asis is laid, however, not upon the personality and acts of Augustus, but upon his adherents and partisans. The composition

d in the character and opinions of the historian Pollio—a Republican, but a partisan of Caesar and of Antonius. This also e

arness—to quote as much as possible of the ancient evidence, to refer but seldom to modern authorities, and to state contro

cs here expounded owes to the supreme example and guidance of Münzer: but for his work on Republican family-history, this b

ut the position of the Princeps as a party-leader naturally owe much, but do not derive entirely, from this illuminating wo

ly, nomenclature, or rank; and most of them will be unfamiliar to any but a hardened prosopographer. For the sake of clearn

illity; and it ought to be held back for several years and rewritten. But the theme, I firmly believe, is of some importanc

rule was a lesser evil than war between citizens. 1 Liberty was gone, but only a minority at Rome had ever enjoyed it. The

f division in his career between two periods, the first of deplorable but necessary illegalities, the second of constitutio

e point when he classified Augustus as a chameleon. 2 Colour changed, but not substance. Contemporaries were not deceived

rary or going back to contemporary sources, often biased, it is true, but admitting criticism, interpretation, or disbelief

s will all the more sharply be revealed by unfriendly presentation. But it is not enough to redeem Augustus from panegyri

public of Augustus as the ministers and agents of power, the same men but in different garb. They are the government of the

investigate, not merely the origin and growth of the Caesarian party, but also the vicissitudes of the whole ruling class o

archy of the nobiles held office at Rome. Pompeius fought against it; but Pompeius, for all his power, had to come to terms

the Roman Revolution he began, not with the crossing of the Rubicon, but with the compact of 60 B.C., devised by the polit

the whole world in strife and anarchy. Gaul and the West stood firm; but the horsemen of the Parthians were seen in Syria

nd continuous calamities: the gods had no care for virtue or justice, but intervened only to punish. 5 Against the blind im

its exercise. The two consuls remained at the head of the government, but policy was largely directed by ex-consuls. These

ls. These men ruled, as did the Senate, not in virtue of written law, but through auctoritas; and the name of principes civ

1 ff.) is here accepted. ‘Nobilis’ may not be quite a technical term, but its connotation is pretty clear. (As Gelzer shows

well-documented epoch of history. Not mere admission to the Senate but access to the consulate was jealously guarded by

st magistracy of the Roman Republic2 he might rise to the praetorship but no higher, save by a rare combination of merit, i

Senate and People, Optimates and Populares, nobiles and novi homines, but by the strife for power, wealth and glory. The co

esar’s mistress. The noble was a landed proprietor, great or small. But money was scarce and he did not wish to sell his

d on congeniality. Individuals capture attention and engross history, but the most revolutionary changes in Roman politics

pute and influence could easily have procured a seat in the Senate. 4 But Atticus did not wish to waste his money on sensel

ole armies of tenants or slaves, and financial magnates like Crassus. But the wealth of knights often outstripped many an a

of life, the political dynast might win influence not merely in Rome but in the country-towns of Italy and in regions not

r spoil in war and estates in Italy when their campaigns were over. But not veterans only were attached to his cause from

trigue would suffice. A programme, it is true, he developed, negative but by no means despicable. 1 NotesPage=>015 1

as concordia ordinum between Senate and knights against the improbi, but later widened to a consensus omnium bonorum and e

later widened to a consensus omnium bonorum and embraced tota Italia. But it was an ideal rather than a programme: there wa

turally invoked the specious and venerable authority of the Senate. 1 But there were to be found in their ranks a few since

ion. The traditional contests of the noble families were complicated, but not abolished, by the strife of parties largely b

decimated the knights, muzzled the tribunate, and curbed the consuls. But even Sulla could not abolish his own example and

ce of the defeated causes in Italy. The tribunes were only a pretext, but the Marian party the proscribed and the disposses

d the other Sabellic peoples of the Apennine were broken and reduced. But Etruria, despoiled and resentful, rose again for

for Lepidus against the Roman oligarchy. 1 Lepidus was suppressed. But disorders continued, even to a rising of the slav

generals (70 B.C.), restoring the tribunate, destroyed Sulla’s system but left the nobiles nominally in power. They were ab

gment of political theory, a specious fraud, or a mere term of abuse, but very precisely a collection of individuals, its s

the Roman State, the manner and fashion of dynastic politics changes but little; and though noble houses suffered defeat i

l disasters and the rise of dynastic houses of the plebeian nobility. But neither Valerii nor Fabii stand in the forefront

inction only by taking in adoption sons of the resplendent Aemilii. 3 But the power of the Cornelii was waning. Their stren

were depressed by a recent catastrophe. 1 So, too, were the Aemilii:2 but neither house resigned its claim to primacy. The

d in their alarming versatility. There was no epoch of Rome’s history but could show a Claudius intolerably arrogant toward

elli, in abrupt decadence, had lacked a consul for two generations. 3 But there was a prominent Lutatius, whose name recall

; and he secured for Pompeius the command in Spain, not ‘pro consule’ but ‘pro consulibus’ (Cicero, Phil. II, 18). On his h

married a daughter of Cinna (Orosius 5, 24, 16). PageBook=>020 But the core and heart of Sulla’s party and Sulla’s o

isions taken in secret, known or inferred by politicians of the time, but often evading historical record and baffling post

stilential tribune, or to curb a general hostile to the government. 3 But the Optimates were solid only to outward show and

lic policy: only a few venerable relics, or recent consuls with birth but no weight. NotesPage=>022 1 The family of

NotesPage=>022 1 The family of his wife Tertulla is not known. But his elder son, M. Crassus, married Caecilia Metel

he transmitted to posterity, not the memory of talent and integrity, but the eternal exemplar of luxury. Secluded like ind

an, cf., above all, Münzer, RA, 336 ff. PageBook=>024 prime. 1 But Servilia would not be thwarted by that accident.

husband, M. Calpurnius Bibulus, an honest man, a stubborn character, but of no great moment in politics. 3 Roman noble h

y; and the Claudii remained on the alert, expecting three consulates, but not unaided. 4 Against novi homines the great f

an advocate, pressed his candidature, championing all popular causes, but none that were hopeless or hostile to the interes

their elders. They were Caesar and Cato, diverse in habit and morals, but supremely great in spirit. 1 C. Julius Caesar,

n of the proscribed, Caesar spoke for family loyalty and for a cause. But he did not compromise his future or commit his al

a granddaughter of Sulla. 4 Active ambition earned a host of enemies. But this patrician demagogue lacked fear or scruple.

, then praetor-designate, spoke in firm condemnation of their treason but sought to avert the penalty of death. It was th

ed picture of the earlier career of this Roman nobilis; cf. the novel but convincing arguments of H. Strasburger, Caesars E

ilius Vatia (Plutarch, Caesar 7). PageBook=>026 high assembly. But the speech and authority that won the day was Cat

great ancestor whom he emulated almost to a parody, Cato the Censor. But it was not character and integrity only that gave

e procured the assassination of a consul. 2 When he died of a natural but providential death the populace broke up his fune

eople when elected consul and the other lent his services to Crassus. But alliance with Crassus need not alienate Pompeius

s he had vindicated its empire abroad. Pompeius never forgave Cicero. But Cicero was not the real enemy. It was the habit

le, ‘the warden of earth and sea’. 2 Not so menacing to outward show, but no less real and pervasive, was his influence in

riumphos ante deum princeps. 3 Pompeius was Princeps beyond dispute but not at Rome. By armed force he might have establi

but not at Rome. By armed force he might have established sole rule, but by that alone and not in solid permanence. The no

JRS XXVIII (1938), 113 ff. About Gabinius’ origin, nothing is known. But his wife Lollia (Suetonius, Divus Julius 50, 1) m

wars comprised not only personal adherents like Afranius and Gabinius but nobiles in the alliance of the general, seeking p

inius. Catulus was now dead, Hortensius enfolded in luxurious torpor. But Lucullus emerged, alert and vindictive, to contes

e Pompeian consul Pupius Piso from getting the province of Syria. 3 But the great triumph was Cato’s, and the greater del

d Caesar’s daughter was betrothed to Servilia’s son, Cato’s nephew. 7 But NotesPage=>034 1 Ad Att. 1, 19, 4. 2 Plu

ernment. 2 He had also prosecuted an ex-consul hostile to Pompeius. 3 But Caesar was no mere adherent of Pompeius: by holdi

ovinces and instruments at Rome. Certain armies were already secured. But Pompeius required for his ally more than an ordin

through special laws. Gabinius and Piso were the most conspicuous, but not the only adherents of the dynasts, whose infl

nd Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus, were not strong political men. But Philippus had recently married Caesar’s niece Ati

ears to purchase and control corn for the city. The powers were wide, but perhaps fell short of his designs. 1 Then arose a

illars of the edifice. The principes strove for prestige and power, but not to erect a despotic rule upon the ruins of th

al of the world they were anachronistic and ruinous. To the bloodless but violent usurpations of 70 and 59 B.C. the logical

ed the primacy of Pompeius the Great. No longer an agent and minister but a rival, the conqueror of Gaul filched his laurel

ion of public business. The next year opened without consuls. Similar but worse was the beginning of 52 B.C., three candida

anted, not at once and automatically after praetorship and consulate, but when an interval of five years had elapsed, was r

was recommended by the fair show of mitigating electoral corruption, but in fact provided resources of patronage for the p

bune. Cato nearly deprived him of his office (Plutarch, Pompeius 54). But there were strong and authentic rumours the year

mned and exiled, likewise P. Plautius Hypsaeus, once his own adherent but now coolly sacrificed. The third was more useful

wing year. Pompeius remained ambiguous, with hints of going to Spain, but forced by the Optimates, not altogether against h

ular elections, that was no unmixed advantage. The Marcelli were rash but unstable, other consuls timid or NotesPage=>

o, a vigorous orator, began the year as a champion of the government, but soon showed his colours, blocking the long-awaite

ke Cato, of a great ancestor, turned his attack on the tribune Curio, but in vain, and on Curio’s friend, the aedile M. Cae

l war, free to negotiate without being accused of ignoble timidity. 4 But the dynast remained ambiguous and menacing. To hi

Celer banded with the Catonian faction to attack and harry Pompeius. But the feud was not bitter or beyond remedy: the Met

great houses. The Pompeii had once been hangers-on of the Scipiones. But the power and splendour of that imperial house, t

Cato. Of his allies and relatives, Lucullus and Hortensius were dead, but the group was still formidable, including his nep

inst Pompeius. For Cato or for the Republic they postponed vengeance, but did not forget a brother and father slain by the

ight, born to power. The Pact of Luca blocked him from his consulate, but only for a year. He had another grievance Caesar’

ulus Sura (cos.71) was expelled from the Senate by the censors of 70. But Clodianus (cos. 72, censor 70) was a legate in th

o Cato’s nephew Brutus. 3 Cato himself had not reached the consulate, but two consulars followed, the stubborn and irascibl

lowed, the stubborn and irascible Bibulus, and Ahenobarbus, energetic but very stupid. The tail of the procession is brough

hy of Sulla, manifest and menacing in its last bid for power, serried but insecure. Pompeius was playing a double game. He

ther way gaining the mastery. They were not duped they knew Pompeius: but they fancied that Pompeius, weakened by the loss

he Republic in the East. Sulla had all the ambition of a Roman noble: but it was not his ambition to seize power through ci

of the rights of the tribunes and the liberties of the Roman People. But that was not the plea which Caesar himself valued

hey had thrust the choice between civil war and political extinction. But Caesar refused to join the long roll of Pompeius’

would bring in the inevitable verdict. After that, nothing for Caesar but to join the exiled Milo at Massilia and enjoy the

. 3 Yet his plan was no mere makeshift, as it appeared to his allies, but subtle and grandiose to evacuate Italy, leaving C

had only a legion to hand: the bulk of his army was still far away. But he swept down the eastern coast of Italy, gatheri

the divided counsels of his adversaries secured the crowning victory. But three years more of fighting were needed to stamp

mall group of men paramount in social distinction, not merely nobiles but patrician; on the outer fringe, many excellent Ro

wished to make war upon them or to exterminate the Roman aristocracy. But these proud adversaries did not always leap forwa

e refused even to ask. 3 Under these unfavourable auspices, a Sulla but for clementia, a Gracchus but lacking a revolutio

er these unfavourable auspices, a Sulla but for clementia, a Gracchus but lacking a revolutionary programme, Caesar establi

. From Pompeius, from Cato and from the oligarchy, no hope of reform. But Caesar seemed different: he had consistently advo

provincial. He had shown that he was not afraid of vested interests. But Caesar was not a revolutionary. He soon disappoin

ier, he may have expected to be consulted upon these weighty matters. But Cicero’s hopes of res publica constituia were soo

onscious mastery of men and events, as before in Gaul. Easy victories but not the urgent needs of the Roman People. About

Roman People. About Caesar’s ultimate designs there can be opinion, but no certainty. The acts and projects of his Dictat

all he affected to inherit from Caesar, the halo. The god was useful, but not the Dictator: Augustus was careful sharply to

ulius 77, reporting an unsafe witness, the Pompeian T. Ampius Balbus. But cf. Caesar’s favourite quotation about tyranny (C

of the future or a singular and elementary blindness to the present. But this is only a Caesar of myth or rational constru

een the first to admit it: he needed neither the name nor the diadem. But monarchy presupposes hereditary succession, for w

ons in the company of his intimates and secretaries: the Senate voted but did not deliberate. As the Dictator was on the po

quis nunc reperiet? ’ 3 As the Historia Augusta, pertinent for once but not perhaps authentic, reports of an Emperor (SHA

assassination of the Dictator. That his removal would be no remedy but a source of greater ills to the Commonwealth, the

ation imposed duties, to family, class and equals in the first place, but also towards clients and dependents. 4 No Notes

itle De officiis (Seneca, Epp. 95, 45). The code was certainly narrow but not by contemporary standards. Brutus’ good reput

ian senators. The figure of interest demanded (48 per cent.) was high but not unparalleled in such transactions (SIG3 748,

y those who did not care to imitate. His was not a simple personality but passionate, intense and repressed. 1 Nor was his

the paths of Brutus and of Caesar diverged sharply for eleven years. But Brutus, after Pharsalus, at once gave up a lost c

not merely for the traditions and the institutions of the Free State, but very precisely for the dignity and the interests

cied; and no Roman conceived of government save through an oligarchy. But Caesar was being forced into an autocratic positi

a new leader, emerging unexpected, at first tore it in pieces again, but ultimately, after conquering the last of his riva

hrough Pompeius and now Pompeius had joined them. 1 A just complaint, but not integral truth: a Sullan partisan before turn

was the head and front of the nobilitas, paramount in public dignity, but by no means invulnerable to scrutiny of morals an

word and gesture, Ap; Claudius and Ahenobarbus, diverse in character but equally a joy and comfort to their enemies. Cer

background. Neutrality was repugnant to a noble and a man of spirit: but kinship might be invoked in excuse. Hence one of

uge bribe decided C. Scribonius Curio, so history records and repeats but that was not the only incentive, for Clodius’ wid

ageBook=>064 their allegiance. 1 Not only senators chose Caesar, but young nobiles at that, kinsmen of the consulars w

lained not always by domestic discord and youth’s intolerance of age, but sometimes by deliberate choice, to safeguard the

v, 369 ff. 3 L. Julius Caesar (cos. 64) was a legate (BC 1, 8, 2), but his son fought for the Republic in Africa and was

s Cotta (cos. 65) was still alive (cf. Suetonius, Divus Iulius 79, 4) but not very conspicuous in public. 4 Caesar, BC 1,

rallied soon or late to the Sullan system and the cause of Pompeius. But not all were now Pompeians P. Sulpicius Rufus, a

an. Some of these pestilential citizens had succumbed to prosecution, but the eloquent Q. Fufius Calenus and the robust and

sulate, managed to hold their own. 1 Catilina and Clodius were dead but remembered. Rapacious or idealistic enemies of th

