cal history, as the binding link between the Republic and the Empire: it is something real and tangible, whatever may be t

uestion confronting the Romans themselves, and I have tried to answer it precisely in their fashion (chapter xxxiii, Pax e

bout Augustus is simply panegyric, whether ingenuous or edifying. Yet it is not necessary to praise political success or t

liography at the end is not intended as a guide to the whole subject: it merely contains, put together for convenience, th

mer of 1937. The index is mainly prosopographical in character, and it covers the footnotes as well as the text. If used

onjunction with the list of consuls and the seven genealogical tables it will sometimes reveal facts or connexions not exp

re patent and flagrant. It has not been composed in tranquillity; and it ought to be held back for several years and rewri

ails accruing. Essentially, and strictly, therefore, the book is what it was when it first appeared. OXFORD, 1 January 1

g. Essentially, and strictly, therefore, the book is what it was when it first appeared. OXFORD, 1 January 1951 R. S.

years of civil war and military tyranny. If despotism was the price, it was not too high: to a patriotic Roman of Republi

ens. 1 Liberty was gone, but only a minority at Rome had ever enjoyed it . The survivors of the old governing class, shatte

xtravagant fancies. Julian the Apostate invoked philosophy to explain it . The problem does not exist: Julian was closer to

t to be defined. Auctoritas is the word his enemies would have called it potentia. They were right. Yet the ‘Restoration o

t. 2 The Triumviral period is tangled, chaotic and hideous. To take it all for granted, however, and make a clean beginn

s and culmination, either melancholy or exultant. The conviction that it all had to happen is indeed difficult to discard.

ologia for Cicero or for Octavianus—or for both at once. A section of it was so written by C. Asinius Pollio, in a Roman a

evident enough: their affinity goes much deeper than words. Nor would it be rash to assert that Pollio was closely akin bo

ning class. Though symbolized for all time in the Battle of Philippi, it was a long process, not a single act. Sallustius

That Pollio chose to write no further will readily be understood. As it was, his path was hazardous. The lava was still m

al (contemporary or going back to contemporary sources, often biased, it is true, but admitting criticism, interpretation,

ll all the more sharply be revealed by unfriendly presentation. But it is not enough to redeem Augustus from panegyric a

another. At its worst, biography is flat and schematic: at the best, it is often baffled by the hidden discords of human

partisans. In all ages, whatever the form and name of government, be it monarchy, republic, or democracy, an oligarchy lu

dapt that cumbrous theme to a consecutive narrative of events. Nor is it only the biography of Augustus that shall be sacr

oligarchy of the nobiles held office at Rome. Pompeius fought against it ; but Pompeius, for all his power, had to come to

his power, had to come to terms. Nor could Caesar have ruled without it . Coerced by Pompeius and sharply repressed by Cae

narchy rules through an oligarchy. Subject and treatment indicated, it remains to choose a date for the beginning. The

In the beginning kings ruled at Rome, and in the end, as was fated, it came round to monarchy again. Monarchy brought co

iberty and of peace. Those ideals were incompatible. When peace came, it was the peace of despotism. ‘Cum domino pax ista

ate did not merely confer power upon its holder and dignity for life: it ennobled a family for ever. Within the Senate, it

combination of merit, industry and protection. The nobilitas did not, it is true, stand like a solid rampart to bar all in

the family, money and the political alliance (amicitia or factio, as it was variously labelled). The wide and remembered

that women were merely the instruments of masculine policy. Far from it : the daughters of the great houses commanded poli

y. The sovran people of a free republic conferred its favours on whom it pleased. 3 Popularity with the plebs was therefor

wly agents such as influential freedmen were not despised. Above all, it was necessary to conciliate the second order in s

the law-courts and in opposition to the Senate. The Equites belonged, it is true, to the same social class as the great bu

tion was a screen and a sham. Of the forces that lay behind or beyond it , next to the noble families the knights were the

nt. He imagined that oratory and intrigue would suffice. A programme, it is true, he developed, negative but by no means d

r widened to a consensus omnium bonorum and embraced tota Italia. But it was an ideal rather than a programme: there was n

uated in Rome and Italy its harsh and hopeless rule. The Empire broke it . The repercussions of the ten years’ war in Ita

n war against the Samnites and the Carthaginians: some had maintained it since then, others had lapsed for a time. The Ful

ge. The ten years’ war in Italy not merely corrupted their integrity: it broke their spirit. Certain of the earliest con

hanged the tone of his political professions. Short of the consulate, it was given NotesPage=>024 1 Plutarch, Cato

at ancestor whom he emulated almost to a parody, Cato the Censor. But it was not character and integrity only that gave Ca

men NotesPage=>026 1 This was notorious. Cicero could not deny it , cf. Ad Att. 12, 21, 1. 2 Sallust, BC 52, 21 f.

lutarch, Pompeius 44; Cato minor 30. Cf. Münzer, RA, 349 ff. 2 That it need not have been a serious matter is shown by A

ious bill providing lands for the veterans of Pompeius. Celer opposed it . More significant evidence of Pompeius’ weakness

in Spain, asked for a triumph. Cato blocked the triumph. To wait for it would be to sacrifice the consulate. Caesar made

reer, with no discredit to either. Caesar’s choice was still open had it not been for Cato; and Caesar’s daughter was betr

fairly be designated as the end of the Free State. From a triumvirate it was a short step to dictatorship. Caesar’s cons

in reply worked for the restitution of Cicero, and at length achieved it . For himself, after a famine in Rome, perhaps del

or their patron and champion, displayed his body in the Forum, burned it on a pyre in the Curia, and destroyed that buildi

rces of patronage for the party in control of the government. Nor was it at all likely that the dynast would abide by lett

heir patron, were ready to bring their levies at his command. Magnus, it might seem, was strong enough to prevent civil wa

rces, entangled in the embrace of perfidious allies: or, as he called it himself, patriotic submission to the needs of the

me. He hoped to employ the leading nobiles to destroy Caesar, whether it came to war or not, in either way gaining the mas

epublic in the East. Sulla had all the ambition of a Roman noble: but it was not his ambition to seize power through civil

it was not his ambition to seize power through civil strife and hold it , supreme and alone. His work done, the Dictator r

was the panacea for the world’s ills, and with the design to achieve it by armed force. 1 Such a view is too simple to be

nitas had ever been dearer than life itself. ’2 Sooner than surrender it , Caesar appealed to arms. A constitutional pretex

an People. But that was not the plea which Caesar himself valued most it was his personal honour. His enemies appeared t

aced as had been Gabinius, the governor of Syria. If he gave way now, it was the end. Returning to Rome a private citizen,

have impaired his decision. 3 Yet his plan was no mere makeshift, as it appeared to his allies, but subtle and grandiose

and then to return, like Sulla, to victory and to power. 4 Caesar, it is true, had only a legion to hand: the bulk of h

ance of the Pompeian cause in Africa and in Spain. ‘They would have it thus,’ said Caesar as he gazed upon the Roman dea

hip. His rule began as the triumph of a faction in civil war: he made it his task to transcend faction, and in so doing wr

enemies would soon direct that deadly weapon against one who had used it with such dexterity in the past and who more rece

No statement of unrealized intentions is a safe guide to history, for it is unverifiable and therefore the most attractive

ty (1914), 112 ff. Phil. 2, 110, however, is a difficult passage. Yet it can hardly be proved that Caesar devised a compre

able as those of a monarch. Caesar would have been the first to admit it : he needed neither the name nor the diadem. But m

power, beginning as a military demagogue. If Caesar must be judged, it is by facts and not by alleged intentions. As his

ng future or laid the foundation of a consistent government. Whatever it might be, it would owe more to the needs of the m

laid the foundation of a consistent government. Whatever it might be, it would owe more to the needs of the moment than to

to alien or theoretical models. More important the business in hand: it was expedited in swift and arbitrary fashion. Cae

3 Suetonius, Divus Iulius 79, 2. PageBook=>056 At the moment it was intolerable: the autocrat became impatient, a

tragic sense of impotence and frustration he had been all things and it was no good. 3 He had surpassed the good fortune

the conspiracy, might lend plausible colouring to such a theory. Yet it is in no way evident that the nature of Brutus wo

us. Above all, to Brutus as to Cato, who stood by the ancient ideals, it seemed that Caesar, avid for splendour, glory and

man instead of the rule of the law, the constitution and the Senate; it announced the triumph soon or late of new forces

took the Dictatorship for life and the sworn allegiance of senators, it seemed clear that he had escaped from the shackle

litical deputy until a new leader, emerging unexpected, at first tore it in pieces again, but ultimately, after conquering

d in the spring of 49 (Dio 41, 14, 5), at the age of ninety-eight, so it was alleged (Pliny, NH 7, 156). 3 Above, p. 41

enate turned with alacrity to a politician whose boast and reputation it was that he never let down his friends. Where Pom

e Marian faction. 2 Hostile to the oligarchy and wishing to supersede it , Marius’ party comprised diverse elements, noble

mpeius. But not all were now Pompeians P. Sulpicius Rufus, a kinsman, it may be presumed, of that eloquent and high-minded

anding armies and governing provinces under the Dictatorship. 6 Some, it is true, were disappointed or ungrateful: yet of

of patrician stock. Caesar, like Sulla, was a patrician and proud of it . He boasted before the people that his house was

laudius Pulcher in 51 (Ad fam. 8, 6, 1), so he had little choice when it came to civil war. Caesar designated him for the

comfortable person of scholarly tastes, in high repute as a gourmet: it was a danger to ask him to dinner. 5 Pansa was al

ct of 60 B.C. In December of that year he sought to bring Cicero into it , Ad Att. 2, 3, 3. 4 Cicero, Pro Balbo 58: ‘nam

eserved. Many of the bankers were already personal friends of Caesar: it may be presumed that he gave them guarantees agai

gainst revolution. They had more to fear from Pompeius, and they knew it . Caesar’s party had no monopoly of the bankrupts

nd 6; 11, 6, 2. 4 Dessau (Hermes XLVI (1911), 613 FF.) has rendered it highly probable that the Caesarian Curtius, or Cu

pina might be found among the officers and friends of Pompeius; 3 and it will not have been forgotten that his father had

ad begun. In Gaul beyond the Alps, the provincia (or Narbonensis as it was soon to be called), there was a chieftain of

52. On the family, cf. also BG 7, 65, 2. 2 Ad fam. 10, 32, 5, where it is stated that Gallus has in his possession a dra

road. At auction Pompeius’ property brought in fifty million denarii: it was worth much more. 6 Antonius and the poet Q. C

