go farther, embracing not only impoverished citizens but aliens and slaves.

Rome yet displayed the name and the fabric of a free state. That was not so long ago. But they had changed with the times,

alliance of Caesar’s heir, had shown the way. The new monarchy could not rule without help from the old oligarchy. The o

of active politics: their sentiments concerning state and society did not need to undergo any drastic transformation. The p

pularity that by now had accrued to Octavianus. It was great, indeed, not so much by contrast with Antonius as with his ear

e terrorist of Perusia. Since then seven years had passed. But he was not yet the leader of all Italy. In this NotesPage=

e step-son of Octavianus (19, 4). 2 Ib. 21, 4. Balbus probably died not long after this. PageBook=>258 brief lull

power at Rome. Antonius had already lost the better part of two years not Ventidius but the victor of Philippi should have

ful and most wealthy of the Roman vassals, the Queen of Egypt: he had not seen her for nearly four years. Fonteius brought

ous. In many of the kings, tetrarchs and petty tyrants abode loyalty, not to Rome, but to Pompeius their patron, whose caus

er, while Deiotarus, the most military of them all, lay low, aged but not decrepit: true to himself, he had just grasped po

kingdoms. Other arrangements were made from time to time, but it was not until the winter of 37-36 B.C. that the principal

island of Cyprus and some cities of Cilicia Aspera. The donation was not magnificent in extent of territories, for Cleopat

d the monopoly of the bitumen from the Dead Sea. That munificence did not content the dynastic pride and rapacity of Egypt’

87ff.; W. W. Tarn, CAH 1, 34; 66 ff.; 80. The province of Cilicia, if not earlier fused with Syria, certainly ended in 39 B

into Syria. Antonius refused to give her any more. These grants do not seem to have excited alarm or criticism at Rome:

e resurgence of the Ptolemaic kingdom in splendour and wealth, though not in military power. She had reconstituted her heri

ng of a new era. 1 But the relations of Antonius and Cleopatra were not merely those of proconsul and vassal-ruler. After

early four years earlier, Cleopatra had given birth to twin children, not a matter of any importance hitherto at least in s

ary enterprises. Egypt, the most valuable of the dependencies, should not be regarded as paramount and apart, but as one li

hese vassal-states, serving the needs of government and defence, were not knit together by any principle of uniformity but

g in the place of Pompeius and Caesar as master of the eastern lands, not only did he invest Polemo, the orator’s son from

wide influence in Asia, founding thereby a line of kings. 6 It was not enough to acquire the adherence of influential dy

d with liberal foresight would seek to demonstrate that the Roman was not a brutal conqueror but one of themselves, display

he Roman was not a brutal conqueror but one of themselves, displaying not tolerant superiority but active good NotesPage=

Mytilene paid honour and the appellation of saviour and benefactor not only to Pompeius Magnus but also to his client Th

Before the eyes of the Greek world Antonius could parade imperially, not only as a monarch and a soldier, but as a benefac

e prestige of Rome and provide for the future security of the Empire, not by annexation of fresh territories as Roman provi

ms. He adopted the plan of campaign attributed to Caesar the Dictator not to cross the arid plains of Mesopotamia, as Crass

and who held Macedonia with the command of Antonius’ Balkan army, has not been recorded. From their base in Armenia the l

rm hold on Armenia by planting garrisons over the land perhaps he did not have enough legions. Thus Artavasdes, given impun

ntonius’ supplies and artillery. Antonius, lacking light horse, could not bring them to battle. It was already late in the

afe. He postponed the revenge upon Artavasdes. It was a defeat, but not a rout or a disaster. The Roman losses were consi

886) may have been won earlier, in 40-39 B.C. PageBook=>265 at not less than a quarter of his whole army. 1 Higher e

lure in Media was soon taken up for propaganda and the survivors were not loath to exaggerate their sufferings for politica

nder Antonius; 2 the amiable and diplomatic L. Cocceius, however, may not have left Italy after the Pact of Brundisium. P

imperatorial salutation (IG II2, 4110: Athens). L. Cocceius Nerva did not become consul. 3 He had charge of the correspon

PageBook=>268 Antonius had been a loyal friend to Caesar, but not a fanatical Caesarian. The avenging of the Dictat

d the contriving of a new cult, that was Octavianus’ policy and work, not his. The contrast did not escape the Republicans.

cult, that was Octavianus’ policy and work, not his. The contrast did not escape the Republicans. Partly despair, but not w

his. The contrast did not escape the Republicans. Partly despair, but not wholly paradox, drove the remnants of the Catonia

he Dictator. Of the company of the assassins in will and sympathy, if not in the deed, he fought at Philippi. Then, refusin

en among the companions of Pompeius. But Catonians and Pompeians do not exhaust the list of nobles in the party of Antoni

ἀντυστράτηγὸν (ILS 9461). He was a Calpurnius Bestia by birth. It is not quite certain that his adoptive parent was descen

nary period prizing and rewarding its own children vigour and talent, not ancestral imagines and dead consuls. Hence no lit

imminent, with aggression coming from the West, from Octavianus, but not upon an innocent and unsuspecting ally. Both side

menian, was led in golden chains to pay homage to Cleopatra. That was not all. Another ceremony was staged in the gymnasium

e ‘Queen of Kings’ over the eastern dependencies. Titles of kingdoms, not all of them in the power or gift of Antonius, wer

ration in the East. Yet even now Antonius’ acts and dispositions were not immediately exploited by his enemies at Rome. The

s were not immediately exploited by his enemies at Rome. The time was not quite ripe. The official Roman version of the c

ealized intentions may be logical, artistic and persuasive, but it is not history. Up to a point the acts of Antonius can

d of kingdoms and tetrarchies in sovran and arbitrary fashion, he did not go beyond the measure of a Roman proconsul. Nor d

d the small coastal tract of Cilicia Aspera conceded to Cleopatra did not come under direct Roman government until a centur

ve to abate its ambitions and narrow the area of its rule. Rome could not deal with the East as well as the West. The East

already there: let them remain, the instruments of Roman domination. Not their strength, but their weakness, fomented dang

land from spoliation and ruin by Roman financiers. Egypt was clearly not suited to be converted into a Roman province: it

the same time a magistrate at Rome and a king in Egypt. But that does not prove the substantial identity of his policy with

f his policy with that of Antonius. There was Cleopatra. Antonius was not the King of Egypt,1 but when he abode there as co

ht be represented that Antonius was making provision for the present, not for a long future, for the East but not for Italy

ng provision for the present, not for a long future, for the East but not for Italy and the West as well. 2 To absolute mon

well. 2 To absolute monarchy belonged divine honours in the East but not to monarchy alone: in any representative of power

of Antonius. The first man in Rome, when controlling the East, could not evade, even if he wished, the rank and attributes

eldest son Ptolemy Caesar (alleged son of the Dictator, but probably not , cf. J. Carcopino, Ann. de l’École des Hautes Étu

e the just remarks of Levi, Ottaviano Capoparte 11, 152: Antonius was not βασιλύϛ. 3 W. W. Tarn, JRS XXII (1932), H9 ff.

bition of Antonius might have moved farther in this direction. He had not been in Rome for six years : had his allegiance a

If Antonius be denied a complete monarchic policy of his own, it does not follow that he was merely a tool in the hands of

uty or dominated by her intellect. His position was awkward if he did not placate the Queen of Egypt he would have to depos

ed to the power of her imagination and her understanding. Yet that is not proved. Antonius was compelled to stand by Cleopa

aesar, he never deserted his friends or his allies. Nobler qualities, not the basest, were his ruin. Rome, it has been cl

were his ruin. Rome, it has been claimed, feared Cleopatra but did not fear Antonius: she was planning a war of revenge

. W. Tarn, JRS XXII (1932), 141; CAH x, 82 f. PageBook=>275 is not certain that her ambition was greater than this,

m as it was designed and contrived by the party of Octavianus. It was not a war for domination against Antonius Antonius mu

ianus. It was not a war for domination against Antonius Antonius must not be mentioned. To secure Roman sanction and emotio

menaced everything that was Roman, as Antonius himself assuredly did not . 1 The propaganda of Octavianus magnified Cleopat

ied Cleopatra beyond all measure and decency. To ruin Antonius it was not enough that she should be a siren: she must be ma

of history. The policy and ambitions of Antonius or of Cleopatra were not the true cause of the War of Actium ; 4 they were

sPage=>275 1 Tarn (CAH x, 76) concedes that Antonius himself was not a danger to Rome. 2 Horace, Odes 1, 37, 21. 3

sified obscure ancestry, NotesPage=>276 1 The order of events, not always clearly indicated by Dio and Plutarch, the

reedom of speech now revelled in a brief renascence as though it were not fettered to the policy of a military despot. To

efore the law, for the triumviral powers had come to an end. 6 He was not dismayed: he took no NotesPage=>277 1 For

in frankness an early product of Octavianus (cf. Martial 11, 20) does not furnish either a satisfactory definition of the w

nus at least Terentilla is presumably Terentia, the wife of Maecenas, not unknown to subsequent scandal. 3 Pliny, NH 14,

, 34). 6 The whole topic, which has provoked excessive debate, does not need to be discussed here. On the one hand, the T

years (Res Gestae 7). A master in all the arts of political fraud did not need to stoop to trivial and pointless deception.

consuls summoned the Senate and took office on January 1st. They did not read the dispatch of Antonius, which they had rec

ent and coerce consuls was inexpedient, the retirement of his enemies not unwelcome. Even now, the Senate and People were n

nt of his enemies not unwelcome. Even now, the Senate and People were not utterly to be despised: the consuls could be held

en Octavianus an insecure control of Rome and Italy. But violence was not enough: he still lacked the moral justification f

gned the office of Triumvir, but retained the power, as was apparent, not only to Antonius, but to other contemporaries for

ong the coasts. He was confident and ready for the struggle but might not open it yet. Here the two consuls met him in the

sonal enmities and rivalries. In a civil war fleets and legions are not the most important things. Under what name and pl

ius had presumed too much upon the loyalty of a party that was united not by principle or by a cause but by personal allegi

but by personal allegiance. Generous but careless, in the past he had not been NotesPage=>280 1 BMC, R. Rep. n, 526

f the word ‘uxor’) complicate the question which is perhaps in itself not of prime importance. Antonius, being a Roman citi

tself not of prime importance. Antonius, being a Roman citizen, could not at any time contract a legally valid marriage wit

heralding the break-up of the Antonian party. Cleopatra, however, was not the prime cause of the trouble. Next to Antoniu

own son, made him insist that the party of Antonius should be Roman, not regal. Not so Munatius Plancus, who set himself t

ade him insist that the party of Antonius should be Roman, not regal. Not so Munatius Plancus, who set himself to win the f

win the favour of Cleopatra, pronounced her the winner in a famed if not fabulous wager with Antonius, and displayed his v

atra. Ahenobarbus hated the Queen and was averse from war. Yet it was not Ahenobarbus who ran away, but Plancus. Accompanie