(a relative of the Dictator Sulla) had been prosecuted in the courts, but rescued by the able defence of an eloquent lawyer

o expel Curio from the Senate. His colleague Piso thwarted that move, but was unable or unwilling to save the Caesarian C.

he publicani. Pompeius could surely have saved him, had he cared. 2 But Gabinius had served his turn now. The extended

. PageBook=>068 and the glory of Caesar. Labienus left Caesar, but not from political principle he returned to an ol

ainst him. No matter Caesar’s faction numbered not only many senators but nobiles at that. Most conspicuous of all is the

the Cornelii, the Scipiones and the Lentuli, stood by the oligarchy. But Caesar claimed, among other patricians, the worth

f Servilia’s own clan which had passed over to the plebeians long ago but had not forgotten its patrician origin. P. Servil

gin. P. Servilius was a man of some competence: Lepidus had influence but no party, ambition but not the will and the power

man of some competence: Lepidus had influence but no party, ambition but not the will and the power for achievement. Caesa

friend and former mistress, the formidable and far-sighted Servilia. But Servilia’s ambitious designs were seriously impai

ed into the cabinet of the Dictator. Most of them were Roman knights: but Pansa, and possibly Hirtius, had already entered

ow no writings of Pansa, or of C. Matius, the Caesarian business man, but Matius’ son composed a treatise upon horticulture

C. Oppius probably belonged to a substantial family of Roman bankers. But Oppius lacks colour beside the formidable Balbus,

he man of Gades. Cicero also spoke. Envious detractors there might be but Balbus, the friend of such eminent citizens, coul

of such eminent citizens, could surely have no enemies. 4 Balbus won. But for the failure of certain political intrigues, t

s person conducted financial operations, not for any personal profit, but to acquire the means for bounty and benevolence.

sed instrumentum bonitati quaerere videretur. ’ PageBook=>074 But Rome had conquered an empire: the fate of Italy w

his father had secured Latin rights for the Transpadane communities. But Caesar had the advantage of propinquity and durat

ampioned them long ago: as proconsul he encouraged their aspirations, but he did not satisfy them until the Civil War had b

ts:4 the son reconquered Spain from Sertorius and the Marian faction. But Pompeius had enemies in Spain, and Caesar both ma

ven the name and occasion to the first triumph of the young Pompeius. But in Africa the adventurer P. Sittius, who had buil

dynasts and cities stood loyal to Pompeius as representative of Rome, but only so long as his power subsisted. Enemies and

f that city was his friend, domestic historian and political agent. 2 But Caesar, too, had his partisans in the cities of H

ors down to soldiers and freedmen? There were to be no proscriptions. But Caesar acquired the right to sell, grant or divid

ls of history. Sulla, they said, put common soldiers into the Senate: but the formidable company of the Sullan centurions s

ntum’ (Sallust, Hist, 1,55, 22 M): A primipilaris (Orosius 5, 21, 3). But there may have been others. On the class from whi

lonial Roman. Balbus, the Gaditane magnate, was not a Roman by birth, but a citizen of an alien community allied to Rome. B

to misconceptions about the Dictator’s policy, domestic and imperial, but renders it hard to understand the composition and

defended, not, as Gabinius, under pressure from the masters of Rome, but from choice, from gratitude or for profit. The pa

entered the Senate they did not need to, being more useful elsewhere. But L. Aelius Lamia, a knight of paramount station an

tota Italia delecti’ (Cicero, Pro Sulla 24). There are plenty of odd but significant examples of the ‘homo novus parvusque

65 (ib. 237, cf. Ad Att. 1, 1, 2) and T. Aufidius, once a publicanus, but rising to be governor of Asia (Val. Max. 6, 9, 7;

dulation invented as ancestor for the Flavii a companion of Hercules: but a place, Vespasiae, with ancient monuments of the

ingle clan. Such families might modify their name to a Latin flexion; but praenomen or cognomen sometimes recalled their lo

The plebeian houses might acquire wealth and dynastic power at Rome, but they could never enter the rigid and defined cast

they could never enter the rigid and defined caste of the patricians. But the earliest consular Fasti and the annals of Reg

uly to Latin or Volscian history. The Junii could not rise to a king, but they did their best, producing that Brutus, himse

, P-W XII, 401. 7 Ib. XIX, 892 ff.; RA, 05 ff. PageBook=>086 But these are exceptions rather than examples. The go

Italy he acquired power and advanced partisans to office at Rome. 1 But the Marian party had been defeated and proscribed

of the central highlands, had not belonged to the Roman State at all, but were autonomous allies. Italy had now become poli

come politically united through the extension of the Roman franchise, but the spirit and practice of government had not alt

dynasts,2 the Italians took up arms. It was not to extort a privilege but to destroy Rome. They nearly succeeded. Not until

sixty days may have weakened the insurgents by encouraging desertion, but did not arrest hostilities everywhere. Samnium

l the Samnites marched on Rome, not from loyalty to the Marian cause, but to destroy the tyrant city. 4 Sulla saved Rome. H

Per. 89. PageBook=>088 After a decade of war Italy was united, but only in name, not in sentiment. At first the new

nment of the Italian cause Rome’s enemy entered the Roman Senate. 2 But the vanquished party in the Bellum Italicum and t

even by renegades. Pompeius Strabo had a large following in Picenum:3 but these were only the personal adherents of a local

ed more active assistance. 1 Atina’s first senator was very recent. 2 But Tusculum, and even Atina, had long been integral

ity in the Roman State. He glorified the memory of Cato and of Marius but it was for himself, as though they were his own a

desired that the sentiment and voice of Italy should be heard at Rome but it was the Italy of the post-Sullan order, and th

ent all over Italy, broken men and debtors ready for an armed rising, but also, and perhaps more disquieting, many municipa

years before, provided the nucleus of the movement this time largely, but not wholly, disappointed Sullan veterans. There w

et Cingulum was easily won. Auximum honoured Pompeius as its patron:2 but the men of Auximum protested that it would be int

rrinas is presumably Umbrian or Etruscan. 4 Pansa came from Perusia,5 but was a senator already. The Sabine country, a land

t of the great landowners in Samnium now were not of Samnite stock. 6 But the Caesarian general L. Staius Murcus was presum

rs in the Bellum Italicum, gain from Caesar the dignity they deserved but otherwise might never have attained. Herius Asini

first man among the Marrucini, fell in battle fighting for Italia. 9 But the family did not perish or lapse altogether int

∊ν ἢ ὲĸ τῆς ‘Іταλίας έξέβαλ∊. 7 ILS 885, nr. Sulmo of the Paeligni, but not his home, for the first Paelignian senator co

posterity knows Ventidius as a muleteer. 3 His career was laborious, but his origin may have been reputable. History has r

icum and the enfranchisement of Italy, could not be confined to Rome, but must embrace all Italy. That Italy should at la

at last enter the government of the enlarged state is a fair notion, but perhaps anachronistic and not the true motive of

ive magnate from Spain or Narbonensis. They represented, not regions, but a class in society and a party in politics. But e

esented, not regions, but a class in society and a party in politics. But even now the work had much farther to go in so fa

ned: the Revolution had barely begun. A unity in terms of geography but in nothing else, the peninsula had been a mosaic

e of Marius. 3 Another termination is found not only in these regions but extends to Picenum and the Sabine country. 4 Abov

among the archaic tribes of the Marsi and Paeligni, extending thence but growing thinner to Picenum northwards and south t

f social and political revolution. The party of Caesar shows a fair but not alarming proportion of non-Latin names. The f

agnate. Of the consulate there had been scant prospect in the past. But the triumph of a military leader, reviving the pa

years he was the first knight’s son to become consul. He was correct but other novi homines, socially more eminent, had no

that, no more novi homines as consuls on the Fasti of the Free State, but an effulgence of historic names, ominous of the e

year, Hirtius and Pansa, the level of social eminence fell a little,1 but was to rise again in 42 with two of the marshals,

government of a province, offering a sum of money in compensation. 6 But L. Tillius Cimber, C. Trebonius (the son of a Rom

rs. The Dictator left, and could leave, no heir to his personal rule. But Antonius was both a leading man in the Caesarian

A lull followed and bewilderment. Sympathizers came to the Capitol but did not stay long, among them the senior statesma

utus. How different, how fiery a speech would Cicero have composed; 2 but Cicero was not present. The Liberators remained e

rtain historians (esp. Appian, on whom see E. Schwartz, P-W II, 230), but is suspect. It is by no means clear that it suite

mpathizers. The harm had already been done. Not the funeral of Caesar but the session of March 17th, that was the real cala

nt and the vain regrets of certain advisers and critics ’a manly deed but a childish lack of counsel. ’2 Brutus and Cassius

moned the Senate to meet upon the Capitol, it was afterwards urged. 3 But that was treason. They should not have left the c

t was treason. They should not have left the consul Antonius alive. But there was no pretext or desire for a reign of ter

n of the Capitol was a symbolical act, antiquarian and even Hellenic. But Rome was not a Greek city, to be mastered from it

grants of the Dictator. Promises were added and privileges, generous but not carrying full conviction. 1 Nor were the vete

s. 1 Further, attempts were made to convert Hirtius to their cause. 2 But Dolabella, though not impervious to flattery, was

n People, all was not lost. The Dictator was dead, regretted by many, but not to be avenged; an assertion of liberty had be

he most able of Caesar’s young men. A nobilis, born of an illustrious but impoverished plebeian family (his grandfather was

family (his grandfather was a great orator, his father a good-natured but careless person), the years of pleasure and adven

. 11, 1, above, p. 97 PageBook=>104 on the field of Pharsalus. But Antonius’ talents were not those of a mere soldie

ell. Lepidus retained the position of nominal deputy to the Dictator. But Lepidus was to take over a province in 44, and An

ength of body and grace of manner, courageous, alert and resourceful, but concealing behind an attractive and imposing faça

a wide indulgence. The failings of Antonius may have told against him but in Rome and in Italy rather than with the troops

power at Rome. In the end it was not debauchery that ruined Antonius, but a fatal chain of miscalculations both military an

iment of loyalty incompatible with the chill claims of statesmanship. But that was later. To gain a fair estimate of the ac

from revolution or from reaction. 5 To be sure, the tyrant was slain, but the tyranny survived hence open dismay among the

at a later date and for abusive comparisons. 1 The consul was firm but conciliatory, taking counsel with senior statesme

: power and patronage rested in his hands. Antonius restored an exile but only NotesPage=>107 1 Phil, 1, 2 ff. Cicer

of Sicily. 3 Bribery and forged decrees, of course, it was whispered. But Cicero himself hoped to profit, tirelessly urging

ng steadily. To what end? Primacy in the Caesarian party was now his: but he might have to fight to retain it. More than

bius Pansa as consuls, Antonius would have his province of Macedonia. But the proconsul was vulnerable if a faction seized

t he condoned and recognized Dolabella’s usurpation of the consulate. But Dolabella, an unscrupulous and ambitious young ma

eBook=>110 that bore down the heads of the nobilitas, the fierce but inconstant Marcelli, the stubborn Ahenobarbus, th

uds. Pompeius they might have tolerated for a time, or even Caesar, but not Antonius and young Dolabella, still less the

nciple, he would have been a nuisance to any government: not less so, but for different reasons, the Caesarian young men Cu

nus. PageBook=>111 the proconsul of Macedonia, was a Caesarian but also a kinsman of Brutus, hence a potential dange

s a Caesarian but also a kinsman of Brutus, hence a potential danger. But that province was soon to be stripped of its legi

He was absent for a month. Various intrigues were devised against him but came to nothing. When he returned, it was to disc

prospect of a consulate. 4 Death frustrated his intended candidature, but the Caesarian alliance maintained the fortunes of

as a Roman and a Roman aristocrat. He was only eighteen years of age: but he resolved to acquire the power and the glory al

-father, both of whom counselled refusal of the perilous inheritance. But he kept his head, neither dazzled by good fortune

pproached: Hirtius and Pansa were certainly in the neighbourhood. 3 But the youth was too astute to confine his attention

eased. 3 The meeting of the Senate on June 1st was sparsely attended. But Antonius chose to get his command from the People

. This was a mere formality. 2 Ad fam. 11, 2. 3 Ad Att. 15, 8, 1. But Hirtius was by no means favourable to the Liberat

dard texts since Madvig choose to omit the word ‘Sextilibus’ wrongly. But even so, the date meant by Cicero is quite certai

any immediate intentions the Liberators said no word in their edict. But they now prepared to depart from Italy. They had

or other of the ten members of the tribunician college. More costly but more remunerative as an investment were the soldi

row into something like a national party. So it was to be in the end. But this was no time for an ideal and patriotic appea

een very different and very short. Lessons might indeed be learned, but from men and affairs, from predecessors and rival

man was cool and circumspect: he knew that personal courage was often but another name for rashness. But the times called f

e knew that personal courage was often but another name for rashness. But the times called for daring and the example of Ca

pon his prestige, his honour, the rights due to his name and station. But not to excess: Octavianus took a firm stand upon

blican help, to betray the Republicans. The calculation was hazardous but not hopeless on the other side, certain moderates

and so destroy the Caesarian party, first Antonius, then Octavianus. But before such respectable elements could venture op

three months. The importance of his speech is difficult to estimate: but the stand made by the two consulars, though negat

Cyrene; of their whereabouts and true intentions nothing was known. But late in October disquieting news came to Rome thr

s secret accomplices. Might and right were on the side of the consul. But the advantage passed in a moment. The meeting nev

of this perhaps the situation was too serious. Not only his soldiers but his partisans were being seduced a report came

lowing day, after a solemn review at Tibur, where not only the troops but a great part of the Senate and many private perso

gainst him. His enemies had drawn the sword: naked force must decide. But not all at once Antonius had not chosen to declar

of a private army as treason and brigandage, not merely Catilinarian but Spartacist. Turning to the person and family of t

the city of Mutina and held Brutus entrapped. Civil war had begun, but winter enforced a lull in hostilities, with leisu

r recorded. Philippus wished for a quiet old age. So did Marcellus. But Marcellus, repenting of his ruinous actions for P

be openly compromised. They would have to go quietly for the present but their chance might come. Octavianus’ other relati

o have sided with Marius in the civil wars, suffering in consequence. But they could not be stripped of their ancestors Oct

