essary illegalities, the second of constitutional government. So well did he succeed that in later days, confronted with th

gents of arbitrary power. For that reason ‘Dux’ became ‘Princeps’. He did not cease to be Imperator Caesar. There is no b

erest of history and precludes a fair judgement upon the agents. They did not know the future. Heaven and the verdict of

demanded, in a plain, hard style. It is much to be regretted that he did not carry his History of the Civil Wars through t

t, but policy was largely directed by ex-consuls. These men ruled, as did the Senate, not in virtue of written law, but thr

be applied to the more prominent of the consulars. 2 The consulate did not merely confer power upon its holder and digni

y a rare combination of merit, industry and protection. The nobilitas did not, it is true, stand like a solid rampart to ba

was a landed proprietor, great or small. But money was scarce and he did not wish to sell his estates: yet he required rea

The competition was fierce and incessant. Family influence and wealth did not alone suffice. From ambition or for safety, p

luence could easily have procured a seat in the Senate. 4 But Atticus did not wish to waste his money on senseless luxury o

verning class. For that surrender they were scorned by senators. They did not mind. 1 Some lived remote and secure in the e

us branches. Sulla the Dictator, himself a patrician and a Cornelius, did his best to restore the patriciate, sadly reduced

man dynastic politics. The tribune M. Livius Drusus, whose activities did so much to precipitate the Bellum Italicum, left

e proscribed, Caesar spoke for family loyalty and for a cause. But he did not compromise his future or commit his allegianc

lacked the desire as well as the pretext to march on Rome; and Caesar did not conquer Gaul in the design of invading Italy

Pompeius. For Cato or for the Republic they postponed vengeance, but did not forget a brother and father slain by the youn

craftiest politician of the day: he was declared a public enemy if he did not lay down his command before a certain day. By

t a blow. No less complete the military miscalculation: the imperator did not answer to his repute as a soldier. Insecurity

or to exterminate the Roman aristocracy. But these proud adversaries did not always leap forward with alacrity to be exhib

tion (Suetonius, Divus Iulius 42 f.): the title of praefectus moribus did not make him any more popular (Ad fam. 9, 15, 5).

t up to point a contrast with Pompeius or Augustus as though Augustus did not assume a more than human name and found a mon

as though Pompeius, the conqueror of the East and of every continent, did not exploit for his own vanity the resemblance to

in the company of his intimates and secretaries: the Senate voted but did not deliberate. As the Dictator was on the point

’ The words were remembered. The most eloquent of his contemporaries did not disdain to plagiarize them. 5 The question

aloof, seemed to embody that ideal of character, admired by those who did not care to imitate. His was not a simple persona

to mediate between Caesar and Pompeius; and during the Civil Wars he did not abate his sincere efforts in the cause of con

Pompeian tribunes, L. Flavius joined Caesar (Ad Att. 10, 1, 2) and so did C. Messius (Bell. Afr. 33, 2). 2 Gellius 12, 12

a relative of his, Dio 40, 63, 5.) PageBook=>070 constitution did not matter they were older than the Roman Republi

the King of Egypt, who, unable to repay his benefactor in hard cash, did what he could and appointed him chief minister of

d them long ago: as proconsul he encouraged their aspirations, but he did not satisfy them until the Civil War had begun.

by birth, but a citizen of an alien community allied to Rome. Balbus did not yet enter the Senate. His young nephew, coura

ul clients. Balbus, Oppius and Matius had not entered the Senate they did not need to, being more useful elsewhere. But L.

hen they governed provinces and led armies of Roman legions. Rabirius did not merely declaim about fleets and armies, vexin

quality at Rome by the patricians in the middle of the fourth century did not portend the triumph of the Roman plebs. The e

tin or Volscian history. The Junii could not rise to a king, but they did their best, producing that Brutus, himself of Tar