. 4 Plutarch, Antonius 58; Dio 50, 3, 1 ff.; Velleius 2, 83. Dio is not very explicit about the cause of their desertion

tra. But the Antonian party was already disintegrating. Loyalty would not last for ever in the face of evidence like the de

that forgery might be suspected, though the provisions of the will do not perhaps utterly pass belief. 1 Octavianus extorte

ch, Antonius 58). The hypothesis of forgery, at least partial, should not summarily be dismissed. It is a question not of s

at least partial, should not summarily be dismissed. It is a question not of scruples but of expedience how far was forgery

n two hundred thousand volumes. 1 The loyal efforts of Calvisius were not accorded general credence; and touching the testa

enegade Plancus. 2 None the less the will was held genuine, and did not fail in its working, at least on some orders of t

d, unable to defend him openly. Wild rumours pervaded Rome and Italy. Not merely that Antonius and Cleopatra designed to co

as the victim of sorcery. 6 Antonius for his part made no move yet. Not merely because Octavianus had picked the quarrel

emies. Otherwise the situation appeared favourable: he was blamed for not exploiting the given advantage before his enemy c

3 If Dio is to be believed (50, 4, 2). The publication of the will is not given so much importance and effect by Plutarch (

ainst the foreign enemy. Yet, on the other hand, the united front was not achieved merely through intimidation. Of the mann

out there stands no record at all. The oath of allegiance was perhaps not a single act, ordered by one decree of the Caesar

tion he appealed to the voice and sentiments of the true Roman People not the corrupt plebs or the packed and disreputable

reas idea and practice were older still. Long ago the nobles of Rome, not least the dynastic house of the patrician Claudii

ensus Italiae against Antonius in the War of Mutina. 3 In vain it did not exist. Private influence and private ties, casual

luence and private ties, casual corruption or local intimidation were not enough. Lack of conviction as well as lack of org

ugh the whole land was enfranchised after the Bellum Italicum, it had not coalesced in sentiment with the victorious city t

nt with the victorious city to form a nation. The Italian peoples did not yet regard Rome as their own capital, for the mem

on the strife for power an ideal, august and patriotic character. But not all at once. A conscious and united Italy canno

cy. 2 The oath was personal in character, with concept and phrasing not beyond the reach of valid conjecture. 3 Of the Ro

litical leader in a private quarrel against his enemies, his inimici, not the enemies of the State (hostes); and as such th

received some kind of assurance. PageBook=>291 Those who were not deceived by the artifices of Octavianus or their

, or at least of acquiescence. The better sort of people in Italy did not like war or despotic rule. But despotism was alre

rs, though liberty perished, peace might be achieved. It was worth it not merely to the middle class, but to the nobiles. T

he middle class, but to the nobiles. Their cause had fallen long ago, not perhaps at Pharsalus, but finally and fatally at

ed for Rome, for the Italy of his fathers and for his own dignity but not for any party, still less for the fraud that was

o wage Rome’s war as consul himself, for the third time. Antonius was not outlawed that was superfluous. On Cleopatra, the

h, Autronius on August 16th, probably of the same year: Autronius may not have been the immediate successor of L. Cornifici

he winter in Greece, ready in his preparations of army and fleet, but not perhaps as resolute as he might appear. Antonius

he garrison of Egypt, Cyrene, Syria and Macedonia. 1 Antonius could not take the offensive, for every reason, not merely

cedonia. 1 Antonius could not take the offensive, for every reason, not merely the political damage of an invasion of Ita

ctavianus onwards, and entrap him with the aid of superior sea-power. Not perhaps by a battle at sea: the greatest general

an blood, as fitted the character of a civil war in which men fought, not for a principle, but only for a choice of masters

ered to the army of the West. Yet, in the last resort, Antonius might not need to appeal to the legions to stand in battle

igorated by their final success in the Sicilian War. Octavianus did not strike at Dyrrhachium or Apollonia. Making an ear

anus and the agile Dellius, whose changes of side were proverbial but not unparalleled. 1 The ex-Republican M. Licinius Cra

d on Antonius’ side, Canidius, Sosius and Gellius Poplicola. It would not be long before the defection of the leaders, Roma

ttle (if treachery there was), and avoidance of bloodshed to Rome, is not known. Sosius might be suspected. Certain of the

t Agrippa at once to Italy. The work must begin without delay. He had not gone farther east than Samos when he was himself

ueen was an embarrassment if she lived :5 but a Roman imperator could not NotesPage=>298 1 Aem. 8, 688. 2 Velleius

n politician. The adversary must have been redoubtable indeed! It was not the glorious battle of Actium and the defeat of t

Cleopatra Selene were reserved to walk in a Roman triumph. The boy is not heard of again—he was probably suppressed. The gi

e power of Antonius in the East he confirmed their titles when he did not augment their territories. It had been an essenti

orthy and criminal aliens the dominions of the Roman People. That did not matter now. The gifts to the NotesPage=>300

enace, imposed on Caesar’s heir in Italy for the needs of his war and not safely to be discarded in peace, was quietly negl

Ephesus for the cult of the goddess Rome and the god Divus Julius did not preclude the worship of the new lord of the East

the East as well, manifest and monarchic. 2 The frontier itself was not an urgent problem. Armenia had been annexed by An

onius, but Armenia fell away during the War of Actium. Octavianus was not incommoded: he took no steps to recover that regi

nvoked and maintained the traditional Roman practice as an excuse for not turning the land into a Roman province. 3 Acqui

The disaster of Crassus and the ill success of Antonius, even though not as great as many believed, were sobering lessons;

orance might elevate Parthia to be a rival empire of Rome :2 it could not stand the trial of arms—or even of diplomacy. Of

the less his command in Spain may have preceded that of Taurus. He is not mentioned at Actium. As for Gaul, Dio records ope

1, 6). Carrinas held a triumph, on May 30th, 28 B.C. (CIL 12, p. 77). Not so Nonius, so far as known, though he took an imp

l salutation (ILS 895). The precise nature and date of his command is not certain (see Ritterling, Fasti des r. Deutschland

. Licinius Crassus (cos. 30 B.C.). 2 The other provinces of the East, not so important because they lacked permanent garris

nius Crassus, held that his successes deserved special honour: he was not allowed to celebrate his triumph till July, 27 B.

was at peace on land and sea. 5 The imposing and archaic ceremony did not , however, mean that warfare was to cease: the gen

the date, no evidence. The period 29–27 B.C. is attractive, but 27–25 not excluded. On his habits, Seneca, Suasoriae 7, 13;

s then embodied in the dedication of the Ara Pads Augustae. Which was not unfitting. To the Roman, peace was not a vague em

e Ara Pads Augustae. Which was not unfitting. To the Roman, peace was not a vague emollient: the word ‘pax’ can seldom be d

azoned the Caesar of Trojan stock, destined himself for divinity, but not before his rule on earth has restored confidence

rinus iura dabunt. 1 Caesar’s heir was veritably a world-conqueror, not in verse only, or by the inevitable flattery of e

quite explicit; 6 and Livy duly demonstrates how the patriot Camillus not only saved Rome from the invader but prevented th

nus: Caesar’s heir was identified with that god by the poet Virgil. 1 Not by conquest only but by the foundation of a lasti

blicae constituendae). Caesar had put off the task, the Triumvirs had not even begun. The duty could no longer be evaded on

ol of victory in civil war. What Rome and Italy desired was a return, not to freedom—anything but that—but to civil and ord

various in kind and variously to be interpreted. Hopeful signs were not wanting in 28 B.C Octavianus was consul for the s

promoted to annul the illegal and arbitrary acts of the Triumvirate— not all of them surely: the scope and force of this a

time. From 31 B.C onwards he had been consul every year. But that was not all. The young despot not only conceded, but even

he had been consul every year. But that was not all. The young despot not only conceded, but even claimed, that he held sov

nd names of an outworn constitution. The reference is probably wider, not merely to the oath of allegiance but to the crown

stern lands for Rome. 2 The consensus embraced and the oath enlisted, not only all Italy, but the whole world. 3 In 28 B.C

The imperator could depend upon the plebs and the army. But he could not rule without the help of an oligarchy. His primac

ithout the help of an oligarchy. His primacy was precarious if it did not accommodate itself to the wishes of the chief men

Messalla and Pollio carried some authority. If the young despot were not willing of his own accord to adopt—or at least pu

mere constitutional opposition in Rome. It would be uncomfortable but not dangerous. Armies and provinces were another matt

um to other proconsuls, and to one commander at least who was perhaps not a proconsul and was certainly not of consular sta

commander at least who was perhaps not a proconsul and was certainly not of consular standing. 3 NotesPage=>308 1 I

te that Crassus had no valid claim to the spolia opima because he was not fighting under his own auspices. The relevance of

W XIII, 283 ff. 3 Nonius Gallus (ILS 89s, cf. Dio 51, 20, 5). It is not certain, however, what position he was holding in

iptions incised on the pyramids of Egypt. 3 Lapidary evidence, though not from a pyramid, shows the Roman knight proclaimin

ianus. The successor of L. Autronius Paetus as proconsul of Africa is not known. 2 Jerome (Chron., p. 164 h) puts his dea

B.C. Dio narrates the prosecution and end of Gallus episodically and not in clear chronological order, under the year 26 B

crime or vice in his associates, providing that his own supremacy was not assailed. The precise nature of Gallus’ violation

k is known, save that each was once a partisan of Antonius. 3 Who had not been? Neither Gallus nor Crassus is even mentione

rnment at Rome. The denial to Crassus of the title of imperator was not merely a matter of constitutional propriety—or ra

an almost religious consecration of the rule of the sole imperator. 4 Not only prestige was at stake—the armed proconsuls w

r. And of power, no surrender. Only words and forms were changed, and not all of them. As ‘dux’ the young Caesar had foug

be known as a magistrate. An appellation that connoted eminence, but not always sole primacy, was ready to hand. The leadi

pes, in recognition of their authority or their power. 1 The name was not always given in praise, for the princeps was all

f ‘dominatus’. 3 Caesar’s heir came to use the term ‘princeps’, but not as part of any official titulature. There were ot

cial titulature. There were other principes in the State, there could not fail to be such in a Republic. So Horace addresse

venient appellation for the holder of vague and tremendous powers did not make its way all at once. Princeps remained also

tly, for the martial glory and martial primacy of the new Romulus was not impaired by the public acts of his sixth and seve

’, as applied to Augustus, is absent from the Aeneid of Virgil and is not of very common occurrence in the first three book

riting his Fasti, discovered in the word ‘dux’ a convenience that was not merely a matter of metre. 3 Then, after a century

of Rome. Acclamation was drowned in protest. The senators adjured him not to abandon the Commonwealth which he had preserve

nd ran, before his assumption NotesPage=>313 1 Dio 53, 12 ff. ( not quite satisfactory on the division of the provinc

actory on the division of the provinces, see below, p. 314). Dio does not explicitly mention a grant of proconsular imperiu

legions; and Egypt stood apart from the reckoning. But Augustus did not take all the legions: three proconsuls had armies

em be described as a military despotism. Before the law, Augustus was not the commander-in-chief of the whole army, but a R

plenty of justification. The civil wars were over, but the Empire had not yet recovered from their ravages. Spain, a vast l

ire had not yet recovered from their ravages. Spain, a vast land, had not been properly conquered; Gaul cried out for surve

ll gave him the means to initiate and direct public policy at Rome if not to control through consular imperium the proconsu

past might properly have been invoked: it is pretty clear that it was not . The Romans as a people were possessed by an es

senators. Lacking any perception of the dogma of progress—for it had not yet been invented—the Romans regarded novelty wit

d come, though slow and combated. Rome’s peculiar greatness was due not to one man’s genius or to NotesPage=>315 1

cepted no magistracy that ran contrary to the ‘mos maiorum’. 3 He did not need to. As it stood, the Roman constitution woul

mple and easily translated. Moreover, the chief men of his party were not jurists or theorists—they were diplomats, soldier

politic. 4 But Pompeius was sinister and ambitious. That princeps did not cure, but only aggravated, the ills of the Roman