PageBook=>078 WHEN a party seizes control of the Commonwealth it cannot take from the vanquished the bitter and ba

loyalty, and for the rewards of loyalty. The Senate was full of them, it was alleged. Only ignorance or temerity will pret

were rustic and humble in origin. The centurionate was worth having: it could be got through patronage as well as service

s, which, lacking full documentation, is sometimes disregarded before it emerges into imperial history with two consuls in

w, p. 80, n. 1; also the Etruscan Cafo, JRS XXVII (1937), 135, though it is not certain that he was a senator. 2 Suetoni

tions about the Dictator’s policy, domestic and imperial, but renders it hard to understand the composition and character

same arguments hold for Caesar’s Senate, with added force, and render it at the same time more difficult and less importan

ditional religious observance. 6 Of certain local dynastic families it could in truth be proved as well as stated that t

he citizens had risen to drive them out. 8 The attempt was as vain as it would have been to expel the Aleuadae from Thessa

cure and controversial. In itself, the process is natural enough; and it is confirmed not a little by subsequent and unimp

or at least subjected to Roman influences. In a wide region of Italy it was reinforced by hostility to Rome as yet unappe

ere. 2 The unification of Italy is often dated much too early. That it can have been neither rapid nor easy is demonstra

The name Bellum Italicum is more comprehensive and no less revealing: it was a holy alliance, a coniuratio of eight people

al and bloody, with massacres of captives, hostages or non-combatants it was complicated and embittered by the strife of l

which had never been sincerely made; and many Italians had no use for it . Loyalties were still personal, local and regiona

in the Roman State. He glorified the memory of Cato and of Marius but it was for himself, as though they were his own ance

red that the sentiment and voice of Italy should be heard at Rome but it was the Italy of the post-Sullan order, and the r

noured Pompeius as its patron:2 but the men of Auximum protested that it would be intolerable to refuse admittance to the

tizens poured forth in jubilation to meet Antonius, Caesar’s man; and it was more than the obstinate folly of Ahenobarbus

f Italy: his decision to evacuate the peninsula was taken long before it was manifest and announced. It is evident enoug

nge and requital at last. The Paeligni have to wait a generation yet, it is true, before they can show a senator; 4 the le

, p. 199. PageBook=>094 obscure men. 1 That might be expected: it is the earliest consuls that convey the visible e

ing numerous suffect consuls as well. For all their admitted talents, it is by no means likely that the Dictator would hav

Schwartz, P-W II, 230), but is suspect. It is by no means clear that it suited his plans to make a violent demonstration

e to be dated immediately after the funeral (see the preceding note), it would not prove, though it might support, the vie

fter the funeral (see the preceding note), it would not prove, though it might support, the view that Antonius intended to

s barricaded themselves in their houses. Nor, as the days passed, did it become safe for them to be seen in public. The mo

e usurped authority and summoned the Senate to meet upon the Capitol, it was afterwards urged. 3 But that was treason. The

ble adversaries, they too had a share of power and glory. Discontent, it is true, could be detected among the populace of

egree of sympathy for the Republican cause defies any close estimate: it may not be measured by optimistic and partisan pr

d suppressed a recrudescence of the irregular cult of Caesar at Rome: it was hoped that he might be induced to support the

used and wrecked the venture. For friendship, however, or for safety, it was advisable to maintain or contract ties with a

The price was civil war. Even had the Liberators been willing to pay it , they could find little to encourage them abroad.

ty of the army commanders for their cause and they did not think that it was necessary. At the time of Caesar’s death, the

and their governors in 44 B.C. suffers from confusion and inaccuracy: it has been brought into satisfactory order through

>103 and before the Dictator’s acta were ratified on March 17th, it was feared that the consul would not allow them t

April Decimus Brutus set out for Cisalpine Gaul; about the same time, it may be presumed, Trebonius went to Asia, Cimber t

h 17th corresponded with political facts and with personal interests, it was not altogether foolish to hope for normal and

deputy. Yet there is no proof of any serious estrangement. 1 Lepidus, it is true, was appointed consul in 46 and Master of

Most of that will be coolly discounted. From the influence of Cicero it is less easy to escape. The Philippics, the serie

nce in 47 B.C., during Caesar’s absence. If Antonius stayed in Italy, it was precisely because he was dependable and most

ew or alarming in the holders of office and power at Rome. In the end it was not debauchery that ruined Antonius, but a fa

of the acts and intentions of Antonius in the year of his consulate, it will be necessary to forget both the Philippics a

bility for the turn which events took at the funeral will be debated: it was certainly in his interest to alarm the Senate

to remain away from Rome. He spoke the language of conciliation,1 and it was long before he abandoned it. On his lips the

ke the language of conciliation,1 and it was long before he abandoned it . On his lips the profession of respect for Brutus

s the Dictator’s war-chest, intended for the Balkan and eastern wars, it might be doubted whether much was still at Rome f

right of electing the pontifex maximus. This looked well. Naturally, it was a piece of political jobbery: Lepidus was cho

e seizure of territory by an eastern monarch subject to Rome not that it mattered much; 2 and he bestowed Roman citizenshi

n the inhabitants of Sicily. 3 Bribery and forged decrees, of course, it was whispered. But Cicero himself hoped to profit

ent Caesarian policy and final contest for the dominion of the world, it was easy to pretend that Antonius strove from the

the Caesarian party was now his: but he might have to fight to retain it . More than that, Antonius was consul, head of t

as the free working of Republican institutions. An innovation indeed: it had seldom, if ever, existed in the preceding twe

and tortuous Ap, Claudius, was yet merciful to the Roman People, for it suppressed along with the principes a source of i

nger he would take that region for his own consular province and with it an army adequate to defy any enterprises of his e

in March he had received Macedonia. Before the end of April, however, it was known that Antonius intended to propose on Ju

igues were devised against him but came to nothing. When he returned, it was to discover with dismay that a new and incalc

stus’. In the early and revolutionary years the heir of Caesar never, it is true, referred to himself as ‘Octavianus’; the

g the sanction of literary tradition, will here be maintained, though it is dubious and misleading. As his enemies bitterl

of the principal agent is of doubtful advantage at the best of times it either imparts a specious unity to the action or

ing of the law (cf. M. A. Levi, Ottaviano Capopartei (1933), 76 ff.), it matters little. PageBook=>116 as well as e

of the consul at the meeting of the Senate announced for August 1st; it may also have been known who was to take the lead

did in order to force his enemies to come out into the open. Nor was it likely that he would consent to surrender his com

that he would consent to surrender his command, hardly even a part of it , the Cisalpina, which may have been Piso’s propos

els would repose on grey hairs or none remaining. Legitimate primacy, it is true, could only be attained at Rome through m

, though a patrician, had designs upon this office. 1 Nothing came of it for the moment: at need, he would always be able

r enough, a faction may grow into something like a national party. So it was to be in the end. But this was no time for an

Caesar’s heir reveals never a trace of theoretical preoccupations: if it did, it would have been very different and very s

heir reveals never a trace of theoretical preoccupations: if it did, it would have been very different and very short.

y evoked among his friends was attested by impressive examples; 1 and it was not merely from lust of adventure or of gain

anus also, though less easily perhaps. Only two of his associates, so it was recorded, were ever thrown over, and that was

r naturally eludes inquiry. Antonius did not press the charge perhaps it was nothing more than a clumsy device to discredi

tonius believed in the reality of the attempt and rejoiced1 as though it suited the plans of Octavianus to rid himself of

ashion. To remove a rival was to remove a potential ally. 2 However it was, Antonius took alarm. Rome was becoming unten

eius now had an army. He was at first quite uncertain what to do with it . Was he to stand at Capua and prevent Antonius fr

The coalition of March 17th had not merely been split and shattered: it was being rebuilt, this time against Antonius, by

mily of M. Agrippa, friends or enemies have nothing to say: even when it became safe to inquire or publish, nothing at all

ium‘Vipsanius’ is exceedingly rare. Agrippa himself preferred to drop it (Seneca, Controv. 2, 4, 13). The origin of it can

mself preferred to drop it (Seneca, Controv. 2, 4, 13). The origin of it cannot be established: on names in ‘-anius’, cf.

. By the beginning of October the young man possessed a huge war-fund it might provide Antonius with an incentive to attac

power when consul at Rome. A policy they had, and they might achieve it to restore concord in the Caesarian party and so

(Ad Att. 12, 27, 1). In contrast, the mansions of Cicero. 3 Though it demands faith to believe that ‘Sallust’, In Cicer

in his political ideal, though not in the means he adopted to attain it . His defence can hardly cover the whole of his ca

attain it. His defence can hardly cover the whole of his career. Yet it would be perverse and unjust to rail and carp at

ius was threatened (in 61-60 B.C. and in 56): each time he reasserted it in a convincing fashion. Cicero surrendered to th

e leaders were Pompeius and Cato. It was clearly the better cause and it seemed the NotesPage=>137 1 Ad fam. 16, 12

he result not altogether satisfactory. Rather than emend, Cicero gave it up, gladly. Caesar did not insist. Time was short

er the cause of ordered government was still not beyond hope: to save it , what better champion than a patriot who boasted

ium esse vult in patria manet’ (May, 49 B.C.).. 3 As Mommsen called it , Ges. Schr. iv, 173. Cf. Dio 46, 34. 4 Ad Att.

aging review of Cicero’s past career (September 19th). Cicero thought it best not to turn up. He salved his dignity by the

on of a speech in reply, the pamphlet known as the Second Philippic:3 it was never spoken the adversaries were destined ne

ver to meet. By venturing to attack the policy of Antonius, Cicero, it might be argued, came out into the open at last,

nerable consular and the revolutionary adventurer. There is a danger, it is true, that the relations of Cicero and Octavia

l perhaps have had cognizance at Leucopetra. Only a domestic quarrel, it might appear, in the ranks of the Caesarian party

