a bold decision in the interests of brevity and clearness—to quote as much as possible of the ancient evidence, to refer but

d papers mentioned in the footnotes. It will at once be evident how much the conception of the nature of Roman politics he

s writings about Antonius and Cleopatra (from which I have learned so much , though compelled to dissent in one matter of car

nd about the position of the Princeps as a party-leader naturally owe much , but do not derive entirely, from this illuminati

the University of Oxford—the more so, precisely, because there is so much in the present volume that will make him raise hi

e, is of some importance. If the book provokes salutary criticism, so much the better. OXFORD, 1 June 1939 R. S. NOTE TO

ss to utilize, the writings and discoveries of the last twelve years, much as I should have liked to insert various small ye

lustius in style and colouring is evident enough: their affinity goes much deeper than words. Nor would it be rash to assert

volution as that bitter theme demanded, in a plain, hard style. It is much to be regretted that he did not carry his History

y, power and office in the towns of Italy, the proportion was clearly much higher than has sometimes been imagined. Of a tot

oneering written by Q. Cicero (the Commentariolum petitionis) reveals much of the truth about his candidature. PageBook=&g

, sadly reduced in political power in the previous generation, not so much through Marius as from internal disasters and the

prevail. The patricians in the restored oligarchy held rank not so much from resources of their own as from alliance with

astic politics. The tribune M. Livius Drusus, whose activities did so much to precipitate the Bellum Italicum, left no son o

rule, but by that alone and not in solid permanence. The nobiles were much too stubborn to admit a master, even on their own

gh patronage of the Scipiones. 4 Subsequent alliances had not brought much aristocratic distinction. Pompeius’ mother was a

us emerged with renewed strength from a crisis which he may have done much to provoke. 4 Had he dropped Caesar, he might hav

Fowler points out, his Roman contemporaries do not seem to have taken much interest in the matter, Roman Ideas of Deity (191

the traditional governing class. Caesar’s autocracy appeared to be much more than a temporary expedient to liquidate the

years Caesar had not been able to influence the consular elections to much effect. 3 Deplorable in appearance, the lack of c

rs he did not abate his sincere efforts in the cause of concord. So much for the principes: before long, most of the Pompe

f his agent and constrained Cicero to undertake his defence: with how much sincerity, another question. Pompeius was probabl

events with some accuracy and face the future with equanimity. It is much to be regretted that his letters to apprehensive

ion Pompeius’ property brought in fifty million denarii: it was worth much more. 6 Antonius and the poet Q. Cornificius divi

st consul of the Republic. 4 Pride kept the legends of the patricians much purer. They did not need to descend to fraud, and

mpunction. About the early admissions to power and nobility at Rome much will remain obscure and controversial. In itself,

cannot be discussed here. 2 The unification of Italy is often dated much too early. That it can have been neither rapid no

a class in society and a party in politics. But even now the work had much farther to go in so far as Italy was concerned: t

Cassius, Ad fam. 11, 1. The dating of this crucial document has been much disputed. The early morning of March 17th, ably a

legions; and Apamea was closely invested by Caesarian generals. So much for provinces and armies. Had the Liberators plot

i auctores’ (Ad Att. 14, 10, 2). PageBook=>107 Roman State had much to be thankful for, as partisan testimony was pre

intended for the Balkan and eastern wars, it might be doubted whether much was still at Rome for Antonius to take. The chara

territory by an eastern monarch subject to Rome not that it mattered much ; 2 and he bestowed Roman citizenship upon the inh

moment, however, Caesar’s heir was merely a nuisance, not a factor of much influence upon the policy of Antonius. The consul

eave Italy. Antonius had returned to Rome with an escort of veterans, much to the disquiet of the Liberators, who wrote to h

before the People, friendly and favourable to the Liberators. 3 So much in public. What happened next is obscure. The ene

bout Octavianus’ prospects was perhaps only a mask. The young man was much in the company of his step-father: the profit in

atrimony he was soon to invest ‘for the good of the Commonwealth’ and much more than his patrimony. The diversion of publi

lution were not eager to stir up another. But Octavianus wished to be much more than the leader of a small band of desperado

is the negation of liberty, the laws and of all civilized life. 3 So much for Caesar. But the desire for fame is not in i

r stood in sole control of the policy of the State. The situation was much more complicated than that, issues entangled, fac

e better than the justest of wars. Then the fair name lost credit. So much talk was there of peace and concord in the revolu

Romano homine moriamur. PageBook=>157 be called, being not so much ethical qualities as standards of an order in soc

al of consulars had fallen to seventeen: their effective strength was much less. Various in character, standing and allegian

’s generals, a clever politician and an orator of some spirit. 1 So much for Senate and senior statesmen. Without armed ai

ions of the moment. On a long view, the future was ominous with a war much more formidable than that which was being so gent

n so, the possession of Macedonia and an army meant for Brutus not so much an instrument for war as security and a basis for

arii more than ten times a year’s pay. 5 They had still to receive as much again. With a devoted army, augmented to eleven l

g army of the Caesarians, which numbered some forty-three legions. So much for present needs. For the future, to recompense

er of Antonius. When Brutus heard of the end of Cicero, it was not so much sorrow as shame that he felt for Rome. 2 For go

in the East, the new compact appeared to bring an ally in the West of much more value than Lepidus to check the power of his

c and dynastic in his management of affairs, like his father trusting much to alien or domestic adherents. Whether from choi

ence from the language, habits and religion of his own people. It was much more than the rule of the nobiles that had collap

y that by now had accrued to Octavianus. It was great, indeed, not so much by contrast with Antonius as with his earlier sit

tions, cut to pieces two legions under Oppius Statianus and destroyed much of Antonius’ supplies and artillery. Antonius, la