Republic. 4 Pride kept the legends of the patricians much purer. They did not need to descend to fraud, and they could admi

early succeeded. Not until they had been baffled and shattered in war did the fierce Italici begin to give up hope. An amne

y days may have weakened the insurgents by encouraging desertion, but did not arrest hostilities everywhere. Samnium rema

tion of the neighbouring city of Corfinium. Pompeius knew better than did his allies the oligarchs the true condition of It

g the Marrucini, fell in battle fighting for Italia. 9 But the family did not perish or lapse altogether into poverty or ob

he same family. 3 So Cicero described him (Pliny, NH 7, 135) and so did Plancus (Ad fam. 10, 183). Really an army contrac

Dictator would have given the consulate to Ventidius or to Balbus he did not gratify the expectations of Rabirius; and who

Brutus was a nobilis, Galba a patrician. Yet the opposition to Caesar did not come in the main from the noble or patrician

lull followed and bewilderment. Sympathizers came to the Capitol but did not stay long, among them the senior statesman Ci

Nero, who demanded special honours for the tyrannicides. Yet Antonius did not strive to get them condemned. Rejecting bot

ators barricaded themselves in their houses. Nor, as the days passed, did it become safe for them to be seen in public. The

would be of inestimable value after a revolution had succeeded. Thus did Brutus lift up his bloodstained dagger, crying th

ecovered in the provinces, as Pompeius knew and as some of his allies did not. The price was civil war. Even had the Libera

to secure a majority of the army commanders for their cause and they did not think that it was necessary. At the time of C

ailed. Yet even now, despite the deplorable fact that the Republicans did not dare to show themselves before the Roman Peop

n inadequacy. The fact that Antonius, unlike gallant young Dolabella, did not participate in the African and Spanish campai

official title. PageBook=>105 Empire, whose unofficial follies did not prevent them from rising, when duty called, t

al friendship. 3 He had no quarrel with the Liberators providing they did not interfere with the first object of his ambiti

urface, which is all that we know. Yet Antonius may have spoken as he did in order to force his enemies to come out into th

e outlook was black for the friends of settled government. Octavianus did not belong to that class. The rhetoric of the a

the soldiers and officers of Caesar’s great army of the Balkans. They did not forget him, nor did he neglect opportunities

s of Caesar’s great army of the Balkans. They did not forget him, nor did he neglect opportunities on his journey from Brun

sar’s heir reveals never a trace of theoretical preoccupations: if it did , it would have been very different and very short

hopes of concord or of dissension were frustrated. Brutus and Cassius did not return to Rome and the rival Caesarian leader

ame bewildered, impatient and tactless. His relations with Octavianus did not improve. Neither trusted the other. To coun

tcome of Cicero’s first public appearance since March 17th. The Curia did not see him again for more than three months. The

nocence. The truth of the matter naturally eludes inquiry. Antonius did not press the charge perhaps it was nothing more

nce Antonius had not chosen to declare Octavianus a public enemy, nor did he now turn his military strength, superior for t

erived was never recorded. Philippus wished for a quiet old age. So did Marcellus. But Marcellus, repenting of his ruinou

rowding out the obscurer partisans and secret contributors. The party did not appeal to the impecunious only. Its leader ne

turned, on any excuse. Piso replied, no doubt with some effect. 3 Nor did any political enemy or ambitious youth come forwa

times followed, with such robust conviction. Piso, a patriotic Roman, did not abandon all care for his country and lapse in

er satisfactory. Rather than emend, Cicero gave it up, gladly. Caesar did not insist. Time was short agents like Balbus wer

lic policy of Antonius. When he made his decision to return, Cicero did not know that unity had been restored in the Caes

to use Octavianus against Antonius and discard him in the end, if he did not prove pliable. It was Cato’s fatal plan all o

as a consular, to pursue gloria as an orator and a statesman, Cicero did not exhibit the measure of loyalty and constancy,

baker or seller of perfumes at Aricia. 4 As for Piso, his grandfather did not come from the ancient colony of Placentia at

ons of Rome’s empire might become her citizens! Where a man came from did not matter at all at Rome it had never mattered!

e songs of licence at Caesar’s triumph. 10 The victims of invective did not always suffer discredit or damage. On the con

mptiness of content in this political eloquence. The boni, after all, did exist the propertied classes; and it was presum

scence, even of belief. Revolution rends the veil. But the Revolution did not impede or annul the use of political fraud at