, a ‘salubris princeps’, for as such he would have himself known. 5 Not only that. The whole career of Pompeius was viole

ook=>317 and lost in war. 1 His murders and his treacheries were not forgotten. 2 It would not do to revive such mem

r. 1 His murders and his treacheries were not forgotten. 2 It would not do to revive such memories, save by covert apolog

eian rather than Caesarian, just as its avowed ideals are Republican, not absolutist. Seeking to establish continuity with

, buried in fraudulent laudations of the dead. What they required was not the ambitious and perfidious dynast but that Pomp

5. 6 Aen. 6, 834 f. 7 lb. 8, 670. PageBook=>318 Virgil did not need to say where Caesar belonged—with his revolu

vertised. A purified Pompeius or a ghostly and sanctified Cato were not the only victims of the Civil Wars who could be c

icero was an irony to men who recalled in their own experience—it was not long ago—the political activity of Cicero in the

of antiquity situated their social and political Utopias in the past, not in the future. It is a more convincing view that

s:2 even if the primacy of one man in the State were admitted, it was not for a princeps like Pompeius. For the rest, it

isting order, reformed a little by a return to ancient practices, but not changed, namely the firm concord of the propertie

n coercion of tribunes and more power for the Senate and for censors: not irrelevant to Cicero’s own past experience and fu

l might he say, when asked his verdict on Cato, that anybody who does not wish the present dispensation to be altered is a

the stubborn class-conscious Republicanism of Cato or of Brutus would not have found a secure haven. The uncontrolled liber

io, it is true, was preserved as a kind of privileged nuisance—he was not the man to advocate assassination or provoke civi

vil war for the sake of a principle. The authentic Cato, however, was not merely ‘ferox’ but ‘atrox’. 4 His nephew Brutus,

he attacked the domination of Pompeius, for the sake of empire it was not worth submitting to tyranny. 5 Cicero refused t

agnanimity of success to pass over the scorn of the nobiles; he would not be harried by tribunes or constrained to speak in

ique. Romans instructed in a long tradition of law and government did not need to take lessons from theorists or from alien

ent constitution to be far the best (De re publica 1, 34); and he was not altogether satisfied with the speculations of the

ize with Roman sentiment. The formulation was easily found—it reposed not in books of the law or abstract speculation, but

inence for himself. 1 Auctoritas denotes the influence that belonged, not by law but by custom of the Roman constitution, t

. Yet the combination of auctoritas and legally granted powers does not exhaust the count. His rule was personal—and base

ion. He controlled all the armies of the Roman People, in fact though not in law, and provided from his own pocket the boun

the primacy of Caesar’s heir should be strengthened and perpetuated. Not , however, under the fatal name of dictator or mon

estituta’; and certain Roman writers echoed the official description. Not so Tacitus—in his brief account of Augustus’ feig

ed moderation and stealthy aggrandizement after the Civil Wars he has not deigned to allude to this transaction at all. 2 I

s, ever alert for the contrast of name and substance. At Rome, it did not mark an era in dating; in the provinces it passed

he res publica which he sought to ‘establish upon a lasting basis’ is not a matter of paramount importance. No man of the

hem up. Suetonius, however, a student of antiquities, was a scholar not wholly devoid of historical sense. He states that

nse. He states that Augustus twice thought of restoring the Republic— not that he did so. 3 To Suetonius, the work of Augus

spect is fairer. It has been maintained in recent times that Augustus not only employed Republican language but intended th

pare Appian, BC 1. 2, 7. PageBook=>325 The choice of means did not demand deep thought or high debate in the party c

ice been acclaimed imperator by the legions. 1 A second consulate was not the only reward of loyal service—he was granted i

d, as before, in charge of three military provinces. But Augustus was not surrendering power. Very different his real purpo

f Spain, Baetica, to the list of public provinces in 27 B.C. Which is not at all likely. Strabo is even worse. In his accou

hree nobiles in the prime of life; 2 and three recent novi homines. 3 Not to mention T. Statilius Taurus. Yet of this imp

et the novi homines like Q. Laronius, M. Herennius, L. Vinicius are not found in charge of military provinces; still less

ack of legates of Augustus either noble in birth or consular in rank. Not a single nobilis can be found among his legates i

the most difficult and most dangerous of the imperial dominions were not among them—a fair and fraudulent pretext to light

incial governors in the early years of the Principate of Augustus are not to be had. 3 Namely M. Acilius Glabrio (cos. su

>331 THE pretext of a special mandate from Senate and People was not merely a recognition of the past services and uni

ecognition of the past services and unique eminence of Caesar’s heir, not merely a due guarantee of his dignitas and pledge

e Dictator intended to spend three years in the Balkans and the East, not merely for warfare and for glory but that consoli

e same reasons counselled Augustus to depart. Others as well he did not wish to contemplate the triumphal pomp of Crassus

be known: it was known to few enough at the time, and they preferred not to publish a secret of state. The incident was di

erred not to publish a secret of state. The incident was disquieting. Not merely did the execution of a consul cast a glari

he Princeps inscribed on the golden shield and advertised everywhere. Not only did it reveal a lack of satisfaction with th

re of the party. Fannius was a ‘bad man’ to begin with, a Republican. Not so Murena. Long ago Salvidienus the marshal betra

mutual affection they knew too much for that, and revolutionaries are not sentimental. Their loyalty to Augustus was also l

ators. 3 The choice of Sestius, like the choice of Piso, will attest, not the free working of Republican institutions, but

above all proconsular imperium over the whole empire. 2 In fact, but not in name, this reduced all proconsuls to the funct

tain powers in law. No trace hitherto of their employment. 3 It was not until this year that the Princeps thought of exer

the fact that a few years later, in 20 and 19 B.C., Agrippa is found, not there, but in Gaul and Spain (Dio 54, 11, 1 ff.).

ut in Gaul and Spain (Dio 54, 11, 1 ff.). PageBook=>338 It was not for ostentation but for use that the Princeps too

s of Crassus and so acquire easy prestige for the new government. 3 Not only that. Syria was the only military province i

n. If an exact date must at all costs be sought in what is a process, not a series of acts, the establishment of the Empire

for their public and plausible justification, Words and phrases were not enough. Piso and Sestius, ex-Republicans in the c

into the land of the distant and proverbial Garamantes. 3 That was not all. The appointment of a pair of censors in 22 B

the government. The constitution is a façade as under the Republic. Not only that. Augustus himself is not so much a man

is a façade as under the Republic. Not only that. Augustus himself is not so much a man as a hero and a figure-head, an emb

as something in his gaze that inspired awe in the beholder: men could not confront it. 1 Statues show him as he meant to be

edit were in the main the work of others, and his unique primacy must not obscure the reality from which it arose the fact

The principal actors were Livia, Maecenas and Agrippa. Augustus could not afford to alienate all three. In alliance they ha

Livia Drusilla had been a political alliance with the Claudii, though not that alone. The cold beauty with tight lips, thin

tate. It was worth having, and she never betrayed a secret. Livia had not given the Princeps a child. She had two sons by h

ecoming quaestor in the next year. PageBook=>341 Even had they not been the step-sons of the Princeps, Tiberius and

him the Princeps set his hopes of a line of succession that should be not merely dynastic, but in his own family and of his

could bequeath his name and his fortune to whomsoever he pleased, but not his imperium, for that was the grant of Senate an

s, like another personal friend of the Princeps, Vedius Pollio, could not stand as a model and an ornament in the New State

counsel. Yet the position of Maecenas had been compromised. He could not withstand Agrippa. Maecenas made a fatal mistake

Terentia of the danger that threatened her brother. 3 Augustus could not forgive a breach of confidence. Maecenas’ wife wa

ce. Maecenas’ wife was beautiful and temperamental. Life with her was not easy. 4 An added complication was Augustus, by no

t Horace has so candidly depicted. 5 Maecenas might be dropped, but not Agrippa; and so Agrippa prevailed. He did not app

s might be dropped, but not Agrippa; and so Agrippa prevailed. He did not approve of the exorbitant honours accorded to the

banishment. 7 There is no truth in this fancy a political suspect is not placed in charge of provinces and armies. PageN

onsul at the age of twenty-three: his adoption would be catastrophic. Not merely that it shattered the constitutional façad

of monarchy, republicanism to Agrippa. The fiction is transparent but not altogether absurd. Unity was established: it wa

ined honours and triumphs and went quietly about his work, his reward not applause or gratitude but the sense of duty done.

l remarks about ‘amici’, ‘officium’ and ‘fides’). 2 Yet Agrippa did not disdain a golden crown for Naulochus and an azure

ing. He would yield to Augustus, but to no other man, and to Augustus not always with good grace. 1 His portraits reveal

his ideal of public utility was logical and intimidating. Agrippa did not stop at aqueducts. He composed and published a me

eance. The nobiles were helpless but vindictive: they made a point of not attending the funeral games of Agrippa, dead earl

the revolutionary age and the heir of the Claudian house were perhaps not so far apart in this matter and in others. Page

even as revolutionaries. In Tiberius there was the tradition, though not the blood, of M. Livius Drusus as well. Like othe

d for the aftermath of Actium, when the lines were composed, they are not even appropriate to a later date, when Agrippa’s

r had been accorded status and definition before the law. Agrippa was not , Agrippa never could be, the brother and equal of

ot, Agrippa never could be, the brother and equal of Augustus. He was not Divi filius, not Augustus’, he lacked the unique

could be, the brother and equal of Augustus. He was not Divi filius, not Augustus’, he lacked the unique auctoritas of the

es of the Empire, and more than that, the tribunicia potestas, he was not in all things the equal and colleague of Caesar A

f sole power, to become all that Augustus had been. The nobiles would not have stood it. Agrippa is rather to be regarded a

become Princeps, when age and merit qualified. For the moment, it did not matter. Whatever the distant future might bring,

d all others, he could invite to a share in his rule allies who would not be rivals. It was hardly to be expected that th

ore. PageNote. 346 (No Notes) PageBook=>347 Augustus might not be a second Caesar: he lacked the vigour and the

aking of these men. 1 Such a triumvirate existed, called into being not by any pre-ordained harmony or theory of politics

the Caesarian party and by the demands of imperial government. It was not the only formula or the only system available.

a vicegerent for the East and perhaps for the western lands as well. Not only this the war in Spain was not yet over. Gaul

aps for the western lands as well. Not only this the war in Spain was not yet over. Gaul and the Balkans, large regions wit

’ PageBook=>348 The appointment of a single deputy-leader was not enough. Agrippa at once proceeded to his duties.

rusus would be available to second or to replace him. Even they would not suffice. It would be necessary, behind the façade

camps of his adversaries until in the end, by stripping Antonius, it not merely swallowed up the old Caesarian party but s

supervened later during the arbitrary rule of a Triumvirate which was not merely indifferent, but even hostile, to birth an

ge, so gravely attested and so ingenuously praised by historians, did not escape contemporary observers. There was a very p

