e of Münzer: but for his work on Republican family-history, this book could hardly have existed. In detail my principal debts

ional calculation. It lasted for forty years. No astrologer or doctor could have foretold that the frail youth would outlive,

a century, his ally and contemporary, the robust Agrippa; no schemer could have counted in advance upon the deaths of his ne

e a formula, revealing to the members of the governing class how they could co-operate in maintaining the new order, ostensib

es. Yet for all that, the history of the whole revolutionary period could be written NotesPage=>004 1 Plutarch, Anto

an spirit. That was tradition, inescapable. The Roman and the senator could never surrender his prerogative of liberty or fra

rained to omit the period of the Triumvirate when he observed that he could not treat his subject with freedom and with verac

gainst it; but Pompeius, for all his power, had to come to terms. Nor could Caesar have ruled without it. Coerced by Pompeius

innings. Of necessity the conception was narrow only the ruling order could have any history at all and only the ruling city:

t to bar all intruders. No need for that the conservative Roman voter could seldom be induced to elect a man whose name had n

Amicitia presupposes inimicitia, inherited or acquired: a statesman could not win power and influence without making many e

the great banker. Had Atticus so chosen, wealth, repute and influence could easily have procured a seat in the Senate. 4 But

’ PageBook=>014 from ambition and wedded to quiet, the knights could claim no title of civic virtue, no share in the s

ights would therefore arrest revolution or even reform, for these men could not be expected to have a personal interest in re

g the old nobility persisted a tradition of service to the State that could transcend material interests and combine class-lo

n political life. Whether he held authority from the State or not, he could thus raise an army on his own initiative and reso

nd corruption, liberal in outlook and policy. Moreover, the tribunate could be employed for conservative ends by aristocratic

nights, muzzled the tribunate, and curbed the consuls. But even Sulla could not abolish his own example and preclude a succes

s saved Rome from the Gauls, had vanished utterly by now, or at least could show no more consuls. The Sulpicii and Manlii had

their alarming versatility. There was no epoch of Rome’s history but could show a Claudius intolerably arrogant towards the

d the husband of women of the Metelli. 4 The dynasty of the Metelli could not rule alone. Both the framework and the bulk o

to and his kinsmen NotesPage=>026 1 This was notorious. Cicero could not deny it, cf. Ad Att. 12, 21, 1. 2 Sallust,

dominated Italy, for five years. Pompeius’ purpose was flagrant there could be no pretext of public emergency, as for the eas

senatui dicto audientis esse. ’ PageBook=>041 venal. 1 Caesar could always count on tribunes. C. Scribonius Curio, a

orator Cicero, pathetically loyal to a leader of whose insincerity he could recall such palpable and painful testimony. The p

ht armed domination. 1 Had Pompeius conquered in battle, the Republic could hardly have survived. A few years, and Pompeius t

the point. The cause of Pompeius had become the better cause. Caesar could not compete. Though interest on each side claimed

nfined to senators. 3 If the Sallustian Epistulae ad Caesarem senem could be taken as genuine, or even contemporary, they w

that very different person, Caesar the Dictator. The rule of Caesar could well be branded as monarchy on a partisan or conv

to. That he was unpopular he well knew. 1 ‘For all his genius, Caesar could not see a way out’, as one of his friends was sub

on and by no means a fanatic. 2 As for the tenets of the Stoics, they could support doctrines quite distasteful to Roman Repu

after all, they had ‘hired the money’. PageBook=>058 oligarchy could survive if its members refused to abide by the ru

that phrase. The Dictatorship was enough. The rule of the nobiles, he could see, was an anachronism in a world-empire; and so

es. The political dynast Crassus used Catilina as his agent. Catilina could not, or would not, understand that reform or revo

cathed through the faction-wars of Marius and Sulla. 3 A consular who could stand neutral without the imputation of lack of c

eform for his personal ambition. Like his father before him, Pompeius could not be described as a consistent party politician

and vice were alleged against Sallustius: the enemies of Ap. Claudius could have incriminated the stern censor on that count.

enormity Gabinius himself was sacrificed to the publicani. Pompeius could surely have saved him, had he cared. 2 But Gabini

trician might recall past favours conferred upon the Roman plebs:3 he could also appeal to the duties which they owed to birt

inus, to M. Aemilius Lepidus and to P. Servilius Isauricus. 4 Lepidus could recall a family feud against Pompeius; and his co

being fettered by caste or principle. Either monarchy or democracy could be made to serve their ends, to enhance person an

s enemies Caesar appealed to the legions, devoted and invincible they could tear down the very heavens, so he told people at

ctors there might be but Balbus, the friend of such eminent citizens, could surely have no enemies. 4 Balbus won. But for the

Egypt, who, unable to repay his benefactor in hard cash, did what he could and appointed him chief minister of finance in th

Enemies and rivals were waiting to exploit a change. In Egypt Caesar could support a candidate, Cleopatra, against her siste

s of the legions, with no interval of time or status. An ex-centurion could be a knight, and therefore juryman, officer or ma

re rustic and humble in origin. The centurionate was worth having: it could be got through patronage as well as service. 3

se about origins and social standing may claim validity. The province could boast opulent and cultivated natives of dynastic

II, 2512 ff.). If the scholiast Porphyrio (on Horace, Sat. 1, 3, 130) could be trusted, P. Alfenus Varus (cos. suff. 39) came

n a charge of corruption. 3 Cicero should have sought consolation: he could now see beside him a great company of bankers and

he Roman citizenship nor of municipal institutions over the peninsula could transform their internal economy. As at Rome unde

cipal aristocrat was largely solicited by Roman politicians. Not only could he sway the policy of his city or influence a who

ies of Italy traced an origin earlier than that of Rome: their rulers could vie in antiquity, and even in dignity and repute,

rom kings and gods, and through all the frauds of pedigree and legend could at the least lay claim to a respectable antiquity

ional religious observance. 6 Of certain local dynastic families it could in truth be proved as well as stated that they ha

