paperback 1960 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or tran

quiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University

rence of power and of property; and the Principate of Augustus should be regarded as the consolidation of the revolutionar

ublic and the Empire: it is something real and tangible, whatever may be the name or theory of the constitution. To that

ous political leaders enter into their own at last. The method has to be selective: exhaustive detail cannot be provided a

own at last. The method has to be selective: exhaustive detail cannot be provided about every family or individual. Even s

and Antonius by contrast are treated rather leniently, the reason may be discovered in the character and opinions of the h

d about Cicero and about Livy. Yet, in the end, the Principate has to be accepted, for the Principate, while abolishing po

e, the books and papers mentioned in the footnotes. It will at once be evident how much the conception of the nature of

phical studies of Münzer, Groag and Stein. Especial mention must also be made of Tarn’s writings about Antonius and Cleopa

een deduced from family, nomenclature, or rank; and most of them will be unfamiliar to any but a hardened prosopographer.

d flagrant. It has not been composed in tranquillity; and it ought to be held back for several years and rewritten. But th

gustus is regarded as the foundation of the Roman Empire. The era may be variously computed, from the winning of sole powe

by a revolutionary leader. The happy outcome of the Principate might be held to justify, or at least to palliate, the hor

re-eminent, in virtue of prestige and authority tremendous and not to be defined. Auctoritas is the word his enemies would

y power. For that reason ‘Dux’ became ‘Princeps’. He did not cease to be Imperator Caesar. There is no breach in continu

ty. Twenty years of crowded history, Caesarian and Triumviral, cannot be annulled. When the individuals and classes that h

f the Republic’ in 28 and 27 B.c. Gibbon’s remarks (c. iii, init) may be read with profit. 2 The Triumviral period is ta

f his earlier career is a question vain and irrelevant, cheerfully to be abandoned to the moralist or the casuist. The pre

d and proscribed his ally. The reason for such exceptional favour may be largely assigned to one thing the influence of li

Yet for all that, the history of the whole revolutionary period could be written NotesPage=>004 1 Plutarch, Antoniu

dent enough: their affinity goes much deeper than words. Nor would it be rash to assert that Pollio was closely akin both

de of the death of Augustus. His character and tastes disposed him to be neutral in the struggle between Caesar and Pompei

NotesPage=>005 1 As Pollio has perished, Tacitus and Sallust can be drawn upon for compensation. For example, the fra

as that bitter theme demanded, in a plain, hard style. It is much to be regretted that he did not carry his History of th

down at Philippi. That Pollio chose to write no further will readily be understood. As it was, his path was hazardous. Th

tion of Augustus: his ability and greatness will all the more sharply be revealed by unfriendly presentation. But it is

his partisans. In all ages, whatever the form and name of government, be it monarchy, republic, or democracy, an oligarchy

class. The marshals, diplomats, and financiers of the Revolution may be discerned again in the Republic of Augustus as th

t garb. They are the government of the New State. It will therefore be expedient and salutary to investigate, not merely

rative of events. Nor is it only the biography of Augustus that shall be sacrificed for the gain of history. Pompeius, too

be sacrificed for the gain of history. Pompeius, too, and Caesar must be reduced to due subordination. After Sulla’s ordin

rd. 6 During the Civil Wars every party and every leader professed to be defending the cause of liberty and of peace. Thos

ough auctoritas; and the name of principes civitatis came suitably to be applied to the more prominent of the consulars. 2

efinition (Die Nobilität, 21 ff.) is here accepted. ‘Nobilis’ may not be quite a technical term, but its connotation is pr

ageBook=>011 hundred senators the names of some four hundred can be identified, many of them obscure or casually know

intruders. No need for that the conservative Roman voter could seldom be induced to elect a man whose name had not been kn

e provinces. Crassus was in the habit of observing that nobody should be called rich who was not able to maintain an army

nobilis, however, would take pride in his feuds. 1 Yet he had ever to be on the alert, jealous to guard his dignitas, that

d therefore arrest revolution or even reform, for these men could not be expected to have a personal interest in redistrib

(Cicero, De legibus 3, 30). PageBook=>015 of their enmity will be reckoned Lucullus, Catilina and Gabinius. It wa

ice and corruption, obscurantism and oppression. The knights must not be left out of the indictment. Among the old nobilit

eation of extraordinary commands in the provinces. The general had to be a politician, for his legionaries were a host of

programme: there was no Ciceronian party. The Roman politician had to be the leader of a faction. Cicero fell short of tha

e specious and venerable authority of the Senate. 1 But there were to be found in their ranks a few sincere reformers, ene

ruption, liberal in outlook and policy. Moreover, the tribunate could be employed for conservative ends by aristocratic de

5 Second and more important by far is that enigmatic faction soon to be led by a man who never became consul. Its origins

rocal interest. They called themselves Optimates: they might properly be described, in contemporary definition, as a facti

lapsed since Sulla’s death, the predominance of the Metelli seemed to be passing. Leadership might therefore fall to that

zer, RA, 336 ff. PageBook=>024 prime. 1 But Servilia would not be thwarted by that accident. She cast about for oth

tician, the authentic Cato, so far from being a visionary, claimed to be a realist of traditional Roman temper and tenacit

wounds of feud and faction. Neither Aemilii nor Claudii were quite to be trusted. The elusive Crassus, who had supported C

nd in the war against Mithridates. 5 Among other Picene partisans may be reckoned T. Labienus, and perhaps A. Gabinius. 6

s known. But his wife Lollia (Suetonius, Divus Julius 50, 1) may well be a daughter of Palicanus, whose candidature he sup

s, inaugurated his tribunate with alarming proposals: Pompeius should be elected consul in absence or recalled to Italy to

n feared a civil war. When Pompeius asked that the consular elections be postponed to permit the candidature of his legate

, asked for a triumph. Cato blocked the triumph. To wait for it would be to sacrifice the consulate. Caesar made a rapid d

be to sacrifice the consulate. Caesar made a rapid decision he would be consul, and to some purpose. The Roman noble, con

t of ambition to adopt the language and tactics of a demagogue, might be captured by the government at a certain stage in

rvices of a number of tribunes; further, less obtrusive and barely to be perceived through the tumultuous clamour of polit

mutuo metu tenebantur. ’ PageBook=>036 constitution may fairly be designated as the end of the Free State. From a t

ted Italy, for five years. Pompeius’ purpose was flagrant there could be no pretext of public emergency, as for the easter

her, one of the consuls of 57 (Caesar, BC 1, 22, 4), and plausibly to be inferred for his colleague Nepos: Nepos got the p

n and Syria respectively for five years; Caesar’s command was also to be prolonged. Pompeius emerged with renewed streng

ction of their successors for money. 2 Pompeius caused the scandal to be shown up. Then his cousin C. Lucilius Hirrus anno

ow, p. 45. (??) 1 Ad Att. 4, 15, 7, &c. PageBook=>039 he be made dictator. 1 Pompeius, openly disavowing, kep

eamed out of the city to the villa of Pompeius, clamouring for him to be consul or dictator. 3 The Senate was compelled

passed to check flagrant abuses. One law, prescribing that provinces be granted, not at once and automatically after prae

ssion to the needs of the Commonwealth. 1 The coalition may summarily be described as four ancient and eminent families, l

ook=>044 Pompeius and alliance with the Lentuli may not unfairly be surmised. 1 The patrician Cornelii Lentuli were

peius, weakened by the loss of his ally and of popular support, would be in their power at last, amenable to guidance or t

support, would be in their power at last, amenable to guidance or to be discarded if recalcitrant. NotesPage=>044

distrustful of Pompeius, took no active part and should more honestly be termed neutrals (P-W 111, 2762; IV A, 853 f.). Ru

e design to achieve it by armed force. 1 Such a view is too simple to be historical. Caesar strove to avert any resort t

onsul’s proposals as conveyed to the Senate were moderate and may not be dismissed as mere manoeuvres for position or for

ing over to their side the power and prestige of Pompeius. They would be able to deal with Pompeius later. It might not co

on. But Caesar refused to join the long roll of Pompeius’ victims, to be superseded like Lucullus, to be discarded and dis

he long roll of Pompeius’ victims, to be superseded like Lucullus, to be discarded and disgraced as had been Gabinius, the

as the end. Returning to Rome a private citizen, Caesar would at once be prosecuted by his enemies for extortion or treaso

n of the Free State. That was the nemesis of ambition and glory, to be thwarted in the end. After such wreckage, the tas

and patriotic co-operation of the governing class, the attempt would be all in vain, the mere creation of arbitrary power

these proud adversaries did not always leap forward with alacrity to be exhibited as object- lessons of the clementia and

d it with such dexterity in the past and who more recently claimed to be asserting the rights of the tribunes, the liberty

ars, an ominous sign. A gleam of hope that the emergency period would be quite short flickered up for a moment, to wane at