B.C. (Dio 52, 42, 4). PageBook=>350 Scaurus and Cn. Cinna were not especially favoured Scaurus, like some other Repu

e other Republicans and Pompeians, never reached the consulate, Cinna not until more than thirty years had elapsed. But som

estates of three hundred and more disloyal or misguided senators were not all tenderly to be spared out of respect for dign

t received from the hands of Italy’s leader the restored Republic did not belie its origin and cannot evade historical para

d the term from the senatorial order to cover every class in society, not shutting out freedmen. 1 What in Cicero’s advocac

times thwarted the power of money: the new order was patently, though not frankly, plutocratic. Capital received guarante

nite rank, duties and privileges. They were to remain: the Romans did not believe in equality. 1 But passage from below to

l preserved traces of its origin as a private army in the Revolution. Not until A.D. 6, when large dismissals of legionarie

of troops stood in an especial relation of devotion to the Princeps. Not only did he possess and retain a private body-gua

order, that is to say, for knights (including senators’ sons who had not yet held the quaestorship). Ex-centurions would n

who had not yet held the quaestorship). Ex-centurions would naturally not be excluded, if they had acquired the financial s

uded, if they had acquired the financial status of knights (which was not difficult): but there was no regular promotion, i

ncial losses during the Civil Wars no doubt a conventional assertion, not restricted to any one class of the wealthy in the

er r. Ritterstand (1927), 136 ff. 2 For example, ILS 2654 and 2656 ( not early). 3 Suetonius, Divus Vesp. 1. 4 ILS 920

soon augmented by a surge of successful speculators. But Augustus did not suffer them to return to their old games. The gre

d strategy, at once enhancing the importance of equestrian praefecti. Not merely in charge of detachments or of single legi

tus is a highly obscure subject. The post of praefectus cohortis does not at first belong to it, but takes time to develop.

8 Tacitus, Agr. 4, 1 (Agricola’s grandfathers). PageBook=>357 Not only that Roman knights could govern provinces, s

orative office and title of consul. That was novel and revolutionary. Not indeed that a sharp line of division had hitherto

or plebeian, affected to despise knights or municipal men; which did not , however, debar marriage or discredit inheritance

us Scapula and P. Salvius Aper. In the time of Augustus the Guard was not so important as Egypt, therefore Scapula’s prefec

illitate vitae, nullis rei publicae negotiis permixtos. ’ Augustus is not to be taken too seriously here. 5 Cf. above, p.

too seriously here. 5 Cf. above, p. 81. PageBook=>359 It was not so: the property qualification was low indeed, wh

to stand for the office of the quaestorship and so enter the Senate. Not only that the tribunate was also thus used. 2 To

to make public life safe, reputable and attractive. Encouragement was not seldom required before the Roman knight was willi

ational war of Actium, the process of creating the unity of Italy had not yet reached its term. Augustus was eager to provi

licet virorum et locupletium, in hac curia esse voluit. ’ Claudius is not quite correct, however, in assigning the innovati

assigning the innovation to Augustus and Tiberius: to Caesar he could not officially appeal for precedent, cf. BSR Papers X

from the foothills of the Alps down to Apulia, Lucania and Bruttium. Not only do ancient cities of Latium long decayed, li

rrying on the tradition of the marshals of the revolutionary wars but not imposing so rapid and frequent a succession of al

sessing large estates in Samnium (De lege agraria III, 3, cf. 8), was not a Valgius but a (Quinctius) Valgus. 5 L. Passie

s) there are in all the years 15 B.C. A.D. 3 very few consuls who are not of consular families. The mere six novi homines d

onsuls who are not of consular families. The mere six novi homines do not belong to the sudden and scandalous category. The

f an ancient dynastic house. Two other consuls in this period, though not locally identified, are certainly of municipal ex

social status through service as a centurion. But P. Ovidius Naso was not disposed to serve the Roman People. He might ha

. suff. A.D. 10? The Origin of Lucilius Longus, cos. suff. A.D. 7, is not known: perhaps the son of Brutus’ friend (Plutarc

ented a coalition of the municipal families, whether in the Senate or not , all alike now looking to Rome as their capital,

the municipia had been invoked in the crisis of civil war: they were not to be neglected in peace. Augustus encouraged the

ections. 2 If the experiment was ever made, it was quickly abandoned. Not so much because it was a mockery, given the true

ble weight of ancient tradition. To promote novi homines was patently not a ‘novus mos’. 3 All men knew that the noblest fa

Italy may with propriety be taken to commend and justify, but they do not explain in root and origin, the acts of Caesar an

romoted to the Senate the aristocracy of Italy. Senators represented, not a region or a town, but a class, precisely the me

viri et locupletes’. As the augmentation of the governing faction was not the execution of a theory or the act of any one m

e Roman People, whether they already possessed the Roman franchise or not . Hence a steady diffusion of Roman ways and senti

em rank comparable to the consulate in the senatorial career. Two, if not three, provincials were Prefects of Egypt. 4 The

9502 f. (C. Caristanius Fronto, a colonist at Pisidian Antioch). 4 Not only Gallus. C. Turranius (c. 7-4 B.C.) came from

That is to leave out the influence of his adherents. The Princeps was not altogether a frank enthusiast for merit wherever

ve the man of the proscriptions. The Princeps had his revenge. He did not care to exclude any large body of nobiles from th

here was change and development is clear. The minor magistracies were not definitely regulated all at once. 1 For the rest,

it for a number of years. Which was fitting. Knights themselves would not have complained. NotesPage=>369 1 Cf. C. C

8 B.C. PageBook=>370 The Senate had been purged once. That was not enough for Augustus. He may have hoped to renew t

sulate, would do well to seek the approbation of the Princeps. He did not nominate candidates that would have been invidiou

stus was debarred. He had already restored the Republic once he could not do it again. NotesPage=>370 1 Dio 54, 14,

ked him, announcing that, even if elected by the people, Rufus should not become consul. The abandoned scoundrel ‘per omnia

ff. (26 B.C.). 4 Velleius 2, 92; cf. Dio 54, 10, 1 (where, however, not a word about Egnatius). PageBook=>372 Egna

vailed in the first four years of the Principate. Riots in Rome could not imperil peace so long as the Princeps controlled

.C., however, a development is perceptible. Yet this may be a result, not only of Augustus’ own enhanced security, with les

umviral period (43–33 B.C.) the proportion is twenty-five to ten. 3 Not counting Varro Murena. PageBook=>373 From

incipate, receiving the consulate at the earliest age permissible, if not with dispensations the young Ahenobarbus, Ti. Cla

developed system could show in the last years of the Princeps’ life. Not until 5 B.C. do suffect consuls become frequent a

ffect consuls become frequent and regular upon the Fasti. The date is not accidental: the flagrant dynastic policy of Augus

k=>374 Election by the people might be a mere form, but it could not be abolished by a statesman who claimed to have r

s insistent to promote a deserving partisan. Pompeius, however, could not or would not support the Picene intriguer, the lo

o promote a deserving partisan. Pompeius, however, could not or would not support the Picene intriguer, the loquacious Loll

t elect whom he would: his suffrage went to ancestry and personality, not to alluring programmes or solid merit. Caesar a

still dominated the field: Gallus and Messallinus recalled but could not rival their parents. Paullus Fabius Maximus, of v

on of the Vinicii, the one was an elegant speaker and man of fashion, not altogether approved of by Augustus; 3 the other,

cting taste, so they said, had Ovid’s poems by heart. 4 Nobiles did not need to adduce proficiency in the arts. Of the no

ular, like Titius, Tarius and Quirinius. That was no bar. Others were not merely his allies, bound by amicitia, but in a tr

lus Fabius Maximus, may even have enjoyed his confidence. 3 They were not all trusted: yet he could not deny them the consu

ave enjoyed his confidence. 3 They were not all trusted: yet he could not deny them the consulate, their birthright. So Iul

the younger son of the Triumvir, became consul. But the consulate did not matter so much. Enemies were dangerous only if th

ian. Valerii, Claudii, Fabii and Aemilii, houses whose bare survival, not to say traditional primacy, was menaced and preca

ipate of Augustus a Sulla, a Metellus, a Scaurus and other nobles did not rise to the consulate. 4 With so few suffect cons

asti reveal the best, or at least the most alert and most astute, but not the whole body, of the nobiles. NotesPage=>3

gh unprolific, he exploited the progeny of others. 2 The daughter was not the Princeps’ only pawn. His sister Octavia had c

om confiscation and the treasure of the Ptolemies, the nobility could not compete. Even if lucky enough to have retained th

cellent men, amassed fortunes without discredit: precisely how, it is not recorded perhaps by inheritance. 5 Quirinius grew

ius, officially commended for integrity, left millions to his family, not the blameless possession of inherited wealth, but

Lollia Paullina, paraded like a princess. It was her habit to appear, not merely at state banquets, but on less exacting oc

on sesterces. 8 Senatorial rank and promotion to the consulate were not the only favours in the hands of the party-dynast

society, it is evident that sacerdotal preferment will be conferred, not upon the pious and learned, but for social distin

robably the consul of 14 B.C., cf. E. Groag in PIR2, C 1379. Some did not praise him as highly as did Tacitus (cf. Seneca,

gustus’ revival of ancient colleges that had lapsed for centuries was not merely a sign of his pious care for the religion

in the wars, being represented in the Senate at the time of Actium by not many more than twenty members. The sons of the sl

The sons of the slain would be available before long. But they would not suffice. Augustus at once proceeded to create new

icuous among them the prudent Cocceii, and even meritorious adherents not yet consular, like the Aelii Lamiae. 9 NotesPag

on of novi homines to the consulate after A.D. 4.2 But Tiberius was not the only force in high politics; and even if Taur

ius was not the only force in high politics; and even if Taurus could not retain under the new dispensation his right to de

ew dispensation his right to designate a praetor every year, that did not matter. There were other ways. The system broad

aximus certainly came from Aeclanum (ILS 1335). As the gentilicium is not uncommon it would hardly be fair to conjecture a

hich he could exert would have been formidable enough, even if he had not been Prefect of the Guard and chief favourite and

ure and statuary, Augustus and the members of his house are depicted, not always quiet and unpretentious, like sombre and d

wife, Livia Ocellina, from a distant branch of Livia’s own family. If not exactly seductive, Galba himself was certainly ar

s in the imperial system, implicit in the Principate of Augustus, but not always clearly discernible in their working. Po

political pests, the demagogue and the military adventurer. That did not mean that the direction of the government now res

n of the government now rested in the hands of Senate and magistrates not for that, but for another purpose, the solemn and

politics. The principes of the dying Republic behaved like dynasts, not as magistrates or servants of the State. Augustus

united front in a political emergency. Against Catilina, perhaps, but not against Pompeius or Caesar. When it came to maint

e or definition and needed none. The precaution may appear excessive. Not in Rome but with the provincial armies lay the re

s lay the real resources of power and the only serious danger. It was not until a century elapsed after the Battle of Actiu

incipate were thus safeguarded. But the mere maintenance of order did not fulfil the ambition of the Princeps or justify hi

ent is a question of terminology. 3 Res Gestae 12. The monument was not completed and inaugurated until 9 B.C. PageBook

sion the proconsul of Macedonia, whoever he may have been, was surely not inactive. Conquest had to come from two direction

or three arduous years. 3 So it was Tiberius, as legate of Illyricum, not Agrippa, who subdued the Pannonians and Dalmati