PageBook=>165 be seen in the Curia. The remaining five Cicero did not count as consulars at all: that is to say, th

and letters protesting love of peace and loyalty to the Republic who did not? But Plancus, it is clear, was coolly waiting

man who had held no public office. But there were limits. The Senate did not choose its own members, or determine their re

Under the threat of war a compromise might save appearances: which did not meet the ideas of Cicero. That the embassy wo

ations. At Rome politics lapsed for the rest of the month. But Cicero did not relent. He proclaimed the revival of the Sena

a supported him. Antonius was not declared a public enemy. But Cicero did not abate his efforts. As a patriotic demonstrati

he People approves of them nor does any patriotic citizen. ’5 Lepidus did not forget the insult to his dignitas. Such was

have witnessed stranger vicissitudes of alliance. 3 Yet, even if this did not happen, he might be caught between Caesarians

t declaring the young man a public enemy. The danger was manifest. It did not require to be demonstrated by the advice whic

he dangers of fraternization as had been the generals of Pompeius. He did not wish to be nor could he have subjugated the s

ust be, it would be sufficient to demonstrate that they acted as they did from a reasoned and balanced estimate of the situ

ured, lifted up and lifted off. 1 Cicero may never have said it. That did not matter. The happy invention epitomized all to

olicy of using Caesar’s heir to wreck the Caesarian party. Octavianus did not intend to be removed; and the emphasis that o

East, invading Italy and restoring the Republic through violence. He did not believe in violence. At Athens he looked abou

d about for allies, opened negotiations with provincial governors but did not act at once. The news of armies raised in Ita

of Syria by Cassius) to be closely dated. According to Gelzer, Brutus did not act until he had news of the session of Novem

rated his responsibility for that policy. But his words belied him he did not cease to urge Brutus to return to Italy. Afte

riends’, the young man observed. 1 But even now there were some who did not lose hope. In the evening came a rumour that

long with Q. Pedius, an obscure relative of unimpeachable repute, who did not survive the honour by many months. The new co

open or secret, of the organs of government. Pompeius and his allies did not claim to be the government or the State: it w

ves and fought his way through Italy to the sea coasts. 1 Arruntius did the same. 2 The Arruntii were an opulent family a

was by no means homogeneous, and the Dictator stood above parties. He did not champion one class against another. If he had

ing order. Nor would Antonius and his associates have behaved as they did , could security and power be won in any other way

talicum and became a Roman senator, now perished for his wealth; 5 so did M. Fidustius, who had been proscribed by Sulla, a

ter of the orator Hortensius, they abated their demands a little, but did not NotesPage=>195 1 Pliny, NH 35, 201: ‘q

rlier posts of subordination, gave sign and guarantee of success, but did not survive. Saxa and Fango were to be cut off in

sage. Their supremacy at sea was short-lived. Pompeius, it is true, did not intervene; but Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, comi

. Blumenthal, Wiener Studien xxxv (1913), 280 f. Agrippa and Maecenas did not deny that Octavianus lurked in a marsh (Pliny

had liberated Rome from the domination of a faction. But L. Antonius did not hold the city for long. He advanced northward

at variance, refused battle and retired through the Apennines. 6 Nor did help come from the south in time or in adequate s

riends and punished enemies, set up petty kings or deposed them. 1 So did he spend the winter after Philippi. Then his pere

from the Cappadocian charmer Glaphyra,4 succumbed with good will but did not surrender. The Queen, who was able to demonst

ely than to Glaphyra, there neither is, nor was, any sign at all. Nor did he see the Queen of Egypt again until nearly four

were famished and unreliable, and he had no ships at all. Not merely did Antonius hold the sea and starve Italy. NotesPa

popularity. Of Lepidus none took account: he had family influence and did not resign ambition, but lacked a party and devot

ents to his credit and the consulate for the next year as his reward, did not choose to hold the triumph that would have th