time decrees of the Senate ordained that an oath of allegiance should be taken in his name. 2 Was this the measure of his

drastic reduction of debts and a programme of revolution that should be radical and genuine. 3 Only the usurers approved

to senators. 3 If the Sallustian Epistulae ad Caesarem senem could be taken as genuine, or even contemporary, they woul

ut the Roman Commonwealth some years earlier, he may have expected to be consulted upon these weighty matters. But Cicero’

eeds of the Roman People. About Caesar’s ultimate designs there can be opinion, but no certainty. The acts and projects

ll the same tale and point the same moral. 1 Yet speculation cannot be debarred from playing round the high and momentou

he pattern of the monarchies of the Hellenistic East. Thus may Caesar be represented as the heir in all things of Alexande

ff. Phil. 2, 110, however, is a difficult passage. Yet it can hardly be proved that Caesar devised a comprehensive policy

ifferent person, Caesar the Dictator. The rule of Caesar could well be branded as monarchy on a partisan or conventional

he road to power, beginning as a military demagogue. If Caesar must be judged, it is by facts and not by alleged intenti

or laid the foundation of a consistent government. Whatever it might be , it would owe more to the needs of the moment tha

rried out the assassination of the Dictator. That his removal would be no remedy but a source of greater ills to the Com

ate, intense and repressed. 1 Nor was his political conduct wholly to be predicted. Brutus might well have been a Caesaria

order. Liberty and the laws are high-sounding words. They will often be rendered, on a cool estimate, as privilege and ve

of the traditional governing class. Caesar’s autocracy appeared to be much more than a temporary expedient to liquidate

oman State. It was going to last and the Roman aristocracy was not to be permitted to govern and exploit the Empire in its

es of his allies and emancipates himself from control, he may have to be dropped or suppressed. The reformer Ti. Gracchus

ality was repugnant to a noble and a man of spirit: but kinship might be invoked in excuse. Hence one of the Marcelli, the

e son of the orator, joined Caesar (Ad Att. 10, 4, 6). It will hardly be necessary to quote the evidence for Catullus’ att

lus’ attacks upon Caesar, Vatinius, Mamurra and Labienus the last may be the ‘Mentula’ of certain poems; cf. T. Frank, AJP

he presence of members of the same noble house on opposing sides will be explained not always by domestic discord and yout

the family, whatever the event. The bond of personal allegiance may be compared to that of the family. It was often stro

But not all were now Pompeians P. Sulpicius Rufus, a kinsman, it may be presumed, of that eloquent and high-minded tribun

his personal ambition. Like his father before him, Pompeius could not be described as a consistent party politician, for g

class does not show a conspicuously high proportion. 5 Whatever might be their origin or affiliation, the generals of the

for the consulate. 7 Other Pompeians and other men from Picenum might be captured by the arts, the gold NotesPage=>06

Hist. 2, 94 M), and Ser. Sulpicius Galba, whose parent may plausibly be discovered in the consilium at Asculum (ILS 8888)

eared for a time by contemporaries and often believed by posterity to be a revolutionary has led to undue emphasis on the

fettered by caste or principle. Either monarchy or democracy could be made to serve their ends, to enhance person and f

r representatives of his class, excellent men. Many knights were to be found in the following of a proconsul, in a varie

anhood some said that he served as a common soldier Ventidius rose to be an army contractor and attached himself to Caesar

d the man of Gades. Cicero also spoke. Envious detractors there might be but Balbus, the friend of such eminent citizens,

rived from L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus, above, p. 44, n. 4. 3 It may be presumed that he had a hand in the pact of 60 B.C

with some accuracy and face the future with equanimity. It is much to be regretted that his letters to apprehensive client

. Many of the bankers were already personal friends of Caesar: it may be presumed that he gave them guarantees against rev

Excellent men from the colonies and municipia of the Cisalpina might be found among the officers and friends of Pompeius;

Gaul beyond the Alps, the provincia (or Narbonensis as it was soon to be called), there was a chieftain of the Vocontii wh

., p. 164 H). His father was called Cn. Cornelius (ILS 8995), and may be a Gallic notable who got the citizenship from a C

partisans, from senators down to soldiers and freedmen? There were to be no proscriptions. But Caesar acquired the right t

were a ghastly and disgusting rabble: among the new senators were to be found centurions and soldiers, scribes and sons o

ce of expulsion by implacable censors; the scribe likewise might well be in possession of the census of a Roman knight. Ca

he legions, with no interval of time or status. An ex-centurion could be a knight, and therefore juryman, officer or man o

tic and humble in origin. The centurionate was worth having: it could be got through patronage as well as service. 3 Not

ipia of this region, virile, prosperous and reputed, might with truth be extolled as the flower of Italy, the pride and bu

senatorial rank, if not Virgil’s as well. Among Caesar’s nominees may be reckoned the Hostilii from Cremona and the poet H

B.C.4 Gallia Narbonensis can assert a peculiar and proper claim to be the home of trousered senators. No names are reco

ignitatis. ’ 4 Three brothers, L., C. and P. Hostilius Saserna, can be distinguished, of whom the first at least was a s

12 ff.). If the scholiast Porphyrio (on Horace, Sat. 1, 3, 130) could be trusted, P. Alfenus Varus (cos. suff. 39) came fr

e wars, either as a centurion or as an equestrian officer. 1 Saxa may be described as an immigrant or colonial Roman. Balb

wn to wild beasts (Ad fam. 10, 32, 3). Another senator from Spain may be Titius, Bell. Afr. 28, 2, cf. Münzer, P- W VI A,

ble Roman knights, men of property and substance, never too warmly to be commended as champions of the established order.

f. Ad Att. 1, 1, 2) and T. Aufidius, once a publicanus, but rising to be governor of Asia (Val. Max. 6, 9, 7; Cicero, Pro

of cavalry, they had acquired varied and valuable experience, now to be employed when they governed provinces and led arm

the policy of his city or influence a whole region of Italy3 he might be able, like the Roman noble, to levy a private arm

observance. 6 Of certain local dynastic families it could in truth be proved as well as stated that they had always bee

Rome, the patricians were ready to enlist allies wherever they might be found. They spread their influence among the loca

onged to the settlement on the Quirinal, Livy 5, 46, 1 ff. 3 As may be inferred from Val. Max. 2, 4, 5. On gentile cults

ate to the backing of the Scipiones. The influence of the Claudii can be discerned in the elevation of M. Perperna (cos. 1

ncestor (Festus, p. 38 L). 4 The consul L. Junius Brutus can hardly be accepted as historical, cf. now P-W, Supp. v, 356

y was very different. 2 The recent war of Italy against Rome must not be forgotten. When Caesar invaded Italy he could rec

of the faction of Marius, an important (and neglected) topic, cannot be discussed here. 2 The unification of Italy is o

Italy and kept alive the memory of defeat and suffering. There could be no reconciliation until a long time had elapsed.

ancestors. 3 He desired that the sentiment and voice of Italy should be heard at Rome but it was the Italy of the post-Su

he post-Sullan order, and the representation, though indirect, was to be adequate and of the best, namely his own person.

adequate and of the best, namely his own person. Italy was held to be firm for conservative interests. No doubt: the pr

mpeius as its patron:2 but the men of Auximum protested that it would be intolerable to refuse admittance to the proconsul

Civil War, though no previous affiliations or service in his army can be detected. Others, failing contradictory record, m

n his army can be detected. Others, failing contradictory record, may be presumed to owe their status to him, for example

sar has a mixed following, some stripped from Pompeius, others not to be closely defined: an origin from the towns of Pice

rs not to be closely defined: an origin from the towns of Picenum can be surmised for certain of Caesar’s partisans, wheth

in effects. That he was aware of the need to unify Italy will perhaps be inferred from his municipal legislation. 6 Whoeve

pal legislation. 6 Whoever succeeded to power after a civil war would be confronted with the task of creating a NotesPag

powerful enemies to whom Pollio makes reference in his letter cannot be identified. 2 T. Herennius (Eutropius 5, 3, 2),

5 Perhaps for Gabinius (above, p. 31). L. Nonius Asprenas may well be Picene, cf‘L. Nonius T.f. Vel. ’in the consilium

after the Bellum Italicum and the enfranchisement of Italy, could not be confined to Rome, but must embrace all Italy. T

s. The advance of alien stocks in the governing hierarchy of Rome can be discovered from nomenclature. 1 The earliest acce

discovered from nomenclature. 1 The earliest accessions may sometimes be detected in the alien roots of their names, to wh

on whom below, p. 199. PageBook=>094 obscure men. 1 That might be expected: it is the earliest consuls that convey

Sex. Teidius (Asconius 28 p. 32 Clark, cf. Plutarch, Pompeius 64) may be mentioned. 2 C. Flavius Fimbria, a novus homo (