Aug. | L. Tario Ruf. pro | pr. | leg. X Fret. | pontem fecit. ’ He is not described as ‘proconsul’. This may mean that the

ispensable in the earlier years, as deputy wherever Augustus happened not to be, above all as vicegerent of the whole East;

ent resisted the trial. For all his capacity and merits, Tiberius was not the only general or administrator among the princ

Germany (c. A.D. 2) and coolly at that (2, 104, 2). Naturally enough, not a word of Ahenobarbus or even of Quirinius. Dio’s

of Quirinius. Dio’s sources for this period were in any case probably not abundant; and two pages of the manuscript of Dio

ittle importance from its constant and arduous wars: the garrison may not always have been as small as the single legion th

as well as rewarded experience. The young consul of thirty-three did not have to wait too long for a province Africa or As

But favour could secure curtailment of legal prescriptions, and that not merely for princes of the blood. Ahenobarbus was

haps of barely two years. 3 As for his own province, the Princeps was not restricted in any way his especial favourites, Ti

f an Ahenobarbus when Caesar monopolized Gaul for many years. It does not follow that the wars waged by nobles or politicia

ve ability and the inherited habit and prerogative of leadership were not enough, the proconsul could invoke the advice of

was severed from Hispania Ulterior and transferred to the Senate has not been recorded. Hardly perhaps as late as 2 B.C.,

ce, skilled to lead native cavalry and to provide for commissariat. Not all men of senatorial rank were untried in active

The proconsul could choose ‘viri militares’ as his legates. Piso was not himself a soldier, but he took to Macedonia compe

fter his consulate to govern one of the great military provinces, had not always been very long or very thorough. The dif

o been created. After Actium, no place for them. 1 But the lesson was not lost. Augustus perpetuated the premium on special

nces, one after another. These were among the greatest, but they were not exceptional. Vinicius is a close parallel; it is

urninus. 2 But Syria, though more prominent in historical record, was not the only Eastern province that called for special

the surrender of the Parthian hostages, which may fall in 19 B.C. and not , as usually assumed, r. 13–10 B.C., cf. L. R. Tay

The argument for assigning to him the inscr. from Tibur (ILS 918) is not so strong. Cf. n. 8. 2 Josephus, AJ 16, 344, &a

in Cilicia, published in Jahreshefte XVIII (1915), Beiblatt 51, would not be sufficient or secure support, for it may belon

fit Piso and his Bellum Thracicum quite well; but Quirinius is still not absolutely excluded (below, p. 399, n. 4). Page

oag, PIK2, C 1379, who demonstrates that he is the consul of 14 B.C., not , as hitherto believed, of 18 B.C. Dates for Lentu

he period 9 B.C.–A.D. 6. PageBook=>401 As for the Rhine, it is not certain who followed Tiberius in 6 B.C.1 Before l

nsulate of Africa. 3 There was also fighting in Africa. 4 These are not the only names that mattered in the critical peri

State endured, well equipped with ministers of government. But it was not in the provinces only that the principes were tra

if and when censors were appointed. NotesPage=>401 1 Probably not Ahenobarbus, attested here by Dio under the year

that the two Spanish armies had by now been fused into one. Which is not unlikely. As for Varus, his proconsulate of Afric

with the Via Latina. 4 Agrippa’s affectionate care for aqueducts did not lapse with his memorable aedileship, but was sust

slaves and workmen which he had recruited and trained. 5 That could not go on. After 19 B.C. there were no more triumphs

senators; and in any case Augustus would have wished, even if he had not been forced, to substitute regular administration

ustus supplied the aediles with a body of fire-fighting slaves it was not until A.D. 6 that he took the step of appointing

ed. The first dealt with roads (20 B.C.); 2 it was composed, however, not of consulars but of praetorians. At a later date

the year 8 B.C.; the first standing commission dates from A.D. 15 or not long after. 5 Other small groups of consulars w

in 26 B.C. and resigning the office after a few days, because he did not understand its functions or because he disapprove

e he did not understand its functions or because he disapproved, need not be too harshly scrutinized. 8 NotesPage=>403

Rome and troops of clients, arousing the distrust of the Princeps; 5 not always without cause. But careful supervision at

tioned in A.D. 14. 3 Suetonius, Divus Aug. 28, 3; Dio 56, 30, 3 f. ( not in the mere literal sense). 4 On this, A. v. Pr

rnor now received a salary in money. 5 Politics can be controlled but not abolished, ambition curbed but not crushed. The s

. 5 Politics can be controlled but not abolished, ambition curbed but not crushed. The strife for wealth and powrer went on

eys requests, modest but firm, to the governors of provinces. 4 Yet not entirely at the expense of the Senate. That body

Ann. 1, 3. 2 As was permitted in 23 B.C. (Dio 53, 32, 5). This does not mean, however, that he exercised proconsular auth

over: Illyricum in 12 B.C., Sardinia in A.D. 6. Proconsuls nominated, not only in A.D. 6 (Dio 55, 28, 2), but much earlier,

hardly be any doubt that their powers were developed and used, though not frequently in the time of Augustus, cf. J. G. C.

roach seriously upon the functions of the full Senate. 2 But this was not a permanent change; and the committee seems subse

ere to six months of the year, shows clearly that it was a committee, not a cabinet an organ of administration, not of auth

ly that it was a committee, not a cabinet an organ of administration, not of authority. As it was there, it might suitably

conduct of public business or the dispensing of justice but they did not debate and determine the paramount questions of g

aled in the course of events: it would have to be postulated, were it not flagrant and evident. The management of the Empir

ment of the Empire demanded expert counsel and many advisers. It will not be imagined that there was any permanent body of

tem of taxation. 4 When the civil service had developed, freedmen did not hold the procuratorships of the imperial province

eleven years before. In the last period of Augustus’ rule, literature not merely languished from the loss of its shining gl

ns directly, and all provinces indirectly. The statute of 23 B.C. may not have given the Princeps the power of making war a

have given the Princeps the power of making war and peace. 2 That was not necessary. Embassies from foreign powers might be

rsal. The assembly of the People might declare war but the People did not decide against whom; the wars, however grandiose

nst whom; the wars, however grandiose and arduous they might be, were not always dignified with that name and status, but w

ell versed in eastern affairs, former governors and procurators. 3 If not themselves absent on provincial commands, men lik

5, cf. above, p. 382. 2 Cf. W. Kolbe, Aus Roms Zeitwende, 51. It is not safe to infer from the Lex de imperio Vespasiana,

er, explicitly. 3 Josephus, AJ 17, 229. PageBook=>413 It was not intended that there should be foreign wars in the

the Alpine lands. Vinicius knew both Gaul and Illyricum. Lollius was not famed for service in eastern provinces only. Afte

d East, executed as an impressive example of converging strategy, may not unfairly be attributed to the great road-builder

nfairly be attributed to the great road-builder and organizer. He did not live to see the consummation of the campaigns in

republic, the other monarchy. The contrast was unreal, the choice did not arise. What was decided by the advisers of the Pr

him from the attempt. It would have required imagination that he did not possess and facts that he could never discover. D

ell as explaining Dio’s date. Yet Cinna’s consulate was probably due, not so much to Augustus, as to the Republican Tiberiu

ugustus, the Princeps’ powers lapsed he might designate, but he could not appoint, his heir. When the Principate was first

lamation of a new Emperor in default of a clearly designated heir was not always due to threat or exertion of open violence

rtant matter, and bitter rivalries. The final and peaceful result was not attained without dissensions in the cabinet, seve

f preserving appearances. 2 Whatever the behaviour of Julia, that was not the prime cause of the crisis of 6 B.C. Tiberius

wed the strength of his determination by a voluntary fast. They could not stop him. Tiberius retired to the island of Rhode

ncealed a high ambition; like Agrippa, he would yield to Augustus but not in all things. His pride had been wounded, his di

ad been wounded, his dignitas impaired. But there was more than that. Not merely spite and disappointment made the first ma

purpose of Augustus was flagrant, and, to Tiberius, criminal. It was not until after his departure that Augustus revealed

ders, which with separate functions but with coalescence of interests not only represented, but were themselves the governi

Augustus, he had benefited from that relationship. Yet even had Livia not been the wife of the Princeps, her son under the

eration of nobiles. Privilege and patronage, and admitted as such but not outrageous. To bestow the supreme magistracy of t

the dynasty. But Augustus was now aged fifty-seven. The crisis could not long be postponed. A loyal but not ingenuous hi

ed fifty-seven. The crisis could not long be postponed. A loyal but not ingenuous historian exclaims that the whole world

xclaims that the whole world felt the shock of Tiberius’ departure. 1 Not at all: both the Princeps and his party were stro

gh a certain lull prevailed now on the northern frontiers, natural if not necessary after the great wars of conquest, the e

ot necessary after the great wars of conquest, the effort of Rome did not flag or fail. The governmental oligarchy could fu

the nobiles now enjoy a brief and last renascence in the strange but not incongruous alliance of monarchy. Augustus had pa

out the folly of the attempt. Even if he succeeded, the nobiles would not put up with Cinna in the place of Augustus. 1 Cin

light of their own ambitions. The Republic had served their ends, why not the Monarchy? The most sincere or most narrow typ

the composition of a body that never came into existence, were there not attested certain eminent personages in the govern

a to the son of Sex. Appuleius. 4 These four consulars were perhaps not all outstanding in talent or very closely related

erpetuated their old political alliance with the Caesarian cause, but not through the Triumvir. His nephew and enemy, Paull

d the distinction due to their family and their mother’s prayers, but not with equal fortune. 1 The elder took to wife Juli

plebeian family of the Domitii boasted a solitary but strong support, not far below monarchic hope. The Marcelli are close

tain great houses remained, however, rivals of the Julii and Claudii, not invited, or perhaps disdaining, to join the inner

and eminence with the foremost in the Principate of Augustus, though not seeking closer relationship with the reigning dyn

ons, such as that mild-mannered person P. Quinctilius Varus, who were not so deeply committed to the court faction that the

who were not so deeply committed to the court faction that they could not survive, and even profit from, a revulsion of for

berius had few kinsmen. Yet the excellent L. Volusius Saturninus will not have forgotten altogether that his father had mar

nificius and others had disappeared. Taurus was dead, and his son did not live to reach the consulate, but the family was i