. The Secular Games were once an observance of the Valerii; 3 and men could remember whole wars waged by a single clan. Such

eian houses might acquire wealth and dynastic power at Rome, but they could never enter the rigid and defined caste of the pa

t, perhaps belongs more truly to Latin or Volscian history. The Junii could not rise to a king, but they did their best, prod

atricians much purer. They did not need to descend to fraud, and they could admit an alien origin without shame or compunctio

taly against Rome must not be forgotten. When Caesar invaded Italy he could reckon on something more than aversion from polit

ion of Italy and kept alive the memory of defeat and suffering. There could be no reconciliation until a long time had elapse

y knights whom Caesar promoted. Campania, again, a prosperous region, could show Marian and Caesarian connexions in towns lik

and that, after the Bellum Italicum and the enfranchisement of Italy, could not be confined to Rome, but must embrace all Ita

. Cassius should be consuls in 41 B.C.3 But before these dispositions could all take effect, civil war broke out again and th

have repelled the advances of the Liberators. The Dictator left, and could leave, no heir to his personal rule. But Antonius

Caesarian party and consul, head of the government. The Ides of March could make no difference to that. When the tyrant fell

ing, loyalty to the established order. His past career showed that he could not be depended on for action or for statesmanshi

e name of Cicero with a loud voice. 2 The appeal was premature. Nor could the faction of Brutus and Cassius reckon upon the

ies, they too had a share of power and glory. Discontent, it is true, could be detected among the populace of Rome NotesPag

es; and he later made a grant to Servilia. Rome and Italy, if lost, could be recovered in the provinces, as Pompeius knew a

e was civil war. Even had the Liberators been willing to pay it, they could find little to encourage them abroad. The executi

d many a secret muttering at the failure of the coup d’état. Yet some could find the Ides of March a great comfort; and the

as to be abolished for ever. Thoughtful men reflected that its powers could easily be restored one day under another appellat

person by betrothing his daughter to Lepidus’ son. Moreover, Antonius could induce him to depart to his province. Lepidus, th

ho cursed the melancholy incompleteness of the glorious Ides of March could not justly complain if the Caesarian consul solic

The Senate was hostile: yet the uneasy reconciliation with Octavianus could scarcely last. On any count, the outlook was blac

pose on grey hairs or none remaining. Legitimate primacy, it is true, could only be attained at Rome through many extra-const

e a compact and devoted following was won, and his power revealed, he could build up a new Caesarian party of his own. It w

at once lent their support and devotion to his son and heir. Loyalty could only be won by loyalty in return. Caesar never le

against the more generous virtues and vices. Another eminent Roman could furnish a text in the school of politics. The fai

first Antonius, then Octavianus. But before such respectable elements could venture openly to advocate sedition, violence and

outlaw Octavianus, a tribune would surely have vetoed the measure: he could not afford a fresh conflict with the Senate and a

o say: even when it became safe to inquire or publish, nothing at all could be discovered. 3 Before long a very different cha

ded with Marius in the civil wars, suffering in consequence. But they could not be stripped of their ancestors Octavianus’ fr

a kind of conspiracy against the Commonwealth. Octavianus’ following could not raise the semblance even of being a party. It

ed the holders of property. But not for long they were a minority and could be held in check. The cause of Caesar’s heir was

f his friends. Further, Caesar’s freedmen were very wealthy. The heir could claim their services. 2 Nor is this all. Caesar,

esarians to be approached in April was the millionaire Balbus. Balbus could keep his counsel,4 and time has respected his sec

evious Marcellus wholly to be neglected he had family connexions that could be brought into play, for the Caesarian cause or

P. Servilius each had a change of side to their credit. No politician could compete with Cicero for versatility, as the attac

War. Returning from his province of Cilicia, he made what efforts he could to avert hostilities. He showed both judgement an

itable clash: on the contrary, relations of friendship, to which they could each with justice appeal. In 49 B.C. Antonius, th

Laelius. Again, on his return from exile, Cicero hoped that Pompeius could be induced to go back on his allies, drop Caesar,

litary despotism and would reveal the strength which the Commonwealth could still muster. In public pronouncements Cicero wen

f his own plan: it may be doubted whether at any time he felt that he could trust Octavianus. Neither was the dupe. When he

ions and personalities at variance. The imperious eloquence of Cicero could not prevail over the doubts and misgivings of men

tician and disapproved of his methods, the attitude of the Caesarians could be surmised: yet Caesarians themselves were divid

us a judge of men and politics. Civil war was an abomination. Victory could only be won by adopting the adversary’s weapons;

rought to completion the commentaries of Caesar, he confessed that he could see no end to civil strife. 1 Men recalled not Ca

ad revelled in cruelty: such had been his lusts that no modest person could mention them. 2 In the professed ideals of a la

eer:8 the fullest elaboration on that theme belongs to a time when it could do him no harm. 9 Nor was it Caesar’s enemies but

as a humourist. Cato had to acknowledge it. 1 The politician Vatinius could give as good as he got he seems to have borne Cic

ctised, however, a more subtle art of misrepresentation, which, if it could not deceive the hardened adept at the game of Rom

the question at Rome where and what was the legitimate authority that could demand the unquestioning loyalty of all good citi

litical thought, no constitution at all. This meant that a revolution could be carried through without any violation of legal

bertas of the People and the auctoritas of the Senate: either of them could be exploited in politics, as a source of power or

had placed themselves in the position of public enemies. A popularis could contest the misuse of this prerogative, but not i

t of partisan interpretation, of debate and of fraud: almost any plea could triumph by an appeal to custom or tradition. Kn

derives in the main from the speeches of Cicero. On the surface, what could be more clear than his categories and his ‘values

f a class and the perpetuation of privilege. Yet, even so, libertas could not be monopolized by the oligarchy or by any par