senators can have believed in the sincerity of such professions. That did not matter. Octavianus was already exploring the

a (ILS 893 a). 5 Messalla may have come with ships from Antonius as did Bibulus and Atratinus. He is not attested with Oc

t merely noble but of the most ancient nobility, the patrician; which did not in any way hamper them from following a revol

l built or repaired a shrine of Neptune, as was right, even though he did not hold a triumph. Apollo, however, was the pr

six were commended by no known military service to the Triumvirs. Nor did they achieve great fame afterwards, either the no

ied to narrate the history of a revolutionary age. Literary critics did not fear to match him with Thucydides, admiring i

for empire, he imitated Greek doctrines of political development and did more than justice to the merits of Senate and Peo

ion of active politics: their sentiments concerning state and society did not need to undergo any drastic transformation. T

tent of territories, for Cleopatra received no greater accession than did other dynasts ; 2 but her portion was exceedingly

o and the monopoly of the bitumen from the Dead Sea. That munificence did not content the dynastic pride and rapacity of Eg

ts do not seem to have excited alarm or criticism at Rome: only later did they become a sore point and pretext for defamati

ruits of mercantile operations, dynastic in their own right. Caesar did his best to equal or usurp the following of Pompe

place of Pompeius and Caesar as master of the eastern lands, not only did he invest Polemo, the orator’s son from Laodicea,

his life regal and lavish ’Antonius the great and inimitable’. 4 Thus did Antonius carry yet farther the policy of Pompeius

a firm hold on Armenia by planting garrisons over the land perhaps he did not have enough legions. Thus Artavasdes, given i

an imperatorial salutation (IG II2, 4110: Athens). L. Cocceius Nerva did not become consul. 3 He had charge of the corre

new cult, that was Octavianus’ policy and work, not his. The contrast did not escape the Republicans. Partly despair, but n

ypt, passed without repercussion in Rome or upon Roman sentiment. Nor did any outcry of indignant patriotism at once denoun

posed of kingdoms and tetrarchies in sovran and arbitrary fashion, he did not go beyond the measure of a Roman proconsul. N

y fashion, he did not go beyond the measure of a Roman proconsul. Nor did Antonius in fact resign to alien princes any exte

; and the small coastal tract of Cilicia Aspera conceded to Cleopatra did not come under direct Roman government until a ce

beauty or dominated by her intellect. His position was awkward if he did not placate the Queen of Egypt he would have to d

est, were his ruin. Rome, it has been claimed, feared Cleopatra but did not fear Antonius: she was planning a war of reve

that menaced everything that was Roman, as Antonius himself assuredly did not. 1 The propaganda of Octavianus magnified Cle

the date fixed for their expiry, as in 37 B.C. This was what Antonius did in 32 B.C. On the other, the statement and attitu

ten years (Res Gestae 7). A master in all the arts of political fraud did not need to stoop to trivial and pointless decept

new consuls summoned the Senate and took office on January 1st. They did not read the dispatch of Antonius, which they had

he renegade Plancus. 2 None the less the will was held genuine, and did not fail in its working, at least on some orders

3. Bononia was in the clientela of the Antonii 2 And some certainly did , Dio 51, 4, 6. 3 Of one of the Claudii, presuma

consensus Italiae against Antonius in the War of Mutina. 3 In vain it did not exist. Private influence and private ties, ca

timent with the victorious city to form a nation. The Italian peoples did not yet regard Rome as their own capital, for the

wed rather than preceded the War of Actium. Only then, after victory, did men realize to the full the terrible danger that

tion, or at least of acquiescence. The better sort of people in Italy did not like war or despotic rule. But despotism was

invigorated by their final success in the Sicilian War. Octavianus did not strike at Dyrrhachium or Apollonia. Making an

he virtue of clemency to extenuate the guilt of civil war. 3 Likewise did his heir, when murder could serve no useful purpo

o the power of Antonius in the East he confirmed their titles when he did not augment their territories. It had been an ess

unworthy and criminal aliens the dominions of the Roman People. That did not matter now. The gifts to the NotesPage=>