. The supersession of Sentius in Syria by Varus in 6 B.C. may, or may not , have had political causes. No doubt, however, ab

publicity and ruined Julia, the daughter of the Princeps. Yet it was not of Livia’s doing, and it brought no immediate ben

in A.D. 16, were grandsons of Sex. Pompeius. 3 Precisely how, it is not quite clear: the adopted son of L. Arruntius (cos

ction the moral regeneration of Rome. 7 It may be tempting, but it is not necessary, to rehabilitate her entirely. Julia ma

elleius (2, 100, 4) says that he took his own life. The difference is not material. 3 Velleius 2, 102, 5: ‘singularem neq

es the vulnerable schemer. Moreover the ruin of the erring mother did not impair the succession of Gaius and Lucius, her so

have been a conspiracy. Whether wanton or merely traduced, Julia was not a nonentity but a great political lady. Her param

entity but a great political lady. Her paramours the five nobiles are not innocent triflers or moral reprobates but a formi

might well be politically dangerous. Like the early Christian, it was not the ‘flagitia’ but the tornen’ that doomed him. I

t all is uncertain if Augustus struck down Julia and Antonius, it was not from tenderness for Tiberius. It may be that thro

the only tie that bound Tiberius to the reigning house. Tiberius was not consulted; when he knew, he vainly interceded for

rilous. In the next year his tribunicia potestas lapsed. Augustus did not renew it. Gaius Caesar, consul designate and inve

bances in Armenia, a land over which Augustus claimed sovranty, while not seriously impairing the interests or the prestige

ore. In the meantime, able men had governed Syria the veteran Titius, not heard of since Actium, but probably appointed leg

3 B.C.,) C. Sentius Saturninus and P. Quinctilius Varus. But that was not enough. Gaius was sent out, accompanied by M. Lol

of Tiberius. 1 If many knew the truth of the whole episode, they were not likely to tell it. It is evident, and it is demon

d contrast and vituperation of Lollius, dead twenty years before, but not forgotten. Lollius, he said, was responsible fo

died at Massilia a few days after Tiberius’ return, the Claudian was not restored to his dignitas. 2 No honour, no command

fely through the climacteric year of a man’s life, the sixty-third. 3 Not three years passed and Gaius was dead. After comp

ion revealed the bitter frustration of his dearest hopes. 1 They were not lost upon Tiberius or upon the principes, his riv

. 6-9). Then Germany rose. Varus and three legions perished. Rome did not see her new master for many years. The adoption

stumus, the only surviving grandchildren of the Princeps and they did not survive for long. In A.D. 8 a new scandal swept a

some thought stupid and whom his mother Antonia called a monster, was not a decorative figure. But Claudius was harmless an

was not a decorative figure. But Claudius was harmless and tolerated. Not so Agrippa, of the blood of Augustus. This politi

M. Aemilius Lepidus, he said, possessed the capacity for empire but not the ambition, Asinius Gallus the ambition only: L

authorities substituted Cn. Piso (cos. 7 B.C.) for Arruntius. That is not the only uncertainty here. The MS. of Tacitus has

iterior, at the head of three legions. 1 Tiberius could trust Lepidus not Gallus, however, the husband of Vipsania. Gallus,

it, was devoured by a fatal impatience to play the politician. He was not given the command of an army. L. Arruntius came o

ead, others discredited, others displaced. Astute politicians who had not committed themselves too deeply were quick to tra

Lucilius who was the friend of Brutus and of Antonius. 1 Tiberius did not forget his own Republican and Pompeian antecedent

ow dead, decrepit or retired, giving place to another generation, but not their own sons the young men inherited nobility,

hat their sons would govern provinces with legionary armies certainly not Ahenobarbus or Paullus Fabius Maximus. Of the e

, 31). 4 Velleius 2, 105, 1 (A.D. 4). How long he had been there is not recorded. Velleius says of Sentius ‘qui iam legat

d character of Tiberius’ party. Members of families that hitherto had not risen to the consulate are prominent yet not para

milies that hitherto had not risen to the consulate are prominent yet not paradoxical, for this was a Claudian faction. In

, stand certain noble houses which, for all their social eminence, do not seem to have been implicated in the matrimonial a

as connected, it is true, with the family of Caesar; but the bond had not been tightened. Piso was an aristocrat of varied

of novi homines. A new government is already in being. Yet this was not enough to preclude rumours, and even risks. As th

thed his daughter to Seianus’ son (Tacitus, Ann. 6, 30). Tiberius did not remove him. That was not from fear of a civil war

nus’ son (Tacitus, Ann. 6, 30). Tiberius did not remove him. That was not from fear of a civil war, as Tacitus reports, but

ial and inevitable version, inevitably mocked and disbelieved. It did not matter. Everything had been arranged, not merel

d and disbelieved. It did not matter. Everything had been arranged, not merely the designation of his successor. At Rom

o prosecute their advantage. Tiberius Caesar had the power they would not let him enjoy it in security and goodwill. In the

late the execution of one of his own blood. 2 That interpretation was not meant to shield Augustus but to incriminate the n

lty or merit and firm rule in Rome, Italy and the provinces, that was not enough. Peace came, and order; but the State, s

in the War of Actium. Whatever the truth of that contention, he could not go back upon it, even if he had wished. The manda

he could not go back upon it, even if he had wished. The mandate was not exhausted when the State was saved from a foreign

and insistent. ‘Magis alii homines quam alii mores. ’1 So Tacitus, not deluded by the outcome of a civil war that substi

at substituted one emperor for another and changed the personnel, but not the character, of government. The same men who ha

State but different ‘mores’ needed to be professed and inculcated, if not adopted. It is not enough to acquire power and we

‘mores’ needed to be professed and inculcated, if not adopted. It is not enough to acquire power and wealth: men wish to a

hers. PageNotes. 440 1 Tacitus, Hist. 2, 95. PageBook=>441 Not until libertas was lost did men feel the full pri

1 The Greeks might have their Alexander it was glorious, but it was not Empire. Armies of robust Italian peasants had cru

of Roman statesmen, would stand and endure for ever. The Romans could not compete with Greece for primacy in science, arts

type of foreign vices ’externi mores ac vitia non Romana’. 2 It was not merely the vices of the principes that barred the

us, Sulla and Pompeius, cf. Tacitus, Hist. 2, 38. Marius and Sulla do not occur in the list of Roman heroes in Aen. 6, 824

young Claudii: fortes creantur fortibus et bonis. 1 But that was not enough, even in the Claudii: the poet proceeds,

mentation, its title was all too revealing. More to the point, he did not need it. The Princeps enacted the measures of 18

Honos Pudorque priscus et neglecta redire Virtus audet. 2 It had not been easy. Opposition arose in the Senate, and pu

slation concerning the family, that was a novelty, but the spirit was not , for it harmonized both with the traditional acti

self. In the aristocracy of the last age of the Republic marriage had not always been blessed with either offspring or perm

ces, the fine arts and mere literature were clearly superfluous, when not positively noxious. 1 Philosophy studied to exces

uous, when not positively noxious. 1 Philosophy studied to excess did not fit a Roman and a senator. 2 Only law and oratory

or. 2 Only law and oratory were held to be respectable. But they must not be left to specialists or to mere scholars. To pr

could bear it, was accompanied by certain grave disadvantages. Slaves not only could be emancipated with ease but were eman

Emperor, 181 ff.; 215 ff. PageBook=>447 The Roman People could not be pure, strong and confident without pietas, the

s, the pontifex maximus, living in seclusion at Circeii. Augustus did not strip him of that honour, ostentatious in scruple

m could be shown as a sublime contest between West and East. Rome was not only a conqueror Rome was a protector of Greek cu

tentes stamus. 5 Though debased by politics, the notion of pietas had not been entirely perverted. Pietas once gave world-e

hinc omne principium, hue refer exitum. 6 Virtus and pietas could not be dissociated; and the root meaning of virtus is

rrhus, Antiochus and Hannibal. 5 The ideal of virtue and valour was not Roman only, but Italian, ingrained in the Sabines

of the Gracchi were incomplete or baffled; and the small holding had not become any more remunerative since then. Samnium

mers there were to be sure, and cereals continued to be grown, though not for profit. 3 Thousands and thousands of veterans

an class, the antithesis of urban and rural at this time in Italy was not complete and exclusive the new proprietors would

ime in Italy was not complete and exclusive the new proprietors would not be utterly alien to the practice of agriculture.

vines. 1 But the advocates of the high ideals of the New State were not asked to examine the concepts of economic science

e pauperiem pati robustus acri militia puer condiscat. 2 This was not far from the ideal of economic self-sufficiency.

On this, cf. above all M. Rostovtzeff, Soc. and Ec. Hist., 50 ff. 4 Not that they were bad farmers. Compare the precepts

m et intonsi Catonis auspiciis veterumque norma. 1 But these were not the days of Romulus or of Cato the Censor; and th

here was another side to that. Yet the strong suspicion of fraud is not enough to lame the efficacy of the Augustan refor

nds aloof and alone, with all the power and all the glory. But he did not win power and hold it by his own efforts alone: w

concealed oligarchy or the general mandate of his adherents? It was not Rome alone but Italy, perhaps Italy more than Rom

Odes 2, 15, 10 ff. 2 Dio 56, 10, 3. PageBook=>454 That will not suffice to prove that the Princeps was merely a d

nd old-fashioned town in Latium certain features in his character may not unfairly be attributed the hard realism, the lack

uperstitions were native. 1 Augustus was a singularly archaic type. 2 Not indeed without culture but he had not been deeply

as a singularly archaic type. 2 Not indeed without culture but he had not been deeply influenced by the intellectual moveme

to be deep-rooted and genuine. He admired the aristocracy, for he was not one of them; he chastened them, but with a loving

ical structure created by the Princeps was solid yet flexible: it was not so easy to shape the habits of a whole people and

ial religion of the Roman People was formal rather than spiritual did not appear to the Roman statesman entirely a defect o

entirely a defect or a disadvantage; 4 and the Augustan revival need not shrink from the charge of studied antiquarianism.

. But the religion of the State, like the religion of the family, was not totally repugnant to sentiment. It was pietas, th

om the provinces, took their place, the rigour of whose parsimony was not relaxed even by the splendid fortunes they amasse

s was disappointed in the aristocracy, he might reflect that Rome was not Italy; and Italy had been augmented in the north

. 4 Cf. the remarks of A. D. Nock, CAH x, 467. PageBook=>456 Not every novus homo, however, or provincial aristocr

s an exemplar of virtue and integrity. The Principate of Augustus did not merely idealize consul and citizen of the ancient

ry of the novus homo. The opening of a career to talent, however, was not always conducive to honourable behaviour in a soc

n. 4, 4; Suetonius, Tib. 48, 2. PageBook=>457 The material was not available. Recruits from Italy south of the Apenn

ghting material in Europe was now being exploited for Rome’s wars but not as regular troops. The legionary was more often a

xpedients the fiction of a national army was gallantly maintained but not without disappointments. The army engaged in comp

otes. 457 1 E. Ritterling, P-W XII, 1781. Some of these soldiers do not even simulate Latin nomenclature. The frequency o

‘cohortes voluntariorum’. 1 The war in Illyricum was a deadly blow, not merely to the foreign and frontier policy of Rome