r superiors; and the plea of patriotism was all-embracing surely they could help the State on whichever side they stood. 2

rians or high-minded casuists. The party in control of the government could secure sanction for almost any arbitrary act: at

act: at the worst, a state of public emergency or a ‘higher legality’ could be invented. Only the first steps need be hazardo

his own initiative, privato consilio, it was claimed that the Senate could at once legalize treason, condoning the private a

here: when the constitution had perished, the will of Army and People could be expressed, immediate and imperative. For the

urgent dispatch from the governor of Cisalpine Gaul. Though nothing could be done while Antonius was still consul, Cicero s

right when summoning him to surrender the province. That point Cicero could not dispute. He therefore had resort to the most

against Antonius, if his troops were mutinous and seditious, Antonius could be no true consul of the Roman People. On the oth

ator. But what of the official recognition of Caesar’s heir? Senators could recall how twenty years before a consul had secur

akened, with no consular Metelli left alive, no Licinii or Junii. Nor could the survivors of the Marcelli, Marcii and Calpurn

t of the Senate. Only three, so Cicero, writing to Cassius, asserted, could be called statesmen and patriots himself, L. Piso

ady possessed the reputation of a time-server. 2 Even less reliance could be placed on M. Aemilius Lepidus, the governor of

ostra or in any part of the Forum that Lepidus should choose. Lepidus could afford to wait. A stronger character than eithe

or determine their relative standing. On no known practice or theory could the auctoritas of the Senate NotesPage=>167

expected the swift fall of Mutina. Against that fait accompli nothing could be done, and Antonius, his rights and his prestig

Cisalpina but cling to Gallia Comata. 2 Deceptive and dangerous there could be no treating with Antonius, for Antonius was in

of war and marched up the Flaminia to Ariminum but not to fight if he could avoid it. He might yet baffle both Cicero and Ant

could avoid it. He might yet baffle both Cicero and Antonius. But he could not arrest the mobilization. Patriotism and priva

journey, and announcing terms that aroused Cicero to anger. ‘Nothing could be more scandalous, more disgusting than the cond

t. ’ The activities of this influential and wealthy country gentleman could have been described in very different terms. 2

to keep faith with Lepidus, with Plancus and with Dolabella. 3 Cicero could not resist the challenge to his talent. He quoted

e exhilaration of a victory in which his legions had so small a share could not compensate the ravages of a long siege. Tha

ation as had been the generals of Pompeius. He did not wish to be nor could he have subjugated the strong Caesarian sympathie

year he had complained that the Senate sent him no instructions; nor could he have marched to Italy against the will of the

PageBook=>172 due to Cicero, still trusting that the adventurer could be won to legitimate methods. Octavianus was not

d unmolested until the proscriptions were duly instituted. Octavianus could afford to wait, to take vengeance upon the lesser

take vengeance upon the lesser enemies along with the greater. Rome could already have a foretaste of legal murder. One of

State made requital. He seized the treasury, which, though depleted, could furnish for each of his soldiers the sum of two t

egions, the consul left Rome for the reckoning with Antonius, whom he could now face as an equal. Antonius had been thwarted

aul again, with a brave front. In force of arms, Lepidus and Antonius could have overwhelmed the young consul. His name and f

ction in Italy when they settled accounts with the Liberators. Cicero could have escaped through indecision he lingered until

and enriched literature with an immortal theme. 1 But the fugitives could not take their property with them; some of the pr

xtenuating feature of faction- contests at Rome the worst extremities could sometimes be avoided, among the aristocracy at le

rder. Nor would Antonius and his associates have behaved as they did, could security and power be won in any other way. The c

scation drives money underground. It must be lured out again. Capital could only be tempted by a good investment. The Caesari

: with the ignominy of the new senators of the Triumviral period they could not have competed. Not only aliens or men of low

aliens or men of low origin and infamous pursuits even escaped slaves could be detected. 6 As with the recruitment of the Sen

me a commendation, when possession of neither traditions nor property could dull the edge of action. From the beginning, the

ic had been abolished. Whatever the outcome of the armed struggle, it could never be restored. Despotism ruled, supported by

made provision for the cult in the towns of Italy. 2 The young Caesar could now designate himself ‘Divi filius’. Under the

een Antonius’ policy when he was consul. But with Caesar’s heir there could be no pact or peace. 1 When the Caesarian leaders

us had now come up though shattered in health and never a soldier, he could not afford to resign to Antonius the sole credi

the loss of Cassius, that brought on the doom of the Republic. Brutus could win a battle but not a campaign. Provoked by the

r was arduous, unpopular and all but fatal to himself. No calculation could have predicted that he would emerge in strength a

, if anybody, knew the character of her husband: he neither would nor could go back upon his pledges of alliance to Octavianu

at Fulginiae, less than twenty miles from Perusia their fire-signals could be seen by the besieged. Ventidius and Pollio wer

d most men’s hopes. In his emergency Octavianus sought aid where he could , an accommodation with the master of the sea. He

e choice between two masters. Which of them had the sympathy of Italy could scarcely be doubted; and, despite the loss of the

er stages of the dissensions in Italy, Antonius was well apprised. He could not intervene the confiscations and the allotment

olicy for which they were jointly responsible. The victor of Philippi could not forswear his promises and his soldiers. His o

last he moved. The Parthian menace was upon him, but the Parthians could wait. Antonius gathered forces and sailed for Gre

onted his Caesarian rival. For war, his prospects were better than he could have hoped; and he at once demonstrated his old g

r the position of the Caesarian leaders so far consolidated that they could dispense with the dictatorial and invidious power

left the company of Pompeius without reluctance; and few Republicans could preserve, if they had ever acquired, sufficient f

an odd Republican or two and certain of the assassins, for whom there could be no pardon from Caesar’s heir, no return to Rom

only from hatred of Caesar’s heir. In reality an adventurer, Pompeius could easily be represented as a pirate. 5 Peace was