and Ephesus for the cult of the goddess Rome and the god Divus Julius did not preclude the worship of the new lord of the E

rld was at peace on land and sea. 5 The imposing and archaic ceremony did not, however, mean that warfare was to cease: the

t the armies of Rome presented a greater danger to her stability than did any foreign enemy. After Actium, the victor who h

irgil. 1 Not by conquest only but by the foundation of a lasting city did a hero win divine honours in life and divinity af

le without the help of an oligarchy. His primacy was precarious if it did not accommodate itself to the wishes of the chief

convenient appellation for the holder of vague and tremendous powers did not make its way all at once. Princeps remained a

the legions; and Egypt stood apart from the reckoning. But Augustus did not take all the legions: three proconsuls had ar

, accepted no magistracy that ran contrary to the ‘mos maiorum’. 3 He did not need to. As it stood, the Roman constitution

ody politic. 4 But Pompeius was sinister and ambitious. That princeps did not cure, but only aggravated, the ills of the Ro

, 125. 6 Aen. 6, 834 f. 7 lb. 8, 670. PageBook=>318 Virgil did not need to say where Caesar belonged—with his re

e unique. Romans instructed in a long tradition of law and government did not need to take lessons from theorists or from a

citus, ever alert for the contrast of name and substance. At Rome, it did not mark an era in dating; in the provinces it pa

es that Augustus twice thought of restoring the Republic— not that he did so. 3 To Suetonius, the work of Augustus was the

hat the Republican constitution should operate unhampered—and that it did , at least in the earlier years of his presidency.

Compare Appian, BC 1. 2, 7. PageBook=>325 The choice of means did not demand deep thought or high debate in the par

. The same reasons counselled Augustus to depart. Others as well he did not wish to contemplate the triumphal pomp of Cra

o publish a secret of state. The incident was disquieting. Not merely did the execution of a consul cast a glaring light on

ps inscribed on the golden shield and advertised everywhere. Not only did it reveal a lack of satisfaction with the ‘felici

cenas might be dropped, but not Agrippa; and so Agrippa prevailed. He did not approve of the exorbitant honours accorded to

seful remarks about ‘amici’, ‘officium’ and ‘fides’). 2 Yet Agrippa did not disdain a golden crown for Naulochus and an a

uls his ideal of public utility was logical and intimidating. Agrippa did not stop at aqueducts. He composed and published

de, disclaiming any talent to celebrate a soldier’s exploits. 5 Nor did Agrippa speak for himself. Like the subtle Maecen

Agrippa and a triumph for both. ‘Remo cum fratre Quirinus. ’2 Thus did Virgil hail the end of fratricidal strife and the

ght become Princeps, when age and merit qualified. For the moment, it did not matter. Whatever the distant future might bri

purge, so gravely attested and so ingenuously praised by historians, did not escape contemporary observers. There was a ve

that received from the hands of Italy’s leader the restored Republic did not belie its origin and cannot evade historical

definite rank, duties and privileges. They were to remain: the Romans did not believe in equality. 1 But passage from below

until A.D. 6, when large dismissals of legionaries were in prospect, did the State take charge of the payments, a special

s stood in an especial relation of devotion to the Princeps. Not only did he possess and retain a private body-guard of nat

ere soon augmented by a surge of successful speculators. But Augustus did not suffer them to return to their old games. The

cian or plebeian, affected to despise knights or municipal men; which did not, however, debar marriage or discredit inherit

orgive the man of the proscriptions. The Princeps had his revenge. He did not care to exclude any large body of nobiles fro

consulate, would do well to seek the approbation of the Princeps. He did not nominate candidates that would have been invi

exacting taste, so they said, had Ovid’s poems by heart. 4 Nobiles did not need to adduce proficiency in the arts. Of th

us, the younger son of the Triumvir, became consul. But the consulate did not matter so much. Enemies were dangerous only i

rincipate of Augustus a Sulla, a Metellus, a Scaurus and other nobles did not rise to the consulate. 4 With so few suffect

as probably the consul of 14 B.C., cf. E. Groag in PIR2, C 1379. Some did not praise him as highly as did Tacitus (cf. Sene