Horace, Odes 1, 1, 1, &c. PageBook=>130 The best party is but a kind of conspiracy against the Commonwealth. Oc

vid and desperate men in his party terrified the holders of property. But not for long they were a minority and could be he

mber he is discovered on a familiar errand, this time not for Caesar, but for Caesar’s heir a confidential mission to ensna

is correct and correctly transmitted we might have here not Maecenas but his father (so Münzer, P-W xiv, 206). About the l

tification have been made, none satisfactory. Λ∈ύκιος might be Balbus but Balbus’ activities were usually less obtrusive. L

es were Ti. Cannutius, L. Cassius Longinus (a brother of the assassin but a Caesarian in sympathy), and D. Carfulenus. The

rank and fortune to one revolution were not eager to stir up another. But Octavianus wished to be much more than the leader

and Pansa might yet save the Republic, not, as some hoped, by action, but by preventing the actions of others. Even a nonen

arty and so in the Roman State. They would gladly see Antonius curbed but not destroyed: they were not at all willing to be

e sinister influence of Balbus3 no good prospect for the Republicans, but a gain for Octavianus. Less is known about Pansa.

and. In November they were clearly working for their young kinsman. 4 But the situation was complicated, and Philippus’ pol

was heard of P. Servilius: like other consulars averse from Antonius but unwilling to commit themselves too soon, he kept

. 1 Cicero was induced to accept a military command under Pompeius, but lingered in Campania, refusing to follow him acro

h the familiar offices of Balbus and Oppius and by personal approach. But Cicero stood firm: he refused to come to Rome and

condone Caesar’s acts and policy by presence in the Senate. Courage, but also fear he was intimidated by the bloodthirsty

or news of the decision in Spain. 2 It was not passion or conviction, but impatience and despair. Pharsalus dissolved their

e with the last remnants of the Pompeians and the sometimes hoped for but ever delayed return to settled conditions threw h

ants, to flatter and to praise him, he will put up with servitude. ’3 But Cicero was able to hold out against Caesar. Thoug

n away. 2 In the autumn, too late: Cicero returning brought not peace but aggravation of discord and impulsion to the most

r leaving Italy. L. Piso, he learned, had indeed spoken in the Senate but with nobody to support him. The sanguine hopes of

open at last, and made history by a resolute defence of the Republic. But Cicero as yet had not committed himself to any ir

Cicero with tact and with respect, advising him not to join Pompeius, but not placing obstacles in his way. 4 After Pharsal

micable attitude. 5 Again, after the assassination of Caesar, nothing but NotesPage=>140 1 Ad Att. 16, 7, ι; Phil. 1

PageBook=>141 deference. 1 Cicero’s return provoked an incident, but gave no indication that the day of September 2nd

by the beginning of October Caesar’s heir was an alarming phenomenon. But even now, during the months of October and Novemb

eseeing trouble. After Caecina, Octavianus sent Oppius to invite him, but in vain. 3 The example or the exhortations of Phi

llus were likewise of no weight. 4 Cicero’s path lay through Aquinum, but apparently he missed Hirtius and Balbus. They wer

he had a great following; and he might win more respectable backing. ‘ But look at his age, his name. ’6 Octavianus was but

espectable backing. ‘But look at his age, his name. ’6 Octavianus was but a youth, he lacked auctoritas. On the other hand,

ded in his political judgements. No easy optimism this time, however, but an accurate forecast of the hazards of supporting

si non est, tamen videtur. ’ 5 Ad fam. 16, 24, 2 of uncertain date, but fitting November of this year. 6 Ad Att. 16, 8,

interpretation will be repulsed in the interests, not of Octavianus, but of the truth. The political alliance between Octa

He resolved to wait until January 1st before appearing in the Senate. But Octavianus and D. Brutus were insistent the forme

lineaments and design, not of any programme or policy in the present, but simply the ancestral constitution of Rome as it w

the Laws, which described in detail the institutions of a traditional but liberal oligarchy in a state where men were free

of a traditional but liberal oligarchy in a state where men were free but not equal. He returned to it under the Dictatorsh

e but not equal. He returned to it under the Dictatorship of Caesar,1 but never published, perhaps never completed, this su

liberty, the laws and of all civilized life. 3 So much for Caesar. But the desire for fame is not in itself an infirmity

e renown. The good statesman will not imitate those military dynasts: but he needs fame and praise to sustain his efforts f

, passion and intensity, among the most splendid of all the orations. But oratory can be a menace to posterity as well as t

its author or its audience. There was another side not Antonius only, but the neutrals. Cicero was not the only consular wh

is career. His hostility towards Antonius was declared and ferocious. But Cicero’s political feuds, however spirited at the

been sustained with constancy. 1 Cicero might rail at the consulars: but the advocates of concord and a settlement based u

ilence: they often betray what they strive most carefully to conceal. But certain topics, not the least important, may neve

ng from time to time, Philippus, Servilius and other schemers, patent but seldom noticed, and Balbus never even named. In

), Brutus was not only a sincere and consistent champion of legality, but in this matter all too perspicacious a judge of m

would be fatal to everything that an honest man and a patriot valued. But Brutus was far away. Winter held up warfare in

t he could see no end to civil strife. 1 Men recalled not Caesar only but Lepidus and armies raised in the name of liberty,

ver, that the strange garb of Vatinius was merely the badge of devout but harmless Pythagorean practices; 8 and Gabinius ha

deals of a landed aristocracy earned wealth was sordid and degrading. But if the enterprise and the profits are large enoug

he governing class. 4 Municipal origin becomes not merely respectable but even an occasion for just pride why we all come f

to a time when it could do him no harm. 9 Nor was it Caesar’s enemies but his beloved soldiery who devised the appropriate

ety to take these things gracefully. Caesar was sensitive to slander: but he requited Catullus for lampoons of unequalled v

minatio that was too simple, too crude. It had all been heard before: but it might be hard to resist the deceitful assertio

rit, and fitted to the fabric, of the Roman constitution: no paradox, but the supreme and authentic revelation of what each

cratic and aristocratic. In theory, the People was ultimately sovran, but the spirit of the constitution was held to be ari

ic enemies. A popularis could contest the misuse of this prerogative, but not its validity. 1 The Romans believed that th

ot to reform or progress, not to abstract right and abstract justice, but to something called mos maiorum. This was not a c

ething called mos maiorum. This was not a code of constitutional law, but a vague and emotional concept. It was therefore a

ory that the conduct of affairs in Rome should not be narrowly Roman, but commend itself to the sentiment and interests of

51.). PageBook=>154 among the champions of the People’s rights but hardly the belief and conviction that popular sov

e measure of acquiescence, even of belief. Revolution rends the veil. But the Revolution did not impede or annul the use of

epublican constitution was, however, a matter not of legal definition but of partisan interpretation. Libertas is a vague a

. Pietas and a state of public emergency was the excuse for sedition. But the Antonii at least kept faith among themselves:

g Caesar’s allies Pollio was not the only one who followed the friend but cursed the cause. The continuance and complicatio

once he composed a propaganda-letter, addressed to Balbus and Oppius but destined for wider circulation: the gist of it wa

7 Extraordinary commands were against the spirit of the constitution8 but they might be necessary to save the State. Of tha

as crown and consecration to any process of violence and usurpation. But liberty, the laws and the constitution were Not

nce through legal provisions, namely the acta of Caesar the Dictator. But what of the official recognition of Caesar’s heir

enim in consulis iure et imperio debent esse provinciae’ (ib. 4, 9). But was that the point? The fact that Cicero uses thi

1 Phil. 4. 2 M. Valerius Messalla Rufus (cos. 53) was still alive, but took no part in politics. PageBook=>164 ba

ranks of the senior statesmen. Of the Pompeian consulars, an eminent but over- lauded group,2 only two were alive at the e

bsent from Italy, Trebonius, Lepidus and Vatinius. Fourteen remained, but few of note in word or deed, for good or evil, in

est stood Plancus, Lepidus and Pollio, Caesarian partisans all three, but diverse in character, attainments and standing; a

ers protesting love of peace and loyalty to the Republic who did not? But Plancus, it is clear, was coolly waiting upon eve

Calvinus, lost to history for thirty months after the Ides of March, but still with a future before him. 2 Ad fam. 10, 3

either Lepidus or Plancus was C. Asinius Pollio in Hispania Ulterior, but his province was distant, his power unequal. A sc

scholar, a wit and an honest man, a friend of Caesar and of Antonius but a Republican, Pollio found his loyalties at varia

o, the pomp and insincerity of whose oratory he found so distasteful. But Pollio was to play his part for peace, if not for

didissimus’ (Ad Att. 9, 9, 3). PageBook=>167 Egypt in October, but no confirmation. Winter, however, while delaying

n Syria or Egypt and Macedonia was soon to provide more than rumours. But there is no evidence of concerted design between

riutm and the charge of a war to a man who had held no public office. But there were limits. The Senate did not choose its

rutus, not to advance within a distance of two hundred miles of Rome, but to submit to the authority of the government. T

rovincia, which fixed two years as the tenure of a consular province: but that might have been contested, for Antonius’ com

nce. Secondly, the law had been passed in defiance of the auspicia: but that plea was very weak, for the authority of sac

litary operations. At Rome politics lapsed for the rest of the month. But Cicero did not relent. He proclaimed the revival

y would offer, he conjectured that Antonius might yield the Cisalpina but cling to Gallia Comata. 2 Deceptive and dangerous

beyond the law. Cicero himself had always been an advocate of peace. But this was different a just and holy war. Thus to t

, set out for the seat of war and marched up the Flaminia to Ariminum but not to fight if he could avoid it. He might yet b

t if he could avoid it. He might yet baffle both Cicero and Antonius. But he could not arrest the mobilization. Patriotism

5, 5 PageBook=>170 merely encouraged his neighbours to enlist but helped them with generous subsidies. 1 On the f

s was prepared to treat were these:3 he would give up Cisalpine Gaul, but insisted on retaining Comata: that province he wo

d guarantees: it was not merely his dignitas that he had to think of, but his salus. The sole security for that was the pos

ments. Pansa supported him. Antonius was not declared a public enemy. But Cicero did not abate his efforts. As a patriotic

ices of those patriotic and high-minded citizens Lepidus and Plancus, but spurning all thought of negotiation so long as An

ion of Mutina, passing Bononia, which Antonius was forced to abandon; but Antonius drew his lines closer around Mutina. O

miles south-east of Mutina. In the battle Pansa himself was wounded, but Hirtius arriving towards evening fell upon the vi

Antonius and retrieved the day, no soldier in repute or in ambition, but equal to his station and duty. The great Antonius

ater, Antonius was forced to risk a battle at Mutina. He was defeated but not routed; on the other side, Hirtius fell. In t

d the support of Lepidus and Plancus, assured to him a month earlier, but now highly dubious. At Rome the exultation was

him from marching westwards to join Antonius. Ventidius, an important but sometimes neglected factor in the campaign of Mut

the glorious dead. 1 Their comrades expected more solid recompense. But the Senate reduced the bounties so generously pro

to effect that salutary economy. Octavianus was not among its members but neither was D. Brutus. The envoys were instructed

Vatinius essayed his vigorous oratory on the soldiers of Pompeius. 2 But not for long Labienus NotesPage=>164 M. Ju

of Narbonensis. Lepidus alleged that he was pained by their behaviour but merciful ‘nos etsi graviter ab iis laesi eramus,

f officers and men: they followed Lepidus not from merit or affection but only because Lepidus was a Caesarian. The troops

g to within forty miles of the latter’s camp. Lepidus encouraged him. But Plancus feared a trap he knew his Lepidus; 3 and

d as they did from a reasoned and balanced estimate of the situation. But more than this can be said. Pollio, the would-be

tify the shedding of Roman blood. It was no time-server or careerist, but the Stoic Favonius, the friend of Cato and of Bru

usque Italiae mira consensio est. ’ 3 It was trivial (1 per cent.), but the rich refused to pay (Ad M. Brutum 1, 18, 5).

dangers of their equivocal alliance. He had not been deluded then. 2 But during the months after Mutina, in the face of th

come flagrantly Pompeian and Republican. 3 The consulate lay vacant but not unclaimed. Octavianus aspired to the honour;

for colleague. Of the intrigues concerning this matter there is scant but significant evidence. In June (so it would seem)

lique constantia’. 5 Suetonius, Divus Aug. 62, 1 the only evidence, but unimpeachable. 6 Ad M. Brutum 2, 2, 3. After an

n to play the political counsellor to a military leader; and this was but the culmination of the policy that he had initiat

ooked about for allies, opened negotiations with provincial governors but did not act at once. The news of armies raised in

n to resist the worst excesses of civil war. Lepidus was a Caesarian: but Brutus refused to concur in the hounding down of

ith Caesar’s heir. He asseverated his responsibility for that policy. But his words belied him he did not cease to urge Bru

he senators advanced to make their peace with Octavianus; among them, but not in the forefront, was Cicero. ‘Ah, the last o

was Cicero. ‘Ah, the last of my friends’, the young man observed. 1 But even now there were some who did not lose hope. I

im once again. In the negotiations he now took his stand as an equal: but the apportionment of power revealed the true rela

ies of the provinces. Depressed by the revived Dictatorship to little but a name, the consulate never afterwards recovered

e but a name, the consulate never afterwards recovered its authority. But prestige it still guaranteed, and the conferment

upon the spot, of his own will. 2 The scene may have been impressive, but the prophecy was superfluous. The three leaders m

id name was now dishonoured. Caesar’s heir was no longer a rash youth but a chill and mature terrorist. 1 Condemnation and

ced the Triumvirs and enriched literature with an immortal theme. 1 But the fugitives could not take their property with

under collusion and protection, or returned soon, saving their lives but making a sacrifice in money. 2 There had been an

g the aristocracy at least. Sulla had many enemies among the nobiles, but certain of the more eminent, through family conne

tonius the public enemy, thereby incurring blame in certain circles,3 but trusting his own judgement; and he had already se

ce was Pollio’s (quoted by Seneca, Suasoriae 6, 24), admitting faults but condoning ‘sed quando mortalium nulli virtus perf

etur. ’ 4 Ib. 11, 4. PageBook=>193 Calidus, famed as a poet, but only among his contemporaries; 1 and the aged M.

aged M. Terentius Varro, once a soldier and a governor of provinces, but now a peaceful antiquary, found harbourage in the

ing the Republicans at Rome as it was soon to fight them in the East. But the struggle was not purely political in characte

the municipia, publicly lauded for the profession of ancient virtue, but avid and unscrupulous in their secret deeds. The

o defence. Varro was an old Pompeian, politically innocuous by now: but he was also the owner of great estates. 3 Likewis

own house once owned by Livius Drusus cried out for confiscation. 8 But a capital levy often defeats its own purpose. The

aughter of the orator Hortensius, they abated their demands a little, but did not NotesPage=>195 1 Pliny, NH 35, 201

izen in Italy was subject to no kind of taxation, direct or indirect. But now Rome and Italy had to pay the costs of civil

herent Q. Fufius Calenus held a military command and died in 40 B.C.; but the Caesarian nobilis Cn. Domitius Calvinus prolo

distant past. Less spectacular than the decadence of the principes, but not less to be deplored, were the gaps in other r

distinction chose Caesar in preference to Pompeius and the oligarchy; but they would not tolerate Caesar’s ostensible polit

equestrian rank, such as the banker C. Flavius, with no heart for war but faithful to the end. 4 At Athens he found a welco