Cicero was possessed by an overweening opinion of his own sagacity: it had ever been his hope to act as political mentor

turer,3 in private letters he vaunted the excellence of his own plan: it may be doubted whether at any time he felt that h

em all, to assert leadership, to free the State again or go down with it in ruin. Once he had written about the ideal stat

licy in the present, but simply the ancestral constitution of Rome as it was or should have been a century earlier, namely

ligarchy in a state where men were free but not equal. He returned to it under the Dictatorship of Caesar,1 but never publ

demonstrate his conception of a well-ordered state and to corroborate it in the light of the most recent history. The De o

ny standards other than those of a man’s time, class and station. Yet it was precisely in the eyes of contemporaries that

hilippic, though technically perfect, is not a political oration, for it was never delivered: it is an exercise in petty r

ally perfect, is not a political oration, for it was never delivered: it is an exercise in petty rancour and impudent defa

had a policy of their own, if only they were strong enough to achieve it . Public pronouncements on matters of high polic

grandfather did not come from the ancient colony of Placentia at all it was Mediolanium, and he was an Insubrian Gaul exe

ome her citizens! Where a man came from did not matter at all at Rome it had never mattered! 7 From the grosser forms of

leteer:8 the fullest elaboration on that theme belongs to a time when it could do him no harm. 9 Nor was it Caesar’s enemi

that theme belongs to a time when it could do him no harm. 9 Nor was it Caesar’s enemies but his beloved soldiery who dev

mense reputation as a wit and as a humourist. Cato had to acknowledge it . 1 The politician Vatinius could give as good as

er had to pass to one man. That was not the worst feature of monarchy it was the growth of servility and adulation. Men

practised, however, a more subtle art of misrepresentation, which, if it could not deceive the hardened adept at the game

tio that was too simple, too crude. It had all been heard before: but it might be hard to resist the deceitful assertions

oquence. The boni, after all, did exist the propertied classes; and it was presumably in their interests that an allianc

eople, maintain the rights of property and avert revolution. Further, it was an attractive theory that the conduct of affa

olitical literature of the period had been more abundantly preserved, it might be discovered that respect for law, traditi

policy. The defenders of the Senate’s rule and prerogative were not, it is true, merely a narrow ring of brutal and unenl

nce on the side of vested interests. In times of peace and prosperity it commands a wide measure of acquiescence, even of

iolence in prospect. At Rome all men paid homage to libertas, holding it to be something roughly equivalent to the spirit

uries later when the phrase Vindex Libertatis appears on the coinage, it indicates armed usurpation attempted or successfu

volutionary that the Republic has succumbed to tyranny or to anarchy, it is his ideal to bring back order again. The decis

commodation with a citizen in arms, any hope or guarantee of concord, it is better to fight and to fall, as becomes a Roma

he most binding ties of personal allegiance. For profit or for safety it might be necessary to change sides. Suitable term

llus tunc legibus locus, ad arma civilia actum’; cf. ib. 1, 10, where it is described as a fraudulent pretext. 5 Dio 48,

east accelerated, by the arguments of a common humanity. Caesar began it , invoking clemency, partly to discredit by contra

to Balbus and Oppius but destined for wider circulation: the gist of it was to announce a new style of ending a civil war

turer raised troops in Italy on his own initiative, privato consilio, it was claimed that the Senate could at once legaliz

trimony for the public good; 4 when the legions of a consul deserted, it was taken to prove that the consul was not a cons

was not a consul. 5 The author of this audacious proposal represented it to be nothing less than ‘laying the foundations o

sary to save the State. Of that the Senate was supreme judge. What if it had not lent its sanction? Why, true patriots wer

his was called a consensus: the term coniuratio is more revealing. If it was thought inexpedient for the moment or even ou

oyalty to the Republic, their attitude was ambiguous and disquieting: it was scarcely to be expected that the generals and

g love of peace and loyalty to the Republic who did not? But Plancus, it is clear, was coolly waiting upon events. He alre

a Republican, Pollio found his loyalties at variance or out of date: it is pretty clear that he had no use for any party.

the only irregularity practised by the party of the constitution when it ‘established the Republic upon a firm basis’. Whi

idity of such grants was to raise a large question in itself, even if it were not coupled with the official sanction given

erhaps with sharp reminder of the fate of the associates of Catilina, it would not do to condemn a Roman citizen unheard.

was a firm and menacing demand. For the friends of Antonius, however, it meant that a declaration of war had been averted;

eligerentur autem in id consilium ab universo populo. ’ 2 Therefore it was legal until the legislation of Antonius (and

stitutional. ‘Eine staatsrechtliche Unmöglichkeit’, so Schwartz terms it , Hermes XXXIII (1898), 195. PageBook=>169

arched up the Flaminia to Ariminum but not to fight if he could avoid it . He might yet baffle both Cicero and Antonius. Bu

with legality a casual or partisan question, he required guarantees: it was not merely his dignitas that he had to think

Republicans exploited their advantage with allegations of atrocities it was affirmed that Dolabella had applied torture t

ord. To that end they urged an accommodation. Servilius spoke against it . Cicero supported him, with lavish praises for th

ens, and never claimed by Sulla or by Caesar. To a thoughtful patriot it was no occasion for rejoicing. ‘Think rather of t

h for the patriotic fervour of the levies of Republican Italy. 4 When it came to battle at Mutina, the grim and silent swo

armies of the Republic in northern Italy would have an easy task. So it might seem. Antonius broke away, moving along the

eir refused to take orders from Caesar’s assassin: nor, if he had, is it certain that the troops would have obeyed. 1 And

palpable truth. 2 On a rational calculation of persons and interests, it was likely that Antonius would regain the support

of heroism and lack of principle. They had no quarrel with Antonius; it was not they who had built up a novel and aggress

d now the legitimate government and the authority of the Roman State, it was impossible to discover. For the judgement on

to discover. For the judgement on these men, if judged they must be, it would be sufficient to demonstrate that they acte

recompense from their generals without the necessity of fighting for it . Their reluctance to obey the constitutional prin

68 honoured, lifted up and lifted off. 1 Cicero may never have said it . That did not matter. The happy invention epitomi

that Octavianus would still support the constitutional cause now that it had become flagrantly Pompeian and Republican. 3

e lay vacant but not unclaimed. Octavianus aspired to the honour; and it would clearly be expedient to give the youth a se

ning this matter there is scant but significant evidence. In June (so it would seem) Cicero denounced certain ‘treasonable

the time of the Battle of Forum Gallorum and rumoured death of Pansa, it was widely believed in Rome NotesPage=>168

ents gradually drove him to a decision. When he left Italy in August, it was not with the plan already conceived of muster

fused to take over (P-W x, 1000). This date is probably too late, for it does not allow a sufficient margin of time for th

, sending one of the officers to Antonius with a friendly message, so it was alleged. 1 The union of Antonius and Lepidus

i rei publicae constituendae). When a coalition seized power at Rome, it employed as instruments of domination the supreme

the consulate never afterwards recovered its authority. But prestige it still guaranteed, and the conferment of nobility.

ft his partisan Pollio as proconsul of the Cisalpina, perhaps to hold it for two years till his consulate (40 B.C.). 4 Lep

isputed in a local civil war for several years. 5 As for the islands, it may already have been feared, and it was soon to

ral years. 5 As for the islands, it may already have been feared, and it was soon to be known, that some of them had been

peius and his allies did not claim to be the government or the State: it was enough that their rivals should be thwarted a

and the taste to draw fine distinctions between the three terrorists, it was hardly for Octavianus that they invoked indul

r of Roman knights. 3 Their victory was the victory of a party. 4 Yet it was not their principal purpose to wipe out utter

e islands. There had been delay and warning enough. For the Triumvirs it was expedient to drive their political enemies ou

his doom. The Caesarian party was fighting the Republicans at Rome as it was soon to fight them in the East. But the strug

in the East. But the struggle was not purely political in character: it came to resemble a class-war and in the process t

e been proscribed, either enjoyed protection already or now purchased it . 5 The ambition of generals like Pompeius and C

Attici 12, 4. Antonius’ agent P. Volumnius Eutrapelus had his eye on it . 8 The town mansion, which had cost 3,500,000 s

ished to overflowing with the creatures of the Triumvirs: before long it was to number over a thousand. 5 Scorn and ridicu

uccumbed early in his tenure of office, stricken by shame and horror, it was alleged, at the proscriptions which it was hi

icken by shame and horror, it was alleged, at the proscriptions which it was his duty to announce. 3 If the three dynasts

Canidia, is exceedingly rare: Schulze gives no epigraphic examples of it . The origin of C. Sosius is unknown: but observe

ublic had been abolished. Whatever the outcome of the armed struggle, it could never be restored. Despotism ruled, support

orce the passage. Their supremacy at sea was short-lived. Pompeius, it is true, did not intervene; but Cn. Domitius Ahen

upon the brother of Antonius. When Brutus heard of the end of Cicero, it was not so much sorrow as shame that he felt for

ὰρ αὑτ ν αἰτίᾳ μ λλον ἣ τ ν τυραννούντων. PageBook=>204 cause, it is held, was doomed from the beginning, defeat in

ew and respected the tried merit of Cassius. The best of the legions, it is true, were Caesarian veterans. Yet the soldier

ong the fallen were recorded the noblest names of Rome. No consulars, it is true, for the best of the principes were alrea

word. 2 The victor Antonius stripped off his purple cloak and cast it over the body of Brutus. 3 They had once been fri

dy of his own life may have risen to his thoughts. Brutus had divined it Antonius, he said, might have been numbered wit

e Republican cause were led before the victorious generals, Antonius, it is alleged, they saluted as imperator, but revile

ory. The Romans had never fought such a battle before. 9 The glory of it went to Antonius and abode with him for ten years

ok=>208 men of property against a rapacious proletariat in arms: it blended with an older feud and took on the colour

o abolish this province and unite the territory to Italy had not yet, it appears, been carried out, perhaps owing to the r

nd Sentinum for Antonius: Salvidienus captured the town and destroyed it utterly. 4 Nursia, remote in the Sabine land, hel

rception of their own interests as well as a strong distaste for war: it would be plain folly to fight for L. Antonius and

e penalty exacted of the town council of Perusia, with the exception, it is said, of one man, an astute person who in Rome

his friend. When Octavianus returned towards the end of the summer, it was to find that Antonius had come up from the Ea

nt events in Italy, the war in Etruria and the investment of Perusia, it may be that he had no cognizance when he arrived

ain was the dawn of redemption. On several theories of cosmic economy it was firmly believed that one world-epoch was pass

sa Roma viribus ruit. The Epode is quoted and utilized here, though it may very well be several years later in date. The

lity or ignorance of scholars and visionaries for two thousand years; it has been aggravated by a hazard to which propheti

arcellus was born two years earlier. 6 In 40 B.C. Octavianus himself, it is true, had contracted a marriage with Scribonia