; 2 and Caesar probably intended that M. Brutus and C. Cassius should be consuls in 41 B.C.3 But before these dispositions

ifying end, Appian, BC 3, 98, 409. 7 On Cimber (whose origin cannot be discovered), cf. P-W, VI A, 1038 ff.; on Treboniu

hen the tyrant fell and the constitution was restored, would Antonius be strong enough to hold party and government togeth

next day likewise fell flat. The mob was apathetic or hostile, not to be moved by the logical, earnest and austere oratory

y Münzer (P- W, Supp. v, 375 f.), is certainly attractive. A case can be made out for March 21st or 22nd, cf. S. Accame, R

and strength (Phil. 2, 91). Even if the letter Ad fam. 11, I were to be dated immediately after the funeral (see the prec

their houses. Nor, as the days passed, did it become safe for them to be seen in public. The mob set up an altar and a pil

tion alone, was the end and justification of their enterprise, not to be altered by wisdom after the event and the vain re

xt or desire for a reign of terror. Brutus had insisted that Antonius be spared. 4 Had the faction of Brutus and Cassius f

act, antiquarian and even Hellenic. But Rome was not a Greek city, to be mastered from its citadel. The facts and elements

nce of the Senate were requisite. Of the consuls, Antonius was not to be had, Dolabella an uncertain factor. The consuls d

confidence. The majority was for order and security. They were not to be blamed. Of consulars, the casualties in the Civil

a lack of experience, ability and leadership in the Senate, sorely to be felt in the course of the next eighteen months. A

ty to the established order. His past career showed that he could not be depended on for action or for statesmanship; and

initiated him into their designs. The public support of Cicero would be of inestimable value after a revolution had succe

hey too had a share of power and glory. Discontent, it is true, could be detected among the populace of Rome NotesPage=&

generous but not carrying full conviction. 1 Nor were the veterans to be won merely by material advantage. They became tru

mpathy for the Republican cause defies any close estimate: it may not be measured by optimistic and partisan proclamations

e of the irregular cult of Caesar at Rome: it was hoped that he might be induced to support the Liberators. 1 Further, att

as apprised. When he requested that the bands of Republican partisans be dissolved, Brutus agreed. 4 Demonstrations of s

d he later made a grant to Servilia. Rome and Italy, if lost, could be recovered in the provinces, as Pompeius knew and

ernkopf (ib. XLVII (1912), 321 ff.). The views of Sternkopf will here be accepted for the most part. PageBook=>103

ecimus Brutus set out for Cisalpine Gaul; about the same time, it may be presumed, Trebonius went to Asia, Cimber to Bithy

ll was not lost. The Dictator was dead, regretted by many, but not to be avenged; an assertion of liberty had been answere

and political strife so firmly imposed by the Dictatorship might even be prolonged. It all turned upon the Caesarian consu

r a province in 44, and Antonius, elected consul for that year, would be left in charge of the government when Caesar depa

to the moral and patriotic propaganda of his rival. Most of that will be coolly discounted. From the influence of Cicero i

a, did not participate in the African and Spanish campaigns, will not be put down to his cowardice or to Caesar’s distrust

wealth. 1 Though the private conduct of a statesman cannot entirely be divorced from his public policy and performance,

acts and intentions of Antonius in the year of his consulate, it will be necessary to forget both the Philippics and the W

The political advocate and the verdict of conventional history must be constrained to silence for a time. With the sup

his responsibility for the turn which events took at the funeral will be debated: it was certainly in his interest to alar

was never accused of dissimulation: the Caesarian leader was later to be taunted with inconsistency on this point. 2 It wo

later to be taunted with inconsistency on this point. 2 It would not be paradoxical to assert that Antonius felt respect

ain primacy in the Caesarian party. No doubt Antonius desired them to be away from Rome: a temporary absence at least migh

vested interests seemed secure from revolution or from reaction. 5 To be sure, the tyrant was slain, but the tyranny survi

es’ (Ad Att. 14, 10, 2). PageBook=>107 Roman State had much to be thankful for, as partisan testimony was prepared

ed and carried a specious measure the name of the Dictatorship was to be abolished for ever. Thoughtful men reflected that

ished for ever. Thoughtful men reflected that its powers could easily be restored one day under another appellation. At th

ither for surprise nor for excuse. Rumours circulated before long, to be reinforced by monstrous allegations when proof or

tator’s war-chest, intended for the Balkan and eastern wars, it might be doubted whether much was still at Rome for Antoni

ct. Certain of his acts that lend colour to the charge of tyranny may be defended by the wide discretionary powers which t

, by his enemies in a manner which on any theory of legality can only be branded as high treason. So far the plea for An

ome’s most important vassal in Asia, worth conciliating and hardly to be prevented at this juncture. 3 Ib. 14, 12, 1. Ca

We are left with slander or romantic biography. PageBook=>109 be a resourceful politician, presenting a double fro

in Rome and sought to pay back old scores. In 42 B.C. D. Brutus would be consul along with the diplomatic and unreliable L

te. For the sake of peace, the predominance of Antonius might have to be admitted by neutrals even by Republicans. As fo

labella, an unscrupulous and ambitious young man, would still have to be watched. To Lepidus Antonius secured the office o

an of Brutus, hence a potential danger. But that province was soon to be stripped of its legions. As for the East, Treboni

ril 21st) and made his way to Campania. The veterans of Caesar had to be attended to, with urgent and just claims not to b

s of Caesar had to be attended to, with urgent and just claims not to be disregarded, as the Liberators themselves were we

ul of Bithynia in 45, took away with him his army of three legions to be used against Bassus, P-W XIV, 1556. Ch. VIII

the new and legal designation of C. Julius Caesar Octavianus. It will be understood that the aspirant to Caesar’s power pr

esar’s power preferred to drop the name that betrayed his origin, and be styled ‘C. Julius Caesar’. Further, the official

f that name, possessing the sanction of literary tradition, will here be maintained, though it is dubious and misleading.

tween youth and middle age. The personality of Octavianus will best be left to emerge from his actions. One thing at lea

ory along with the name of Caesar. Whether his insistence that Caesar be avenged and the murderers punished derives more f

When he learned about the will, he conceived high hopes, refusing to be deterred by letters from his mother and step-fath

ards the assassins, with impunity. The disloyal Caesarian was soon to be brought to book. To maintain power with the popul

The Architect of the Roman Empire 1 (1928), 192 ff. Even if June 1st be not the day of the passing of the law (cf. M. A.

de terms of reference. More patronage: L. Antonius the tribune was to be president of a board of seven commissioners. They

ce in his destiny and with public exploitation. 2 He caused a star to be placed upon the head of statues of Caesar. Henc

may have gone too far. It was known before the event that there would be criticism of the consul at the meeting of the Sen

pected consular L. Calpurnius Piso. The balance in politics seemed to be turning against Antonius: he would have to make a

might surrender his provincial command, that Brutus and Cassius would be able to return to Roman political life. 4 Notes

no evidence: perhaps he suggested that Cisalpine Gaul should cease to be a province at the end of the year and be added to

salpine Gaul should cease to be a province at the end of the year and be added to Italy. That would preclude competition f

is part, had been constrained to an unwelcome decision. In no mood to be thwarted in his ambitions, he still hoped to avoi

been couched in a vein of conciliation; his recent speech was held to be distinctly amicable. 1 To their edict he now made

ch may have been Piso’s proposal (cf. Appian, BC 3, 30, 115). It must be repeated that the only clear account of the speec

y hairs or none remaining. Legitimate primacy, it is true, could only be attained at Rome through many extra-constitutiona

path that Octavianus intended to tread, such resources would have to be doubled and redoubled. Octavianus was resolute.

office. 1 Nothing came of it for the moment: at need, he would always be able to purchase one or other of the ten members

a faction may grow into something like a national party. So it was to be in the end. But this was no time for an ideal and

ience as a subject of academic study, that the arts of government may be learned from books. The revolutionary career of C

would have been very different and very short. Lessons might indeed be learned, but from men and affairs, from predecess

whole career of the Dictator, however, showed the fabulous harvest to be got soon or late from the cultivation of the pleb

nt their support and devotion to his son and heir. Loyalty could only be won by loyalty in return. Caesar never let down a

t hopeless on the other side, certain moderates and Republicans might be lured and captured by the genial idea of employin

September 1st Antonius proposed that a day in honour of Caesar should be added to the solemn thanksgivings paid by the Rom

Octavianus. In pursuance of his Caesarian policy, Antonius caused to be set up in the Forum a statue of Caesar with the i

summoned D. Brutus to yield up his command. The threat of force would be necessary. Antonius set out for Brundisium on Oct

senior statesmen. In vain his backers were timid or absent. He had to be content with the plebs and a tribune. Brought bef

5, 3. 4 Appian, BC 3, 42, 174. PageBook=>126 It would surely be easy to incriminate or to intimidate his secret a