9 Trebonius the proconsul of Asia had been put to death by Dolabella; but his quaestor P. Lentulus, the son of Spinther, wa

half- brother, L. Gellius Poplicola, was also with Brutus for a time, but acted treacherously (Dio 47, 24, 3 ff.). Above, p

ad expelled from Italy not only the nobiles, their political enemies, but their victims as well, men of substance and reput

l governors and commanders in his civil wars naturally fare better; 3 but two of them at least, having passed over to the L

command under Caesar: Allienus and Staius are soon heard of no more, but C. Calvisius Sabinus goes steadily forward. 5 Oth

e dedication ILS 925 (Spoletium) should belong to him (below, p. 221) but CIL ix, 414 (Canusium) perhaps to his son or his

m earlier posts of subordination, gave sign and guarantee of success, but did not survive. Saxa and Fango were to be cut of

L. Vinicius, who have left no record of service to the rulers of Rome but , as sole and sufficient proof, the presence of th

ves no epigraphic examples of it. The origin of C. Sosius is unknown: but observe the Roman knight from Picenum, Q. Sosius,

te, given the rarity and non-Latin termination of their family names. But the Antonians were not the worst. Advancement unh

t an indispensable qualification for leading armies of Roman legions. But Salvidienus was not unique: foreigners or freed s

t or crime. ‘Non mos, non ius. ’3 So might the period be described. But the Caesarians claimed a right and a duty that tr

macy at sea was short-lived. Pompeius, it is true, did not intervene; but Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, coming up with a large

n of the Liberators had not been Antonius’ policy when he was consul. But with Caesar’s heir there could be no pact or peac

decided not to carry the war into Italy in winter or even in summer, but to occupy the time by organizing their resources

e stood. Brutus himself was no soldier by repute, no leader of men. But officers and men knew and respected the tried mer

onveying two legions to Dyrrhachium. 3 It was not the ghost of Caesar but an incalculable hazard, the loss of Cassius, that

, that brought on the doom of the Republic. Brutus could win a battle but not a campaign. Provoked by the propaganda and th

irrevocable, the last struggle of the Free State. Henceforth nothing but a contest of despots over the corpse of liberty.

r a principle, a tradition and a class narrow, imperfect and outworn, but for all that the soul and spirit of Rome. No ba

torious generals, Antonius, it is alleged, they saluted as imperator, but reviled Octavianus. A number of them were put to

nting a proposal of Caesar the Dictator, must be a province no longer but removed from political competition by being made

se engagements were duly recorded in writing, a necessary precaution, but no bar to dishonesty or dispute. Antonius now dep

and unpopular task of carrying out confiscation in Italy. A victor, but lacking the glory and confidence of victory, Octa

he dynasts, the share of Caesar’s heir was arduous, unpopular and all but fatal to himself. No calculation could have predi

was not the fierce peoples of the Apennine as in the Bellum Italicum, but rather the more prosperous and civilized regions

a, Etruria and the Sabine country, which had been loyal to Rome then, but had fought for the Marian cause against Sulla. No

gent mission to Syria. 3 Caecina returned without a definite message, but Nerva stayed with Antonius. NotesPage=>208

, divorced his unwelcome and untouched bride, the daughter of Fulvia. But the consul and Fulvia, so far from giving way, al

fficers intervened and called a conference. A compromise was reached, but the more important articles were never carried ou

essors when they had liberated Rome from the domination of a faction. But L. Antonius did not hold the city for long. He ad

d by the Antonian generals, strong in prestige and mass of legions. But the Antonians were separated by distance and divi

with a huge force of legions: they, too, had opposed Salvidienus. 2 But that was not all. The Republican fleets dominated

es in Italy and on the seas adjacent would have destroyed Octavianus. But there was neither unity of command nor unity of p

from Spain through the Cisalpina; Pollio and Ventidius followed, slow but menacing, in his rear. The war had already broken

emote in the Sabine land, held out for freedom under Tisienus Gallus, but was forced to a capitulation. 5 These were episod

us had called him a muleteer and a brigand; and Pollio hated Plancus. But there was a more potent factor than the doubts an

es. He was master of Italy, a land of famine, desolation and despair. But Italy was encompassed about with enemies. Antoniu

was the sister of that Libo whose daughter Sex. Pompeius had married. But Pompeius, as was soon evident, was already in neg

resh from the Cappadocian charmer Glaphyra,4 succumbed with good will but did not surrender. The Queen, who was able to dem

ook=>215 merely championed his cause and won Republican support, but even raised civil war with a fair prospect of des

n,1 or else his complicity in the designs of his brother was complete but unavowed. The alternative but not incongruous acc

the designs of his brother was complete but unavowed. The alternative but not incongruous accusations of vice and duplicity

had no cognizance when he arrived at Tyre in February of the year 40, but learned only after his departure, when sailing to

upon events. 5 At last he moved. The Parthian menace was upon him, but the Parthians could wait. Antonius gathered force

rn Italy. A complete revolution of alliances transformed the visage but not the substance of Roman politics. Octavianus

f as the true Caesarian by standing for the interests of the legions. But his errors were not fatal Octavianus had great di

lomatic Maecenas. L. Cocceius Nerva was present, a friend of Antonius but acceptable to the other party. 2 Under their au

Isles beyond the western margin of the world, without labour and war, but innocent and peaceful. The darker the clouds, t

new era, not merely to begin with the consulate of his patron Pollio but very precisely to be inaugurated by Pollio, ‘te d

infancy, its parents likewise are neither celestial nor apocalyptic, but a Roman father with virtus to bequeath NotesPag

e sister of Octavianus had a son, Marcellus, by her consular husband; but Marcellus was born two years earlier. 6 In 40 B.C

cribonia; Julia, his only daughter, was born in the following year. But there was a more important pact than the despairi

an P. Canidius Crassus. 5 Their services were diverse and impressive, but barely known to historical record. Octavianus n

d as yet no senatorial office the wars had hardly left time for that. But Octavianus had designated him as consul for the f

ne took account: he had family influence and did not resign ambition, but lacked a party and devoted legions. His style of

tions was the island of Zacynthus, held by his admiral C. Sosius. 3 But the Balkan peninsula was in no way the chief preo

branch of the royal house. The damage and the disgrace were immense. But the domination of the nomads was transient. Brund

, CQ xxvi (1932), 75 ff. Appian (BC 5, 75, 320) mentions the Dardani, but there is no record of any operations against them

ntonius. 5 The predominance of Antonius was secured and reinforced; but the execution of his policy was already being ham

ference in the spring of the year 38. Antonius arrived at Brundisium, but not finding his colleague there, and being refuse

admit him. Not that he had either the desire or the pretext for war, but he was in an angry mood. Once again for the benef

, were adherents of Antonius, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus and C. Sosius. But five years is a long period in a revolutionary ep

rte 11, 71 f. PageBook=>226 be enlisted to deal with Pompeius. But Octavianus would have none of that. Further, from

asteful. His future and his fate lay in the East, with another woman. But that was not yet apparent, least of all to Antoni

espite at last from raids and famine, and to Octavianus an accidental but delayed advantage prominent Republicans now retur

piracy a Republican admiral, Staius Murcus. 3 Defeated at Pharsalus but not destroyed, the family and faction of the Pomp

whom there could be no pardon from Caesar’s heir, no return to Rome. But the young Pompeius was despotic and dynastic in h

that the young Pompeius might be a champion of the Republican cause. But it was only a name that the son had inherited, an

epidus (cos. 34 B.C.), had Scipionic blood (Propertius 4, 11, 29 f.), but cannot be the issue of a marriage contracted as l

in Africa was silent or ambiguous. Ambition had made him a Caesarian, but he numbered friends and kinsmen among the Republi

t delay. For the moment Antonius was loyal to the Caesarian alliance; but Antonius, who came to Brundisium but departed aga

loyal to the Caesarian alliance; but Antonius, who came to Brundisium but departed again without a conference, gave him no

tic alliances. It is not known whom Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus married; but his grand-daughter, child of L. Domitius and Anto

The fighting was varied and confused. Agrippa won a victory at Mylae but Octavianus himself was defeated in a great battle

ty-two legions at his back, ordered Octavianus to depart from Sicily. But Octavianus had not acquired and practised the art

t, Lepidus begged publicly for mercy. 5 Stripped of triumviral powers but retaining the title of pontifex maximus, Lepidus

had no doubt been carefully contrived, with little risk to its author but a fine show of splendid courage. 6 It was easier

=>233 now stood some forty legions diverse in history and origin but united by their appetite for bounties and lands.

ted by their appetite for bounties and lands. Octavianus was generous but firm. 1 The veterans of Mutina and Philippi he no

formulation, though not extravagant, was perhaps a little premature. But it contained a programme. Octavianus remitted deb

lieutenants. His health was frail, scanty indeed his military skill. But craft and diplomacy, high courage and a sense of

services of three friends. Agrippa held the praetorship in that year, but Maecenas and Salvidienus were not even senators.

al. Caesar’s heir had the army and the plebs, reinforced in devotion, but had attached few senators of note, even when four

and Cn. Domitius Calvinus. Carrinas, of a family proscribed by Sulla, but admitted to honours by Caesar, commanded armies f

erious character are not unequivocally recorded. PageBook=>236 But now, after Brundisium, the soldiers of fortune Sa

uick reward, then lapsing into obscurity again. Some names are known, but are only names, accidentally preserved, such as t

ng of aliens and freedmen, of which support Pompeius had no monopoly, but all the odium. 2 C. Proculeius, however, now turn

e odium. 2 C. Proculeius, however, now turns up, only a Roman knight, but a person of repute and consequence. 3 Above all,

ial semblance, the campaigns in Sicily were advertised not as a civil but a foreign war, soon to become a glorious part of

the family of Messalla (ib. 35, 21). 6 Lepidus was not an admiral: but he was in the company of Octavianus in 36 B.C(Sue

Suetonius, Divus Aug. 16, 3). 7 Pulcher was an Antonian in 43 B.C., but willing to be recommended to D. Brutus (Ad fam. 1

recommended to D. Brutus (Ad fam. 11, 22). PageBook=>238 land. But Cornificius received or usurped the privilege of

to history, Messalla, Ap. Pulcher and Lepidus were not merely noble but of the most ancient nobility, the patrician; whic

he daughter of Scribonia, above, p. 229. Pulcher’s wife is not known, but there is a link somewhere with the Valerii, cf. P

liminated Lepidus and satisfied the veterans without harming Italy. But the seizure of Sicily and Africa disturbed the ba

he achievements in foreign policy of the long Principate of Augustus. But Octavianus’ time was short, his aims were restric

tia and subdued the native tribes up to the line of the Dinaric Alps, but not beyond it. If war came, he would secure Italy

panish triumph (33) repaired a temple of Hercules. These were some, but not all, of the edifices that already foreshadowe

ianus became consul for the second time, and his influence, not total but at least preponderating, may perhaps be detected

the monarchy, to prepare not merely for the contest that was imminent but for the peace that was to follow victory in the l

and some through influence or protection got restitution of property. But the government had many enemies, the victims of c

s, the victims of confiscation, rancorous and impotent at the moment, but a danger for the near future, should the Republic

rship of the State, stood an array of consulars, impressive in number but not in dignity, recent creations almost all. By t

seasons: Octavianus created new families of that order, for patronage but with a good pretext. 1 Among the consulars coul

trician Cornelii two at the most, perhaps only one; 2 no Valerii yet, but the Valerii were soon to provide three consuls in

lus, Licinius, Junius or Calpurnius. Those families were not extinct, but many years would have to pass before the Fasti of

3 Not only Messalla himself, consul with Octavianus for the year 31, but two Valerii, suffect consuls in 32 and 29 respect

2 The marshals might disappear, some as suddenly as they had arisen, but the practice of diplomacy engendered in its adept

nder the peace of the Triumvirs, with no use left in Senate or Forum, but only of service to overcome the recalcitrance of

the florid Asianic style, yielded the primacy to the more restrained but ample and harmonious style of Cicero, recognized

of Cicero, recognized as ultimate and classical even in his own day. But not without rivals: a different conception and fa

of his promotion. PageBook=>246 the best all bone and nerve, but liable to be dry, tenuous and tedious. 1 Caesar’s

d that Brutus’ choice of the plain and open manner was no affectation but the honest expression of his sentiments. 2 Neithe

t leisure and illusions and took no pains to conceal their departure. But a direct, not to say hard and truculent manner of

ollio are accorded the rank of ‘classical’ orators next to and below, but comparable to Cicero. 2 Tacitus, Dial. 25, 6

rt in adversity. Stoicism was a manly, aristocratic and active creed; but the doctrines of Epicurus were available, extolli

Rome had relapsed under a Sullan despotism, retired from public life but scorning ignoble ease or the pursuits of agricult

at Rome between the two Dictatorships. Not Caesar’s invasion of Italy but the violent ascension and domination of Pompeius,

lius and the unspeakable Fufidius. 4 The young Pompeius, fair of face but dark within, murderous and unrelenting, took on t

f the Roman and the senator, archaic yet highly sophisticated, sombre but not edifying. Men turned to history for instruc

er and arguments of defence or apology: his testimony to the peculiar but contrasted greatness of Caesar and Cato denied ra

t wars and monarchic faction-leaders like Sulla, Pompeius and Caesar, but of a wider and even more menacing perspective. Th

e them the heirs and the marshals of Caesar, owing no loyalty to Rome but feigned devotion to a created divinity, Divus Jul

ight turn a verse with ease, or fill a volume, set no especial value. But it was now becoming evident that poetry, besides

strument of government by conveying a political message, unobtrusive, but perhaps no less effective, than the spoken or wri

of these poets was diverse. Lucretius stands solitary and mysterious, but Calvus was a nobilis and Cornificius was born of

and their creature Vatinius. With Caesar reconciliation was possible, but hardly with Pompeius. Cornificius, Cinna, and oth

preserved or restored the poet’s estate so long as he held Cisalpina, but the disturbances of the Perusian War supervened,

to write, the history of the Bellum Siculum as an epic narrative. 4 But the poet was reluctant, the patron too wise to in

principium, tibi desinet’). This looks like the original dedication: but a poem in honour of Octavianus stands at the head

mer. Varro, however, had described the land of Italy as no desolation but fruitful and productive beyond comparison; 1 Ital

t from vine and olive to the growing of cereals for mere subsistence. But Virgil intended to compose a poem about Italy, no

o the army of the Liberators. He fought at Philippi, for the Republic but not from Republican convictions: it was but the a

hilippi, for the Republic but not from Republican convictions: it was but the accident of his presence at a university city

ilient temperament reasserted its rights. Horace now composed satires but not in the traditional manner of Lucilius. His su

His subject was ordinary life, his treatment not harsh and truculent, but humane and tolerant: which suited his own tempera

on after change and disturbance: beneath, no confidence yet or unity, but discord and disquiet. Italy was not reconciled to

er the contest with Antonius. Rome had witnessed a social revolution, but it had been arrested in time. After the next subv

c order it might go farther, embracing not only impoverished citizens but aliens and slaves. There had been warning signs.

n of political stability and national confidence. The need was patent but the rulers of Rome claimed the homage due to gods

ed the name and the fabric of a free state. That was not so long ago. But they had changed with the times, rapidly. Of the

o any drastic transformation. The politician and the orator perished, but the banker and man of affairs survived and prospe

policy had become discernible, the prime agents were already at work. But the acts of the young dynast even now can hardly

and splendour of the future monarch. Antonius was absent from Italy, but Antonius was the senior partner. His prestige, th

o longer the terrorist of Perusia. Since then seven years had passed. But he was not yet the leader of all Italy. In this

Antonius had already lost the better part of two years not Ventidius but the victor of Philippi should have driven the Par

of the kings, tetrarchs and petty tyrants abode loyalty, not to Rome, but to Pompeius their patron, whose cause suddenly re

nvader, while Deiotarus, the most military of them all, lay low, aged but not decrepit: true to himself, he had just graspe

atia, murdering a tetrarch and a tetrarch’s wife, his own daughter. 3 But Deiotarus died in the year of the Parthian invasi

a, received kingdoms. Other arrangements were made from time to time, but it was not until the winter of 37-36 B.C. that th

or Cleopatra received no greater accession than did other dynasts ; 2 but her portion was exceedingly rich. Her revenues we

e celebrated in Egypt and reckoned as the beginning of a new era. 1 But the relations of Antonius and Cleopatra were not

e of the dependencies, should not be regarded as paramount and apart, but as one link in a chain of kingdoms that ran north

nt and defence, were not knit together by any principle of uniformity but depended upon the ties of personal allegiance.