same time if he came to Rome to assume the insignia of his consulate, it was not to wear them for long, for a new pair of

had everything to gain by stirring up trouble. Octavianus soon found it advisable or necessary to make war upon Sex. Pomp

e an accommodation between her brother and her husband or so at least it was alleged, in order to represent Antonius in an

w prolonged for another five years until the end of 33 B.C.3 By then, it was presumed, the State would have been set in or

certain L. Plinius Rufus. 3 To the defeated of Philippi and Perusia it had seemed for a time that the young Pompeius mig

t the young Pompeius might be a champion of the Republican cause. But it was only a name that the son had inherited, and t

avour and name of Neptune; 4 the Roman plebs might riot in his honour it was only from hatred of Caesar’s heir. In reality

the day of his death. For once in his life he surrendered to emotion: it was with political advantage. He fell in love wit

the camp of Lepidus, with the name of Caesar as his sole protection: it was enough. 4 The soldiers had no opinion of Lepi

ioted so often against the Triumvirs. Their iron rule in Italy, while it crushed liberty, had at least maintained a sembla

mulation, though not extravagant, was perhaps a little premature. But it contained a programme. Octavianus remitted debts

w confidence in himself. Of his victories the more considerable part, it is true, had been the work of his lieutenants. Hi

gentissimus iuvenis’, fought for liberty at Philippi and was proud of it . He then followed Antonius for a time, it is unce

t Philippi and was proud of it. He then followed Antonius for a time, it is uncertain for how long. 5 The young Lepidus we

rundisium or Tarentum with the fleets and armies of the East, whether it was peace or war in the end, Octavianus could fac

the native tribes up to the line of the Dinaric Alps, but not beyond it . If war came, he would secure Italy in the north-

ot publicly commemorated. 1 At the end of 33 B.C. the Triumvirate (as it may still be called despite the disappearance of

nment of the city. Pollio repaired the Atrium Libertatis and equipped it with the first public library known at Rome for t

mposition of the consular list of that year, of unprecedented length: it contains seven other names. Hitherto he had promo

ed disturbances, the lapse of time permitted the Revolution (for such it may with propriety be called) to acquire permanen

formidable body of interests was massed in defence of the new order, it lacked inner cohesion and community of sentiment.

o be dry, tenuous and tedious. 1 Caesar’s style befitted the man; and it was generally conceded that Brutus’ choice of the

was not deterred. At the age of eighty, discovering, as he said, that it was time to gather his baggage for the last journ

onwards. Though Sallustius was no blind partisan of Caesar, his aim, it may be inferred, was to demonstrate how rotten an

B.C. 2 Dio 43, 9, 2 though this may not be convincing evidence, for it may derive from a belief, natural enough, in the

re was no idealization in his account of a more recent period he knew it too well; and the immediate and palpable present

gs of human nature: Sallustius, plunging deeper into pessimism, found it bad from the roots. History, to be real and true,

recundo. ’ PageBook=>250 thoughts and darker operations, which it never lost so long as the art was practised in th

logy, raising dispute over the dead. The controversy about Cato began it . Then Caesar the Dictator became a subject of lit

alike, that history repeated itself in cyclical revolutions. For Rome it might appear to be the time of Sulla come again;

lexander. To discern which demanded no singular gift of perspicacity: it is the merit of the least pretentious of contempo

alpurnius, was so patently the pride and monopoly of the senator that it was held a matter of note, if not of scandal, whe

turn a verse with ease, or fill a volume, set no especial value. But it was now becoming evident that poetry, besides and

stock. The rest all came from the province of Gallia Cisalpina, Cato, it was alleged (perhaps falsely), a freedman,2 the o

oets, as they were called, possessed a common doctrine and technique: it was their ambition to renovate Latin poetry and e

e beyond comparison; 1 Italy had barely been touched by the wars; and it would have been an anachronism to revert from vin

ht at Philippi, for the Republic but not from Republican convictions: it was but the accident of his presence at a univers

Horace had come to manhood in an age of war and knew the age for what it was. Others might succumb to black despair: Hor

y of common sense and social stability. In Rome under the Triumvirs it was more easy to witness and affirm the passing o

n the wounds of civil war. There was material for another revolution: it had threatened to break out during the Sicilian W

he contest with Antonius. Rome had witnessed a social revolution, but it had been arrested in time. After the next subvers

had been arrested in time. After the next subversion of public order it might go farther, embracing not only impoverished

prestige, though waning, was still formidable enough in 33 B.C.; and it is fatally easy to overestimate the strength and

struggle, whatever name the victor chose to give to his rule, because it was for monarchy that the rival Caesarian leaders

eceived kingdoms. Other arrangements were made from time to time, but it was not until the winter of 37-36 B.C. that the p

king. The policy and the choice of the agents goes beyond all praise: it was vindicated by history and by the judgement of

o his client Theophanes. 2 The example was nothing novel or untimely: it revealed a habit and created a policy. At Ephesus

ch, Antonius 28. | PageBook=>264 Roman army reached Ctesiphon, it might never return. Antonius proposed to march th

intimate friends had once been Antonians. 1 Evidence is scanty. Yet it could be guessed that the Cocceii, a new family s

ped to use Pompeius for the Republic against Caesar. Failing in that, it conspired with dissident Caesarians and assassina

men had never yet sat in the Roman Senate. That mattered little now, it is true. They NotesPage=>269 1 Appian, BC

victors is palpably fraudulent; the truth cannot be disinterred, for it has been doubly buried, in erotic romance as well

the facts, there is and was no authentic record; even if there were, it would be necessary further to speculate upon the

of unrealized intentions may be logical, artistic and persuasive, but it is not history. Up to a point the acts of Anton

Book=>272 he also removed Cyprus from Roman control and resigned it to the kingdom of Egypt. 1 Antonius in his consul

an People. If the Roman oligarchy was to survive as a governing class it would have to abate its ambitions and narrow the

. Egypt was clearly not suited to be converted into a Roman province: it must remain an ally or an appanage of the ruler o

given to the most alarming accounts of his ulterior ambitions. Was it the design of Marcus Antonius to rule as a Hellen

in the East but not to monarchy alone: in any representative of power it was natural and normal. Had the eastern lands ins

ellenistic susceptibilities and politic advertisement. With Cleopatra it was different: she was a goddess as well as a que

n and credulity have run riot. When Antonius met Cleopatra at Tarsus, it was Aphrodite meeting Dionysus, for the blessing

opatra? If Antonius be denied a complete monarchic policy of his own, it does not follow that he was merely a tool in the

his allies. Nobler qualities, not the basest, were his ruin. Rome, it has been claimed, feared Cleopatra but did not fe

ome. The clue is to be found in the character of the War of Actium as it was designed and contrived by the party of Octavi

ed. To secure Roman sanction and emotional support for the enterprise it was necessary to invent a foreign danger that men

magnified Cleopatra beyond all measure and decency. To ruin Antonius it was not enough that she should be a siren: she mu

his trusted adherents. The contents of this missive might be guessed: it was to be imparted to the Senate on the first day

acked Antonius’ devotion to drink and to Cleopatra. Antonius retorted it was nothing new, but had begun nine years ago: Cl

blican freedom of speech now revelled in a brief renascence as though it were not fettered to the policy of a military des

om Hirtius and Pansa. Then the new year had been eagerly awaited, for it brought a chance to secure constitutional sanctio

position legalized. He respected the constitution and dispensed with it . When the time came, he went beyond Senate and Pe

autumn. They may previously have made a compromise with Octavianus:1 it is more likely that they were afraid to divulge i

of Triumvir. But he possessed auctoritas and the armed power to back it . He entered the Curia, surrounded by soldiers and

e Caesarian leader. Octavianus then dismissed the Senate, instructing it to assemble again on a fixed day, when he would s

wed enemies by no means left a Senate unreservedly and reliably loyal it was packed with the timid and the time-serving, r

timid and the time-serving, ready to turn against him if they dared: it was a bad sign that more than three hundred senat

suls were on his side. Antonius stood on the defensive and therefore, it might be represented, for peace. For war his pres

oasts. He was confident and ready for the struggle but might not open it yet. Here the two consuls met him in the spring,

the ships that Cleopatra provided for the war. 2 Canidius prevailed: it was alleged that he had been bribed. The compromi

r Antonius passed from Ephesus to Samos and from Samos to Athens. Now it might seem that Cleopatra had finally triumphed.

y Cleopatra. Ahenobarbus hated the Queen and was averse from war. Yet it was not Ahenobarbus who ran away, but Plancus. Ac

s still stood firm. Had Ahenobarbus required a pretext for desertion, it lay to hand in Antonius’ refusal to dismiss Cleop

th the secrets of Antonius, the renegades brought a precious gift, so it is alleged news of the documentary evidence that

. 1 Octavianus extorted the document from the Vestal Virgins and read it out to the Senate of Rome. Among other things, An

eneral credence; and touching the testament of Antonius, many thought it atrocious that a man should be impugned in his li

t fail in its working, at least on some orders of the population, for it confirmed allegations already current and designe

f Egypt and transfer the capital to Alexandria. 4 Her favourite oath, it was even stated (and has since been believed), wa

ent, a certain suspension of belief may safely be recommended. Nor is it to be fancied that all the land rose as one man i

ius. An absurdity the Roman constitution was manifestly inadequate if it was the instrument of Rome’s enemy. And so Octavi

he consensus Italiae against Antonius in the War of Mutina. 3 In vain it did not exist. Private influence and private ties

ustrated these partial attempts. The name of Italy long remained as it had begun, a geographical expression. Italia was

ae. Though the whole land was enfranchised after the Bellum Italicum, it had not coalesced in sentiment with the victoriou

ompeii: that was a reality. More recently, Perusia. For any contest it would have been difficult enough to enlist Italia

ime she came to believe was a national war. The contest was personal: it arose from the conflicting ambitions of two rival

nywhere in the vicinity of Calvisius Sabinus or Statilius Taurus; and it may fairly be conjectured that no opposition conf

lf no menace to the Empire, but a future ruler who could hope to hold it together. But Antonius victorious in war with the

icial to Italian economy as well as alarming to Italian sentiment. As it was, Antonius’ system of reducing the burdens of

ould dwindle into poverty and dishonour. National pride revolted. Was it for this that the legions of the imperial Republi

years, though liberty perished, peace might be achieved. It was worth it not merely to the middle class, but to the nobile

perhaps at Pharsalus, but finally and fatally at Philippi. They knew it , and they knew the price of peace and survival.