Augustus’ policy of moral and patriotic regeneration, the effort had not been in vain: it was not one man’s idea, and the

l and patriotic regeneration, the effort had not been in vain: it was not one man’s idea, and the origins of it went back b

earned obedience, the veterans the habit of a regular and useful life not like Sulla’s men. Even freedmen were not treated

of a regular and useful life not like Sulla’s men. Even freedmen were not treated as outcasts. Above all, the aristocracy

census honores, census amicitias: pauper ubique iacet. 3 Laws were not enough. The revolutionary leader had won power mo

equivocal testimony to the restoration of public liberty; but it does not follow that the poets and historians who lent the

a. 5 Pollio, it is true, was honoured by Horace in a conspicuous ode. Not so Messalla, however. As for the plebeian militar

ier, religion and morality, the heroic past and the glorious present. Not merely propaganda something much greater was afoo

was both Roman and Greek. The War of Actium was shown to be a contest not so much against Greece as against Egypt and the E

of contemporary literature. As in politics, the last generation was not rich in models to commend or imitate. Horace ha

m, indeed, stood for order and for monarchy. Catullus, however, could not have been domesticated, tamely to chant the regen

geNotes. 461 1 Virgil, Aen. 6, 726 f. PageBook=>462 That did not matter. The New State had its lyric poet, technic

invective of his Epodes. Age and prosperity abated his ardour but did not impair the sceptical realism of his character the

terminet astris, Iulius a magno demissum nomen lulo. 3 Later it is not the conqueror of the world but the coming inaugur

character of the epic hero is neither splendid nor striking. That was not intended. The perpetual guidance lavished upon th

pietas, firm in resolution but sombre and a little weary. The poem is not an allegory; but no contemporary could fail to de

cision in council with his friends at Apollonia, the young Caesar had not wavered or turned back. Announced by Apollo, his

erocis contundet, moresque viris et moenia ponet. 5 His triumph did not bring personal domination, but the unity of Rome

oral and hortatory. Even antiquarianism had its uses. But history did not need to be antiquarian it could be employed, like

ome ‘deum deo natum, regem parentemque urbis Romanae’. 1 But it would not do to draw too precise a parallel. The Romulus of

ently regained their property, or at least compensation. History does not record, or legend embroider, any loss sustained b

d, or legend embroider, any loss sustained by Livy the historians did not excite the interests of biographers and scholiast

Pollio governed the Cisalpina: the wealthy went into hiding then, and not a single slave betrayed his master. 3 PageNotes

313 f. 2 Tacitus, Ann. 4, 34. The term ‘Pompeianus’, however, need not denote an adherent of Pompeius. The Romans lacked

for gratitude to Augustus, that fact may have reinforced, but it did not pervert, the sentiments natural to members of the

d non-political order in society. On the other hand, their genius was not the creation of the Augustan Principate. They had

admirable. To Virgil the Transpadane, Actium is the victory of Italy, not of Rome only. This conception does not find expre

ctium is the victory of Italy, not of Rome only. This conception does not find expression in the versions of Horace and Pro

gain, when singing the praises of Italy in a patriotic vein, invokes, not Italy, but the name of Rome: omnia Romanae cede

ly, but the name of Rome: omnia Romanae cedent miracula terrae. 1 Not all the poets were inclined by character or situa

in spirit and theme, the earlier generation. But even Propertius was not untouched by the patriotic theme, or the repeated

e army: militat omnis amans, et habet sua castra Cupido. 3 It was not merely improper verse that incurred the displeasu

nstead, he composed a didactic poem on the Art of Love. The tract was not meant to be taken seriously it was a kind of paro

t meant to be taken seriously it was a kind of parody. Augustus did not see the joke. Like the early Germans depicted by

not see the joke. Like the early Germans depicted by Tacitus, he did not think that moral laxity was a topic of innocent a

imaginary figure. The poet himself, who had married three times, was not unhappy in his last choice, a virtuous and excell

appy in his last choice, a virtuous and excellent woman. 1 That did not matter. Ovid was a disgrace. He had refused to se

r repute than to be known as the home of an erotic poet. Augustus did not forget. It was in vain that Ovid interspersed his

morality to spread more widely and sink more deeply. For such as were not admitted to the recitations of the rich, or lacke

eps: the proceeds went towards dedications in the temples. 2 That was not all. When Augustus carried out his organization o

It is a little surprising that the rich vocabulary of politics was not more frequently drawn upon. Tota Italia would not

ary of politics was not more frequently drawn upon. Tota Italia would not have been out of place. The Princeps’ own form

promises to his family an abiding home in Italy. Pax Augusta could not be dissociated from Victoria Augusti. The martial

monument is a reminder, if such be needed, that Dux was disguised but not displaced by Princeps. Augustus was Divi filius

his young ally as ‘divinus adulescens’. 2 The epithet was rhetorical, not religious: he also applied it to the legions that

ory, the flood of miracles and propaganda was sensibly abated but did not utterly cease. A more enduring instrument of powe

slowly being forged. Augustus strove to revive the old religion: but not everybody was susceptible to the archaic ritual a

himself from taking the form of honours almost divine. Augustus was not a god, though deification would come in due cours

irtues and his attributes could be suitably celebrated. Worship might not be paid to the man but to the divine power within

ects his overt designs for the succession of Gaius and Lucius. He did not need it so much for himself. At the colony of Ace

rsonal allegiance to the military leader in the War of Actium: it did not lapse when he became a magistrate at Rome and in

some to Republican sentiment becomes more and more lavish and ornate. Not only is Augustus, like his predecessors, a god an

nate. Not only is Augustus, like his predecessors, a god and saviour; not only does he take from Pompeius the title of ‘war

Pompeius, ILS 9459 (Miletopolis); above, p. 30. PageBook=>474 not only do cities compete, pouring their cascades of

stus as a god. The West was different. The Roman towns had altars but not temples, as at Tarraco and at Narbo. There was as

or the country districts of Gaul and Galatia. National memories were not strong in the western lands: in the East the fact

In town or country there was poverty and social unrest but Rome could not be held directly responsible for the transgressio

of Mauretania, a man of peace and letters, enjoyed long rule, though not undisturbed by the nomad Gaetulians. The kings of

enses. The private vices and domestic scandals of Herod the Great did not shake Augustus’ confidence in the efficiency of h

d more productive. The publicani were superseded or reduced. That did not mean an end of oppression and injustice. The vice

had to suffer from a murderous proconsul. 4 Lack of prosecutors does not prove a lack of criminals. It took courage to ass

gin. 5 Lollius’ disgrace was due to a political error of calculation, not to any defect of personal integrity. PageNotes.

an traditions. On the whole, a harmless practice. Yet Mediolanium did not forget Brutus and Cassius; 2 Corduba produced a d

rious opposition to the new régime was at all likely to come and then not from the majority. The new men were contented, th

nceps was threatened by continual conspiracies though these plots may not have been either as frequent or as dangerous as t

ism. The aristocracy knew the truth and suffered in bitter impotence, not least when they derived profit and advancement fr

ey had gone very far. 3 This is the argument in Tacitus, Ann. 1, 10 not against the Principate but against the Princeps.

letudinarian, abandoning bodily exercise and bathing rarely: he could not stand the sun, even in winter, in which season he

inter, in which season he would wear no fewer than four under-shirts, not to mention puttees round his legs. It may be adde

have been privately canvassed and derided as offensive when they were not palpably fraudulent. His personal courage was not

sive when they were not palpably fraudulent. His personal courage was not above reproach. With all allowance made for hosti

ke into the camp and tent of the Caesarian leader at Philippi: he was not there. After the example set by Caesar the Dict

were notorious instances of mercy, as when Cinna was pardoned after a not very well authenticated conspiracy, the Principat

ght at Philippi to pass from Antonius to Octavianus, the statement is not as daring as it might appear, but is rather a sub

tus should be hailed as pater patriae (2 B.C.) Pollio, however, did not suffer himself thus to be captured by the governm

PageBook=>483 His freedom of speech cost him promotion he did not rise above the praetorship. Augustus gave the con

oratory, ambition and political intrigue. Augustus was invulnerable. Not so his friends: a trial might be the occasion eit

iticism of the whole government. The major scandals, it is true., did not always come before the courts; but politics are p

tervention of Augustus, who came to the court and sat there. 2 He did not need to make a speech. Such was auctoritas. Maece

on their side, with salutary rebuke of their enemies. 3 Augustus did not forget his friends and allies: he was able to pre

the moral of the times, intelligent to anticipate the future. He did not intend that his retirement from politics should b

duced the practice of holding recitations, though to friends only and not to an indiscriminate public. 5 PageNotes. 483

rience, he must have found much to criticize. Certain politicians had not delayed to produce their memoirs: it may be presu

t delayed to produce their memoirs: it may be presumed that they were not alarmingly outspoken about the career of the Caes

tonius in which he had participated; 2 the disasters of Antonius will not have been underestimated. Even Agrippa took up th

regretted that Pollio’s comments upon this interesting document have not been preserved. Of the style at least he will hav

hat his real opinion of the character, policy and style of Cicero was not so far from that of Pollio. Pollio’s native distr

rian. 2 Livy had come to history from the study of rhetoric. That was not the only defect that Pollio could discover in Liv

and romantic view of history. 1 Pollio knew what history was. It was not like Livy. Augustus’ historian of imperial Rome

n: a rich concoction. The writers and speakers of the opposition were not confined to a jejune archaism or a bare Attic sim

r, a favourite of Maecenas, was an easy target. The more eminent were not immune. He even criticized Pollio. 3 Labienus als

ion against noxious literature. 5 Public bonfires were instituted but not for such trifles as the Ars amatoria of Ovid. Con

nus’ writings were officially condemned and publicly burned. That did not matter, said Cassius Severus, who had them all by

r, said Cassius Severus, who had them all by heart. 7 But Cassius did not go unscathed. This man, an able and vigorous orat

friend Nonius Asprenas on a charge of poisoning. His activities were not confined to the courts he composed libellous pamp

elve years later they removed him to the barren rock of Seriphus. 4 Not so dangerous as Labienus and Cassius, or possessi

nation from being stamped as the open enemy of freedom and truth. But not for long. Coerced through official repression, or

y, history soon decayed and perished. ‘Magna illa ingenia cessere. ’7 Not history only, but poetry and eloquence also, now

enius from the Triumviral period and claimed it for its own: it could not produce a new crop. The generation that grew to m

th to attack or traduce the Founder was an offence against the State. Not all emperors, however, were succeeded by rulers w

f state. The variations of the technique are curious and instructive. Not enough to celebrate in fulsome language the ‘inen

’ monopoly of military glory, whether personal enemies of Tiberius or not . Lollius is a monster of rapacity and intrigue, V

inius and Ahenobarbus were simply left out altogether. Vinicius could not decently be omitted: the praise of his military a

that this form of composition was peculiarly and wholly Roman. He did not live to see his verdict confirmed by Juvenal and

EMMATA quid faciunt? ’1 The satirist Juvenal makes mock of pedigrees. Not , however, with all the fierce, free invective of

ames and examples from the descendants of the Republican nobility but not the living. Few of them, indeed, survived in Juve

ng. Few of them, indeed, survived in Juvenal’s day, and they mattered not at all. The Empire had broken their power and the

The Empire had broken their power and their spirit. The satirist did not dare to deride the new nobility, the oligarchy of

the Empire, they wore the purple of the Caesars. Juvenal’s poem is not so much a panegyric of plebeian merit as a lament

d reveals the causes and tragedy of their decadence. The nobiles have not spoken themselves. They have left no personal and

better cause and the best men, the brave and the loyal, had perished. Not a mere faction of the nobility had been defeated,

e nobility had been defeated, but a whole class. The contest had been not merely political but social. Sulla, Pompeius and

eius. The last in the direct line of the Metelli, an ex-Antonian, did not reach the consulate; and the last consular bearer

l consul then, M. Claudius Marcellus Aeserninus, consul in 22 B.C., a not very distinguished partisan of Caesar the Dictato