Chersonesus. 1 Mithridates the Pergamene, son of a Galatian tetrarch but reputed bastard of the king of Pontus, raised tro

t would seek to demonstrate that the Roman was not a brutal conqueror but one of themselves, displaying not tolerant superi

conqueror but one of themselves, displaying not tolerant superiority but active good NotesPage=>262 1 M. Rostovtzef

I (1917), 27 ff., with especial reference to Satyrus (IOSPE I2, 691), but mentioning other caesarian partisans in the East.

the appellation of saviour and benefactor not only to Pompeius Magnus but also to his client Theophanes. 2 The example was

ntonius could parade imperially, not only as a monarch and a soldier, but as a benefactor to humanity, a protector of the a

he Empire, not by annexation of fresh territories as Roman provinces, but by an extension of the sphere of vassal kingdoms.

unsafe. He postponed the revenge upon Artavasdes. It was a defeat, but not a rout or a disaster. The Roman losses were c

lrous for the first time in his life. He was dealing with Octavianus: but he learned too late. Octavianus, however, was no

200. PageBook=>268 Antonius had been a loyal friend to Caesar, but not a fanatical Caesarian. The avenging of the Di

not his. The contrast did not escape the Republicans. Partly despair, but not wholly paradox, drove the remnants of the Cat

His father-in-law L. Scribonius Libo at once became consul (34 B.C.), but seems to have lapsed from politics. The young nob

a relative of Libo, had also been among the companions of Pompeius. But Catonians and Pompeians do not exhaust the list o

ive when contrasted with the following of the rival Caesarian dynast, but decorative rather than solid and useful. Many of

now imminent, with aggression coming from the West, from Octavianus, but not upon an innocent and unsuspecting ally. Both

ion of unrealized intentions may be logical, artistic and persuasive, but it is not history. Up to a point the acts of An

them remain, the instruments of Roman domination. Not their strength, but their weakness, fomented danger and embarrassment

therefore at the same time a magistrate at Rome and a king in Egypt. But that does not prove the substantial identity of h

f Antonius. There was Cleopatra. Antonius was not the King of Egypt,1 but when he abode there as consort of Egypt’s Queen,

making provision for the present, not for a long future, for the East but not for Italy and the West as well. 2 To absolute

t as well. 2 To absolute monarchy belonged divine honours in the East but not to monarchy alone: in any representative of p

patra and her eldest son Ptolemy Caesar (alleged son of the Dictator, but probably not, cf. J. Carcopino, Ann. de l’École d

a genuine religious content. Dionysus-Osiris was the consort of Isis. But in this matter exaggeration and credulity have ru

and edifying literature. Cleopatra was neither young nor beautiful. 3 But there are more insistent and more dangerous forms

basest, were his ruin. Rome, it has been claimed, feared Cleopatra but did not fear Antonius: she was planning a war of

naugurate a new universal kingdom. 4 In this deep design Antonius was but her dupe and her agent. Of the ability of Cleop

tra was of no moment whatsoever in the policy of Caesar the Dictator, but merely a brief chapter in his amours, comparable

tion to drink and to Cleopatra. Antonius retorted it was nothing new, but had begun nine years ago: Cleopatra was his wife.

ng them was the conquest of Armenia, a strong argument in his favour. But Armenia was outweighed by the donations of Antoni

iative he summoned the Senate. He had discarded the name of Triumvir. But he possessed auctoritas and the armed power to ba

violence had given Octavianus an insecure control of Rome and Italy. But violence was not enough: he still lacked the mora

pidity. Octavianus professed to have resigned the office of Triumvir, but retained the power, as was apparent, not only to

umvir, but retained the power, as was apparent, not only to Antonius, but to other contemporaries for Antonius, who, more h

pr. 44 B.C.) was the husband of Pompeia, daughter of Pompeius Magnus: but the consul of 32 may be his son by an earlier mar

isposed along the coasts. He was confident and ready for the struggle but might not open it yet. Here the two consuls met h

aration of war; and war would have ensued, Cleopatra or no Cleopatra. But the Queen was there: Antonius stood as her ally,

the loyalty of a party that was united not by principle or by a cause but by personal allegiance. Generous but careless, in

d not by principle or by a cause but by personal allegiance. Generous but careless, in the past he had not been NotesPage

us, each with a following of his own. Between them was no confidence, but bitter enmity, causing a feud with subsequent rep

een and was averse from war. Yet it was not Ahenobarbus who ran away, but Plancus. Accompanied by his nephew Titius, he des

iental despotism. Bibulus, the proconsul of Syria, died in this year, but the rest of the Catonian faction under Ahenobarbu

desertion, it lay to hand in Antonius’ refusal to dismiss Cleopatra. But the Antonian party was already disintegrating. Lo

, should not summarily be dismissed. It is a question not of scruples but of expedience how far was forgery necessary? and

e of the Caesarian leader and executed simultaneously over all Italy, but rather the culmination in the summer of a series

the corrupt plebs or the packed and disreputable Senate of the city, but all Italy. The phrase was familiar from recent

then had been foreign, and the activities of Drusus precipitated war. But Italy, become Roman through grant of the franchis

sacred shields of Mars, the Roman name, the toga and eternal Vesta! 1 But Horace, himself perhaps no son of Italian stock,

wer. The elder, like Pompeius twenty years before, a great reputation but on the wane: nec reparare novas vires multumque

g upon the strife for power an ideal, august and patriotic character. But not all at once. A conscious and united Italy c

total and immediate, from the plebiscite of the year 32: that act was but the beginning of the work that Augustus the Princ

f the oath was to intimidate opposition and to stampede the neutrals. But the measure was much more than a device invented

for his ordering of the East, was in himself no menace to the Empire, but a future ruler who could hope to hold it together

to the Empire, but a future ruler who could hope to hold it together. But Antonius victorious in war with the help of alien

ors most nearly allied to them by the ties of family or business. 2 But what if the partition of the world was to be perp

The better sort of people in Italy did not like war or despotic rule. But despotism was already there and war inevitable. I

ce might be achieved. It was worth it not merely to the middle class, but to the nobiles. Their cause had fallen long ago,

e nobiles. Their cause had fallen long ago, not perhaps at Pharsalus, but finally and fatally at Philippi. They knew it, an

ervices Antonius had been the gainer: his own conscience was clear. 1 But he refused to support the national movement. Poll

cared for Rome, for the Italy of his fathers and for his own dignity but not for any party, still less for the fraud that

=>292 severed his amicitia, their feud was private and personal. But if Antonius stood by his ally, his conduct would

l cities like Gades and Corduba. 2 Old Balbus and his nephew were all but monarchic in their native Gades; it may be presum

a. 5 Maecenas controlled Rome and Italy, invested with supreme power, but no title. 6 There must be no risks, no danger of

nt the winter in Greece, ready in his preparations of army and fleet, but not perhaps as resolute as he might appear. Anton

he character of a civil war in which men fought, not for a principle, but only for a choice of masters. In ships Antonius

s in Italy. The retreat from Media had seriously depleted his army. 2 But he made up the losses by fresh levies and Notes

ns to thirty. The new recruits were inferior to Italians, it is true, but by no means contemptible if they came from the vi

s was composed in the main of the survivors of his veteran legions. 1 But would Roman soldiers fight for the Queen of Egypt

oyalty of Caesarian legions to a general of Caesar’s dash and vigour; but they lacked the moral advantage of attack and tha

as his plan, it failed. Antonius had a great fleet and good admirals. But his ships and his officers lacked recent experien

Silanus and the agile Dellius, whose changes of side were proverbial but not unparalleled. 1 The ex-Republican M. Licinius

, 161 (for Messalla). 7 Virgil, Aen. 8, 680 f. PageBook=>297 But Octavianus, though ‘dux’, was even less adequate

mander sought to induce his soldiers to march away through Macedonia, but in vain. He had to escape to Antonius. After some

n. Sosius might be suspected. Certain of the Antonians were executed, but Sosius was spared, at the instance, it was allege

aganda against Cleopatra, to the sworn and sacred union of all Italy. But the young Caesar required the glory of a victory

legend. To Octavianus the Queen was an embarrassment if she lived :5 but a Roman imperator could not NotesPage=>298

the day that called forth the shrillest jubilation from the victors, but the death of the foreign queen, the ‘fatale monst

self was not an urgent problem. Armenia had been annexed by Antonius, but Armenia fell away during the War of Actium. Octav

tavianus was not incommoded: he took no steps to recover that region, but invoked and maintained the traditional Roman prac

years. Octavianus had his own ideas. It might be inexpedient to defy, but it was easy to delude, the sentiments of a patrio

Egypt was secure, or deemed secure, in the keeping of a Roman knight. But what of Syria and Macedonia? Soon after Actium, M

st governor of Macedonia is nowhere attested—perhaps it was Taurus. 4 But Messalla and Taurus departed to the West before l

, 18, 6). 3 Dio 51, 7, 7, cf. Tibullus 1, 7, 13 ff. 4 No evidence— but Taurus was an honorary duovir of Dyrrhachium, ILS

The exaltation of peace by a Roman statesman might attest a victory, but it portended no slackening of martial effort. The

ia. About the date, no evidence. The period 29–27 B.C. is attractive, but 27–25 not excluded. On his habits, Seneca, Suasor

more than one year; and a certain Thorius Flaccus, otherwise unknown ( but from Lanuvium), was proconsul of Bithynia c. 28 B

pacisque imponerc morem, parcere subiectis et debellare superbos. 1 But the armies of Rome presented a greater danger to

he war-booty, especially the treasure of Egypt. 2 Liberty was gone, but property, respected and secure, was now mounting

had been fought and won, the menace to Italy’s life and soul averted. But salvation hung upon a single thread. Well might m

emblazoned the Caesar of Trojan stock, destined himself for divinity, but not before his rule on earth has restored confide

strates how the patriot Camillus not only saved Rome from the invader but prevented the citizens from abandoning the destin

s identified with that god by the poet Virgil. 1 Not by conquest only but by the foundation of a lasting city did a hero wi

their own ambition, inadequacy or dishonesty. Sulla established order but no reconciliation in Rome and Italy. Pompeius des

ar. What Rome and Italy desired was a return, not to freedom—anything but that—but to civil and ordered government, in a wo

Rome and Italy desired was a return, not to freedom—anything but that— but to civil and ordered government, in a word, to ‘n

party and its leader to rule? He had resigned the title of Triumvir, but it might have been contended that he continued un

o men at the time. From 31 B.C onwards he had been consul every year. But that was not all. The young despot not only conce

every year. But that was not all. The young despot not only conceded, but even claimed, that he held sovranty over the whol

The reference is probably wider, not merely to the oath of allegiance but to the crowning victory of Actium and the reconqu

. 2 The consensus embraced and the oath enlisted, not only all Italy, but the whole world. 3 In 28 B.C Caesar’s heir stood

s vulnerable. The imperator could depend upon the plebs and the army. But he could not rule without the help of an oligarch

marshals, such as Agrippa, Calvisius and Taurus, to any extremity. But the military oligarchy was highly variegated. The

chy was highly variegated. There was scarce a man among the consulars but had a Republican—or Antonian—past behind him. Tre

like Plancus and Titius. Ahenobarbus the Republican leader was dead; but Messalla and Pollio carried some authority. If th

any mere constitutional opposition in Rome. It would be uncomfortable but not dangerous. Armies and provinces were another

after pacifying Thrace and defeating the Bastarnae, earned a triumph but claimed more, namely the ancient honour of the sp

ted that Cornelius Cossus won the spolia opima when military tribune: but Augustus told Livy that he had seen in the temple

exceedingly rash to speculate on the identity of her husband Gallus: but a knight as powerful as C. Cornelius Gallus could

that yielded certain provinces of the Empire, nominally uncontrolled, but left the more important, deprived of proconsuls,

eatest of them all. It could also fit a political leader—dux partium. But warfare and party politics were deemed to be over

d to be known as a magistrate. An appellation that connoted eminence, but not always sole primacy, was ready to hand. The l

ng of ‘dominatus’. 3 Caesar’s heir came to use the term ‘princeps’, but not as part of any official titulature. There wer

of the Odes of Horace (which appeared in 23 B.C.). Propertius uses it but once, ‘dux’, however, at least twice. 1 As late a

ook of the Odes (13 B.C.) the ruler of Rome can still be called ‘dux’— but with a difference and with the appendage of a ben

and ‘ductor’. 4 So much for Rome, the governing classes and Italy. But even in Italy, the Princeps by his use of ‘impera

. 1 For the rest, proconsuls were to govern the provinces, as before, but responsible only to the Senate; and Senate, Peopl

Romulus, for the omen of twelve vultures had greeted him long ago. 3 But Romulus was a king, hated name, stained with a br