ry preserves the opinions of Pollio concerning these transactions and it can be well understood. His comments would have b

d Balbus and his nephew were all but monarchic in their native Gades; it may be presumed that the wealthy family of the An

t and the western end of the Via Egnatia. That might appear an error: it was probably a ruse. Antonius proposed to leave t

Antonius had the preponderance of strength; as for number of legions it was doubtful whether the enemy could transport ac

of his legions to thirty. The new recruits were inferior to Italians, it is true, but by no means contemptible if they cam

contended against invaders coming from Italy. If that was his plan, it failed. Antonius had a great fleet and good admir

e help of barbarian allies. 4 The battle of Actium was decided before it was fought. The true story is gone beyond recal

ff.; G. W. Richardson, JRS XXVII (1937), 1 ff. Against Tarn’s theory it can be argued, with Kromayer, that Antonius had a

the Antonians were executed, but Sosius was spared, at the instance, it was alleged, of L. Arruntius, an ex-Pompeian. 3 S

had intended that there should be a serious battle if they could help it . So it turned out. Actium was a shabby affair, th

ended that there should be a serious battle if they could help it. So it turned out. Actium was a shabby affair, the worth

as himself recalled by troubles in Italy. There had been a plot—or so it was alleged. It was suppressed at once by Maecena

treated Egypt as his own private and dynastic possession and governed it through a viceroy, jealously excluding Roman sena

and Syria directly administered by Rome was considerably smaller than it had been after Pompeius’ ordering of the East, th

he East, where he inherited the policy of Antonius in order to render it more systematic. Temples dedicated at Nicaea and

s. Octavianus had his own ideas. It might be inexpedient to defy, but it was easy to delude, the sentiments of a patriotic

North. To serve the policy of Rome and secure the eastern frontiers, it was enough to invoke the arts of diplomacy and th

ty or ignorance might elevate Parthia to be a rival empire of Rome :2 it could not stand the trial of arms—or even of dipl

3 Octavianus’ first governor of Macedonia is nowhere attested—perhaps it was Taurus. 4 But Messalla and Taurus departed to

triumph till July, 27 B.C. When a party has triumphed in civil war, it claims to have asserted the ideals of liberty and

g. For a generation, all parties had triven for peace: once attained, it became the spoil and prerogative of the victors.

exaltation of peace by a Roman statesman might attest a victory, but it portended no slackening of martial effort. The ne

been celebrated by a Roman consul. 3 The avenging of Caesar, and with it his own divine descent, was advertised by the ina

urs in life and divinity after death. That was the lesson of Romulus: it was enunciated in prose as well as in verse. 2

the arduous task of rebuilding a shattered commonwealth and infusing it with new vigour. The attempts of earlier statesme

home. Peace had been established, there was only one faction left—and it was in power. The pleasing legend Libertalis P.

ty and its leader to rule? He had resigned the title of Triumvir, but it might have been contended that he continued unobt

wer to the discretion of the Senate and the People. By what right had it been in his hand? He indicates that it was throug

the People. By what right had it been in his hand? He indicates that it was through general consent that he had acquired

rule without the help of an oligarchy. His primacy was precarious if it did not accommodate itself to the wishes of the c

life in 30 B.C. (Dio 51, 19, 6), he seems to have made little use of it before 23. See further below, p. 336. 2 Accordi

es that Octavianus took the title of imperator from Crassus and added it to his own total (51, 25, 2). A premature Athenia

precise nature of Gallus’ violation of amicitia evades conjecture :1 it was hardly trivial or verbal, for Suetonius ranks

ot only prestige was at stake—the armed proconsuls were a menace. Yet it would be inexpedient to remove them all. Octavian

an consular in rank; and no imperatorial salutations, no triumphs, if it could be helped. The nobilis and the consular, th

ough the appellation gradually faded from use. Yet he might have kept it , whatever the form of the constitution and legal

e over and gone. The word had too military a flavour for all palates: it would be expedient to overlay the hard and astrin

ks of the Odes of Horace (which appeared in 23 B.C.). Propertius uses it but once, ‘dux’, however, at least twice. 1 As la

th an authority familiar to them as proconsular and absolute, whether it resided upon the dictatorial powers of the Triumv

n und Wesen des Prinzipats, 229 ff.) follows Mommsen and assumes that it carried imperium maius over the provinces of the

y of Senate and People had been restored. It remains to discover what it all amounted to. On the face of things, the new

lay at a distance, disposed on the periphery of the Empire—no threat, it might seem, to a free constitution, but merely gu

e ruinous ambition of politicians who sought power illegally and held it for glory and for profit. Rival dynasts rent the

close parallel from the recent past might properly have been invoked: it is pretty clear that it was not. The Romans as

recent past might properly have been invoked: it is pretty clear that it was not. The Romans as a people were possessed

living senators. Lacking any perception of the dogma of progress—for it had not yet been invented—the Romans regarded nov

racy that ran contrary to the ‘mos maiorum’. 3 He did not need to. As it stood, the Roman constitution would serve his pur

torians of more recent times. Augustus knew precisely what he wanted: it was simple and easily translated. Moreover, the c

lt of Cicero was an irony to men who recalled in their own experience— it was not long ago—the political activity of Cicero

Polybius:2 even if the primacy of one man in the State were admitted, it was not for a princeps like Pompeius. For the r

re admitted, it was not for a princeps like Pompeius. For the rest, it might pertinently be urged that the political doc

trine of Cicero was couched in phrases so vague and so innocuous that it could be employed by any party and adapted to any

and the consecrated vocabulary of Roman political literature, much of it , indeed, in no way peculiar to Cicero: the speech

for that end Augustus laboured, to conserve the new order, announcing it as his dearest wish to be known as the ‘optimi st

s dearest wish to be known as the ‘optimi status auctor’. 2 He called it the Optimus status’ himself: the writer who has t

to speak of a ‘novus status’. 3 The Princeps would never have denied it . Only ghosts and words were called up to comfor

erocia of Pollio came as a verbal reminder of that tradition. Pollio, it is true, was preserved as a kind of privileged nu

d when he attacked the domination of Pompeius, for the sake of empire it was not worth submitting to tyranny. 5 Cicero r

s the best state of all, more truly Republican than any Republic, for it derived from consensus Italiae and concordia ordi

epublic, for it derived from consensus Italiae and concordia ordinum; it commended itself to all good citizens, for it ass

and concordia ordinum; it commended itself to all good citizens, for it asserted the sacred rights of property; it was Ro

to all good citizens, for it asserted the sacred rights of property; it was Roman and Republican, for power rested upon t

y to harmonize with Roman sentiment. The formulation was easily found— it reposed not in books of the law or abstract specu

eyond and above all legal and written prescription stands auctoritas; it was in virtue of auctoritas that Augustus claimed

tas has a venerable and imposing sound: unfriendly critics would call it ‘potentia’. Yet the combination of auctoritas a

hiest man in the Empire, ruling Egypt as a king and giving account of it to no man; he coined in gold and silver in the pr

or proconsul as legally defined appears portentous and alarming. Yet it would be an elementary error to fancy that the ce

ty, the consolidation of the Revolution and the maintenance of peace, it was necessary that the primacy of Caesar’s heir s

theory. It was evident: no profit but only danger from talking about it . The Principate baffles definition. The ‘consti

he has not deigned to allude to this transaction at all. 2 In truth, it may be regarded merely as the legalization, and t

Tacitus, ever alert for the contrast of name and substance. At Rome, it did not mark an era in dating; in the provinces i

ubstance. At Rome, it did not mark an era in dating; in the provinces it passed almost unnoticed. No change in the foreign

d that the Republican constitution should operate unhampered—and that it did, at least in the earlier years of his preside

age to age the transmission of perennial maxims of political wisdom; it is more instructive to discover, in any time and

hly obscure (P-W V A, 706 ff.). Nor is his nomenclature constant. Yet it is pretty clear that the consul of 23 B.C. ‘A. T[

een governed by proconsuls, usually consular in rank. Thus all Spain, it appears, had been under one governor, with severa

s under their own auspices and had celebrated triumphs would consider it no great honour to serve as legates. The Triumvir

hese men were dead or had lapsed long ago from public notice. Nor was it likely that the ex-Antonians Pollio, Censorinus,

ortion of the Senate seems to balance the provincia of the Princeps - it comprised three military provinces, Illyricum, Ma

ination of consular and praetorian provinces gradually developed; and it is by no means certain that it held good for the

ian provinces gradually developed; and it is by no means certain that it held good for the public provinces from the begin

sia, were governed by proconsuls of consular rank. In the early years it might be expected that from time to time men of c

publica auctoritas. 1 The truth of the matter will never be known: it was known to few enough at the time, and they pre

nscribed on the golden shield and advertised everywhere. Not only did it reveal a lack of satisfaction with the ‘felicissi

of satisfaction with the ‘felicissimus status’. Worse than all that, it touched the very heart and core of the party. Fan

lace a certain L. Sestius took office another exercise of auctoritas, it may be presumed, arbitrary but clothed in a fair

sustained note of jubilation, as though men knew its falsity: behind it all there lurked a deep sense of disquiet and ins

uin had been averted but narrowly, peace and order restored but would it last? And, more than security of person and prope

, 2, 25f. PageBook=>336 The anxiety was public and widespread: it has found vivid and enduring expression in the pr

ve and formidable; while imperium is so important that all mention of it is studiously omitted from the majestic and misle

ive years. The exact nature and competence of the grant is uncertain: it probably covered the dominions of the Princeps, e

m Rome, there must be care in the choice of Caesar’s legate to govern it . Conspiracy in the capital might be suppressed wi

pressed without causing disturbances: if backed by a provincial army, it might mean civil war the Varro in charge of Syria

o and Sestius, ex-Republicans in the consulate, that looked well. But it was only a manifesto. PageNote. 338 1 Dio 53,

that Secular Games should be celebrated precisely in that year; 5 and it is at least remarkable that certain Odes of Horac

in his gaze that inspired awe in the beholder: men could not confront it . 1 Statues show him as he meant to be seen by the

thers, and his unique primacy must not obscure the reality from which it arose the fact that he was the leader of a party.