ccording to the spirit and profession of the Roman constitution there could be no rational hope any more. There was ordered g

ty and monarchy over all the world. Of the Caesarian leaders, neither could brook an equal. Should Antonius come again to Bru

rmies of the East, whether it was peace or war in the end, Octavianus could face him, as never yet, with equal power and arms

last twenty years, others, especially the Pompeians and Republicans, could show no member of consular age or standing. The p

order, for patronage but with a good pretext. 1 Among the consulars could be discerned one Claudius only, one Aemilius, par

a military age. Some at least of the merits of the plain style, which could claim to be traditional and Roman, might be prize

ice of rhetoric: in public, the official panegyric. Freedom of speech could never return. Freedom, justice and honesty, ban

rature and philosophy. From the official religion of the Roman People could come scant consolation in evil days, NotesPage=

tion and to reinforce the fabric of the Commonwealth. Only philosophy could provide either a rational explanation of the natu

il war, the sombre, intense and passionate chapters of Thucydides. He could not have chosen better, if choice there was, for

ccessors, the breaking of his empire into separate kingdoms; and they could set before them the heirs and the marshals of Cae

s now becoming evident that poetry, besides and above mere invective, could be made an instrument of government by conveying

here is any definite evidence at all: the Arcadian scenery of Ecl. 10 could not safely be invoked to show that Gallus was in

tate and society. Republican libertas, denied to the nobiles of Rome, could not be conceded to a freedman’s son. NotesPage=

later charges of highway robbery outstanding against certain senators could at last be annulled. 3 The Caesarian soldiers w

turned, under the goad of fear, into a fanatical hatred. The Roman could no longer derive confidence from the language, ha

n People, august and sanctioned by divine providence; ancient legends could be employed to advertise in literature and on mon

in the alliance of Caesar’s heir, had shown the way. The new monarchy could not rule without help from the old oligarchy. T

many feared the imminent clash and some favoured Caesar’s heir, none could have foreseen by what arts a national champion wa

and succour to humanity. Before the eyes of the Greek world Antonius could parade imperially, not only as a monarch and a so

haps he did not have enough legions. Thus Artavasdes, given impunity, could desert with his cavalry at a critical moment. The

h of Antonius’ supplies and artillery. Antonius, lacking light horse, could not bring them to battle. It was already late in

had an evil and often exaggerated reputation yet Galatia or Macedonia could have competed with Italy in valour and even in di

Judaea in the south and south-east, Rome was secure on that flank and could direct her full effort towards the north or the n

imate friends had once been Antonians. 1 Evidence is scanty. Yet it could be guessed that the Cocceii, a new family showing

onius Atratinus (cos. suff. 34 B.C.), whose sister Poplicola married, could recall a distant and dissipated youth in the circ

lkans and in Illyricum, as far as the Danube. Only then and only thus could the Empire be made solid, coherent and secure. In

uld have to abate its ambitions and narrow the area of its rule. Rome could not deal with the East as well as the West. The E

14, 12, 1. PageBook=>273 Egypt itself, however much augmented, could never be a menace to the empire of Rome. Ever sin

m that of Antonius. The first man in Rome, when controlling the East, could not evade, even if he wished, the rank and attrib

e, does not need to be discussed here. On the one hand, the Triumvirs could continue to hold their powers after the date fixe

w, the Senate and People were not utterly to be despised: the consuls could be held guilty of a grave misdemeanour in leaving

asts, whether legal or personal, were no novelty to a generation that could recall the misrepresentation and invective of Rep

>279 1 Dio 50, 2, 7. 2 Antiquarians and constitutional purists could recall the situation in 49 B.C., when the Pompeia

s in itself not of prime importance. Antonius, being a Roman citizen, could not at any time contract a legally valid marriage

legiance on a calculation of interest, or preferred to lapse, if they could , into a safe and inglorious neutrality. Yet Anton

e, if they could, into a safe and inglorious neutrality. Yet Antonius could count upon tried military men like Sosius and Can

about the divorce of Octavia, had served his purpose adequately. Men could see that divorce, like marriage, was an act of hi

uples but of expedience how far was forgery necessary? and how easily could forgery be detected? PageBook=>283 that An

I deliver my edicts upon the Capitol’. 5 No Roman however degenerate could have descended to such treason in his right mind.

lp from Italian men of property, themselves menaced. 4 Aid from Italy could be invoked for revolution, for reaction or for do

ecome Roman through grant of the franchise after the Bellum Italicum, could with the utmost propriety be summoned and conjure

profession. The local gentry, who controlled the policy of the towns, could create opinion, produce votes of the local senate

ptives from the disaster of Crassus (and by implication of Antonius), could turn renegade and live in Parthia: milesne Cras

p. 86 ff. PageBook=>287 Shame that the Marsian and the Apulian could forget the sacred shields of Mars, the Roman name

was a name and a deception. Etruria, Picenum and the Samnite country could remember their conquest by Sulla and by the Pompe

inimici, not the enemies of the State (hostes); and as such the oath could never change or lapse. By whatever name known or

us. 1 Many senators had fled to Antonius. Rival factions in the towns could now emerge, seizing power at the expense of absen

s won over the city of Aesernia in northern Samnium, that the Vinicii could answer for fervid support from the colony of Cale

East, was in himself no menace to the Empire, but a future ruler who could hope to hold it together. But Antonius victorious

already there and war inevitable. In a restoration of liberty no man could believe any more. Yet if the coming struggle elim

d authority on rhetoric, must have been a man of some substance if he could secure senatorial rank for two of his sons. 4 C

as he might appear. Antonius now had to stand beside Cleopatra—there could be no turning back. Patrae at the mouth of the Gu

e up the garrison of Egypt, Cyrene, Syria and Macedonia. 1 Antonius could not take the offensive, for every reason, not mer

strength; as for number of legions it was doubtful whether the enemy could transport across the Adriatic a force superior to

for power had intended that there should be a serious battle if they could help it. So it turned out. Actium was a shabby af

the Queen was an embarrassment if she lived :5 but a Roman imperator could not NotesPage=>298 1 Aem. 8, 688. 2 Vell

xtenuate the guilt of civil war. 3 Likewise did his heir, when murder could serve no useful purpose : he even claimed that af

nto a Roman province. 3 Acquiring Egypt and its wealth for Rome, he could afford to abandon Armenia and one part of the nor

or ignorance might elevate Parthia to be a rival empire of Rome :2 it could not stand the trial of arms—or even of diplomacy.