. Cato’s son fell at Philippi and the Porcii lapsed into obscurity if not extinction. 1 No more consuls came of the Luculli

eign of Augustus produced no more consuls after that time. That was not all. To Roman and aristocratic pride the families

Lepidus. Scaurus was spared after Actium. PageNotes. 492 1 It is not certain that the delator Porcius Cato (Tacitus, A

longed to this family. 2 Tacitus, Ann. 3, 76. The most germane were not in evidence ‘sed prae- fulgebant Cassius atque Br

tus’. The descent and relationships of M. Servilius (cos. A.D. 3) Are Not Known. Like His Son, He May Have Had The cognomen

o protection from the doom of an illustrious name. 3 Yet these were not the most prominent among the sacrifices of the bl

most prominent among the sacrifices of the blood-stained Principate, not the closest in power, in prestige, or in family t

e blind old censor, to the Decemvir. Yet by a paradox the power went, not to the brilliant and ambitious branch of the Clau

Roman noble, the Claudian had aspired to primacy among his peers but not at the cost of personal humiliation, through disa

it meant the ruin of Roman and Republican virtue. The Principate was not a monarchy in name. That made it all the worse. T

emed destined to achieve power in the end. Inheriting from his father not only great estates but boundless popularity with

dership in his party. To the Domitii, primacy might be delayed, but not denied for ever. The complex marriage policy of A

arbi, eight consuls before him in eight generations. 1 But Nero was not the last survivor of the blood of Augustus. The J

uccumbed to a prosecution in the reign of Tiberius, and the family is not heard of afterwards. 3 The Fabii and the Valeri

l prominent in the first days of the Empire but their direct line did not survive the dynasty of the Julii and Claudii, the

of Augustus’ Principate. Before long, however, they became entangled, not only among themselves, as when a Piso, adopted by

ssus Frugi Licinianus, whose historic name, spared by Domitian, could not escape allegations of conspiracy against both Ner

onspiracy against both Nerva and Trajan. 8 He was duly relegated, but not executed until the beginning of the reign of Hadr

bility seemed to have run its course. Yet the succeeding period did not entirely lack bearers of Augustan consular names

As has been shown, the marshals of Augustus, the flower of Italy, did not respond to his national policy by the production

s. 2 But his three grandsons, two consuls and a consul-designate, did not outlive the Julio-Claudians; one of them perished

(cos. 12 B.C.,) himself of an ancient and respectable family that had not risen above the praetorship. 6 Even under Traja

temma, ib., 870. Of all noble houses, however, the Acilii Glabriones, not of great political consequence in the early Princ

of princesses. 1 That was the end of a Sabine family. Passienus could not compete with L. Vitellius, three times consul.

Pius, in origin a Narbonensian from Nemausus. Even had Antoninus Pius not become emperor, he would still have been one of t

ns. In the first decade of his constitutional rule, Augustus employed not a single nobilis among the legates who commanded

4). 3 That Pompeia Plotina came from Nemausus is made probable, but not proved, by SHA Hadr. 12, 2. A slight confirmation

n if the nobilis forgot his ancestors and his name, the Emperor could not . Before long the nobiles disappear from the great

Ib. 1, 49 (ultimate and damning). PageBook=>504 The lesson was not lost. Nero was the descendant of Ahenobarbus, of

ved the house of the Cocceii through many generations; 3 but it could not ultimately protect the grandson of Augustus’ mars

e’s invasion of the Roman government, they seize supreme power but do not hold it for long. Africa and the eastern lands ar

estrian officers and political or financial agents of the government, not merely under Augustus but even with Pompeius and

d by ‘bad emperors’ or masterful servants of the government. It could not be arrested. The defeat of the nobiles was spirit

The defeat of the nobiles was spiritual as well as political. It was not merely that the Principate engrossed their power

and Cassius, who had fought against Caesar’s heir at Philippi, could not have been invoked to support his Principate witho

amilies whose names embodied the history of Republican Rome. That was not the worst. Political liberty had to go, for the s

virtus, that was hard for a patriot and an honest man to bear. It is not so much the rigour of despotism as the servility

e doom of Republican Libertas. Tacitus, in a sense his successor, was not a Roman aristocrat either, but a new man, presuma

and persecuted. The record of their ruin might be instructive it was not a happy task for an historian. The author of the

mpany, sons of the old Italian aristocracy, whose private virtues did not avail to compensate the cardinal crime of being o

incompetent, bears in those epithets the blame for three legions lost not all his own fault. 2 The most eminent of the patr

by Horace’s charming ode and by the loyal effusions of Ovid, he might not stand in such startling contrast to his son, the

contrast to his son, the infamous Persicus, whom Claudius, an emperor not averse from cruel irony, described as ‘nobilissim

. Commentators on this speech have failed to notice that Persicus was not only notorious for vice but was even the type of

at Philippi. Political liberty, it could be maintained, was doomed if not dead long before that. Pollio knew the bitter tru

isset? ’1 His purpose was expressly to deny the Republic of Augustus, not to rehabilitate anarchy, the parent of despotism.

umque potiri. 2 The nobiles, by their ambition and their feuds, had not merely destroyed their spurious Republic: they ha

e important than political liberty; and political rights are a means, not an end in themselves. That end is security of lif

nd in themselves. That end is security of life and property: it could not be guaranteed by the constitution of Republican R

he New State might be called monarchy, or by any other name. That did not matter. Personal rights and private status need n

er name. That did not matter. Personal rights and private status need not depend upon the form of government. And even thou

efore civic duty and national patriotism. With the Principate, it was not merely Augustus and his party that prevailed it m

peaceful men of property to be driven into taking sides in a quarrel not their own or mulcted of their lands for the benef

over. The Republic was something that a prudent man might admire but not imitate: as a wicked opportunist once observed, ‘

ed by patronage into the ranks of the governing class, the conviction not merely of the inevitability but also of the benef

was a snob as well as a careerist. 4 The Republican profession was not so much political as social and moral: it was mor

ation of active discontent with the present state of affairs. It need not be taken as seriously as it was by suspicious emp

ced one civil war in his own lifetime, and the threat of another, did not allow his judgement entirely to be blinded by lit

better. After that, only a contest for supreme power. 2 Tacitus does not even admit a restoration of the Free State if Bru

ich fools call liberty’, left no record in the annals of eloquence. 5 Not so Athens and Rhodes they were democracies, and d

in Hist. 1, 50: ‘mansuram fuisse sub Pompeio Brutoque rem publicam. ’ Not , however, in Hist. 2, 38, where the historian spe

nsavit. ’ PageBook=>516 The admirer of ancient eloquence could not have the advantage both ways, enjoying both Repub

s organized under a principate no dictatorship or monarchy. Names did not matter much. Before long the eloquent Seneca, whe

th the notion of absolute power. The Principate, though absolute, was not arbitrary. It derived from consent and delegation

s something different from the monarchies of the East. The Romans had not sunk as low as that. Complete freedom might be un

Principate provided the middle way between these extremes. 4 It was not long before the Principate gave birth to its own

r rulers, to stamp their power as illicit, in a word, as ‘dominatio’, not ‘principatus’. NotesPage=>516 1 Dial. 41,

nt donee homines’ it was folly to be utopian. 4 But the situation was not hopeless. A good emperor would dispense the bless

s rule over the whole world, while the harm done by a bad emperor was not boundless: it fell mostly upon his immediate ento

the Roman People and quietly practised the higher patriotism. It was not glorious: but glory was ruinous. A surer fame was

yrdom, who might be admired for Republican independence of spirit but not for political wisdom. 3 Neither Tacitus nor Traja

orte inclaruerunt. ’ 4 Tacitus, Ann. 15, 31. 5 Hist. 4, 69, 18 M ( not invalidated by the fact that it occurs in the let

d perhaps went too far when he spoke of ‘dux sacratus’. 3 But Dux was not enough. Augustus assumed the irreproachable garb

lize into titles official or conventional, were already there. It was not until 2 B.C. that Augustus was acclaimed pater pa

lels in the language of the Stoics, is Roman and military. 2 He would not desert his post until a higher command relieved h

of the Commonwealth. The new member reinvigorated the whole and could not have been severed without damage. 8 NotesPage=&

position became ever more monarchic. Yet with all this, Augustus was not indispensable that was the greatest triumph of al

knight or for soldier, for Roman or for provincial. The rewards were not so splendid as in the wars of the Revolution; but

he end came it found him serene and cheerful. On his death-bed he was not plagued by remorse for his sins or by anxiety for

nceps in war and the victims of his public or private treacheries are not mentioned by name but are consigned to contemptuo

as legal and magisterial; and he excels any colleague he might have, not in potestas, but only in auctoritas. 3 Which is t

n potestas, but only in auctoritas. 3 Which is true as far as it goes not very far, Auctoritas, however, does betray the tr

naval expedition in A.D. 5, commanded by Tiberius, though his name is not mentioned (ib. 26). 3 Ib. 34. 4 As Mommsen ob

recisely the clients of the Princeps (Klio XXII (1928), 261 ff.), has not always been sufficiently regarded. PageBook=>

great merits and for reasons of high politics. None the less, it will not help to describe the Res Gestae as the title-deed

s the title-deeds of his divinity. 1 If explained they must be, it is not with reference to the religions and kings of the

identification with P. Cornelius Scipio (for whom cf. 35 B.C.). It is not certain, however, who he was. 36 B.C. The suffe

erges as cos. suff., and the praenomen of Galba is shown to be Gaius, not Servius. 4 B.C. New suffecti: C. Caelius and Ga

w suffecti: A. Plautius and A. Caecina (Severus). What follows does not pretend to be in any sense an edition of a part o

e to ready identification; and cognomina are added, even when they do not occur in the documents that attest the consulates

Fourth Eclogue, 218 ff.; in Macedonia, 222 f.; his triumph, 222, 241; not at Tarentum, 225; his public library, 241; attitu

of, 457. Auximum, 90, 92, 478. Avectius, Nervian, 475. Baetica, not a province in 27 B.C., 326; date of origin, 395.

e Emperor, betrothed to Livia Medullina, 422; to Urgulania, 385, 422; not liked by his family, 433; his Antonian blood, 495

1 f., 139, 159, 407; prosecuted, 72, 151; great wealth, 77, 381; does not enter the Senate, 80 f.; relations with Octavianu

ff.; responsibility for the Civil War, 47 ff.; Dictatorship, 51 ff.; not really a revolutionary, 52, 59, 68, 194; monarchi

Postumus, C., financier, his importance, 73; services to Caesar, 82; not given the consulate, 82, 95; helps Octavianus, 13

f Augustus, 474. Saserna, 131 see also Hostilius. Satire, 489; does not attack the wealthy and powerful, 490. PageBook=

y, 225, 277 f., 279; merits of, as a form of government, 347. Troy, not to be rebuilt, 305; Trojan descent of Julii, 305,

egations of, 127, 149 ff., 276 f., 281, 426 f., 432, 479 ff., 509 f.; not always pernicious, 105, 442. Vicomagistri, 469,

the Principate of Augustus, omits certain childless matches and does not carry his descendants beyond the second generatio

facing p. 362, where, as the author admits, there are uncertainties. Not less so in the matter of the Arruntii, cf. above,