tructions by Marcellus as well as by Augustus:2 falsely, perhaps, but it was disquieting. However, when Augustus in prospe

t easy. 4 An added complication was Augustus, by no means insensible, it was rumoured, to those notorious charms which the

ed to his counsellors. It was thwarted. Agrippa’s conception, backed, it may well be, by a powerful and domestic ally, tri

of twenty-three: his adoption would be catastrophic. Not merely that it shattered the constitutional façade of the New Re

tices of Roman dynastic politics into the realm of pure monarchy; and it might end in wrecking the Caesarian party. In t

on is transparent but not altogether absurd. Unity was established: it was to a Roman proverb about unity that Agrippa w

an. His refusal of honours was represented as modest self-effacement: it is rather the sign of a concentrated ambition, of

tock, Tiberius could rise above class and recognize merit when he saw it . In Agrippa there was a republican virtue and a

o become all that Augustus had been. The nobiles would not have stood it . Agrippa is rather to be regarded as the deputy-l

might become Princeps, when age and merit qualified. For the moment, it did not matter. Whatever the distant future might

ormula or the only system available. Indeed, for the empire of Rome it might be too narrow, especially as concerned prov

icipalities in the West, the Empire was too large for one man to rule it . Already the temporary severance of East and West

e Pact of Brundisium and the War of Actium had been alarming, because it corresponded so clearly with history and geograph

the camps of his adversaries until in the end, by stripping Antonius, it not merely swallowed up the old Caesarian party b

l rank, in name at least. As soon as a census came they would forfeit it , if they had lost their fortunes. After Actium ce

en Dictator and Princeps. The Caesarian party was installed in power: it remained to secure domination for the future. Aft

though not frankly, plutocratic. Capital received guarantees which it repaid by confidence in the government. More we

blic he could rise to the centurionate, but no higher. After service, it is true, he might be in possession of the equestr

questrian census, and hence eligible for equestrian posts; 5 further, it is by no means unlikely that sons of equestrian f

Thus was the equestrian order steadily reinforced from beneath; and it transmitted the choice flower of its own members

inces, blocking reform and provoking revolution. The knights paid for it in the proscriptions for knights were the princip

subject. The post of praefectus cohortis does not at first belong to it , but takes time to develop. Notice, on the other

need to disguise plutocracy, eagerly inherited traditional prejudice: it was often expressed by the sons of knights themse

In itself, the promotion of knights to the Senate was no novelty, for it is evident that the Senate after Sulla contained

s friends Maecenas and Proculeius furnished palpable evidence. Again, it often happened that only one son of a municipal f

that only one son of a municipal family chose to enter the Senate. If it was thus in colonies and municipia that had long

nies and municipia. 3 NotesPage=>359 1 Augustus at first fixed it at a mere 400,000 sesterces, subsequently raising

s at first fixed it at a mere 400,000 sesterces, subsequently raising it to1,000,000 (Dio 54, 17, 3, cf. 30, 2): Suetonius

et honorata atque ex principibus Etruriae. ’ For an earlier member of it , CIL 12, 2511 (67 B.C.). 5 Suetonius, Vitellius

ncial governor: he preferred to be a fashionable poet and he paid for it in the end. Through the recalcitrance of P. Ovidi

a ordinum thus achieved was at the same time a consensus Italiae, for it represented a coalition of the municipal families

icers and senators to the Roman State. They were themselves a part of it ; the bond of unity was organic and grew stronger

for candidates at Roman elections. 2 If the experiment was ever made, it was quickly abandoned. Not so much because it was

periment was ever made, it was quickly abandoned. Not so much because it was a mockery, given the true character of popula

t was a mockery, given the true character of popular election at Rome it was quite superfluous. The absence of any syste

ty. Yet the Senate had once seemed to represent the Roman People, for it was a ruling aristocracy by no means narrow and e

was determined by the possession of the latus clavus; in its working it was liberal and ‘progressive’. Moreover, every cl

but now embracing a whole empire, to the exclusion of rivals. Nor was it for reasons of theory that Caesar and Augustus at

faction was not the execution of a theory or the act of any one man, it could hardly be suspended at one blow. Even had h

tent to arrest the working of a natural process. How soon and how far it would go beyond Italy, which of the personal adhe

rdly have desired or sought to stem their steady advance. Augustus, it is commonly held, lacked both the broad imperial

acquired sole power, the Revolution had already proceeded so far that it could abate its rhythm without any danger of reac

The Princeps was not altogether a frank enthusiast for merit wherever it might be discovered and careless of class, but a

archical designs of Augustus and prevented the adoption of Marcellus; it may be conjectured that certain among them, above

on is evidence recorded of vital changes concerning the magistracies: it is therefore hard to discern under what condition

ons accorded show that the low age limit was in force before 23 B.C.: it was probably established in 29-28 B.C. PageBook

fice, calling for various expedients. 2 The Senate had been purified: it was rejuvenated in two ways, by knights’ sons mad

age, he conveniently revived the Republic to be used as they had used it . To the People Augustus restored freedom of elect

surrenders in certain provinces of public affairs and by the promise, it may be, of an imminent programme of reform. The c

’ continuous tenure, and regaining its annual and Republican dignity, it now seemed worth having to the aristocracy. From

s debarred. He had already restored the Republic once he could not do it again. NotesPage=>370 1 Dio 54, 14, 1. 2

.C. he was replaced by M. Vinicius, another of the marshals. Nor will it be forgotten that Taurus was there all the time,

ht come of new families against five nobles. 3 The restored Republic, it is evident, meant no restoration of the nobiles,

own provincia gradually developed into a series of separate commands, it was right that they should be regarded and govern

f the nobiles. Hence a steady cheapening of the consulate. In effect, it went now by nomination. NotesPage=>373 1 C

PageBook=>374 Election by the people might be a mere form, but it could not be abolished by a statesman who claimed

w order Cicero would have won the consulate without competition, held it without ostentation or danger, and lived secure a

s profits as a political advocate money from P. Sulla went to pay for it . The Antonian L. Marcius Censorinus entered into

The Antonian L. Marcius Censorinus entered into possession, from whom it passed to the family of Statilius Taurus. 6 Agrip

us, excellent men, amassed fortunes without discredit: precisely how, it is not recorded perhaps by inheritance. 5 Quirini

s. When religion is the care of the State in an oligarchical society, it is evident that sacerdotal preferment will be con

deputy-master of the college that celebrated the Secular Games; 5 and it was C. Ateius Capito who then interpreted the Sib

that did not matter. There were other ways. The system broadens as it descends from consulars to senators of lower rank

nly came from Aeclanum (ILS 1335). As the gentilicium is not uncommon it would hardly be fair to conjecture a relationship

te. This man had married well his wife was Aelia Galla, the daughter, it may be presumed, of that Aelius Gallus who was th

ent intriguers like that Praecia to whose good offices Lucullus owed, it was said, his command in the East,1 found success

sianus formed a connexion with Caenis, a freedwoman of Antonia; 2 and it was to the patronage of the great Narcissus that

ious, seldom useful to the Roman People. Within the Senate or without it , a rich fund of ability and experience lay idle o

. Against Catilina, perhaps, but not against Pompeius or Caesar. When it came to maintaining public concord after the assa

nasts without title or official powers. In 26 B.C. Taurus was consul, it is true; but the authority of Agrippa, Maecenas a

could be created elsewhere than at Rome. 2 Everybody had known about it . After the first settlement Augustus in no way

, died. The widow was consigned to Agrippa. As Maecenas his enemy put it , there was no choice: Augustus must make Agrippa

however, was greater still. There was the Rhine as well. The glory of it all was intended to fall to Agrippa and the two C

yricum and fought a campaign in the winter of 13-12 B.C.2 The design, it may be conjectured, was that Agrippa should prose

th an army, was occupied in the Balkans for three arduous years. 3 So it was Tiberius, as legate of Illyricum, not Agrippa

e the public provinces classified as praetorian and consular. Africa, it may be presumed, was governed from the beginning

by men of consular rank, perhaps Asia as well. Illyricum, as long as it was senatorial, and Macedonia, while it retained

s well. Illyricum, as long as it was senatorial, and Macedonia, while it retained legions, can furnish examples of consula

en to the share of the Princeps: he also took over Sardinia, and kept it . 4 NotesPage=>394 1 The legion XII Fulmina

n 27 B.C., and reveals its own inadequacy. It is here assumed, though it cannot be proved, that M. Vinicius was the last p

reatest, but they were not exceptional. Vinicius is a close parallel; it is unfortunate that so little is known of the car

or three years; after that, he was proconsul of Asia; 7 subsequently, it may be, legate of Syria. 8 NotesPage=>398

I (1915), Beiblatt 51, would not be sufficient or secure support, for it may belong to another L. Piso at a slightly later

which he fought as legate of Galatia- Pamphylia c. 9-8 or 4-3 B.C.), it cannot be made to prove two governorships of Syri

a in the period 9 B.C.–A.D. 6. PageBook=>401 As for the Rhine, it is not certain who followed Tiberius in 6 B.C.1 B

he New State endured, well equipped with ministers of government. But it was not in the provinces only that the principes

in 3/2 B.C., ILS 8895 (Bracara), cf. CIL II 2581 (Lucus Augusti). If it could be proved that he was legate of Citerior ra

uld be proved that he was legate of Citerior rather than of Ulterior, it would show that by now the region of Asturia-Call

Then came the affair of Egnatius Rufus, which showed how dangerous it was to resign functions of public utility to indi

se. Augustus supplied the aediles with a body of fire-fighting slaves it was not until A.D. 6 that he took the step of app

enators had been established. The first dealt with roads (20 B.C.); 2 it was composed, however, not of consulars but of pr

o be mentioned, that of praefectus urbi. In the nature of the matter, it is difficult to see how the Princeps could be rep

nd the Empire. He boasted that he found Rome a city of brick and left it a city of marble. 3 The observation was true in e

sed by the Princeps and his family. The soldiers were his own clients it was treason to tamper with them. Hence constant a

itutional liberty, with free elections and free debate in the Senate, it is evident that there would have to be expert pre

restricted as they were to six months of the year, shows clearly that it was a committee, not a cabinet an organ of admini

ittee, not a cabinet an organ of administration, not of authority. As it was there, it might suitably be employed by the P

abinet an organ of administration, not of authority. As it was there, it might suitably be employed by the Princeps as a g

the State and from their effects as revealed in the course of events: it would have to be postulated, were it not flagrant

evealed in the course of events: it would have to be postulated, were it not flagrant and evident. The management of the E

sort of Roman voluptuary waited for the end with fortitude and faced it like a soldier. Next in power and next in crime

ok=>410 Maecenas had suppressed the conspiracy of young Lepidus: it was Sallustius who procured the removal of Agripp

edmen did not hold the procuratorships of the imperial provinces. But it was a freedman called Licinus who assessed and ex

fashion. There must be financial experts lurking somewhere. Moreover, it was no doubt only the residue of the revenues fro