rehensions. Once aroused they would be difficult to allay: their echo could still be heard. Horace produces a divine decree,

esar had put off the task, the Triumvirs had not even begun. The duty could no longer be evaded on the plea of wars abroad or

’potentiae securus’. 4 Naked despotism is vulnerable. The imperator could depend upon the plebs and the army. But he could

rable. The imperator could depend upon the plebs and the army. But he could not rule without the help of an oligarchy. His pr

ubsidies; some had even been elevated into the patriciate. Octavianus could count upon certain of his NotesPage=>307 1

credit and the confidence of any who deal in that commodity. No ruler could have faith in men like Plancus and Titius. Ahenob

ic office had expired years before: in law the only power to which he could appeal if he wished to coerce a proconsul was the

omn[i]|um regum formidine, subacta. ’ PageBook=>310 Octavianus could tolerate misdemeanour, crime or vice in his assoc

consular in rank; and no imperatorial salutations, no triumphs, if it could be helped. The nobilis and the consular, those we

f her husband Gallus: but a knight as powerful as C. Cornelius Gallus could easily take a wife from the noblest houses in Rom

nd the victor of Actium was the last and the greatest of them all. It could also fit a political leader—dux partium. But warf

y official titulature. There were other principes in the State, there could not fail to be such in a Republic. So Horace addr

in turn might be subjected to the same salutary treatment, for nobody could believe that the frontiers of Illyricum and Maced

precedent and tradition, by a rooted distaste of change unless change could be shown to be in harmony with ancestral custom,

y and sanctified Cato were not the only victims of the Civil Wars who could be called up and enlisted in the service of the r

ne of Cicero was couched in phrases so vague and so innocuous that it could be employed by any party and adapted to any ends.

worth submitting to tyranny. 5 Cicero refused to admit that freedom could exist even under a constitutional monarchy. 6 N

vice on weighty matters—and never tempted by ambition into danger. He could afford in the magnanimity of success to pass over

mperium was indispensable. What fairer blend of libertas and imperium could have been discovered? A champion of the ‘higher l

ould pretend that internecine war and the proscription of ‘boni viri’ could ever produce an exemplary kind of citizen. Names

in virtue of the Senate’s decree. 1 The significance of the measure could be grossly exaggerated by the adulatory or the un

time, reared among the hard and palpable realities of Roman politics, could have been deceived. The Princeps speaks of a rest

provincia might later be modified how and when he pleased. One thing could never change, the source and origin of his domina

consulate. In the manner of controlling the provinces the recent past could offer lessons, had Augustus stood in need of inst

d armies again. Yet, apart from these survivals of a lost cause, Rome could boast in 27 B.C. some eleven viri triumphales. So

ten in number. Now they were only eight, about as many as the Senate could manage with safety. 4 Moreover, the most difficul

ritories of Augustus’ provincia were to be firmly held by men whom he could trust. Northern Italy was no longer a province, b

ue and traditional control over all provincial governors. At need, he could revive the imperium consulare, ostensibly reduced

lty to Augustus was also loyalty to Rome a high and sombre patriotism could prevail over political principle, if such existed

irtuous and disinterested Proculeius, an intimate friend of Augustus, could save him. Proculeius had openly deplored the fate

o, to Agrippa his signet-ring. 2 Under their direction the government could have continued for a time. Augustus recovered.

here was something in his gaze that inspired awe in the beholder: men could not confront it. 1 Statues show him as he meant t

cing. The principal actors were Livia, Maecenas and Agrippa. Augustus could not afford to alienate all three. In alliance the

picion. 3 The Senate refused, as was politic and inevitable. Augustus could bequeath his name and his fortune to whomsoever h

aecenas, like another personal friend of the Princeps, Vedius Pollio, could not stand as a model and an ornament in the New S

of his counsel. Yet the position of Maecenas had been compromised. He could not withstand Agrippa. Maecenas made a fatal mist

e told Terentia of the danger that threatened her brother. 3 Augustus could not forgive a breach of confidence. Maecenas’ wif

of not attending the funeral games of Agrippa, dead earlier than they could have hoped. 4 Of Agrippa, scant honour in his l

us as well. Like other Romans of ancient aristocratic stock, Tiberius could rise above class and recognize merit when he saw

status and definition before the law. Agrippa was not, Agrippa never could be, the brother and equal of Augustus. He was not

anum (1930). PageBook=>346 To the Principate of Augustus there could be no hereditary succession, for two reasons, the

upreme, invested with power and with auctoritas beyond all others, he could invite to a share in his rule allies who would no

Republic and the Triumviral period, once extraordinary and menacing, could now become safely domiciled in regular and normal

n party but secured the adhesion of a large number of Republicans and could masquerade as a national party. Over seven hundre

n soldier. Under the military and social hierarchy of the Republic he could rise to the centurionate, but no higher. After se

ola’s grandfathers). PageBook=>357 Not only that Roman knights could govern provinces, some of them quite small and co

policing and for security from riot or fire. 3 The Viceroy of Egypt could look down from high eminence upon a mere proconsu

er, debar marriage or discredit inheritance. A recent municipal taint could be detected in the most distinguished of noble fa

r, in assigning the innovation to Augustus and Tiberius: to Caesar he could not officially appeal for precedent, cf. BSR Pape

en with gentilicia like Calpetanus, Mimisius, Viriasius and Mussidius could never pretend to derive from pure Latin stock. 2

rom Larinum (CIL IX, 751), might be related to this family. 2 There could scarcely be any doubt about [M]amius Murrius Umbe

s narrow and exclusive. The generous policy of Caesar and of Augustus could be supported by the venerable weight of ancient t

ction was not the execution of a theory or the act of any one man, it could hardly be suspended at one blow. Even had he desi

uired sole power, the Revolution had already proceeded so far that it could abate its rhythm without any danger of reaction.