5. 3 Phil. 10, 22 (Saxa and Cafo); the activities of Ventidius can be deduced from subsequent events, perhaps also from

merous; 2 and he got little NotesPage=>127 1 His arguments may be discovered from Cicero’s defence of the morals, f

erved monumental discretion, giving visitors no guidance at all. 2 To be sure, he had dissuaded the taking up of the inher

s house. Philippus and Marcellus were both desperately anxious not to be openly compromised. They would have to go quietly

even when it became safe to inquire or publish, nothing at all could be discovered. 3 Before long a very different charac

arius in the civil wars, suffering in consequence. But they could not be stripped of their ancestors Octavianus’ friend wa

erred to drop it (Seneca, Controv. 2, 4, 13). The origin of it cannot be established: on names in ‘-anius’, cf. Schulze, L

holders of property. But not for long they were a minority and could be held in check. The cause of Caesar’s heir was pur

of the reserves of money which he needed for his campaigns. It would be folly to leave a large treasure behind him, a tem

s and political agents of the Dictator. Among the first Caesarians to be approached in April was the millionaire Balbus. B

n inactive. 5 The Caesarian Rabirius Postumus also shows up, as would be expected, benevolent and alert in any shady trans

dherents of some note participated in the venture. Only two names can be recovered, Agrippa and Maecenas. 9 NotesPage=&g

ts at identification have been made, none satisfactory. Λ∈ύκιος might be Balbus but Balbus’ activities were usually less o

the Spaniard Decidius Saxa. 2 The fact that Octavianus was deemed to be on the side of the Republic precluded a full and

esarian leader beside Antonius, only eight men of senatorial rank can be discovered among his generals and they are not an

evolution were not eager to stir up another. But Octavianus wished to be much more than the leader of a small band of desp

ee Antonius curbed but not destroyed: they were not at all willing to be captured by an anti-Caesarian faction and forced

consulate for his own son. 5 Nor was the devious Marcellus wholly to be neglected he had family connexions that could be

Marcellus wholly to be neglected he had family connexions that could be brought into play, for the Caesarian cause or for

ntonius, namely L. Piso, P. Servilius and Cicero, and therefore might be said to have encouraged the designs of Octavianus

ting the public good for the pursuit of selfish pleasure, might still be NotesPage=>135 1 Cicero, In Pisonem 68 ff.

between Caesar and Pompeius and when Roman politics again appeared to be degenerating into faction strife. 1 His character

t. His defence can hardly cover the whole of his career. Yet it would be perverse and unjust to rail and carp at an aspira

circumstantial rumours. It was by no means unlikely that Caesar would be entangled and defeated in Spain by the experience

tion of June 1st deepened his dismay. Nor was any decision or hope to be discerned among the Liberators, as the congress a

cutum abicere nolebam. ’ PageBook=>140 the Senate; there would be a meeting of the Senate on August 1st and some pr

et. By venturing to attack the policy of Antonius, Cicero, it might be argued, came out into the open at last, and made

incident, but gave no indication that the day of September 2nd would be a turning- point in Roman politics. For the mom

a danger, it is true, that the relations of Cicero and Octavianus may be dated too far back, interpreted in the light of s

for six weeks. In June, however, he recognized that the youth was to be encouraged and kept from allying himself with Ant

ro and P. Servilius when they attacked the consul. However that may be , by the beginning of October Caesar’s heir was an

s for an interview, for Cicero was close at hand. 1 Cicero refused to be compromised in public. Then Octavianus urged Cice

w the memory of the glorious Nones of December. 2 Cicero was not to be had. He left Campania and retired to Arpinum, for

e waters. 5 Wherever there was trouble, the secret agent Balbus might be detected in the background. For Cicero, in fear a

f the avenging of Caesar. Of that purpose, no secret, no disguise. To be sure, he offered a safeguard to the conservatives

to the conservatives by permitting one of the assassins of Caesar to be elected tribune7 merely a political gesture, easi

ves: ‘if Octavianus succeeded and won power, the acta of Caesar would be more decisively confirmed than they were on March

confirmed than they were on March 17th; if he failed, Antonius would be intolerable. ’9 Cicero was all too often delude

parent and a benefactor. That facile and partial interpretation will be repulsed in the interests, not of Octavianus, but

us. Again, on his return from exile, Cicero hoped that Pompeius could be induced to go back on his allies, drop Caesar, an

of a senior statesman. 2 Of that persistent delusion, Cicero cannot be acquitted. Aware of the risks, he hoped to use Oc

in private letters he vaunted the excellence of his own plan: it may be doubted whether at any time he felt that he could

PageBook=>144 must have congratulated himself on his refusal to be lured into a premature championing of the Republi

y open to merit as well as to birth; and the good statesman would not be deserted by his peers, coerced by military dynast

desire for fame is not in itself an infirmity or a vice. Ambition can be legitimate and laudable. De gloria was written in

De officiis not until November (ib. 16, 11, 4). 5 This may perhaps be supported by what St. Augustine records about the

n statesman in his last and courageous battle for what he believed to be the Republic, liberty and the laws against the fo

rchy or despotism. He would stand as firm as Cato had stood, he would be the leader of the Optimates. It might fairly be

had stood, he would be the leader of the Optimates. It might fairly be claimed that Cicero made ample atonement for earl

tives against Piso. The other speeches against Antonius, however, may be counted, for vigour, passion and intensity, among

tensity, among the most splendid of all the orations. But oratory can be a menace to posterity as well as to its author or

, but the neutrals. Cicero was not the only consular who professed to be defending the highest good of the Roman People. T

and disapproved of his methods, the attitude of the Caesarians could be surmised: yet Caesarians themselves were divided

ard of these alarming transactions, he protested bitterly. 4 Whatever be thought of those qualities which contemporaries a

of men and politics. Civil war was an abomination. Victory could only be won by adopting the adversary’s weapons; and vict

opting the adversary’s weapons; and victory no less than defeat would be fatal to everything that an honest man and a patr

nterprise and the profits are large enough, bankers and merchants may be styled the flower of society, the pride of the Em

speech was an essential part of the Republican virtue of libertas, to be regretted more than political freedom when both w

was too simple, too crude. It had all been heard before: but it might be hard to resist the deceitful assertions of a part

be hard to resist the deceitful assertions of a party who claimed to be the champions of liberty and the laws, of peace a

l thought, no constitution at all. This meant that a revolution could be carried through without any violation of legal an

was ultimately sovran, but the spirit of the constitution was held to be aristocratic. In fact, oligarchy ruled through co

of the People and the auctoritas of the Senate: either of them could be exploited in politics, as a source of power or as

s in the main from the speeches of Cicero. On the surface, what could be more clear than his categories and his ‘values’ ‘

s an attractive theory that the conduct of affairs in Rome should not be narrowly Roman, but commend itself to the sentime

literature of the period had been more abundantly preserved, it might be discovered that respect for law, tradition and th

rrow ring of brutal and unenlightened oligarchs. Again, there were to be found honest men and sincere reformers NotesPag

ssion of which ideals no party can feel secure and sanguine, whatever be the acts of deception or violence in prospect. At

e in prospect. At Rome all men paid homage to libertas, holding it to be something roughly equivalent to the spirit and pr

and the perpetuation of privilege. Yet, even so, libertas could not be monopolized by the oligarchy or by any party in p

o bring back order again. The decisive act in a policy of treason may be described as ‘laying the foundations of settled g

uspices of concord and appeasement. It therefore became a reproach to be ‘afraid of peace’, to be ‘enemies of peace’. 1 In

peasement. It therefore became a reproach to be ‘afraid of peace’, to be ‘enemies of peace’. 1 In detestation of civil war

tion of civil war, Republicans might honestly hold an unjust peace to be better than the justest of wars. Then the fair na

e had to abandon their plea when they spoke for war. Peace should not be confused with servitude; 4 negotiations with an e

uld not be confused with servitude; 4 negotiations with an enemy must be spurned because they were dangerous as well as di

In open war the language of peace and goodwill might still suitably be employed to seduce the allies or adherents of the

ignum est et senatore et Romano homine moriamur. PageBook=>157 be called, being not so much ethical qualities as st

inding ties of personal allegiance. For profit or for safety it might be necessary to change sides. Suitable terminology w

11, 400 ff.). PageBook=>158 patriotism private enmities should be composed, private loyalties surrendered, for the

. Lepidus duly uttered the exemplary prayer that private feuds should be abandoned. 4 Plancus had assured Cicero that no p

described as ‘madmen’, ‘raging brigands’ or ‘parricides’. 7 It would be necessary to ‘bring them to their right minds aga

=>159 who led them: salutary compulsion from the army would then be needed to transform a brigand and murderer into a

tood. 2 The conversion of a military leader might sometimes have to be enforced, or at least accelerated, by the argumen

ere, ut vere dicam, coegit. ’ He urged that ‘misericordia’ should not be regarded as criminal. Cf. Appian, BC 3, 84, 345 (

t the worst, a state of public emergency or a ‘higher legality’ could be invented. Only the first steps need be hazardous.