C. Turranius, C. Julius Aquila and M. Magius Maximus. These persons, it is true, have no known history among the equestri

literature not merely languished from the loss of its shining glories it appears to have broken away from the control of t

People’: in fact they were the clients of the Princeps, and they knew it . Their kingdoms were his gift, precarious and rev

f the Princeps, and a number of distinguished personages, among them ( it may be conjectured) men well versed in eastern af

ly. After his consulate he governed Macedonia and Gaul in succession; it may be presumed that he had formed certain impres

government. The Principate arose out of usurpation. It never forgot, it never entirely concealed, its origin. But the act

of his nature was ill matched with the gay elegance of Julia to call it by no more revealing name. It was the duty and th

his resentment upon a diet of science and letters. His enemies called it secret vice. 1 Like Agrippa, beneath the mask of

pproval and bided his time with secret exultation. 3 In the next year it came out. Gaius was to have the consulate after a

and Drusus had received special dispensations and early distinction, it is true. Tiberius became consul at the age of twe

f the constitutional usage and Republican language of the Principate: it revolted the genuine Republican feelings and good

aristocrat. Illicit and exorbitant power, ‘regnum’ or ‘dominatio’ as it was called, was no new thing in the history of Ro

ore easily than the primacy of one of their own number. Augustus knew it . The ambition of the nobiles might have appeared

t have appeared the most serious menace to his rule. On the contrary, it proved his surest support. NotesPage=>419

ILS 921, &c). PageBook=>423 So Livia worked for power. But it is by no means certain that Silvanus was popular

. Licinius Crassus Frugi (cos. A.D. 27) was one of his sons, adopted, it appears, by the mysterious M. Licinius Crassus, c

st into publicity and ruined Julia, the daughter of the Princeps. Yet it was not of Livia’s doing, and it brought no immed

a, the daughter of the Princeps. Yet it was not of Livia’s doing, and it brought no immediate benefit to her son. The whol

aetor in A.D. 16, were grandsons of Sex. Pompeius. 3 Precisely how, it is not quite clear: the adopted son of L. Arrunti

to sanction the moral regeneration of Rome. 7 It may be tempting, but it is not necessary, to rehabilitate her entirely. J

ristocrat and claimed the prerogatives of her station and family8 was it necessary that there should be public scandal?

iumvir might well be politically dangerous. Like the early Christian, it was not the ‘flagitia’ but the tornen’ that doome

and. But all is uncertain if Augustus struck down Julia and Antonius, it was not from tenderness for Tiberius. It may be t

the next year his tribunicia potestas lapsed. Augustus did not renew it . Gaius Caesar, consul designate and invested with

or the prestige of Rome, none the less called for attention. Moreover it was advisable to display the heir apparent to pro

was sent out, accompanied by M. Lollius as his guide and counsellor1 it would never do if an ambitious and inexperienced

es et rector’ fell abruptly from favour and died, of his own hand, so it was reported. Everybody rejoiced at his death, sa

any knew the truth of the whole episode, they were not likely to tell it . It is evident, and it is demonstrated by another

he whole episode, they were not likely to tell it. It is evident, and it is demonstrated by another incident nearly twenty

n to friction, dissension and political intrigue. 2 Against Lollius it was alleged that he had taken bribes from eastern

tive responsibility to which he was doomed by his implacable master:4 it is alleged that he asked for permission to dwell

ked for permission to dwell in the East in a private station. However it be (and scandal has probably embellished the topi

returned to power, no testimony exists. 2 In his own order and class, it will be presumed, no lack of open joy and welcome

ies and perhaps to the ultimate advantage of the Roman People. Julia, it was alleged, had slipped into the wayward habits

ave been schooled in the discipline of the camp or the playing-field: it was out of place at Court. His coeval, Germanicus

to defraud them of military glory. The deplorable Lollius had a son, it is true, but his only claim to fame or history is

he Cornelii Lentuli. L. Calpurnius Piso (cos. 15 B.C.) was connected, it is true, with the family of Caesar; but the bond

stus had drawn up his last will and testament. 4 About the same time, it may be inferred, three state-papers were composed

ions for the smooth transference of the supreme power. As in 27 B.C., it was necessary that the Principate should be confe

a syndicate might appear preferable to a principate:5 none the less, it must be demonstrated and admitted that there coul

advantage. Tiberius Caesar had the power they would not let him enjoy it in security and goodwill. In the critical session

ium. Whatever the truth of that contention, he could not go back upon it , even if he had wished. The mandate was not exhau

of the libertas which the Roman People enjoyed, of the imperium which it exerted over others. PageNotes. 440 1 Tacitus

o: imperium sine fine dedi. 1 The Greeks might have their Alexander it was glorious, but it was not Empire. Armies of ro

dedi. 1 The Greeks might have their Alexander it was glorious, but it was not Empire. Armies of robust Italian peasants

outhful vigour of the martial Republic. They were emboldened to doubt it . 2 More than that, the solid fabric of law and or

how long? Could Rome maintain empire without the virtues that had won it ? 4 A well-ordered state has no need of great me

s of the New State. If anything of them remained in the Commonwealth, it was to be monopolized by the one Princeps, along

ass was left with the satisfaction of the less decorative virtues: if it lacked them, it must learn them. The spirit of

h the satisfaction of the less decorative virtues: if it lacked them, it must learn them. The spirit of a people is best

st learn them. The spirit of a people is best revealed in the words it employs with an emotional content. To a Roman, su

ed was men like those of old, and ancient virtue. As the poet had put it long ago, moribus antiquis res stat Romana viri

he was offered the cura legum et morum, which he declined, professing it inconsistent with the ‘mos maiorum’. That office

, its title was all too revealing. More to the point, he did not need it . The Princeps enacted the measures of 18 B.C. in

oncerning the family, that was a novelty, but the spirit was not, for it harmonized both with the traditional activities o

liance with a freedwoman, or none at all. With marriage and without it , the tone and habits of high society were gay and

ce with mild remedies and incomplete redress, into a crime. The wife, it is true, had no more rights than before. But the

edwomen, though now forbidden to senators, was condoned in others for it was better than no marriage. The Roman People was

ate and imitate the ancient ideals, personified in their betters: but it was to be a purified Roman People. At Rome the

lished Rome’s power in Italy on the broad basis that alone could bear it , was accompanied by certain grave disadvantages.

atened collapse of Rome and the Empire, engendered a feeling of guilt it all came from neglect of the ancient gods. The ev

re could be only one answer. The official head of the state religion, it is true, was Lepidus, the pontifex maximus, livin

s once gave world-empire to the Roman, and only pietas could maintain it : dis te minorem quod geris, imperas: hinc omn

unicipia, had mostly been born, or had lived, on country estates; and it will be recalled that such apparently sophisticat

fe was stern and laborious, so much the better. He must learn to love it , for his own good and for the good of the State,

. The old-fashioned moralist might rejoice. Let foreign trade decline it brought no good, but only an import of superfluou

2 One of them came of a noble Samnite family now reconciled to Rome: it might be added that the other was a Picene. That

though in truth their offence was political rather than moral. Nor is it certain that the Princeps himself was above repro

al: he was also narrow and grasping, brutal and superstitious. Nor is it evident that the Roman aristocrat of the golden a

th all the power and all the glory. But he did not win power and hold it by his own efforts alone: was the ostensible auth

uited in so large a measure from Roman knights of the towns of Italy, it found itself rewarded with power in the Senate an

l member of the Italian middle class. No less genuine his patriotism: it might be guessed that his favourite line of verse

e political structure created by the Princeps was solid yet flexible: it was not so easy to shape the habits of a whole pe

stus’ own views were narrow and definite. How far they won acceptance it is difficult to say. Of the efficacy of mere legi

ristocracy was evident to the historian Tacitus; no less evident that it was slow in operation and due to other causes tha

he Roman nation now transcended the geographical limits of Italy, for it included the descendants of Italian colonists and

romanticism of a prosperous age, based upon the convenient dogma that it retained liberty while discarding licence and ach

status of the recruit often defies but cannot always evade detection: it will seldom have been high. Indeed, natives from

ble concerning the legions of the West in the Principate of Augustus, it may be presumed that men from Spain and Narbonens

of moral and patriotic regeneration, the effort had not been in vain: it was not one man’s idea, and the origins of it wen

t had not been in vain: it was not one man’s idea, and the origins of it went back before Actium. The different classes in

s but indiscriminate, save when there was a government in being. Then it mustered for the attack. Pamphlets and poems assa

rule of Augustus is established, men of letters, a class whose habit it had been to attack the dominant individual or fac

or an unequivocal testimony to the restoration of public liberty; but it does not follow that the poets and historians who

partisan men of letters were less in evidence. There was Sallustius, it is true, attacking both oligarchy and the power o

by supporting a Greek versifier, Antipater of Thessalonica. 5 Pollio, it is true, was honoured by Horace in a conspicuous

life and was dedicated to two sons of this Piso is so plausible that it can dispense with the support of Porphyrio. Pag

or public service. Stoicism, however, was salubrious and respectable: it could be put to good use. Living in a changed and

licy of social regeneration and the most illuminating commentary upon it . After eloquent discourse upon high themes Horace

am qui terminet astris, Iulius a magno demissum nomen lulo. 3 Later it is not the conqueror of the world but the coming

eret, ac totum sub leges mitteret orbem. 2 None would have believed it , but Rome’s salvation issued from a Greek city. T

alvation issued from a Greek city. The priestess of Phoebus announced it : via prima salutis, quod minime reris, Graia

tiquarianism had its uses. But history did not need to be antiquarian it could be employed, like poetry, to honour the mem

nder of Rome ‘deum deo natum, regem parentemque urbis Romanae’. 1 But it would not do to draw too precise a parallel. The

reasons for gratitude to Augustus, that fact may have reinforced, but it did not pervert, the sentiments natural to member

ely improper verse that incurred the displeasure of Augustus. Poetry, it was agreed, should be useful. Ovid accepted that

was agreed, should be useful. Ovid accepted that principle and turned it inside out. He might have instructed the youth of