ny large body of nobiles from the Senate. But the master of patronage could attach to his cause even the most recalcitrant of

ctator had probably fixed thirty as the age at which the quaestorship could be held, forty- two the consulate. Caesar had bee

d Augustus was debarred. He had already restored the Republic once he could not do it again. NotesPage=>370 1 Dio 54,

ad prevailed in the first four years of the Principate. Riots in Rome could not imperil peace so long as the Princeps control

n of Moesia to the seven military commands which the developed system could show in the last years of the Princeps’ life. Not

ageBook=>374 Election by the people might be a mere form, but it could not be abolished by a statesman who claimed to ha

urist when urging a soldier’s claims to the consulate. 2 None of them could prevail alone. Neither law nor oratory would carr

ast was insistent to promote a deserving partisan. Pompeius, however, could not or would not support the Picene intriguer, th

ssalla still dominated the field: Gallus and Messallinus recalled but could not rival their parents. Paullus Fabius Maximus,

ns. 1 Other novi homines, worthy heirs of the revolutionary marshals, could show to their credit service in the military prov

n and openly advertised as the justification for ennoblement. Nothing could be more fair and honest. There were also deeper a

e with M. Vinicius and P. Silius. 2 Without his favour, no novus homo could have reached the consulate. Of the nobiles, many

even have enjoyed his confidence. 3 They were not all trusted: yet he could not deny them the consulate, their birthright. So

alerii sought to graft themselves upon his family tree. 3 Some frauds could perhaps evade detection. Certain great houses had

won from confiscation and the treasure of the Ptolemies, the nobility could not compete. Even if lucky enough to have retaine

ry. Moreover, the choice of a proconsul or the disposal of a province could be resigned by the Senate to the Princeps. 1 If a

Tiberius was not the only force in high politics; and even if Taurus could not retain under the new dispensation his right t

ght rank with senators in the New State or even above them. Patronage could therefore follow the reverse direction. The promo

hers, cousins and an uncle of consular rank. 7 The patronage which he could exert would have been formidable enough, even if

a well ordered state such as Sulla and Caesar might have desired but could never have created. The power of the People was b

rth, protection or desperate ambition stood aloof from politics. They could hardly be blamed. The consulate was the monopoly

e gaps. The Senate which acclaimed Augustus and the Republic restored could show an imposing roll of consulars, perhaps as ma

s or proconsuls. 1 There were good reasons for that. Rome and Italy could be firmly held for the Princeps in his absence by

Claudii, that the great secret was first published abroad an emperor could be created elsewhere than at Rome. 2 Everybody ha

provide for the veterans. By 13 B.C. Augustus and his subordinates could show a stupendous achievement to their credit.

ugmented in a measure that none of the agents of the drama of 23 B.C. could have foreseen. Before the year was out, Marcellus

personal and opportunistic rule of the Princeps; and special commands could be created at will, to face an emergency or to pr

JRS XXIV (1934), 113 ff., with an inclination to the later years. It could , however, be urged that the new command was set u

by the working of the lot after an interval of five years. But favour could secure curtailment of legal prescriptions, and th

ed habit and prerogative of leadership were not enough, the proconsul could invoke the advice of experienced soldiers. Note

men of senatorial rank were untried in active warfare. The proconsul could choose ‘viri militares’ as his legates. Piso was

, 410 f. (Pergamum) and BCH V (1881), 183 (Stratonicea): though these could as well refer to L. Calpurnius Piso (the augur),

the provinces of the East with which, indeed, both Silvanus and Piso could recall hereditary ties. 7 NotesPage=>399 1

census of Judaea) always seem to break down somewhere. Though ILS 918 could be claimed for Quirinius (and the war which he fo

built up a powerful dominion, was isolated on west and east. If they could with accuracy and completeness be recovered, the

sular legate Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, usually assigned to Illyricum, could quite well have been a legate of Moesia in the pe

3): possibly Saturninus, if an earlier command than that of A.D. 4-6 could be assumed (cf. Velleius 2, 105, 1); below, p. 43

3/2 B.C., ILS 8895 (Bracara), cf. CIL II 2581 (Lucus Augusti). If it could be proved that he was legate of Citerior rather t

ff of slaves and workmen which he had recruited and trained. 5 That could not go on. After 19 B.C. there were no more trium

In the nature of the matter, it is difficult to see how the Princeps could be represented by a deputy, and the behaviour of

on was true in every sense. Augustus, who waived the name of Romulus, could justly claim to be the second founder of Rome.

t from Italy and visit the provinces, save permission obtained. 1 Nor could he now discover fields to spread his personal inf

the Roman whether he acted as parent, magistrate or general. Augustus could have invoked tradition and propriety, had he need

the equestrian councillors of the Princeps, but any Prefect of Egypt could furnish information about taxation and fiscal pol

. Nor would Taurus, the other soldier and administrator. Even lawyers could have been dispensed with, for the formulation was

d have required imagination that he did not possess and facts that he could never discover. Dio was well aware that no authen

t, it never entirely concealed, its origin. But the act of usurpation could be consummated in a peaceful and orderly fashion,

h of Augustus, the Princeps’ powers lapsed he might designate, but he could not appoint, his heir. When the Principate was fi

r was not always due to threat or exertion of open violence. The deed could be done in secret and in advance. The rule of Ner

a visible reminder and check to conspirators. For the rest, Augustus could rely on Tiberius’ submission and his own prestige

nd showed the strength of his determination by a voluntary fast. They could not stop him. Tiberius retired to the island of R

waited the princes. But that was all in the situation already. Nobody could have been deceived. In 6 B.C. there was an agitat

t at Rhodes. His career was ended, his life precarious. Of that, none could doubt who studied dynastic politics and the worki

ce and the dynasty. But Augustus was now aged fifty-seven. The crisis could not long be postponed. A loyal but not ingenuou