20 ff.). That Augustus exercised such a supervision there is no doubt— but in virtue of his auctoritas. Augustus’ own words

majority of the legions; and Egypt stood apart from the reckoning. But Augustus did not take all the legions: three proc

phery of the Empire—no threat, it might seem, to a free constitution, but merely guardians of the frontiers. Nor need the n

e the law, Augustus was not the commander-in-chief of the whole army, but a Roman magistrate, invested with special powers

mandate there was plenty of justification. The civil wars were over, but the Empire had not yet recovered from their ravag

y recurrence of the anarchy out of which his domination had arisen. But Augustus was to be consul as well as proconsul, y

his colleagues in magistracy (Res Gestae 34). An enigmatic statement, but elucidated by Premerstein (Vom Werden und Wesen d

istratuum ad pristinum redactum modum,' PageBook=>316 one age, but to many men and the long process of time. 1 Augus

t a colleague, under a mandate to heal and repair the body politic. 4 But Pompeius was sinister and ambitious. That princep

But Pompeius was sinister and ambitious. That princeps did not cure, but only aggravated, the ills of the Roman State. Ver

dead. What they required was not the ambitious and perfidious dynast but that Pompeius who had fallen as Caesar’s enemy, a

us bore testimony: ‘Cicero was a great orator—and a great patriot. ’2 But any official cult of Cicero was an irony to men w

e existing order, reformed a little by a return to ancient practices, but not changed, namely the firm concord of the prope

e of a principle. The authentic Cato, however, was not merely ‘ferox’ but ‘atrox’. 4 His nephew Brutus, who proclaimed a fi

n eo est ut iusto utamur domino, sed ut nullo. ` PageBook=>321 But Cicero might have changed, pliable to a changed o

us. Genuine Pompeians there still were, loyal to a family and a cause— but that was another matter. Insistence upon the lega

ily found—it reposed not in books of the law or abstract speculation, but in the situation itself. Beyond and above all l

himself. 1 Auctoritas denotes the influence that belonged, not by law but by custom of the Roman constitution, to the whole

s, open or secret—all that the principes in the last generation held, but now stolen from them and enhanced to an exorbitan

ence about the gap between fact and theory. It was evident: no profit but only danger from talking about it. The Principate

d in recent times that Augustus not only employed Republican language but intended that the Republican constitution should

ecially the consulate, precisely after the manner of earlier dynasts, but with more thoroughness and without opposition. Th

nominating each year one member of the board of praetors. 2 A noble, but none the less by now a firm member of the Caesari

imperium, had recently been employed to control the armed proconsuls. But the Triumvirate was abolished, the consulate redu

roconsuls remained, as before, in charge of three military provinces. But Augustus was not surrendering power. Very differe

longer the menace of a single consular proconsul governing all Spain, but instead two or three legates, inferior in rank an

Calvisius, and a general from the campaign of Philippi, C. Norbanus. But there were presumably three nobiles in the prime

h Corsica. PageBook=>329 These regions were far from peaceful, but their garrison was kept small in size, perhaps so

by men whom he could trust. Northern Italy was no longer a province, but the Alpine lands, restless and unsubdued, called

vinus at a date difficult to determine (Dio 49, 38, 3, under 34 B.C., but perhaps in error, cf. L. Ganter, Die Provinzial-v

f the Princeps. The formula then devised would serve for the present, but his New State would require yet deeper foundation

ars in the Balkans and the East, not merely for warfare and for glory but that consolidation and conciliation should come m

e of the world reposed. Meagre and confused, the sources defy and all but preclude the attempt to reconstruct the true hist

ειδὴ καì ἀκράτῳ καί κατακoρϵ τ παρρησίᾳ πρὸς πάντας ὁμoίως χρ τo. 6 But difficult to identify precisely, cf. P-W VI, 1993

behalf of Murena. 4 What friends or following Murena had is uncertain but the legate of Syria about this tirke bore the nam

office another exercise of auctoritas, it may be presumed, arbitrary but clothed in a fair pretext. Sestius, once quaestor

f Piso, will attest, not the free working of Republican institutions, but the readiness of old Republican adherents to rall

ient patriotism had brought low a great people. Ruin had been averted but narrowly, peace and order restored but would it l

people. Ruin had been averted but narrowly, peace and order restored but would it last? And, more than security of person

ers, above all proconsular imperium over the whole empire. 2 In fact, but not in name, this reduced all proconsuls to the f

PageBook=>337 With his keen taste for realities and inner scorn ( but public respect) for names and forms, Augustus pre

s his authority was legal. The new settlement liberated the consulate but planted domination all the more firmly. The tribu

rium maius over the senatorial provinces in the East has been argued, but cannot be proved. Nor can precision be extorted f

at a few years later, in 20 and 19 B.C., Agrippa is found, not there, but in Gaul and Spain (Dio 54, 11, 1 ff.). PageBook

(Dio 54, 11, 1 ff.). PageBook=>338 It was not for ostentation but for use that the Princeps took a partner and stre

Piso and Sestius, ex-Republicans in the consulate, that looked well. But it was only a manifesto. PageNote. 338 1 Dio

ful operations in Gaul and in the Alpine lands, as well as in Spain,2 but no serious warfare in the senatorial provinces. B

ell as in Spain,2 but no serious warfare in the senatorial provinces. But now, as though to demonstrate their independence,

our that Augustus should assume the office of Dictator. 6 He refused, but consented to take charge of the corn supply of th

PageBook=>340 The life of the Princeps was frail and precarious, but the Principate was now more deeply rooted, more f

Statues show him as he meant to be seen by the Roman People youthful but grave and melancholy, with all the burden of duty

moral programme which he was held to have inspired. He was no puppet: but the deeds for which he secured the credit were in

leader. In the critical year of Murena’s conspiracy and Augustus’ all but fatal illness the secret struggle for influence a

had been employed in her brother’s interest before and knew no policy but his. She had a son, C. Marcellus. On him the Prin

his hopes of a line of succession that should be not merely dynastic, but in his own family and of his own blood. Two years

instructions by Marcellus as well as by Augustus:2 falsely, perhaps, but it was disquieting. However, when Augustus in pro

tus could bequeath his name and his fortune to whomsoever he pleased, but not his imperium, for that was the grant of Senat

n of the Revolution can scarcely be described as slaves to tradition: but the dour Agrippa, plebeian and puritan, ‘vir rust

poet Horace has so candidly depicted. 5 Maecenas might be dropped, but not Agrippa; and so Agrippa prevailed. He did not

entment,6 in another his residence in the East is described as a mild but opprobrious form of banishment. 7 There is no tru

acy of monarchy, republicanism to Agrippa. The fiction is transparent but not altogether absurd. Unity was established: i

of the loyal and selfless adjutant, the ‘fidus Achates’, unobtrusive but ever present in counsel and ready for action. Agr

and went quietly about his work, his reward not applause or gratitude but the sense of duty done. The character of Marcus

pa’s nature was stubborn and domineering. He would yield to Augustus, but to no other man, and to Augustus not always with

3 This was the New State with a vengeance. The nobiles were helpless but vindictive: they made a point of not attending th

to found a monarchy in the full and flagrant sense of those terms. But the Caesarian party had thwarted its leader in th

aesar: he lacked the vigour and the splendour of that dynamic figure. But he had inherited the name and the halo. A domesti

led into being not by any pre-ordained harmony or theory of politics, but by the history of the Caesarian party and by the

eriods of residence in the provinces, at Tarraco, Lugdunum and Samos. But the Princeps after all stood at the head of the R

tripping Antonius, it not merely swallowed up the old Caesarian party but secured the adhesion of a large number of Republi

the arbitrary rule of a Triumvirate which was not merely indifferent, but even hostile, to birth and breeding. The Senate h

ed the consulate, Cinna not until more than thirty years had elapsed. But some perished or disappeared. Nothing is heard ag

otesPage=>350 1 Namely M. Insteius, Q. Nasidius and M. Octavius. But , for that matter, few Triumviral consuls even are

profited further from the Principate land rose rapidly in value. 3 But the new order was something more than a coalition

leges. They were to remain: the Romans did not believe in equality. 1 But passage from below to the equestrian order and fr

s’ and enforced a sterner discipline than civil wars had tolerated. 2 But this meant no neglect. Augustus remembered, rewar

d social hierarchy of the Republic he could rise to the centurionate, but no higher. After service, it is true, he might be

or adventure, for employment and for the profits of the centurionate. But the positions of military tribune in the legions

d acquired the financial status of knights (which was not difficult): but there was no regular promotion, in the army itsel

their ranks were soon augmented by a surge of successful speculators. But Augustus did not suffer them to return to their o

in administration is gradually built up, in itself no sudden novelty, but deriving from common practice of the age of Pompe

ject. The post of praefectus cohortis does not at first belong to it, but takes time to develop. Notice, on the other hand,

omparable to the commands which were accessible to a minor proconsul, but one more rich and powerful than any. A Roman knig

f these provinces was comparable to Egypt or contained Roman legions; but the Prefect of Egypt found peer and parallel in t

ed senators from knights. They belonged to the same class in society, but differed in public station and prestige dignita

fered in public station and prestige dignitas again. A patent fact, but obscured by pretence and by prejudice. The old no

n no more than a knight in standing, a citizen of Volsinii in Etruria but Seius became Prefect of the Guard and Viceroy of

ero had spoken of Italy with moving tones and with genuine sentiment. But Cicero spoke for the existing order even had he t

earing the garb and pretext of ancient virtue and manly independence, but all too often rapacious, corrupt and subservient

their families, sometimes the last, with no prospect of the consulate but safe votes for the Princeps in his restored and s

, carrying on the tradition of the marshals of the revolutionary wars but not imposing so rapid and frequent a succession o

. Lanuvium is only five miles from Velitrae. 2 No certain evidence: but he purchased large estates in Picenum (Pliny, NH

estates in Samnium (De lege agraria III, 3, cf. 8), was not a Valgius but a (Quinctius) Valgus. 5 L. Passienus Rufus, cos

tion and sentiments had so recently been arrayed in war against Rome. But Italy now extended to the Alps, embracing Cisalpi

Excellent persons, no doubt, and well endowed with material goods. But Augustus was sometimes disappointed, precisely wh

ary careerist rising in social status through service as a centurion. But P. Ovidius Naso was not disposed to serve the Rom

ution which permitted any free-born citizen to stand for magistracies but secured the election of members of a hereditary n

e widened and strengthened oligarchy in the new order was indirectly, but none the less potently, representative of Rome an

less ‘democratic’, for eligibility to office was no longer universal, but was determined by the possession of the latus cla

seded the spurious Republic of the nobiles. No mere stabilizing here, but a constant change and renewing. Liberal theory

unifying of Italy may with propriety be taken to commend and justify, but they do not explain in root and origin, the acts

bitions of earlier Roman politicians, practised since immemorial time but now embracing a whole empire, to the exclusion of

e aristocracy of Italy. Senators represented, not a region or a town, but a class, precisely the men of property, ‘boni vir

ay satisfy the needs of the moralist, the pedagogue or the politician but is alien and noxious to the understanding of hist

rtisans remained. 1 Of the men from Spain, Saxa and Balbus were dead, but the younger Balbus went on in splendour and power

rly entered the Senate under the new order. 5 Augustus exalted Italy; but the contrast between Italy and the provinces is m

iast for merit wherever it might be discovered and careless of class, but a small-town bourgeois, devoted and insatiable in

Ap. Claudius Pulcher and M. Valerius Messalla were quickly won over. But the aristocracy were slow to forgive the man of t

He did not care to exclude any large body of nobiles from the Senate. But the master of patronage could attach to his cause

person, to his family and to the new system, with no little success. But there must be no going back upon his earlier supp

the most ancient patrician houses and the most recent of careerists. But this was an order more firmly consolidated than C

served. The young nobilis often became consul at the prescribed term, but the son of a Roman knight commonly had to wait fo

enhanced security, with less cause to fear and distrust the nobiles, but of accident. To replenish the ranks of the nobile

f. PageBook=>374 Election by the people might be a mere form, but it could not be abolished by a statesman who clai

d Messalla still dominated the field: Gallus and Messallinus recalled but could not rival their parents. Paullus Fabius Max

arisius, both of whom had served against Sex. Pompeius and elsewhere. But L. Tarius Rufus, an admiral at Actium, rose at la

hat was no bar. Others were not merely his allies, bound by amicitia, but in a true sense his intimates and friends the Pri

. So Iullus Antonius, the younger son of the Triumvir, became consul. But the consulate did not matter so much. Enemies wer

h one another and with the dynasty; and though the Scipiones were all but extinct, numerous Lentuli saved and transmitted t

ine forth on the Fasti a Quinctius, a Quinctilius, a Furius Camillus, but brief in duration and ill- starred. 1 Pride of

ar Fasti reveal the best, or at least the most alert and most astute, but not the whole body, of the nobiles. NotesPage=&

atisfactory Claudian connexion. Livia, however, gave him no children. But Julia, his daughter by Scribonia, was consigned i

rius Messalla Barbatus Appianus. 3 These were the closest in blood, but by no means the only near relatives of the Prince

und the Princeps bringing distinction and strength to the new régime, but also feuds and dissensions in the secret oligarch

ghter of a respectable municipal man, a senator of praetorian rank. 2 But Titius secured Paullina, sister of the patrician

ing money to Caesar for a timely loan when the Civil War broke out. 4 But the Triumvirate soon blotted out the memory of Ca

lt on the Palatine, in the house of Hortensius:5 this was the centre, but only a part, of an ever-growing palace. Cicero ha

e of Rome a sum as large as Caesar had, twenty-five denarii a head. 1 But Balbus began as a millionaire in his own right. A

ions to his family, not the blameless possession of inherited wealth, but the spoil of the provinces. 7 His granddaughter,

a princess. It was her habit to appear, not merely at state banquets, but on less exacting occasions, draped in all her pea

erdotal preferment will be conferred, not upon the pious and learned, but for social distinction or for political success.

h fell to M. Antonius when of quaestorian rank: Antonius was a noble. But Antonius required all Caesar’s influence behind h

twenty members. The sons of the slain would be available before long. But they would not suffice. Augustus at once proceede

s of ancient plebeian houses, such as the renegade M. Junius Silanus; but also the new nobility of the Revolution, conspicu

frequent promotion of novi homines to the consulate after A.D. 4.2 But Tiberius was not the only force in high politics;

ers of consular families such as Sempronia and Servilia down to minor but efficient intriguers like that Praecia to whose g

unpretentious, like sombre and dutiful servants of the Roman People, but aloof, majestic and heroic. Livia might seldom

in cultivation of Antonia’s favour was L. Vitellius, a knight’s son, but a power at the court of Caligula and three times

nours in the imperial system, implicit in the Principate of Augustus, but not always clearly discernible in their working.

rice a well ordered state such as Sulla and Caesar might have desired but could never have created. The power of the People

nment now rested in the hands of Senate and magistrates not for that, but for another purpose, the solemn and ostensible re

c might be designated as the government, ‘auctores publici consilii’. But that government had seldom been able to present a

t a united front in a political emergency. Against Catilina, perhaps, but not against Pompeius or Caesar. When it came to m

t title or official powers. In 26 B.C. Taurus was consul, it is true; but the authority of Agrippa, Maecenas and Livia, who

ion and needed none. The precaution may appear excessive. Not in Rome but with the provincial armies lay the real resources

ates. Three military provinces, however, were governed by proconsuls. But they too were drawn from his partisans. For the p

ans. For the present, peace and the Principate were thus safeguarded. But the mere maintenance of order did not fulfil the

the West in 20-19 B.C., when he completed the pacification of Spain. But the constitutional powers and the effective posit

from the Rhine invaded Germany and Tiberius operated in the Balkans. But the central column snapped. Shattered by a winter

nd Maecenas, no longer a power in politics, had a short time to live. But there was a new generation, the two Claudii, to i

d the gap and borne the general’s task in splendour and with success. But now Drusus was dead and Tiberius in exile. The

as more senators reached the consulate, sturdy men without ancestors but commended by loyalty and service, or young aristo

independent of the Princeps, conducted wars under their own auspices. But the Senate lost the other two armies. In 12 B.C.