., cf. E. Groag in PIR2, C 1379. Some did not praise him as highly as did Tacitus (cf. Seneca, De ben. 2, 27, 1). 6 Tacit

he new dispensation his right to designate a praetor every year, that did not matter. There were other ways. The system b

hose political pests, the demagogue and the military adventurer. That did not mean that the direction of the government now

e Principate were thus safeguarded. But the mere maintenance of order did not fulfil the ambition of the Princeps or justif

outh as well as rewarded experience. The young consul of thirty-three did not have to wait too long for a province Africa o

ealt with the Via Latina. 4 Agrippa’s affectionate care for aqueducts did not lapse with his memorable aedileship, but was

urbi in 26 B.C. and resigning the office after a few days, because he did not understand its functions or because he disapp

the conduct of public business or the dispensing of justice but they did not debate and determine the paramount questions

system of taxation. 4 When the civil service had developed, freedmen did not hold the procuratorships of the imperial prov

ehearsal. The assembly of the People might declare war but the People did not decide against whom; the wars, however grandi

ot unfairly be attributed to the great road-builder and organizer. He did not live to see the consummation of the campaigns

d a republic, the other monarchy. The contrast was unreal, the choice did not arise. What was decided by the advisers of th

rred him from the attempt. It would have required imagination that he did not possess and facts that he could never discove

if not necessary after the great wars of conquest, the effort of Rome did not flag or fail. The governmental oligarchy coul

Cornificius and others had disappeared. Taurus was dead, and his son did not live to reach the consulate, but the family w

inates the vulnerable schemer. Moreover the ruin of the erring mother did not impair the succession of Gaius and Lucius, he

d perilous. In the next year his tribunicia potestas lapsed. Augustus did not renew it. Gaius Caesar, consul designate and

Claudian house. 5 Tiberius, who honoured, if ever a Republican noble did , the sacred claims of fides, remembered the affro

(A.D. 6-9). Then Germany rose. Varus and three legions perished. Rome did not see her new master for many years. The adop

a Postumus, the only surviving grandchildren of the Princeps and they did not survive for long. In A.D. 8 a new scandal swe

hat Lucilius who was the friend of Brutus and of Antonius. 1 Tiberius did not forget his own Republican and Pompeian antece

etrothed his daughter to Seianus’ son (Tacitus, Ann. 6, 30). Tiberius did not remove him. That was not from fear of a civil

fficial and inevitable version, inevitably mocked and disbelieved. It did not matter. Everything had been arranged, not m

acitus, Hist. 2, 95. PageBook=>441 Not until libertas was lost did men feel the full pride of Rome’s imperial destin

regimentation, its title was all too revealing. More to the point, he did not need it. The Princeps enacted the measures of

erfluous, when not positively noxious. 1 Philosophy studied to excess did not fit a Roman and a senator. 2 Only law and ora

pidus, the pontifex maximus, living in seclusion at Circeii. Augustus did not strip him of that honour, ostentatious in scr

rge estates grew larger. Prosperity might produce qualms no less than did adversity. Horace, in whom the horrors of the Per

stands aloof and alone, with all the power and all the glory. But he did not win power and hold it by his own efforts alon

fficial religion of the Roman People was formal rather than spiritual did not appear to the Roman statesman entirely a defe

t was an exemplar of virtue and integrity. The Principate of Augustus did not merely idealize consul and citizen of the anc

regular troops. The legionary was more often an engineer: the auxilia did most of the fighting. By such expedients the fi

’, so Horace exclaimed in the revolutionary period. 2 The New State did its best to refute that archaic prejudice: in p