oem on the Art of Love. The tract was not meant to be taken seriously it was a kind of parody. Augustus did not see the

escens’. 2 The epithet was rhetorical, not religious: he also applied it to the legions that had deserted the consul Anton

as Divus Julius enough. His son could hardly have prevented, even had it been expedient, the gratitude of the people to hi

overt designs for the succession of Gaius and Lucius. He did not need it so much for himself. At the colony of Acerrae in

h of personal allegiance to the military leader in the War of Actium: it did not lapse when he became a magistrate at Rome

gistrate at Rome and in relation to the laws of Rome. A similar oath, it may be presumed, was administered to the Eastern

re submission to kings was an ingrained habit and inevitable fashion, it was natural that the ruler should be an object of

ced good tidings to the world. 3 Asia surpasses decency in the thanks it renders to divine providence. 4 If such was the d

e in the efficiency of his government. Herod’s death showed his value it was followed by a rising which Varus the governor

rulers or making representations to the Princeps. How far they deemed it safe or expedient to exert their rights, if such

ms to attest inevitable and unbroken peace. There was another side to it ’pacem sine dubio post haec, vero cruentam’1 The

new order. A government may invent conspiracies for its own ends: if it cannot entirely suppress the evidence of its own

it cannot entirely suppress the evidence of its own internal crises, it falsifies the symptoms. Most of the real history

that had been built up at their expense. They had no illusions about it and they remembered Philippi, with melancholy pri

historical criticism. To turn from the scandalous to the ridiculous, it will be observed that the Princeps was by no mean

s not above reproach. With all allowance made for hostile propaganda, it will have to be conceded, at the very least, that

mies who had asked that his life be spared. 3 The claim was impudent: it is refuted by one of his own historians who, prai

exclaims that he would have behaved precisely so in earlier wars, had it been possible. 4 As for Actium, men might remembe

of antiquity that Princeps was more clement than Dux. Some dismissed it as ‘lassa crudelitas’. 6 PageNotes. 480 1 On

when convenient. As for the fourth of the cardinal virtues, justice, it was necessary to say much about that. Less advert

erred to risk their heads rather than forego a jest. 3 For Augustus it was inexpedient to suppress any activity that cou

C. he had laid down the office of praefectus urbi almost at once; and it was his habit to boast openly that he had always

o pass from Antonius to Octavianus, the statement is not as daring as it might appear, but is rather a subtle compliment.

as included, but enrolled last on the list of the consulars. 5 Labeo, it is also recorded, brought to ridicule a proposal

ly spontaneous criticism of the whole government. The major scandals, it is true., did not always come before the courts;

f the Princeps in legislation or to accept his candidates for office, it was virtually excluded. Already in the Triumviral

ticize. Certain politicians had not delayed to produce their memoirs: it may be presumed that they were not alarmingly out

e not been preserved. Of the style at least he will have approved, if it recalled the unpretentious simplicity of the Prin

n. Augustus might permit the cult of Cicero for his own purposes. Yet it may be that his real opinion of the character, po

me a historian. Both writers had practical experience of affairs; and it will be a fair inference that Pollio, the eminent

not the only defect that Pollio could discover in Livy. Pollio, so it is recorded by Quintilian, criticized Livy for ‘P

he Principate inherited genius from the Triumviral period and claimed it for its own: it could not produce a new crop. The

herited genius from the Triumviral period and claimed it for its own: it could not produce a new crop. The generation that

. 5 Velleius delights in the language of laudation, or, as he calls it , ‘iustus sine mendacio candor’. 6 It is lavishly

of Cordus, Severus and Labienus returned to public circulation; 2 and it was alleged that the Princeps proposed to banish

. 3 The rule of Caligula brought no freedom, no benefit to history: it merely poisoned the sources again. Literature und

biles were involved in the struggles of the dynasts. For many of them it had been hard enough to preserve and perpetuate t

nsuls in the age of Pompeius, became extinct in the Civil Wars. Some, it is true, especially decayed branches of the patri

us and encouraged to bring up a family: Tiberius refused to help, and it lapsed into a shameful poverty. 1 In the record

of the Princeps won unhappy prominence. Their morals were impugned: it was their name or their ambition that ruined them

enforced choice of a successor. 1 Tiberius Caesar hated the monarchy it meant the ruin of Roman and Republican virtue. Th

publican virtue. The Principate was not a monarchy in name. That made it all the worse. The duty of rule was a grievous se

, the husband of the younger Julia. They were destined never to grasp it . The last of them, married to a sister of Caligul

, under Domitian and under Hadrian. 9 For prudence and for success, it might have seemed that all would be outdone by th

. When he died after a brilliant career of service his enemies called it sordid adulation trusted by Tiberius, by Caligula

w all about contemporary history: Balbus had a share in the making of it , from the dynasts’ pact in 60 B.C. through civil

f the Triumvirs. The man from Gades, consul in 40 B.C., is a portent, it is true but a portent of the future power of Span

arbus, Piso and Paullus Fabius Maximus govern the military provinces, it is true. But a rational distrust persists, confir

interval of years the proconsulate of Asia or of Africa. For all else it was perilous. Even if the nobilis forgot his ance

es preserved the house of the Cocceii through many generations; 3 but it could not ultimately protect the grandson of Augu

hard to establish. E. Stein (Hermes LII (1917), 564 ff.) argues that it applies to families consular before A.D. 14 the y

ion of the Roman government, they seize supreme power but do not hold it for long. Africa and the eastern lands are pressi

e Principate engrossed their power and their wealth: worse than that, it stole their saints and their catchwords. Despotis

ciently shown, may be appropriated by any faction and any government: it soon went the way of Pax and became Libertas Augu

gave no scope for the display of civic virtue at home and abroad, for it sought to abolish war and politics. There could b

egraded and persecuted. The record of their ruin might be instructive it was not a happy task for an historian. The author

EN a party has triumphed in violence and seized control of the State, it would be plain folly to regard the new government

of their rule. The halo of their resplendent fortune may dazzle, but it cannot blind, the critical eye. Otherwise there c

me of traducing the upstart may have originated with the aristocracy: it was cheerfully adopted by the snobbish fervour of

tion the primacy of the nobiles was a fraud as well as an anachronism it rested upon support and subsidy by a military lea

the cession of their power and ambition. Pride and pedigree returned: it masked subservience or futility. The nobles, emer

e consular patrons of Augustan literature, themselves no mean part of it . The Roman patrician and the Italian novus homo a

cus and composed a memoir to be published after Plancus’ death; 3 and it was Messalla who coined as a title for Dellius th

s destroyed when Virtus was shattered at Philippi. Political liberty, it could be maintained, was doomed if not dead long

not an end in themselves. That end is security of life and property: it could not be guaranteed by the constitution of Re

hed from the theory of the Principate, every effort was made to apply it in practice, for fear of something worse: sober m

e way before civic duty and national patriotism. With the Principate, it was not merely Augustus and his party that prevai

e Principate, it was not merely Augustus and his party that prevailed it meant the victory of the non-political classes.

iles were inextricably bound up with the New State, being indebted to it for their preservation and standing. As more and

Republican profession was not so much political as social and moral: it was more often a harmless act of homage to the gr

th the present state of affairs. It need not be taken as seriously as it was by suspicious emperors or by artful and unscr

conventional and vulgar opinion:3 Tacitus himself would have thought it impossible after a civil war. Like the historia

roduced vigorous oratory. 7 There were the Gracchi and Cicero but was it worth it? 8 NotesPage=>515 1 Sallust, Hist

igorous oratory. 7 There were the Gracchi and Cicero but was it worth it ? 8 NotesPage=>515 1 Sallust, Hist, I, 7 M:

absolute, was not arbitrary. It derived from consent and delegation; it was founded upon the laws. This was something dif

the Republic, a necessary and salutary fraud: his successors paid for it . Libertas in Roman thought and usage had never qu

e word now embodied was the respect for constitutional forms. Indeed, it was inconceivable that a Roman should live under

καί δημοκρατονμένονς ἂνϵν διχοσταίας . PageBook=>517 Libertas, it was widely held in senatorial circles, should be

h what you got. 3 Given the nature of man ’vitia erunt donee homines’ it was folly to be utopian. 4 But the situation was

whole world, while the harm done by a bad emperor was not boundless: it fell mostly upon his immediate entourage. 5 The

of ruinous liberty and degrading servility. A sensible man could find it . And such there were. NotesPage=>517 1 Tac

Ann. 15, 31. 5 Hist. 4, 69, 18 M (not invalidated by the fact that it occurs in the letter of an oriental despot). 6

en corrupt, unrepresentative and ruinous. Caesar’s heir passed beyond it . What was a special plea and political propaganda

til 2 B.C. that Augustus was acclaimed pater patriae. Horace hints at it long before: hie ames dici pater atque princeps.

ie ames dici pater atque princeps. 4 The notion of parent brings with it that of protector: optime Romulae custos gent

Augustus stood like a soldier, ‘in statione’ for the metaphor, though it may have parallels in the language of the Stoics,

der, ‘augusto augurio’, in the phrase of Ennius. The Roman could feel it in his blood and in his traditions. Again Ennius

ent and enhancing his own prestige beyond that of a mortal man, while it consolidated his own regime and the new system of

ers on the frontiers of empire. 1 Yet for all that, when the end came it found him serene and cheerful. On his death-bed h

was to stand outside his monument, the Res Gestae]5 or at the least, it may be conjectured that some such document was in

urviving in provincial copies, bears the hall-mark of official truth: it reveals the way in which Augustus wished posterit

and character of his rule. The record is no less instructive for what it omits than for what it says. The adversaries of t

le. The record is no less instructive for what it omits than for what it says. The adversaries of the Princeps in war and

e, not in potestas, but only in auctoritas. 3 Which is true as far as it goes not very far, Auctoritas, however, does betr

for his great merits and for reasons of high politics. None the less, it will not help to describe the Res Gestae as the t

stae as the title-deeds of his divinity. 1 If explained they must be, it is not with reference to the religions and kings

sprenas) and a fragmentary name of which enough survives to show that it was Marcius. 35 B.C. The suffecti P. Cornelius

torical student. The filiation of consuls, where known, is given, for it is often a valuable clue to ready identification;

The scope and purpose of the Index is mainly prosopographical, and it is draw up according to gentilicia, save that Aug

tris, 353 ff., 396; in relation to the municipio, 384, 446; Greeks in it , 506. Milo, see Annius. Mimisius Sardus, Post.,