mpeius, Caesar and Augustus, to warfare, to provincial affairs and to constitutional history has been severely restricted. Instead, th

nsion of Caesar’s heir had been a series of hazards and miracles: his constitutional reign as acknowledged head of the Roman State was

ds, the first of deplorable but necessary illegalities, the second of constitutional government. So well did he succeed that in later

nator. Of such dominating forces behind the phrases and the façade of constitutional government the most remarkable was Servilia, Cato

life itself. ’2 Sooner than surrender it, Caesar appealed to arms. A constitutional pretext was provided by the violence of his adver

if he did not lay down his command before a certain day. By invoking constitutional sanctions against Caesar, a small faction misrepr

for life seemed to mock and dispel all hope of a return to normal and constitutional government. His rule was far worse than the viole

ed Pompeians were rapidly advanced to magistracies without regard for constitutional bar or provision. From six hundred Caesar raised

ion, through a coalition of Caesarians and Republicans, Rome received constitutional government again. Concord was advertised in the e

faction took to calling himself ‘Imperator Caesar’. 1 After the first constitutional settlement and the assumption of the name ‘August

needed an army in the first place, after that, Republican allies and constitutional backing. He would then have to postpone the aveng

evolution could be carried through without any violation of legal and constitutional form. The Principate of Augustus was justified by

justice, but to something called mos maiorum. This was not a code of constitutional law, but a vague and emotional concept. It was th

sal represented it to be nothing less than ‘laying the foundations of constitutional government’. 6 Again, when private individuals

expedient for the moment or even outworn and superfluous to appeal to constitutional sanctions in carrying out a political mandate, a

ere is no evidence of concerted design between the Liberators and the constitutional party in Rome on the contrary, discordance of pol

’s proposal to have the proconsul outlawed can hardly be described as constitutional . ‘Eine staatsrechtliche Unmöglichkeit’, so Schwar

ianus. The unnatural compact between the revolutionary leader and the constitutional party crumbled and crashed to the ground. Notes

ed factor in the campaign of Mutina, was coming up in the rear of the constitutional forces with three veteran legions raised in his n

uilt up a novel and aggressive faction, mobilizing private armies and constitutional sanctions against a proconsul. Where and with who

ithout the necessity of fighting for it. Their reluctance to obey the constitutional principles invoked by faction and to fight agains

s thereby achieved, in hoping that Octavianus would still support the constitutional cause now that it had become flagrantly Pompeian

due the Parthians, when there would be no excuse for delay to restore constitutional government. Few senators can have believed in the

new year had been eagerly awaited, for it brought a chance to secure constitutional sanction for the young adventurer. Once again O

plea both NotesPage=>279 1 Dio 50, 2, 7. 2 Antiquarians and constitutional purists could recall the situation in 49 B.C., wh

rice in confiscation of their lands when the war was over. 2 In the constitutional crisis of the year 32, the consuls and a show of

’. Octavianus in his sixth and seventh consulates carried out certain constitutional changes, various in kind and variously to be inte

power)1 Octavianus possessed the means to face and frustrate any mere constitutional opposition in Rome. It would be uncomfortable but

fighting under his own auspices. The relevance of the dispute to the constitutional settlement of 28– 27 B.C. was first emphasized by

enial to Crassus of the title of imperator was not merely a matter of constitutional propriety—or rather, impropriety. Crassus was a n

ecial commands were no novelty, no scandal. The strictest champion of constitutional propriety might be constrained to concede their n

onstrates that after 27 B.C. the consulate was reduced to its due and constitutional powers, cf. Velleius 2, 89, 3: 'imperium magistra

ny. 5 Cicero refused to admit that freedom could exist even under a constitutional monarchy. 6 NotesPage=>320 1 Quoted by Mac

Insistence upon the legal basis of Augustus’ powers, on precedents in constitutional practice or anticipations in political theory can

the age of the Revolution and the years between Actium and the first constitutional settlement any more conspicuous. Most of them wer

hority to enforce a programme of social and moral regeneration. The constitutional settlement of 27 B.C. regulated without restricti

the most critical, in all the long Principate of Augustus. 3 From a constitutional crisis, in itself of no great moment, arose grave

endure. Two measures were taken, in the name of Caesar Augustus. The constitutional basis of his authority was altered. More importan

on and ostensible restriction of his powers in that sense a return to constitutional government, in so far as his authority was legal.

his adoption would be catastrophic. Not merely that it shattered the constitutional façade of the New Republic men like Agrippa had n

confidence in the government. More welcome than the restoration of constitutional forms was the abolition of direct taxation in Ita

t in 20-19 B.C., when he completed the pacification of Spain. But the constitutional powers and the effective position of Agrippa were

1 He is right. If Augustus wished his rule to retain the semblance of constitutional liberty, with free elections and free debate in t

ashion, about matters of weight; and the power exerted by such extra- constitutional forces as the auctoritas of senior statesmen hold

at there was any permanent body of counsellors to the Princeps or any constitutional organ. There was no cabinet but a series of cabin

tieth year of his age, that was much more than a contradiction of the constitutional usage and Republican language of the Principate:

esignated)1 there followed a disaster unparalleled since Crassus, the constitutional crisis in Rome, supervening when the first man in

s essential to the Principate than the public conferment of legal and constitutional power. Deed and phrase recur at the beginning of

om its military and revolutionary origins. In the first decade of his constitutional rule, Augustus employed not a single nobilis amon

iberty; and the ideal which the word now embodied was the respect for constitutional forms. Indeed, it was inconceivable that a Roman

gna iustos dominos volunt’. 5 The two were now to be reconciled, with constitutional monarchy as a guarantee of freedom such as no Rep

masterly of all is the formulation of the chapter that describes the constitutional position of the Princeps and most misleading. His

3, 438 f.; death and deification, 438 f., 521 f.; cult, 469, 524. His constitutional powers, 313 ff., 336 ff., 406, 412; provincia, 31

aesar, 55; ‘Hellenistic’, 54, 59, 256 f.; inevitability of, 258, 291; constitutional , 320, 516 ff.; as the best form of government, 51

side of Atticus, 257; in the War of Actium, 295 ff.; in 28 B.C., 306; constitutional powers of, 337, 389; his position after 23 B.C.,