y or a ‘higher legality’ could be invented. Only the first steps need be hazardous. A proconsul in defence of honour, when

t a consul. 5 The author of this audacious proposal represented it to be nothing less than ‘laying the foundations of cons

commands were against the spirit of the constitution8 but they might be necessary to save the State. Of that the Senate w

when the constitution had perished, the will of Army and People could be expressed, immediate and imperative. For the pr

dispatch from the governor of Cisalpine Gaul. Though nothing could be done while Antonius was still consul, Cicero seiz

t Antonius, if his troops were mutinous and seditious, Antonius could be no true consul of the Roman People. On the other

ense in land and money. The claim urged for D. Brutus might perhaps be defended: he was at least a magistrate and held h

: Antonius, he said, was an assassin, a brigand, a Spartacus. He must be crushed and would be crushed, as once Senate, Peo

was an assassin, a brigand, a Spartacus. He must be crushed and would be crushed, as once Senate, People and Cicero had de

ntonius. That prospect was cheerfully envisaged. What resources might be enlisted for the struggle? The authority of the

e enlisted for the struggle? The authority of the Senate was now to be played against the People and the army commanders

he Senate. Only three, so Cicero, writing to Cassius, asserted, could be called statesmen and patriots himself, L. Piso an

ots himself, L. Piso and P. Servilius. 8 From the rest nothing was to be expected. Cicero distrusted for different reasons

2, 5, 2, cf. Mommsen, Ges. Schriften IV, 176 ff. PageBook=>165 be seen in the Curia. The remaining five Cicero did

lic, their attitude was ambiguous and disquieting: it was scarcely to be expected that the generals and the veterans of Ca

ssessed the reputation of a time-server. 2 Even less reliance could be placed on M. Aemilius Lepidus, the governor of Ga

ire temporibus. ’ PageBook=>166 Lepidus stood, if the word can be used of this flimsy character, was with Antonius,

of the services of Lepidus to the Roman State, a gilded statue should be set up on the Rostra or in any part of the Forum

title of pro-praetor. 2 Further, by a special dispensation, he was to be allowed to stand for the consulship ten years bef

esPage=>167 1 Phil. 5. Something at least of Calenus’ speech can be recovered from Dio (46, 1, ff.). 2 Res Gestae 1

o 46, 29, 2. For Cicero’s proposal, Phil. 5, 46. PageBook=>168 be invoked to confer senatorial rank upon a private

to condemn a Roman citizen unheard. At the very least Antonius should be brought to trial, to answer for his alleged misde

. Fufius Calenus, the friend of Antonius, was adopted. Envoys were to be sent to Antonius; they were to urge him to withdr

37), 221. Cicero’s proposal to have the proconsul outlawed can hardly be described as constitutional. ‘Eine staatsrechtlic

ed the swift fall of Mutina. Against that fait accompli nothing could be done, and Antonius, his rights and his prestige r

ina but cling to Gallia Comata. 2 Deceptive and dangerous there could be no treating with Antonius, for Antonius was in ef

ey, and announcing terms that aroused Cicero to anger. ‘Nothing could be more scandalous, more disgusting than the conduct

p his army and surrender at the discretion of a party that claimed to be the government, that was folly and certain extinc

s went to Athens and was seen at the lectures of philosophers. It may be presumed that his agents were at work in Macedoni

in the East alarmed the friends of Antonius: there was little time to be lost, for the beginning of hostilities in the nor

e in March. In Rome Piso and Calenus carried a motion that an embassy be sent to treat with Antonius. Five consulars were

owever, changed his mind and backed out. The embassy, he urged, would be futile: to negotiate at this stage would NotesP

secret of his agreement with Antonius: Antonius suppressed, he would be the next of the Caesarian generals to be assailed

ntonius suppressed, he would be the next of the Caesarian generals to be assailed. They protested loyalty to the Republic,

s. 4 To Lepidus he was abrupt and overbearing ‘in my opinion you will be wiser not to make meddling proposals for peace: n

the East in the hands of Brutus and Cassius, the Republic appeared to be winning all along the line. The NotesPage=>1

received news from Rome that amply justified his decision: he was to be discarded as soon as he had served the purposes o

n Republicans in the Senate (Ad M. Brutum 1, 15, 9). However that may be , the Autobiography of Augustus, in self-justifica

to stand firm, precarious though his own position was. Antonius might be destroyed hence ruin to the Caesarian cause, and

icissitudes of alliance. 3 Yet, even if this did not happen, he might be caught between Caesarians in the West and Republi

ng man a public enemy. The danger was manifest. It did not require to be demonstrated by the advice which the Caesarian co

aternization as had been the generals of Pompeius. He did not wish to be nor could he have subjugated the strong Caesarian

Macedonia. He was trapped and killed by a Gallic chieftain. It would be easy and unprofitable to arraign the Caesarian ge

ible to discover. For the judgement on these men, if judged they must be , it would be sufficient to demonstrate that they

ver. For the judgement on these men, if judged they must be, it would be sufficient to demonstrate that they acted as they

asoned and balanced estimate of the situation. But more than this can be said. Pollio, the would-be neutral, the cautious

lancus, even the perfidious and despised Lepidus may yet in treachery be held true to the Roman People at a time when patr

vonius, the friend of Cato and of Brutus, who pronounced civil war to be the worst of evils, worse even than submitting to

acing. That young man had got wind of a witticism of Cicero he was to be praised and NotesPage=>167 1 Ad fam. 10, 1

sar’s heir to wreck the Caesarian party. Octavianus did not intend to be removed; and the emphasis that open enemies and f

not unclaimed. Octavianus aspired to the honour; and it would clearly be expedient to give the youth a senior consular for

atives of Caesar (presumably Philippus and Marcellus) who appeared to be supporting the ambition of Octavianus. 4 Who was

been elected. 2 Of a later proposal there is evidence not lightly to be discarded. 3 Cicero and Octavianus were to be joi

evidence not lightly to be discarded. 3 Cicero and Octavianus were to be joint consuls. It might fairly be represented tha

ed. 3 Cicero and Octavianus were to be joint consuls. It might fairly be represented that the mature wisdom of a senior st

s had captured in Macedonia. Cicero insisted that the criminal should be put to death: there was nothing to choose between

the three Antonii; only practise a salutary severity, and there will be no more civil wars. 5 The plea of Brutus was plai

82, 337 ft.; Dio 46, 42, 2; Plutarch, Cicero 45 f. If Plutarch is to be believed, Augustus admitted that he had played up

ieved, Augustus admitted that he had played upon Cicero’s ambition to be consul. 4 Ad M. Brutum 1, 4a, 4 (May 15th). 5

le the occupation of Macedonia by Brutus (and of Syria by Cassius) to be closely dated. According to Gelzer, Brutus did no

r the passage of news and movements of troops in winter. 2 This may be why he wished to delay the publication in Rome of

of a slave to a despot. ’1 Cicero had suggested that Octavianus might be induced to pardon the assassins of Caesar. ‘Bette

ook=>172 due to Cicero, still trusting that the adventurer could be won to legitimate methods. Octavianus was not def

nus forbore to enter the city with armed men a ‘free election’ was to be secured. The people chose him as consul along wit

for the islands, it may already have been feared, and it was soon to be known, that some of them had been seized by the a

of the organs of government. Pompeius and his allies did not claim to be the government or the State: it was enough that t

e the government or the State: it was enough that their rivals should be thwarted and impotent. Caesar the Dictator pardon

NotesPage=>190 1 Appian (BC 4, 8, 31 ff.) gives what purports to be their official manifesto. 2 lb. 4, 4, 15 perhap

le stories were told of the rapacity and blood-lust of Fulvia. It may be doubted whether contemporaries agreed. If they ha

300 (Cicero 46; Brutus 27; Antonius 20) presumably senators. It is to be regretted that there is such a lack of evidence f

re of faction- contests at Rome the worst extremities could sometimes be avoided, among the aristocracy at least. Sulla ha

n ancient family of Tibur:3 the proscription of a Coponius may fairly be put down to Plancus. 4 A brother and a nephew of

and his associates have behaved as they did, could security and power be won in any other way. The consequences of compell

threat of taxation or confiscation drives money underground. It must be lured out again. Capital could only be tempted by

ves money underground. It must be lured out again. Capital could only be tempted by a good investment. The Caesarian leade

ed upon the blood of citizens. 1 The proscriptions may not unfairly be regarded as in purpose and essence a peculiar lev

al levy often defeats its own purpose. The return was at once seen to be disappointing. From virtue or from caution, men r

e East in the hands of the Republicans. From Italy, therefore, had to be found the money to pay the standing army of the C

resent needs. For the future, to recompense the legions which were to be led against the Republicans, the Triumvirs set ap

or men of low origin and infamous pursuits even escaped slaves could be detected. 6 As with the recruitment of the Senate

ertain Barbarius Philippus actually became praetor (Dig. ib.): not to be identified with M. Barbatius Pollio, quaestor of

oscriptions which it was his duty to announce. 3 If the three dynasts be excluded, the surviving consulars now numbered tw