, the effort of Rome did not flag or fail. The governmental oligarchy could furnish adequate generals and sagacious counsello

ivinity: his sons were princes and would succeed him. The aristocracy could tolerate the rule of monarchy more easily than th

origin of Augustus, remembered his past and loathed his person, they could neither compete with the Divi filius nor hope to

displayed neither grace of form nor intellectual promise. But even he could serve the political ambitions of his grandmother;

arus, who were not so deeply committed to the court faction that they could not survive, and even profit from, a revulsion of

ral legislation had been baffled and mocked in his own family. Yet he could have dealt with the matter there. His programme w

enough with the aristocracy, and the most circumspect of politicians could hardly afford in this critical season the luxury

of Vinicius as his personal attachment to the family of that general could with decency permit. 4 The soldiers at least were

ter Aemilia Lepida was perhaps already betrothed. L. Aemilius Paullus could hardly be accused of adultery with Julia, for she

but finally exiled when she proved incorrigible in her vices. If this could be taken as quite reliable, the conspiracy of Pau

vernor of Hispania Citerior, at the head of three legions. 1 Tiberius could trust Lepidus not Gallus, however, the husband of

ing so, few indeed of the nobiles, the rivals and equals of Tiberius, could hope that their sons would govern provinces with

was not from fear of a civil war, as Tacitus reports, but because he could trust these Lentuli. 2 Tacitus, Ann. 1, 4. 3

pate:5 none the less, it must be demonstrated and admitted that there could be no division of the supreme power. NotesPage=

power in the War of Actium. Whatever the truth of that contention, he could not go back upon it, even if he had wished. The m

a people. While they took over and assimilated all that the Hellenes could give, they shaped their history, their traditions

bated whether Alexander himself, at the height and peak of his power, could have prevailed over the youthful vigour of the ma

acity of Roman statesmen, would stand and endure for ever. The Romans could not compete with Greece for primacy in science, a

pted the ancient ideals of duty, piety, chastity and frugality. 4 How could they be restored? About the efficacy of moral a

as repugnant to aristocratic breeding and sentiment. The Roman matron could claim that she needed no written law to guide her

eration was now vigorously at work upon the Roman People. The New Age could confidently be inaugurated. The Secular Games wer

ue, had no more rights than before. But the husband, after divorcing, could prosecute both the guilty partner and her paramou

t had established Rome’s power in Italy on the broad basis that alone could bear it, was accompanied by certain grave disadva

r it, was accompanied by certain grave disadvantages. Slaves not only could be emancipated with ease but were emancipated in

Roman Emperor, 181 ff.; 215 ff. PageBook=>447 The Roman People could not be pure, strong and confident without pietas,

f restoration? cui dabit partis scelus expiandi Iuppiter? 2 There could be only one answer. The official head of the stat

hat honour, ostentatious in scruple when scruple cost him nothing. He could wait for Lepidus’ death. Better that he should in

ocedure condemned as irregular. 3 As in all else, the First Citizen could act without law or title by virtue of his paramou

er sort of Greek deities on the right side, so that the War of Actium could be shown as a sublime contest between West and Ea

erverted. Pietas once gave world-empire to the Roman, and only pietas could maintain it: dis te minorem quod geris, imperas

eras: hinc omne principium, hue refer exitum. 6 Virtus and pietas could not be dissociated; and the root meaning of virtu

rn methods of cultivation. As in politics, so in economic life, there could be no reaction. None was intended. No thought of

otes. 454 (No Notes) PageBook=>455 Civic virtue of this kind could exist in the Roman aristocracy along with a certa

measure from the unconscious suppression of awkward truth. When Rome could admit with safety, or could no longer disguise, t

s suppression of awkward truth. When Rome could admit with safety, or could no longer disguise, the decline of Italy and the

to service in the legions of the Roman People. 1 On no interpretation could these aliens pass for Italian peasants, still les

danger of mutiny (Dio 56, 12, 2). PageBook=>458 No new legions could be raised. As a partial remedy for the lack of le

ion he thought of making an end of his life. But for that disaster he could have borne the loss of Varus’ three legions with

say of Catullus and Lucretius. Those free and passionate individuals could find no place or favour in the civic and discipli

public service. Stoicism, however, was salubrious and respectable: it could be put to good use. Living in a changed and more

toicism, indeed, stood for order and for monarchy. Catullus, however, could not have been domesticated, tamely to chant the r

and a little weary. The poem is not an allegory; but no contemporary could fail to detect in Aeneas a foreshadowing of Augus

uarianism had its uses. But history did not need to be antiquarian it could be employed, like poetry, to honour the memory of

the Revolution; and they all repaid Augustus more than he or the age could give them. Horace was the son of a wealthy free

or the repeated instances of Maecenas. For all his dislike of war, he could turn away from his love and lover’s melancholy to

ons to depart to Tomi, a Greek city on the coast of the Black Sea. He could hardly have been sent farther. Poetry and histo

le by lavish display at games, shows and triumphs. As a showman, none could compete with Augustus in material resources, skil