PageNotes. 461 1 Virgil, Aen. 6, 726 f. PageBook=>462 That did not matter. The New State had its lyric poet, tec

ter invective of his Epodes. Age and prosperity abated his ardour but did not impair the sceptical realism of his character

ue ferocis contundet, moresque viris et moenia ponet. 5 His triumph did not bring personal domination, but the unity of R

c, moral and hortatory. Even antiquarianism had its uses. But history did not need to be antiquarian it could be employed,

erting Sallustius. When Pompeius thus became a respectable figure, so did Octavianus. It was the fashion to be Pompeian rat

ecord, or legend embroider, any loss sustained by Livy the historians did not excite the interests of biographers and schol

torians did not excite the interests of biographers and scholiasts as did the poets. But the opulent city of Patavium certa

sons for gratitude to Augustus, that fact may have reinforced, but it did not pervert, the sentiments natural to members of

s not meant to be taken seriously it was a kind of parody. Augustus did not see the joke. Like the early Germans depicted

did not see the joke. Like the early Germans depicted by Tacitus, he did not think that moral laxity was a topic of innoce

unhappy in his last choice, a virtuous and excellent woman. 1 That did not matter. Ovid was a disgrace. He had refused t

obler repute than to be known as the home of an erotic poet. Augustus did not forget. It was in vain that Ovid interspersed

victory, the flood of miracles and propaganda was sensibly abated but did not utterly cease. A more enduring instrument of

reflects his overt designs for the succession of Gaius and Lucius. He did not need it so much for himself. At the colony of

f personal allegiance to the military leader in the War of Actium: it did not lapse when he became a magistrate at Rome and

onadenses. The private vices and domestic scandals of Herod the Great did not shake Augustus’ confidence in the efficiency

r and more productive. The publicani were superseded or reduced. That did not mean an end of oppression and injustice. The

blican traditions. On the whole, a harmless practice. Yet Mediolanium did not forget Brutus and Cassius; 2 Corduba produced

ugustus should be hailed as pater patriae (2 B.C.) Pollio, however, did not suffer himself thus to be captured by the gov

47. PageBook=>483 His freedom of speech cost him promotion he did not rise above the praetorship. Augustus gave the

s criticism of the whole government. The major scandals, it is true., did not always come before the courts; but politics a

l intervention of Augustus, who came to the court and sat there. 2 He did not need to make a speech. Such was auctoritas. M

ened on their side, with salutary rebuke of their enemies. 3 Augustus did not forget his friends and allies: he was able to

draw the moral of the times, intelligent to anticipate the future. He did not intend that his retirement from politics shou

ntemporary political literature provided the cause and the fuel. Thus did Augustus have his revenge, imitating the Greek Ti

abienus’ writings were officially condemned and publicly burned. That did not matter, said Cassius Severus, who had them al

atter, said Cassius Severus, who had them all by heart. 7 But Cassius did not go unscathed. This man, an able and vigorous

med that this form of composition was peculiarly and wholly Roman. He did not live to see his verdict confirmed by Juvenal

all. The Empire had broken their power and their spirit. The satirist did not dare to deride the new nobility, the oligarch

cians, marshalled their resources and tightened their alliances. Thus did Servilia work for her family, capturing the Aemil

Pompeius. The last in the direct line of the Metelli, an ex-Antonian, did not reach the consulate; and the last consular be

still prominent in the first days of the Empire but their direct line did not survive the dynasty of the Julii and Claudii,

n nobility seemed to have run its course. Yet the succeeding period did not entirely lack bearers of Augustan consular na

e believed a danger, though often only a nuisance, so great a tribute did Roman conservatism and snobbery pay to the posses

rs. As has been shown, the marshals of Augustus, the flower of Italy, did not respond to his national policy by the product

ulars. 2 But his three grandsons, two consuls and a consul-designate, did not outlive the Julio-Claudians; one of them peri

s company, sons of the old Italian aristocracy, whose private virtues did not avail to compensate the cardinal crime of bei

4 The New State might be called monarchy, or by any other name. That did not matter. Personal rights and private status ne

rienced one civil war in his own lifetime, and the threat of another, did not allow his judgement entirely to be blinded by

e was organized under a principate no dictatorship or monarchy. Names did not matter much. Before long the eloquent Seneca,

ne and a successor left on guard. Augustus used the word ‘statio’: so did contemporaries. 3 Augustus’ rule was dominion o