Less spectacular than the decadence of the principes, but not less to be deplored, were the gaps in other ranks and orders

. the new Fasti of the Vicomagistri, L’ann. ép., 1937, 62: shortly to be published by A. Degrassi in Inscr. It. XIII, part

si in Inscr. It. XIII, part 1); and perhaps Q. Marcius Crispus, if he be the Marcius who also was cos. suff. in that year.

and guarantee of success, but did not survive. Saxa and Fango were to be cut off in their prime, cheated of the consulate;

he came from the ancient colony of Norba, P-W xvii, 926. Canidius may be the man who was with Cato in Cyprus in 57 B.C. (P

abolished. Whatever the outcome of the armed struggle, it could never be restored. Despotism ruled, supported by violence

mpense of craft or crime. ‘Non mos, non ius. ’3 So might the period be described. But the Caesarians claimed a right and

called Machaeras (Josephus, BJ 1, 317, &c). The name might really be ‘Machares’, which occurs in the royal house of Po

led among the gods of the Roman State. 1 In the Forum a temple was to be built to the new deity, Divus Julius; and another

tonius’ policy when he was consul. But with Caesar’s heir there could be no pact or peace. 1 When the Caesarian leaders un

1 For the rest, the prospects of Brutus and Cassius left little to be desired. Their plan was simple to hold up the ene

n admitted by the apologetic Velleius (2, 70, 1), There was plenty to be explained away in the Autobiography, cf. F. Blume

. 1 Brutus, their own leader, took his own life. Virtus had proved to be an empty word. 2 The victor Antonius stripped o

ecided, invoking or inventing a proposal of Caesar the Dictator, must be a province no longer but removed from political c

slow to make open protest: they suggested that the imposition should be spread out and equalized. Then other cities in al

they laid the blame upon Octavianus, insisting that a final decision be reserved for Antonius for the prestige of the vic

L. Antonius, that was the least of his difficulties. He might easily be overwhelmed by the Antonian generals, strong in p

lginiae, less than twenty miles from Perusia their fire-signals could be seen by the besieged. Ventidius and Pollio were r

of their own interests as well as a strong distaste for war: it would be plain folly to fight for L. Antonius and the prop

eceived with honour the brother of his colleague and sent him away to be his governor in Spain, where he shortly died. 6 T

the cause of liberty and the protection of their own estates. It may be supposed that the escape of the greater number wa

province, was at last overcome and killed. 3 Caesar’s heir would soon be trapped and crushed at last. That way all odds po

n two masters. Which of them had the sympathy of Italy could scarcely be doubted; and, despite the loss of the Gallic legi

th sides in Rome’s intestine wars. He exacted nine years’ tribute, to be paid in two. Antonius distributed fines and privi

1 Appian, BC 5, 4, 15 ff. 2 Plutarch, Antonius 25. 3 It will not be necessary to repeat Plutarch’s dramatic and roman

ts in Italy, the war in Etruria and the investment of Perusia, it may be that he had no cognizance when he arrived at Tyre

easure of the disaster. Whether for revenge or for diplomacy, he must be strongly armed: he prepared a fleet and looked ab

ppian, BC 5, 58, 245. 4 Appian, BC 5, 53, 220. Appian may, however, be exaggerating the prestige of Antonius. PageBook

goodwill, Antonius sent away Ahenobarbus, a compromising adherent, to be governor of Bithynia, and he instructed Pompeius

ment was reached. 3 The Triumvirate was re- established. Italy was to be common ground, available for recruiting to both l

, proscriptions and the desolation of Italy, with a victor certain to be worse than his defeated adversary and destined to

o begin with the consulate of his patron Pollio but very precisely to be inaugurated by Pollio, ‘te duce’. The Golden Age

recisely to be inaugurated by Pollio, ‘te duce’. The Golden Age is to be fulfilled, or at least inaugurated, by a child so

n Age is to be fulfilled, or at least inaugurated, by a child soon to be born. The child appears to be something more th

least inaugurated, by a child soon to be born. The child appears to be something more than a personification of an era i

uit. The Epode is quoted and utilized here, though it may very well be several years later in date. The problem of prior

e incident is there brought into connexion with the comet and said to be referred to in the Autobiography of Augustus. For

nic candidates with spurious credentials or none at all may summarily be dismissed. A definite claim was early made. Polli

4 Yet the very existence, not merely the relevance, of Saloninus may be called into doubt; 5 further, there is no reason

reget patriis virtutibus orbem. 1 The expected child turned out to be a girl (the elder Antonia, born in 39 B.C.), the

ompact of the dynasts a mere respite in the struggle. That was not to be known. At the end of 40 B.C. the domination of th

tesPage=>220 1 Ecl. 4, 17. 2 Appian, BC 5, 63, 269. 3 As may be inferred from Dio 48, 26, 3. 4 Appian, BC 5, 65

‘Q. Salvius imp. cos. desig. ’ (BMC, R. Rep. 11, 407 f.) It will not be necessary to add that we possess only the ‘Offici

r, strong in the support of the plebs and the veterans, would have to be NotesPage=>221 1 Nicolaus, Vita Caesaris 2

ourse of the following year they were modified and completed. It will be convenient to mention later in one place the terr

1 ff.; M. A. Levi, Ottaviano Capoparte 11, 71 f. PageBook=>226 be enlisted to deal with Pompeius. But Octavianus wo

dominance nor his prestige were gravely menaced and there was work to be done in the East. Antonius departed for Syria. Fr

obles of ancient family or municipal aristocrats. Here were allies to be courted, men of some consequence now or later. 1

Republican or two and certain of the assassins, for whom there could be no pardon from Caesar’s heir, no return to Rome.

pi and Perusia it had seemed for a time that the young Pompeius might be a champion of the Republican cause. But it was on

red of Caesar’s heir. In reality an adventurer, Pompeius could easily be represented as a pirate. 5 Peace was not kept f

ninus, Thermus, Antistius, Fannius and Libo. These persons can mostly be identified. There is only one difficulty, whether

attract ambitious aristocrats, among the earliest of whom may fairly be reckoned a Claudian of the other branch, Ap. Clau

. 34 B.C.), had Scipionic blood (Propertius 4, 11, 29 f.), but cannot be the issue of a marriage contracted as late as 38

of Antonius. Again, Republicans in the company of Sex. Pompeius might be able to influence Antonius or Lepidus: they had d

of Naples. The year 37 passed in thorough preparations. There was to be no mistake this time. Agrippa devised a grandiose

1, 517 ff. The presence of Atratinus in western waters is likewise to be inferred from his coins, some struck in Sicily (B

ng to the spirit and profession of the Roman constitution there could be no rational hope any more. There was ordered gove

or Caesar’. 8 The Senate and People for these bodies might suitably be convoked for ceremonial purposes or governmental

r governmental proclamations also decreed that a golden statue should be set up in the Forum with an inscription to announ

he gave public expression to the hope that the Free State would soon be re-established. 2 It only remained for his triumv

rtner to perform his share and subdue the Parthians, when there would be no excuse for delay to restore constitutional gov

esar set forth on the Ides of March; 4 and Caesar had destined him to be NotesPage=>234 1 Appian, BC 5, 130, 541 f.

or of all Spain for Octavianus the year after. No other nobilis can be found holding military command under Caesar’s hei

isium, unless Norbanus, the grandson of the proscribed Marian consul, be accorded this rank: Norbanus was the general who

ardinia. 7 To this ill-consorted and undistinguished crew may perhaps be added P. Alfenus Varus (cos. suff. 39 B.C.), also

e name of non-Latin termination. Rebilus (Appian, BC 5, 101, 422) may be the son of C. Caninius Rebilus, cos. suff. 45 B.C

s Aug. 16, 3). 7 Pulcher was an Antonian in 43 B.C., but willing to be recommended to D. Brutus (Ad fam. 11, 22). Page

t of the admirals, was devised an excessive honour, a golden crown to be worn on the occasion of triumphs. 2 Other admiral

, like the dynastic Livia Drusilla, the greatest of them all, were to be amply NotesPage=>238 1 Dio 49, 7, 6. 2 I

neasy equilibrium. With only two remaining the alternatives seemed to be fast friendship or open war. Of the former, the c

feguard Italy. The victories of Antonius paled with distance or might be artfully depreciated; his own achievements would

distance or might be artfully depreciated; his own achievements would be visible and tangible. It was on the north-east

with ostentation and received honourable wounds. Antonius must not be allowed to presume upon his Caesarian qualities o

ommemorated. 1 At the end of 33 B.C. the Triumvirate (as it may still be called despite the disappearance of Lepidus) was

and his influence, not total but at least preponderating, may perhaps be detected in the composition of the consular list

