roscriptions and when he sanctioned clemency, when he seized power by force , and when he based authority upon law and consent

ustice, but intervened only to punish. 5 Against the blind impersonal forces that drove the world to its doom, human forethoug

cising a power beyond the reach of many a senator. Of such dominating forces behind the phrases and the façade of constitution

in 60 B.C. heralded the end of the Free State; and a re-alignment of forces precipitated war and revolution ten years later.

te and society, the Roman knights, converted into a ruinous political force by the tribune C. Gracchus when he set them in co

financiers. The Roman constitution was a screen and a sham. Of the forces that lay behind or beyond it, next to the noble f

=>016 It was an alliance of interest and sentiment to combat the forces of dissolution represented by the army-commanders

Aged thirty-three and only quaestorian in rank, this man prevailed by force of character. Cato extolled the virtues that won

tterly. Crassus used his patronage to demonstrate that he was still a force in politics and to embarrass the government wit

s. 3 Pompeius was Princeps beyond dispute but not at Rome. By armed force he might have established sole rule, but by that

a sword, with dramatic gesture, bidding him take command of the armed forces in Italy. Pompeius already held all Spain, in a

ing. To his allies he expressed firm confidence, pointed to his armed forces and spoke contemptuously of the proconsul of Gaul

d to avert the appeal to arms, he was swept forward by uncontrollable forces , entangled in the embrace of perfidious allies: o

Again, when he landed in Italy after an absence of nearly five years, force was his only defence against the party that had a

acea for the world’s ills, and with the design to achieve it by armed force . 1 Such a view is too simple to be historical.

misleading as the contrast between the aspirant to autocracy and the forces of law and order. Caesar’s following was heteroge

titution and the Senate; it announced the triumph soon or late of new forces and new ideas, the elevation of the army and the

an knights. 1 The same arguments hold for Caesar’s Senate, with added force , and render it at the same time more difficult an

tator and even his last projects, as yet unpublished were to have the force of law. The need of this was patent and inevitabl

p civil war two years before, seizing the strong place of Apamea. His forces were inconsiderable, one or two legions; and Apam

ty and the maintenance of order dictated the same salutary policy. By force of argument and personal authority, Antonius brou

of public disorder and the emergence of a Caesarian rival might well force Antonius back again to the policy which he had de

all that we know. Yet Antonius may have spoken as he did in order to force his enemies to come out into the open. Nor was it

e. As for Antonius, pressure from a competitor was now beginning to force him to choose at last between the Senate and the

is time is summed up by Dio (45, 11, 1 ff.) with unwonted insight and force : ∊ί⍴ήvouv ἔтι ĸαȋ έπoλὲµoυν ἢδƞ тó т∊ тῆς ὲλ∊υθ∊⍴

a. Antonius summoned D. Brutus to yield up his command. The threat of force would be necessary. Antonius set out for Brundisi

ir homes, none the worse for a brief autumnal escapade. With weakened forces and despair in his heart, Octavianus made his way

ns were mobilized against him. His enemies had drawn the sword: naked force must decide. But not all at once Antonius had not

rovince of Cisalpine Gaul. Before the end of the year he disposed his forces around the city of Mutina and held Brutus entrapp

ying himself with Antonius; 3 in July, Octavianus became a fact and a force in politics. Events were moving swiftly. In his

what he believed to be the Republic, liberty and the laws against the forces of anarchy or despotism. He would stand as firm a

trial on the plea of public emergency and the charge of levying armed forces against the State. Now the champion of the consti

rament now rested with the sword. Through the month of February the forces of the consul Hirtius and the pro-praetor Octavia

e campaign of Mutina, was coming up in the rear of the constitutional forces with three veteran legions raised in his native P

such a slight upon their leader, patron and friend. Octavianus, his forces augmented by the legions of Pansa, which he refus

d onwards. He reached Plancus towards the end of June. Their combined forces amounted to fourteen legions, imposing in name al

ry. He waited patiently for time, fear and propaganda to dissolve the forces of his adversaries. On July 28th Plancus composed