On special occasions there were distributions of wine and oil. But he could be firm. PageNotes. 468 1 She was a protégée

e aqueducts which his son-in-law had constructed for the people. 1 He could have added that there were now public baths as we

his sixty-one living descendants in three generations. 4 Even slaves could be commended Augustus set up a monument in honour

ent was dedicated three or four years later. On its sculptured panels could be seen the Princeps, his family and his friends

t that promises to his family an abiding home in Italy. Pax Augusta could not be dissociated from Victoria Augusti. The mar

cast the horoscope a ruler of the world was portended. When the child could first speak, he bade the frogs be silent. No frog

of the traditional gods of Rome. Nor was Divus Julius enough. His son could hardly have prevented, even had it been expedient

meantime, his birthday and his health, his virtues and his attributes could be suitably celebrated. Worship might not be paid

e Roman citizen of the towns with his tradition of law and government could respect the magistrate and the imperator without

altar to Rome and Augustus where deputies from the peoples of Comata could gather and manifest their loyalty. 7 PageNotes.

rovinces and kings. The sum of power and prestige was tremendous. Who could have entured to compete or oppose? PageNotes. 4

THE OPPOSITION PageBook=>476 THE army had made one emperor and could make another; and the change from Republic to Emp

tory. In town or country there was poverty and social unrest but Rome could not be held directly responsible for the transgre

iest opportunity when Roman armies were absent. Other subject peoples could show more authentic grievances. Augustus intended

le the provinces were contented enough, for they had known worse, and could see no prospect of a successful war for liberty a

om exile. 5 Too prudent or too grateful to attack Augustus, the plebs could visit their disfavour on the more unpopular of hi

s Magnus as its patron. 6 Now Titius usurped that position. 7 Auximum could do nothing but the Roman plebs remembered. When T

n. 3, 22 f. PageBook=>479 Augustus, the patronus of the plebs, could answer for their good behaviour. Disturbances b

about the victims of civil war and proscriptions, except for such as could usefully be revived to adorn legend or consecrate

s a valetudinarian, abandoning bodily exercise and bathing rarely: he could not stand the sun, even in winter, in which seaso

rdoned after a not very well authenticated conspiracy, the Principate could also show its judicial murders or deaths self-inf

st. 3 For Augustus it was inexpedient to suppress any activity that could do him no harm. Tiberius was alarmed at the frequ

passionate and ferocious, defended his ideals in the only fashion he could , by freedom of speech. 3 Too eminent to be muzzle

ly Labeo continued to enjoy the better reputation. 1 The law courts could still provide scope for oratory, ambition and pol

from the study of rhetoric. That was not the only defect that Pollio could discover in Livy. Pollio, so it is recorded by

ited genius from the Triumviral period and claimed it for its own: it could not produce a new crop. The generation that grew

howing, with Ovid to sustain the splendour and dignity of poetry. Nor could the new oratory outshine the fame of Messalla and

f Quirinius and Ahenobarbus were simply left out altogether. Vinicius could not decently be omitted: the praise of his milita

ic. Tiberius, doubly Claudian, for the line ran through both parents, could look back through the annals of the family to tha

us Crassus Frugi Licinianus, whose historic name, spared by Domitian, could not escape allegations of conspiracy against both

their name and establish the families which their resplendent fortune could so handsomely have endowed. The Caesarian partisa

s of Ventidius and Canidius belong to history: no offspring of theirs could hope to receive the consulate from the Caesarian

ther Poppaeus, a military man, left a daughter. 1 Quirinius, however, could show no children for two marriages with daughters

sband of princesses. 1 That was the end of a Sabine family. Passienus could not compete with L. Vitellius, three times consul

s. Even if the nobilis forgot his ancestors and his name, the Emperor could not. Before long the nobiles disappear from the g

d his advisers had made a prudent choice. They also thought that they could safely entrust a military province, Hispania Cite

assert their lack of ability; and much of the hostile testimony that could be adduced is nothing more than the perpetuation

preserved the house of the Cocceii through many generations; 3 but it could not ultimately protect the grandson of Augustus’

lerated by ‘bad emperors’ or masterful servants of the government. It could not be arrested. The defeat of the nobiles was sp

Brutus and Cassius, who had fought against Caesar’s heir at Philippi, could not have been invoked to support his Principate w

at home and abroad, for it sought to abolish war and politics. There could be no great men any more: the aristocracy was deg

reacherous. Of the Sulpicii, Ser. Galba and his ugly hunchback father could display no real talent, but owed advancement to s

e wars again. 6 No chance of that: in the cool shade of Tibur Plancus could take his ease and reflect with no little complace

n this monument. PageBook=>512 With that to his credit Plancus could smile at the impotent envy of his detractors and

estroyed when Virtus was shattered at Philippi. Political liberty, it could be maintained, was doomed if not dead long before

t an end in themselves. That end is security of life and property: it could not be guaranteed by the constitution of Republic

5 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, c. VII, init. PageBook=>514 They could be safe and happy at last. As a survivor of the p

itu pensavit. ’ PageBook=>516 The admirer of ancient eloquence could not have the advantage both ways, enjoying both R

ong the eloquent Seneca, when counselling the young Nero to clemency, could employ with indifference the names of ‘rex’ or ‘p

that a Roman should live under any other dispensation. Hence Libertas could be invoked as a catchword against unpopular ruler

e extremes of ruinous liberty and degrading servility. A sensible man could find it. And such there were. NotesPage=>517

for the family of the Cocceii, they had a genius for safety. There could be great men still, even under bad emperors, if t

constitutional monarchy as a guarantee of freedom such as no Republic could provide: nunquam libertas gratior exstat quam s

stus represented the Populus Romanus: under his trusteeship the State could in truth be called the Commonwealth, ‘res publica

. 1 That the power of Caesar Augustus was absolute, no contemporary could doubt. But his rule was justified by merit, fou

as the Founder, ‘augusto augurio’, in the phrase of Ennius. The Roman could feel it in his blood and in his traditions. Again

body of the Commonwealth. The new member reinvigorated the whole and could not have been severed without damage. 8 NotesPa

ed ruin. But now the reinvigorated Roman People, robust and cheerful, could bear the burden with pride as well as with securi

ds whether he had played well his part in the comedy of life. 2 There could be one answer or none. Whatever his deserts, his