80; 71. 3 On the family of Herennius, cf. above, p. 92. Memmius may be the son of C. Memmius (pr. 58 B.C.) and of Fausta

apse of time permitted the Revolution (for such it may with propriety be called) to acquire permanence and stability. The

ertain symptoms of consolidation, political and social. There were to be no more proscriptions, no more expulsions of Ital

der the Triumvirate (43–33 B.C.), the following brief computation can be made. Excluding the Triumvirs, and iterations, th

for patronage but with a good pretext. 1 Among the consulars could be discerned one Claudius only, one Aemilius, partis

on. PageBook=>246 the best all bone and nerve, but liable to be dry, tenuous and tedious. 1 Caesar’s style befitt

e. But a direct, not to say hard and truculent manner of speech would be well matched with the temper of a military age. S

Some at least of the merits of the plain style, which could claim to be traditional and Roman, might be prized and preser

the plain style, which could claim to be traditional and Roman, might be prized and preserved until threatened by a comple

calm. The signs of the melancholy future of eloquence were plainly to be read. Oratory would degenerate into the private p

gns of their existence, were susceptible to such an appeal might well be doubted. The aged Varro, the most learned of the

s. Though Sallustius was no blind partisan of Caesar, his aim, it may be inferred, was to demonstrate how rotten and fraud

sul of Africa Nova in 46‖45 B.C. 2 Dio 43, 9, 2 though this may not be convincing evidence, for it may derive from a bel

nging deeper into pessimism, found it bad from the roots. History, to be real and true, would have to concern itself with

repeated itself in cyclical revolutions. For Rome it might appear to be the time of Sulla come again; in a larger sphere,

becoming evident that poetry, besides and above mere invective, could be made an instrument of government by conveying a p

atronage to others. Under the rule of the Triumvirate he was known to be composing tragedies about the monarchs of mythica

lves, not from ascertained and well- authenticated facts: they cannot be employed in historical reconstruction. 6 His Ly

oet was reluctant, the patron too wise to insist. Yet something might be done. It was folly not to exploit the treasures o

ite evidence at all: the Arcadian scenery of Ecl. 10 could not safely be invoked to show that Gallus was in Greece. 2 In

r of Annales belli Gallici (cf. esp. Horace, Sat. 2, 5, 41), may well be Bibaculus, though this has been disputed. 4 Qui

ociety. Republican libertas, denied to the nobiles of Rome, could not be conceded to a freedman’s son. NotesPage=>254

of highway robbery outstanding against certain senators could at last be annulled. 3 The Caesarian soldiers were tumultu

at Philippi. The doom of empire was revealed the ruling people would be submerged in the innumerable hordes of its subjec

st beginnings of a patriotic revival, the new taste for history might be induced to revert to the remotest origins of the

le, august and sanctioned by divine providence; ancient legends could be employed to advertise in literature and on monume

new. Despite the losses of war and proscriptions, there was still to be found in the higher ranks of the Senate a number

foreseen by what arts a national champion was to prevail and a nation be forged in the struggle. One thing was clear. Mo

iumvirate at Tarentum when that office lapsed, Antonian consuls would be in power at Rome. Antonius had already lost the b

ry promise of long duration. 1 East of the Hellespont there were to be three Roman provinces only, Asia, Bithynia and Sy

realm of Ptolemy Philadelphus except for Judaea. The occasion was to be celebrated in Egypt and reckoned as the beginning

enterprises. Egypt, the most valuable of the dependencies, should not be regarded as paramount and apart, but as one link

le, the personal following of Rome’s ruler in the East might suitably be extended to embrace the whole aristocracy in town

ty leader and Hellenistic dynast in one person; the latter role would be sensibly enhanced by the glory of victory in Part

o cross the arid plains of Mesopotamia, as Crassus had done, there to be harried by cavalry and arrows. Even if a NotesP

at not less than a quarter of his whole army. 1 Higher estimates can be discovered the failure in Media was soon taken up

and by the lack of trained troops. The western soldiers were held to be far the best. Eastern levies had an evil and of

ted now on the line Macedonia-Bithynia-Pontus. The results would soon be evident in the Balkans and on the Black Sea coast

51, 5, 6; BMC, R. Rep. 11, 583 ff. To the above list should probably be added, as proconsuls of Asia, M. Cocceius Nerva b

y uncertainties in this field. Valuable additions and corrections may be expected from the forthcoming work of Mr. M. Gran

friends had once been Antonians. 1 Evidence is scanty. Yet it could be guessed that the Cocceii, a new family showing tw

ew Caesarian and Republican coalition. Another kinsman of Cato was to be found with Antonius, his grandson L. Calpurnius B

n of the Dictator and ruler in conjunction with Cleopatra, who was to be ‘Queen of Kings’ over the eastern dependencies. T

distorted these celebrations that accuracy of fact and detail cannot be recovered: the resplendent donations, whatever th

The version of the victors is palpably fraudulent; the truth cannot be disinterred, for it has been doubly buried, in er

s, there is and was no authentic record; even if there were, it would be necessary further to speculate upon the policy an

wn ambitions. A fabricated concatenation of unrealized intentions may be logical, artistic and persuasive, but it is not h

sive, but it is not history. Up to a point the acts of Antonius can be recovered and explained. When he disposed of king

re in some respects premature. A province of Cilicia was now shown to be superfluous. With the suppression of the Pirates

s of brigands, Isaurian, Pisidian and Cilician, eminently suitable to be left to the charge of a native prince. 2 Amyntas

Rome, advantage as well as necessity; and the population preferred to be free from the Roman tax-gatherer. Caesar took fro

ted new problems. The remainder of the northern frontier clamoured to be regulated, as Caesar himself had probably seen, b

ricum, as far as the Danube. Only then and only thus could the Empire be made solid, coherent and secure. In the West muni

PageBook=>273 Egypt itself, however much augmented, could never be a menace to the empire of Rome. Ever since Rome h

liation and ruin by Roman financiers. Egypt was clearly not suited to be converted into a Roman province: it must remain a

stic dynast was ambiguous, disquieting and vulnerable. Credence might be given to the most alarming accounts of his ulteri

hey were to Octavianus’ agents and to subsequent historians. It might be represented that Antonius was making provision fo

274 When he dwelt at Athens with Octavia, Antonius’ behaviour might be construed as deference to Hellenistic susceptibil

ideas swerved from Rome under the influence of Cleopatra? If Antonius be denied a complete monarchic policy of his own, it

nt her Ptolemaic kingdom under the protection of Rome. The clue is to be found in the character of the War of Actium as it

s. It was not a war for domination against Antonius Antonius must not be mentioned. To secure Roman sanction and emotional

asure and decency. To ruin Antonius it was not enough that she should be a siren: she must be made a Fury ‘fatale monstr

ruin Antonius it was not enough that she should be a siren: she must be made a Fury ‘fatale monstrum’. 2 That was the

nt where Antonius was most vulnerable, Roman sentiment most easily to be worked and swayed. Years before, Cleopatra was of

f Egypt. Then irony: the grandiose conquests of Antonius would surely be more than enough to provide bounties or lands for

C. Sosius, his trusted adherents. The contents of this missive might be guessed: it was to be imparted to the Senate on t

d adherents. The contents of this missive might be guessed: it was to be imparted to the Senate on the first day of the ne

essalla turned his eloquence to political advantage; 5 he was soon to be requited with the consulate which Antonius should

blems concerning the ‘marriage’ of Antonius. The women alluded to may be the wives of certain associates of Octavianus at

he whole topic, which has provoked excessive debate, does not need to be discussed here. On the one hand, the Triumvirs co

rominence of consuls and of a tribune at the beginning of 32 B.C. may be taken as fair proof that the Triumvirate had come

es not unwelcome. Even now, the Senate and People were not utterly to be despised: the consuls could be held guilty of a g

Senate and People were not utterly to be despised: the consuls could be held guilty of a grave misdemeanour in leaving It

Cornelius Cinna, grandson of Sulla’s enemy. In the next year he would be consul with Corvinus, instead of Antonius: one of

consul with Corvinus, instead of Antonius: one of the suffecti was to be Cn. Pompeius, a great-grandson of Sulla. Historic

and of Pompeia, daughter of Pompeius Magnus: but the consul of 32 may be his son by an earlier marriage (PIR2, C 1338). CN

on his side. Antonius stood on the defensive and therefore, it might be represented, for peace. For war his prestige and

he most important things. Under what name and plea was the contest to be fought? For Rome, for the consuls and the Republi

nus, or for Egypt and Egypt’s Queen? Ahenobarbus urged that Cleopatra be sent back to Egypt. Canidius the marshal dissente