97. 3 Ad Att. 14, 12, 1. PageBook=>273 Egypt itself, however much augmented, could never be a menace to the empire

he wife of the prince of Mauretania ; 3 nor was the foreign woman now much more than an accident in the contest, inevitable

o be believed (50, 4, 2). The publication of the will is not given so much importance and effect by Plutarch (Antonius 58 f.

timidate opposition and to stampede the neutrals. But the measure was much more than a device invented to overcome a tempora

Asia, Bithynia-Pontus and Syria. Such was the sober truth about the much advertised reconquest of the East for Rome. 1 The

d the fabric of Roman rule. There were to be no more civil wars. So much for the East. It was never a serious preoccupatio

tius 2, 10, 13 ff. 2 It was an especial habit of the Greeks to make much of Parthia. The historian Livy rebuked them (9, 1

ry was flattered when his poets called him ‘dux’ and ‘ductor’. 4 So much for Rome, the governing classes and Italy. But ev

o’s character and Cicero’s style; and Pollio detested Plancus. That much more than the memory and the oratory of Cicero wa

oncepts and the consecrated vocabulary of Roman political literature, much of it, indeed, in no way peculiar to Cicero: the

name was A. Terentius Varro Licinius Murena. PageBook=>326 So much for the consulate. In the manner of controlling t

who wished to keep watch over the Balkans as well as the East. 5 So much for the settlement of 23 B.C. It was only twenty-

çade as under the Republic. Not only that. Augustus himself is not so much a man as a hero and a figure-head, an embodiment

the Revolution and the rule of the Triumvirate. Knights had been of much more value in the armies of Rome than the public

. 2 If the experiment was ever made, it was quickly abandoned. Not so much because it was a mockery, given the true characte

ithout ostentation or danger, and lived secure as a senior statesman, much in demand on decorative occasions as speaker for

n of the Triumvir, became consul. But the consulate did not matter so much . Enemies were dangerous only if they had armies a

he took and carried for a time (ib., 4, 1), and, like his father, was much in demand as a match. After the death of his wife

A.D. 6. Proconsuls nominated, not only in A.D. 6 (Dio 55, 28, 2), but much earlier, for example P. Paquius Scaeva again in C

explaining Dio’s date. Yet Cinna’s consulate was probably due, not so much to Augustus, as to the Republican Tiberius, mindf

was brief and transient. The death of Marcellus, a heavy calamity and much bewailed, was compensated by a new policy, in whi

ople upon an untried youth in the twentieth year of his age, that was much more than a contradiction of the constitutional u

close to the succession ‘nomini ac fortunae Caesarum proximi’. 2 Too much , perhaps, to hope for the power themselves but th

, 97, 1. The truth of the matter is revealed by Dio 54, 20, 4 ff. Too much has been made of the ‘clades Lolliana’. 6 Tacit

k=>442 Marius was an exemplar of ‘Itala virtus’; Sulla Felix was much more a traditional Roman aristocrat than many hav

uilt it all came from neglect of the ancient gods. The evil went back much farther than Caesar or Pompeius, being symptom an

ts validity or its success from mere action by a government. There is much more authentic religious sentiment here than has

ught no money to the peasant, if his life was stern and laborious, so much the better. He must learn to love it, for his own

ity in origin and sentiment with a large class in Italy Augustus owed much of his success as a party leader and sufficient c

eror from the Sabine country, ‘antiquo ipse cultu victuque’, effected much by his personal example. Yet more than all that,

heroic past and the glorious present. Not merely propaganda something much greater was afoot, the deliberate creation of a R

h Roman and Greek. The War of Actium was shown to be a contest not so much against Greece as against Egypt and the East. The

Aemilius Lepidus, reveals a gravity and depth of feeling beside which much of the ceremonial literature of Augustan Rome app

onumental commemoration. The official treatment of these themes makes much Augustan poetry seem an inspired anticipation and

designs for the succession of Gaius and Lucius. He did not need it so much for himself. At the colony of Acerrae in Campania

pire. 1 The institution would further inspire among the Gauls just so much community of sentiment as would serve the conveni

the fourth of the cardinal virtues, justice, it was necessary to say much about that. Less advertised by the government, bu

th the period of which he had personal experience, he must have found much to criticize. Certain politicians had not delayed

pire, they wore the purple of the Caesars. Juvenal’s poem is not so much a panegyric of plebeian merit as a lament for the

son and his granddaughter were in banishment, confined to islands. So much for the nearest of his kin among the descendants

t Philippi or Antonius at Actium, the ultimate result might have been much the same for the Domitii: prominent among the Lib

suls sixty years later (PIR2, C 295 and 317). PageBook=>498 So much for the nobiles. The successful novi homines of t

e tie with the Julio-Claudians is surely too tenuous to have mattered much . PageBook=>501 Even Nerva seems an anachro

of the nobiles under the Empire to assert their lack of ability; and much of the hostile testimony that could be adduced is

, that was hard for a patriot and an honest man to bear. It is not so much the rigour of despotism as the servility and dege

snob as well as a careerist. 4 The Republican profession was not so much political as social and moral: it was more often

under a principate no dictatorship or monarchy. Names did not matter much . Before long the eloquent Seneca, when counsellin

f Caesar’s heir and avenger alone. 1 Agrippa indeed occurs twice, but much more as a date than as an agent. Other allies of