elegance: he protested good will and loyalty, explained how weak his forces were, and blamed upon the young Caesar the escape

for war as security and a basis for negotiation. He was reluctant to force the pace and preclude compromise in this matter p

instruments rather than agents. Behind them stood the legions and the forces of revolution. Octavianus crossed the Apennines

he Apennines and entered Cisalpine Gaul again, with a brave front. In force of arms, Lepidus and Antonius could have overwhel

us. When Octavianus arrived, the Caesarian fleet was strong enough to force the passage. Their supremacy at sea was short-l

ths earlier, and rallied promptly. That was the only weak spot in the forces of the Republic: would the legions stand against

or could go back upon his pledges of alliance to Octavianus. She must force him by discrediting, if not by destroying, the ri

eyond the Alps, was held for him by Calenus and Ventidius with a huge force of legions: they, too, had opposed Salvidienus. 2

not the only time. A concerted effort of the Antonian and Republican forces in Italy and on the seas adjacent would have dest

menace was upon him, but the Parthians could wait. Antonius gathered forces and sailed for Greece. At Athens he met Fulvia an

my, was now invading Italy with what remained of the Republican armed forces . His admiral was Ahenobarbus, Cato’s nephew, unde

the hinterland of Dyrrhachium. 1 The Dardani will also have felt the force of the Roman arms Antonius kept a large garrison

ern lands, raised a private army of three legions in Asia, with which force he contended for a time against the NotesPage=&

d. 1 Disturbances among the civil population were suppressed by armed force for the soldiers had been paid. To public taxat

Patrae at the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth was his head-quarters. His forces , fed by corn-ships from Egypt, were strung out in

was doubtful whether the enemy could transport across the Adriatic a force superior to his own—still less feed them when the

and destroyed his lines of communication. Antonius concentrated his forces in the neighbourhood. Then all is obscure. Months

he was now encompassed and shut in. Famine and disease threatened his forces . NotesPage=>295 1 As Tarn argues, CQ XXVI

itrary acts of the Triumvirate— not all of them surely: the scope and force of this act of indemnity will have depended upon

r, or ‘potential for personal rule :2 ‘principalis’ also acquired the force and meaning of ‘dominatus’. 3 Caesar’s heir cam

he constitution, down to his third consulate and the power he held by force NotesPage=>316 1 Cicero, De re publica 2,

the western Pyrenees to the north of Portugal, had never yet felt the force of Roman arms; and in the confusion of the Civil

rom a base near Burgos. The nature of the land dictated a division of forces . The Romans operated in three columns of invasion

f the Roman general was perpetuated in times of peace by the standing force of nine cohorts of the Praetorian Guard, establis

ff. 2 The dispensations accorded show that the low age limit was in force before 23 B.C.: it was probably established in 29

mines to the consulate after A.D. 4.2 But Tiberius was not the only force in high politics; and even if Taurus could not re

East, prestige was his object, diplomacy his method. 3 The threat of force was enough. The King of the Parthians was persuad

ving from the disasters of Crassus and Antonius; and an expeditionary force commanded by the stepson of the Princeps imposed

soon decays: senatus consulta then became common, gradually acquiring force of law. Yet once again, behind the nominal author

atters of weight; and the power exerted by such extra- constitutional forces as the auctoritas of senior statesmen holding no

n a Republic like that of Pompeius, Livia would have been a political force , comparable to her kinswoman Servilia. When Augus

volutionary leader had won power more through propaganda than through force of arms: some of his greatest triumphs had been a

at houses, attached them to his family and built up a new faction. By force or craft he had defeated the Aemilii and the Anto

fall of the Roman Republic, historians invoke a variety of converging forces or movements, political, social and economic, whe

e his peace, through subservience or through adulation, with the real forces in politics knights and freedmen, courtiers male

cles. The present was ominous, the future offered no consolation. The forces of revolution, though confined within definite ch

ruined the Republic long ago. Marius and Sulla overthrew libertas by force of arms and established dominatio. Pompeius was n

cta inter se conexa. ’1 So Tacitus described the Empire and its armed forces . The phrase might fittingly be applied to the who