Book=>395 To the Senate he had restored no military territories, but only, from time to time, certain peaceful regions

ght be his by the working of the lot after an interval of five years. But favour could secure curtailment of legal prescrip

oose ‘viri militares’ as his legates. Piso was not himself a soldier, but he took to Macedonia competent legates; and Cicer

ship, the senator might command a legion this post was no innovation, but the stabilization of a practice common enough in

t in A.D. 22 (ILS 940, cf. Tacitus, Ann. 3, 74). PageBook=>397 But even so, in the fully developed system of the Pri

of admirals had also been created. After Actium, no place for them. 1 But the lesson was not lost. Augustus perpetuated the

mportant provinces, one after another. These were among the greatest, but they were not exceptional. Vinicius is a close pa

t of the time with the provinces of Macedonia and Achaia as well. 3 But Poppaeus belongs rather to the reign of Tiberius,

evements of his rule should be glorified at the expense of their real but subordinate authors. Many important military oper

rn lands (17-13 B.C.). That was one solution of the political danger. But Agrippa departed in 13 B.C. M. Titius, who posses

1 his successor was the trusty and competent C. Sentius Saturninus. 2 But Syria, though more prominent in historical record

). There might be room for another legate between Titius and Sentius, but there is no point in inserting one. 3 Dio 54, 2

e augur), cos. I B.C., proconsul of Asia (ILS 8814). 8 No evidence: but there would be room for him in the period 4–1 B.C

an who was legate of Augustus in a province the name of which is lost but which earned him ornamenta triumphalia for a succ

n, of Syria. This would fit Piso and his Bellum Thracicum quite well; but Quirinius is still not absolutely excluded (below

ong with Caecina Severus, the legate of Moesia, in a great battle all but disastrous for Rome, and remained for two years a

), 113 ff. Certainty cannot be attained, or even precision in detail. But this dating will fit the military situation and t

not the only names that mattered in the critical period in question, but they are enough to illuminate the varied composit

us the New State endured, well equipped with ministers of government. But it was not in the provinces only that the princip

onate care for aqueducts did not lapse with his memorable aedileship, but was sustained till his death, with the help of a

lt with roads (20 B.C.); 2 it was composed, however, not of consulars but of praetorians. At a later date a definite body a

s, arousing the distrust of the Princeps; 5 not always without cause. But careful supervision at first and then the aboliti

governor now received a salary in money. 5 Politics can be controlled but not abolished, ambition curbed but not crushed. T

oney. 5 Politics can be controlled but not abolished, ambition curbed but not crushed. The strife for wealth and powrer wen

but not crushed. The strife for wealth and powrer went on, concealed, but all the more intense and bitter, in the heart of

Like the individual senator, the Senate as a body preserves dignitas but loses power as the Princeps encroaches everywhere

with respect for forms preserved ; 3 and he conveys requests, modest but firm, to the governors of provinces. 4 Yet not

gustus had frequent resort to the People for the passing of his laws. But the practice of comitial legislation soon decays:

in A.D. 6. Proconsuls nominated, not only in A.D. 6 (Dio 55, 28, 2), but much earlier, for example P. Paquius Scaeva again

ί т ν Κρηтικ ν καì Κυρηναϊκ ν παρχήαν καθ- ξοντ∈ςκτλ. 5 In 19 B.C., but only for a few years, after which Augustus establ

abinet government has set in. The Senate was no longer a sovran body, but an organ that advertised or confirmed the decisio

ank and the tenure of high office were no longer an end in themselves but the qualification for a career in the service of

ced as to encroach seriously upon the functions of the full Senate. 2 But this was not a permanent change; and the committe

cilitated the conduct of public business or the dispensing of justice but they did not debate and determine the paramount q

ors to the Princeps or any constitutional organ. There was no cabinet but a series of cabinets, the choice of members varyi

freedmen did not hold the procuratorships of the imperial provinces. But it was a freedman called Licinus who assessed and

there for a long time. 8 Senators might preside over the treasury, but the Senate had no control of financial policy, no

ve no known history among the equestrian councillors of the Princeps, but any Prefect of Egypt could furnish information ab

nding committee enabled the Princeps to keep in touch with the Senate but who decided the business to be brought before tha

er a suitable rehearsal. The assembly of the People might declare war but the People did not decide against whom; the wars,

s they might be, were not always dignified with that name and status, but were conveniently regarded as the suppression of

It was not intended that there should be foreign wars in the East. But the needs of West and North were urgent, organiza

y Seneca, De clem. 1, 9 (apparently indicating the period 16–13 B.C., but inaccurately). Suetonius and Tacitus know nothing

usurpation. It never forgot, it never entirely concealed, its origin. But the act of usurpation could be consummated in a p

he death of Augustus, the Princeps’ powers lapsed he might designate, but he could not appoint, his heir. When the Principa

son already held sufficient powers to preclude any real opposition. But the problem was to recur again and again. The gar

e provincial armies elevated Vespasian to the purple after civil war. But the proclamation of a new Emperor in default of a

otions to the advancement of the family and the good of the Republic. But was Augustus’ design beneficial to the Roman Peop

s concealed a high ambition; like Agrippa, he would yield to Augustus but not in all things. His pride had been wounded, hi

not in all things. His pride had been wounded, his dignitas impaired. But there was more than that. Not merely spite and di

led the rapid honours and royal inheritance that awaited the princes. But that was all in the situation already. Nobody cou

PageBook=>418 Thus the two orders, which with separate functions but with coalescence of interests not only represente

ate functions but with coalescence of interests not only represented, but were themselves the governing and administrative

inction, it is true. Tiberius became consul at the age of twenty-nine but that was after service in war, as a military trib

generation of nobiles. Privilege and patronage, and admitted as such but not outrageous. To bestow the supreme magistracy

adherents. While Augustus lived, he maintained peace and the dynasty. But Augustus was now aged fifty-seven. The crisis cou

w aged fifty-seven. The crisis could not long be postponed. A loyal but not ingenuous historian exclaims that the whole w

ate, the nobiles now enjoy a brief and last renascence in the strange but not incongruous alliance of monarchy. Augustus ha

rious in the history of the Roman Republic or more recently ennobled. But nobiles, and especially patricians (for the latte

sarum proximi’. 2 Too much, perhaps, to hope for the power themselves but their descendants might have a chance or a portio

2, 114, 5) for M. Aemilius Lepidus, cos. A.D. 6. PageBook=>421 But with Augustus dying before his sons attained thei

r rank. Sex. Appuleius (cos. 29 B.C.), a dim and mysterious figure, but none the less legate of Illyricum in 8 B.C., was

ii perpetuated their old political alliance with the Caesarian cause, but not through the Triumvir. His nephew and enemy, P

ained the distinction due to their family and their mother’s prayers, but not with equal fortune. 1 The elder took to wife

, Claudius, displayed neither grace of form nor intellectual promise. But even he could serve the political ambitions of hi

ur (ILS 921, &c). PageBook=>423 So Livia worked for power. But it is by no means certain that Silvanus was popul

l lived on; and he had something of a party. 1 The Scipiones were all but extinct; 2 but the other great branch of the Corn

he had something of a party. 1 The Scipiones were all but extinct; 2 but the other great branch of the Cornelii, the Lentu

Antonia, the great plebeian family of the Domitii boasted a solitary but strong support, not far below monarchic hope. The

ey could not survive, and even profit from, a revulsion of fortune. 3 But the principal supporters of the Claudian party we

Republic. 5 Cn. Calpurnius Piso (cos. 23 B.C.) had been a Republican but rallied to Augustus; his son, a man of marked and

ed. Taurus was dead, and his son did not live to reach the consulate, but the family was intact and influential. 4 Of the m

epos]’ or ‘a[dnepos]’ of Pompeius Magnus (ILS 976, cf. PIR2, A 1147). But L. Arruntius himself (cos. A.D. 6) may have Pompe

ere to sanction the moral regeneration of Rome. 7 It may be tempting, but it is not necessary, to rehabilitate her entirely

ecessary, to rehabilitate her entirely. Julia may have been immodest, but she was hardly a monster. Granted a sufficient an

been suspected, bearing heavily on the Julii who supplanted her son. But no ancient testimony makes this easy guess and in

spiracy. Whether wanton or merely traduced, Julia was not a nonentity but a great political lady. Her paramours the five no

amours the five nobiles are not innocent triflers or moral reprobates but a formidable faction. Gracchus bears most of the

ically dangerous. Like the early Christian, it was not the ‘flagitia’ but the tornen’ that doomed him. Iullus Antonius may

e found the accomplished Antonius more amiable than her grim husband. But all is uncertain if Augustus struck down Julia an

men had governed Syria the veteran Titius, not heard of since Actium, but probably appointed legate of Syria when Agrippa l

t the East (13 B.C.,) C. Sentius Saturninus and P. Quinctilius Varus. But that was not enough. Gaius was sent out, accompan

ered at the hands of raiding Germans a trifling defeat, soon repaired but magnified beyond all measure by his detractors. 5

inted contrast and vituperation of Lollius, dead twenty years before, but not forgotten. Lollius, he said, was responsibl

k of political influences and powerful advisers that evade detection. But even now, return was conditional on the consent o

restored to his dignitas. 2 No honour, no command in war awaited him, but a dreary and precarious old age, or rather a brie

this emergency Augustus remained true to himself. Tiberius had a son; but Tiberius, though designated to replace Augustus,

oniam atrox fortuna Gaium et Lucium filios mihi eripuit’, &c. 2 But Velleius (2, 103, 4) deserves to be quoted: ‘tum

nst Agrippa Postumus had been more vague, his treatment more merciful but none the less arbitrary and effective. Agrippa is

was relegated after her husband had been put to death, then recalled, but finally exiled when she proved incorrigible in he

hom his mother Antonia called a monster, was not a decorative figure. But Claudius was harmless and tolerated. Not so Agrip

ed. M. Aemilius Lepidus, he said, possessed the capacity for empire but not the ambition, Asinius Gallus the ambition onl

re now dead, decrepit or retired, giving place to another generation, but not their own sons the young men inherited nobili

them of military glory. The deplorable Lollius had a son, it is true, but his only claim to fame or history is the parentag

f the Balkans after their praetorships; 2 they received the consulate but no consular military province. Silius’ two brothe

(cos. 15 B.C.) was connected, it is true, with the family of Caesar; but the bond had not been tightened. Piso was an aris

eral of a war in Africa, a somnolent and lazy person to outward view, but no less trusted by Tiberius than the excellent Pi

assum disserere, plures bellum pavescere, alii cupere. ’2 So Tacitus, but he proceeds at once to demolish that impression.

emove him. That was not from fear of a civil war, as Tacitus reports, but because he could trust these Lentuli. 2 Tacitus

endered and expected. The task might appear too great for any one man but Augustus alone, a syndicate might appear preferab

his own blood. 2 That interpretation was not meant to shield Augustus but to incriminate the new régime. ‘Primum facinus no

taly and the provinces, that was not enough. Peace came, and order; but the State, still sorely ailing, looked to its ‘sa

r that substituted one emperor for another and changed the personnel, but not the character, of government. The same men wh

wars of the Revolution now controlled the destinies of the New State but different ‘mores’ needed to be professed and incu

fine dedi. 1 The Greeks might have their Alexander it was glorious, but it was not Empire. Armies of robust Italian peasa

war and government: tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento. 3 But the possession of an empire was something more th

civil wars were only too well grounded. Actium had averted the menace but for how long? Could Rome maintain empire without

equited privilege with duty to the State. Then individuals were poor, but the State was rich. His immoral and selfish desce

, but the State was rich. His immoral and selfish descendants had all but ruined the Roman People. Conquest, wealth and ali

dation of the young Claudii: fortes creantur fortibus et bonis. 1 But that was not enough, even in the Claudii: the poe

as at once withdrawn in the face of protest and opposition (28 B.C.)2 But reform was in the air. The unpopular task called

rs punished. 3 Legislation concerning the family, that was a novelty, but the spirit was not, for it harmonized both with t

, into a crime. The wife, it is true, had no more rights than before. But the husband, after divorcing, could prosecute bot

an and a senator. 2 Only law and oratory were held to be respectable. But they must not be left to specialists or to mere s

emplate and imitate the ancient ideals, personified in their betters: but it was to be a purified Roman People. At Rome t

mpensated by a virtue singularly lacking in the city states of Greece but inculcated from early days at Rome by the militar

n grave disadvantages. Slaves not only could be emancipated with ease but were emancipated in hordes. The wars of conquest

crumbled, ceremonies and priesthoods lapsed. No peace for the Roman, but the inherited and cumulative curse would propagat

inities of Nile. 2 Phoebus, to be sure, was Greek in name and origin. But Phoebus had long been domiciled in Latium. Thou

onal spirit of Rome was a reaction against Hellas, there was no harm, but every advantage, in invoking the better sort of G

and Hannibal. 5 The ideal of virtue and valour was not Roman only, but Italian, ingrained in the Sabines of old and in E

ine above all the Marsi, ‘genus acre virum’, a tribe small in numbers but renowned for all time in war. In the exaltation o

ofit. 3 Thousands and thousands of veterans had been planted in Italy but may more correctly be regarded as small capitalis

mon were noted for the rich return they secured from their vines. 1 But the advocates of the high ideals of the New State

moralist might rejoice. Let foreign trade decline it brought no good, but only an import of superfluous luxury and alien vi

uli praescriptum et intonsi Catonis auspiciis veterumque norma. 1 But these were not the days of Romulus or of Cato the

Cato himself, of peasant stock and a farmer, was no grower of cereals but a shrewd and wealthy exponent of more remunerativ

negyric stands aloof and alone, with all the power and all the glory. But he did not win power and hold it by his own effor

rchy or the general mandate of his adherents? It was not Rome alone but Italy, perhaps Italy more than Rome, that prevail

w ideas, had discarded without repining the rugged ancestral virtues. But the ancient piety and frugality, respect for the

Augustus was a singularly archaic type. 2 Not indeed without culture but he had not been deeply influenced by the intellec

was capable of dissimulation and hypocrisy, if ever a statesman was. But his devotion to the ancient ideal of the family a

mired the aristocracy, for he was not one of them; he chastened them, but with a loving hand. For the respect due to aristo

an revival need not shrink from the charge of studied antiquarianism. But the religion of the State, like the religion of t

aly; and Italy had been augmented in the north there was a new Italy, but recently a province, populous, patriotic and prou

law. Gades might export dancing-girls or a millionaire like Balbus. But there were many other towns in Spain and Gallia N

nence in Rome, Cn. Domitius Afer, of resplendent talents as an orator but avid and ruthless. 2 The greatness of an imperial

heavy toll to the army. The social status of the recruit often defies but cannot always evade detection: it will seldom hav

talian peasants, still less for members of the Italian bourgeoisie. 2 But they were a tough and military stock. That was wh

t fighting material in Europe was now being exploited for Rome’s wars but not as regular troops. The legionary was more oft

ch expedients the fiction of a national army was gallantly maintained but not without disappointments. The army engaged in

a deadly blow, not merely to the foreign and frontier policy of Rome, but to the patriotic pride of Augustus. In dejection

de of Augustus. In dejection he thought of making an end of his life. But for that disaster he could have borne the loss of

h force of arms: some of his greatest triumphs had been achieved with but little shedding of blood. The Princeps, now a mon

their tastes from above. Political invective was vigorous, ferocious but indiscriminate, save when there was a government

icy or an unequivocal testimony to the restoration of public liberty; but it does not follow that the poets and historians

bitter invective of his Epodes. Age and prosperity abated his ardour but did not impair the sceptical realism of his chara

o demissum nomen lulo. 3 Later it is not the conqueror of the world but the coming inaugurator of the New Age, hic vir, h

ws his mission, sacrificing all emotion to pietas, firm in resolution but sombre and a little weary. The poem is not an all

esolution but sombre and a little weary. The poem is not an allegory; but no contemporary could fail to detect in Aeneas a

, ac totum sub leges mitteret orbem. 2 None would have believed it, but Rome’s salvation issued from a Greek city. The pr

s et moenia ponet. 5 His triumph did not bring personal domination, but the unity of Rome and Italy, reconciliation at la

was patriotic, moral and hortatory. Even antiquarianism had its uses. But history did not need to be antiquarian it could b

founder of Rome ‘deum deo natum, regem parentemque urbis Romanae’. 1 But it would not do to draw too precise a parallel. T

excite the interests of biographers and scholiasts as did the poets. But the opulent city of Patavium certainly had to end

ial reasons for gratitude to Augustus, that fact may have reinforced, but it did not pervert, the sentiments natural to mem

nities of Italia Transpadana and secured them full Roman citizenship. But the men of the North, though alert and progressiv

rs. 2 On the other hand, Bononia was in the clientela of the Antonii. But all these diverse loyalties, as was fitting in a

singing the praises of Italy in a patriotic vein, invokes, not Italy, but the name of Rome: omnia Romanae cedent miracula

Callimachus: he recalls, in spirit and theme, the earlier generation. But even Propertius was not untouched by the patrioti

the conventional excuse of the erotic poet his page may be scabrous, but his life is chaste: vita verecunda est, Musa io

rious mistake to which the poet refers was probably trivial enough. 2 But Augustus was vindictive. He wished to make a demo

dole. On special occasions there were distributions of wine and oil. But he could be firm. PageNotes. 468 1 She was a

ople. 1 He could have added that there were now public baths as well. But complaints were rare. The poor expressed their gr

nceps and confidence in the government. There were less spectacular but more permanent methods of suggestion and propagan

ima Porta, showing the Princeps in his middle years, firm and martial but melancholy and dedicated to duty: Troius Aeneas

tic monument is a reminder, if such be needed, that Dux was disguised but not displaced by Princeps. Augustus was Divi fi

he legions that had deserted the consul Antonius, ‘heavenly legions’. But the orator would have been shocked had he known t

ith victory, the flood of miracles and propaganda was sensibly abated but did not utterly cease. A more enduring instrument

was slowly being forged. Augustus strove to revive the old religion: but not everybody was susceptible to the archaic ritu

es could be suitably celebrated. Worship might not be paid to the man but to the divine power within him, his genius or his

Augustus as a god. The West was different. The Roman towns had altars but not temples, as at Tarraco and at Narbo. There wa

ce in history. In town or country there was poverty and social unrest but Rome could not be held directly responsible for t

matians invoked in palliation the rapacity of Roman fiscal methods; 3 but the Dalmatians and Pannonians, incompletely conqu

ouse of Pompeius. He had made an ill requital. The Pompeii were dead, but Titius lived on, in wealth and power. The town of

atron. 6 Now Titius usurped that position. 7 Auximum could do nothing but the Roman plebs remembered. When Titius presided

For the sake of peace, the Principate had to be. That was admitted. But was Augustus the ideal Princeps? 3 PageNotes. 4

his is the argument in Tacitus, Ann. 1, 10 not against the Principate but against the Princeps. PageBook=>480 That m

e as his effigies show him forth. 1 His limbs were well proportioned, but his stature was short, a defect which he sought t

tor, clemency became a commodity widely advertised by his successors, but by no means widely distributed. Augustus alleged

necessary to say much about that. Less advertised by the government, but no less distasteful to the nobiles, were the dome

arm. Tiberius was alarmed at the frequency of libellous publications, but Augustus reassured him, pointing to the real impo

ius to Octavianus, the statement is not as daring as it might appear, but is rather a subtle compliment. It was Messalla wh

s, Labeo stood his ground and carried his point Lepidus was included, but enrolled last on the list of the consulars. 5 Lab

e major scandals, it is true., did not always come before the courts; but politics are probably at the bottom of a number o

r in the revolutionary wars. Messalla praised Brutus and Cassius; 1 but he reprehended Antonius in justification of his o

ression against noxious literature. 5 Public bonfires were instituted but not for such trifles as the Ars amatoria of Ovid.

at did not matter, said Cassius Severus, who had them all by heart. 7 But Cassius did not go unscathed. This man, an able a

for all time the character and capacity of Paullus Fabius Maximus. 2 But Cassius was vulnerable and widely hated. Augustus

domination from being stamped as the open enemy of freedom and truth. But not for long. Coerced through official repression

cayed and perished. ‘Magna illa ingenia cessere. ’7 Not history only, but poetry and eloquence also, now that Libertas was

eBook=>488 It was impossible to tell the truth about the living, but hate might have its revenge upon the dead. Hence

, but hate might have its revenge upon the dead. Hence the contrasted but complementary vices inherent in imperial Roman hi

t. Lollius is a monster of rapacity and intrigue, Varus mild-mannered but corrupt and incompetent. The campaigns of Quirini

is names and examples from the descendants of the Republican nobility but not the living. Few of them, indeed, survived in

ustus. They were preserved, pampered and subsidized by the New State; but they were the survivors of a catastrophe, doomed

, had perished. Not a mere faction of the nobility had been defeated, but a whole class. The contest had been not merely po

efeated, but a whole class. The contest had been not merely political but social. Sulla, Pompeius and Caesar were all more

s did Servilia work for her family, capturing the Aemilian connexion. But alliances begot feuds, and the nobiles were invol

nelii, the Lentuli, who had also decided for Pompeius against Caesar, but were more fortunate in duration. 1 The plebeian C

peius. Their main line lapsed with Marcellus, the nephew of Augustus, but the name supplied one collateral consul then, M.

s, prevailed over Pompeius and the dominant faction of the nobilitas. But the Julii left no direct heir, and the grandnephe

ot to the brilliant and ambitious branch of the Claudii, the Pulchri, but to the more modest Nerones. For Tiberius the sp

ke a Roman noble, the Claudian had aspired to primacy among his peers but not at the cost of personal humiliation, through

Domitii Ahenobarbi perpetuated a direct succession in the male line, but with diverse fortune. The Aemilii had been perilo

e power in the end. Inheriting from his father not only great estates but boundless popularity with the plebs of Rome, L. D

leadership in his party. To the Domitii, primacy might be delayed, but not denied for ever. The complex marriage policy

ons of the Julii and Claudii. Livia had given her husband no children but the Claudii ruled. And in the end, by posthumous

omitii Ahenobarbi, eight consuls before him in eight generations. 1 But Nero was not the last survivor of the blood of Au

ient plebeian houses, were the first to go. 1 The line of the obscure but newly ennobled Appuleii was extinguished with the

us and Pompeius, were still prominent in the first days of the Empire but their direct line did not survive the dynasty of

o, adopted by a Crassus, married a Scribonia descended from Pompeius, but also with the Julio- Claudians in the various tie

of conspiracy against both Nerva and Trajan. 8 He was duly relegated, but not executed until the beginning of the reign of

theirs could hope to receive the consulate from the Caesarian leader. But the Caesarians themselves seem to fare little bet

s. 37 B.C.), and M. Herennius (cos. 34 B.C.) each had a consular son, but no further descendants. 4 Seneca, De clem. 1, 1

however, appeared to have established their families securely enough. But good fortune seldom accompanied their descendants

essallina. 5 The second and third wives of Nero bore the now historic but by no means antique names of Poppaea Sabina and S

cina was prolific. 1 P. Silius Nerva had three sons, all consulars. 2 But his three grandsons, two consuls and a consul-des

io was survived by only one son, Gallus, who came to a miserable end. But Gallus propagated the Asinii with six sons, of wh

virs. The man from Gades, consul in 40 B.C., is a portent, it is true but a portent of the future power of Spaniards and Na

1354). 3 That Pompeia Plotina came from Nemausus is made probable, but not proved, by SHA Hadr. 12, 2. A slight confirma

and Paullus Fabius Maximus govern the military provinces, it is true. But a rational distrust persists, confirmed under his

ents, and leads to the complete exclusion of the nobiles, the delayed but logical end of Revolution and Empire. Noble bir

ginius Rufus from Mediolanium, like them the son of a Roman knight. 2 But for this defect of birth, Verginius Rufus might h

façade of a man, in no way answering to his name or his reputation. 4 But the prediction made long ago came true fear, foll

spicious. Though the murderous tyranny of the Julio-Claudians has all but exhausted the Republican and the Augustan nobilit

Quies preserved the house of the Cocceii through many generations; 3 but it could not ultimately protect the grandson of A

erful upstart, Gallus, Lollius or Seianus, went crashing to his fall. But they seldom got away unscathed from such spectacl

e Empire’s invasion of the Roman government, they seize supreme power but do not hold it for long. Africa and the eastern l

furnish the most patent evidence of the intrusion of alien elements; but they indicate the climax rather than the origins

ical or financial agents of the government, not merely under Augustus but even with Pompeius and Caesar. Once again, Balb

lready out of the way when Octavianus took up arms against the State. But Cato was worshipped as a martyr of liberty. Augus

worst. Political liberty had to go, for the sake of the Commonwealth. But when independence of spirit and of language peris

ustius and Pollio, the senator Tacitus, who admired Republican virtue but believed in ordered government, wrote a history o

Tacitus, in a sense his successor, was not a Roman aristocrat either, but a new man, presumably of provincial extraction, l

gesta populi Romani’; 1 and Cato wrote of Italy as well as of Rome. 2 But Cato was powerless against Roman tradition. The b

ties of their rule. The halo of their resplendent fortune may dazzle, but it cannot blind, the critical eye. Otherwise ther

Otherwise there can be no history of these times deserving the name, but only adulation and a pragmatic justification of s

s portraits of novi homines. The nobiles were comparatively immune. But for that, the aristocratic partisans of Augustus

e, under pretext of public service and distinction in oratory or law, but more and more for the sole reason of birth. 1 T

the monarchy. By the end of Augustus’ reign, however, there remained but little of the Catonian faction or of the four nob

houses that supported Pompeius. The patrician Lentuli were numerous, but by no means talented in proportion. The fact that

er. Galba and his ugly hunchback father could display no real talent, but owed advancement to snobbery and to the favour of

h have failed to notice that Persicus was not only notorious for vice but was even the type of the degenerate nobilis (Sene

in his writings Pollio professed an unswerving devotion to Libertas. But Libertas was destroyed when Virtus was shattered

r, the Commonwealth was no longer to be a playground for politicians, but in truth a res publica. Selfish ambition and pers

was over. The Republic was something that a prudent man might admire but not imitate: as a wicked opportunist once observe

f the governing class, the conviction not merely of the inevitability but also of the benefits of the system must have beco

us, the son of a centurion, may have been sincere in his principles:3 but the Roman knight who filled his house with the st

with melancholy and complain that his own theme was dull and narrow. But the historian who had experienced one civil war i

path, produced vigorous oratory. 7 There were the Gracchi and Cicero but was it worth it? 8 NotesPage=>515 1 Sallus

ns had not sunk as low as that. Complete freedom might be unworkable, but complete enslavement was intolerable. The Princip

ture of man ’vitia erunt donee homines’ it was folly to be utopian. 4 But the situation was not hopeless. A good emperor wo

ple and quietly practised the higher patriotism. It was not glorious: but glory was ruinous. A surer fame was theirs than t

martyrdom, who might be admired for Republican independence of spirit but not for political wisdom. 3 Neither Tacitus nor T

d, or at least sterilized. As a result, history and oratory suffered, but order and concord were safeguarded. As Sallustius

ublica’. The last of the dynasts prevailed in violence and bloodshed. But his potentia was transmuted into auctoritas, and

bonus’. Ovid perhaps went too far when he spoke of ‘dux sacratus’. 3 But Dux was not enough. Augustus assumed the irreproa

principes and better than all of them. They had been selfish dynasts, but he was ‘salubris princeps’. He might easily have

The loyal town-council of the colony of Pisa showed more restraint, but meant the same thing, when they celebrated the ‘G

power of Caesar Augustus was absolute, no contemporary could doubt. But his rule was justified by merit, founded upon con

, for saving Rome in his consulate, had been hailed as pater patriae. But Sulla, with well-grounded hate, was styled ‘the s

to himself all the functions of Senate, magistrates and laws. 7 Truly but more penetrating the remark that he entwined hims

y would have survived, led by Agrippa, or by a group of the marshals. But Augustus lived on, a progressive miracle of durat

l. The rewards were not so splendid as in the wars of the Revolution; but the rhythm, though abated, was steady and continu

. The doom of Empire had borne heavily on Rome, with threatened ruin. But now the reinvigorated Roman People, robust and ch

His dearest hopes, his most pertinacious designs, had been thwarted. But peace and the Principate endured. A successor had

ictims of his public or private treacheries are not mentioned by name but are consigned to contemptuous oblivion. Antonius

ry of Caesar’s heir and avenger alone. 1 Agrippa indeed occurs twice, but much more as a date than as an agent. Other allie

isterial; and he excels any colleague he might have, not in potestas, but only in auctoritas. 3 Which is true as far as it

not with reference to the religions and kings of the Hellenistic East but from Rome and Roman practice, as a combination be

eipzig, 1898. OLTRAMARE, A. ‘La réaction cicéronienne et les dé buts du principat’, Rev. ét. lat. x (1932), 58 ff.