A. Levi, Ottaviano Capoparte 11, 139 ff. Both Holmes and Levi seem to be against Kromayer’s thesis of a marriage in 37/36

cts of his own son, made him insist that the party of Antonius should be Roman, not regal. Not so Munatius Plancus, who se

tics. Now came an opportune discovery so opportune that forgery might be suspected, though the provisions of the will do n

the children of Cleopatra and directed that, when he died, he should be buried beside her in Alexandria. 2 The signal w

8). The hypothesis of forgery, at least partial, should not summarily be dismissed. It is a question not of scruples but o

xpedience how far was forgery necessary? and how easily could forgery be detected? PageBook=>283 that Antonius had

he testament of Antonius, many thought it atrocious that a man should be impugned in his lifetime for posthumous dispositi

ero, Pro Balbo 53; ILS 3700) and hostile to Plancus. 3 If Dio is to be believed (50, 4, 2). The publication of the will

nder a despotic government, a certain suspension of belief may safely be recommended. Nor is it to be fancied that all the

certain suspension of belief may safely be recommended. Nor is it to be fancied that all the land rose as one man in patr

Res Gestae 25: ‘iuravit in mea ver[ba] tota | Italia sponte sua et me be [lli] quo vici ad Actium ducem depoposcit. ’ Pag

m Italian men of property, themselves menaced. 4 Aid from Italy could be invoked for revolution, for reaction or for domin

egiance to Drusus, which is significant though the phraseology cannot be genuine, cf. H. J. Rose, Harv. Th. Rev. XXX (1937

franchise after the Bellum Italicum, could with the utmost propriety be summoned and conjured to redress the balance of R

blivious of recent Italian history. The Marsi had no reason at all to be passionately attached to Roman gods and garb. I

ing of enemies of Caesar or of Antonius? The Roman constitution might be endangered: that was a name and a deception. Etru

itium, in the province of Lusitania). A part of the last of these may be quoted for illustration: ‘ex mei animi sententia,

er the control of Octavianus’ firmest friends and partisans. It would be a brave man, or a very foolish one, who asserted

vicinity of Calvisius Sabinus or Statilius Taurus; and it may fairly be conjectured that no opposition confronted Maecena

from the colony of Cales in Campania. 2 Less eminent partisans might be no less effective. The Paelignian town of Sulmo h

sion of Sulmo to the national cause seventeen years later may perhaps be put down to the agency of a local office-holding

of a local office-holding family, the Ovidii. 3 The soldiery might be purchased, the lower orders deceived or dragooned

istrate with equestrian military service behind him, the first man to be accorded a public funeral in Sulmo (CIL IX, 3082)

the national unity and the crusade against the East were no doubt to be found in the order of Roman knights and among tho

family or business. 2 But what if the partition of the world was to be perpetuated? The limit between the dominions of t

l and delayed so long. The loss of the dominions beyond the sea would be ruinous to an Italy that had prospered and grown

t deceived by the artifices of Octavianus or their own emotions might be impelled by certain melancholy reflections to the

d wars of the last thirty years, though liberty perished, peace might be achieved. It was worth it not merely to the middl

esarian party, old and new, about Plancus, or about Agrippa. It is to be regretted that no history preserves the opinions

erves the opinions of Pollio concerning these transactions and it can be well understood. His comments would have been fra

sar the Dictator; and there was an imposing total of Roman knights to be found in provincial cities like Gades and Corduba

s and his nephew were all but monarchic in their native Gades; it may be presumed that the wealthy family of the Annaei co

me and Italy, invested with supreme power, but no title. 6 There must be no risks, no danger of an Antonian rising in Ital

B.C., cf. Bell. Al. 56, 4. 3 The knight L. Annaeus Seneca, later to be known as a historian and authority on rhetoric, m

might appear. Antonius now had to stand beside Cleopatra—there could be no turning back. Patrae at the mouth of the Gulf

eal to the legions to stand in battle against their kinsmen. He might be able to employ sea-power with a mastery that neit

Antonius’ side, Canidius, Sosius and Gellius Poplicola. It would not be long before the defection of the leaders, Roman s

r side the fleet of Octavianus faced the Antonians. The battle was to be fought under the auspices of Caesar—Caesar’s heir

. W. Richardson, JRS XXVII (1937), 1 ff. Against Tarn’s theory it can be argued, with Kromayer, that Antonius had already

was), and avoidance of bloodshed to Rome, is not known. Sosius might be suspected. Certain of the Antonians were executed

of the rivals in the contest for power had intended that there should be a serious battle if they could help it. So it tur

Egypt. Octavianus had a huge army on his hands, with many legions to be paid, demobilized or employed. He sent Agrippa at

rbed the provinces, the repercussions of a Roman civil war would soon be felt. Some at least of the triumphs soon to be he

n civil war would soon be felt. Some at least of the triumphs soon to be held by Caesarian marshals (no fewer than six in

de of Cleopatra found a way out. The last of the Ptolemies scorned to be led in a Roman triumph. Her firm and defiant end,

imed that after his victory he spared all Roman citizens who asked to be spared. 4 dementia became one of his cardinal vir

3 ff. PageBook=>301 children of Cleopatra, whatever they might be and whatever they were worth, Octavianus naturall

on Caesar’s heir in Italy for the needs of his war and not safely to be discarded in peace, was quietly neglected in the

to the history of those years. Octavianus had his own ideas. It might be inexpedient to defy, but it was easy to delude, t

n policy. Adulation, perversity or ignorance might elevate Parthia to be a rival empire of Rome :2 it could not stand the

of diplomacy. Of an invasion of Asia and Syria there was no danger to be apprehended, save when civil war loosened the fab

save when civil war loosened the fabric of Roman rule. There were to be no more civil wars. So much for the East. It wa

ctors. Already the Senate had voted that the Temple of Janus should be closed, a sign that all the world was at peace on

the Roman, peace was not a vague emollient: the word ‘pax’ can seldom be divorced from notions of conquest, or at least co

egions. For the military needs of the empire, fewer than thirty would be ample: any larger total was costly to maintain an

pt became everywhere apparent. 3 Above all, security of tenure was to be the watchword of the new order. 4 Italy longed fo

ntonius abode for long years in the East men might fear lest the city be dethroned from its pride of place, lest the capit

city be dethroned from its pride of place, lest the capital of empire be transferred to other lands. The propaganda of Oct

had skilfully worked upon such apprehensions. Once aroused they would be difficult to allay: their echo could still be hea

Once aroused they would be difficult to allay: their echo could still be heard. Horace produces a divine decree, forbiddin

ll be heard. Horace produces a divine decree, forbidding Troy ever to be rebuilt; 5 Virgil is quite explicit; 6 and Livy d

the task, the Triumvirs had not even begun. The duty could no longer be evaded on the plea of wars abroad or faction at h

out certain constitutional changes, various in kind and variously to be interpreted. Hopeful signs were not wanting in

nformal exchange of opinion there may well have been. No record would be likely to survive, when an important public event

ce and frustrate any mere constitutional opposition in Rome. It would be uncomfortable but not dangerous. Armies and provi

restige was at stake—the armed proconsuls were a menace. Yet it would be inexpedient to remove them all. Octavianus decide

e military provinces in their charge, about which due foresight would be exercised— few legions for garrison, proconsuls o

ar in rank; and no imperatorial salutations, no triumphs, if it could be helped. The nobilis and the consular, those were

was buried in the sepulchre of the Crassi (CIL VI, 21308). She might be the first cousin of M. Licinius Crassus, cos. 30

t be the first cousin of M. Licinius Crassus, cos. 30 B.C. It would be exceedingly rash to speculate on the identity of

cal leader—dux partium. But warfare and party politics were deemed to be over and gone. The word had too military a flavou

d gone. The word had too military a flavour for all palates: it would be expedient to overlay the hard and astringent pill

g that smacked of tradition and custom. The military leader wished to be known as a magistrate. An appellation that connot

ure. There were other principes in the State, there could not fail to be such in a Republic. So Horace addresses him, ma

on of the last book of the Odes (13 B.C.) the ruler of Rome can still be called ‘dux’—but with a difference and with the a

3 Fasti 1, 613; 2, 60; 5, 145; 6, 92. Nor is this merely, as might be expected, with definite reference to the victorie

n the saviour of the State. They voted that a wreath of laurel should be placed above the door-post of his dwelling, for h

r he had saved the lives of Roman citizens; that in the Senate should be hung a golden shield with his virtues inscribed t

ly resigned them to proconsuls. Further, Cisalpine Gaul had ceased to be a province. Augustus’ own armies lay at a distanc

ution, but merely guardians of the frontiers. Nor need the new system be described as a military despotism. Before the law

Parthians, required careful supervision. Other regions in turn might be subjected to the same salutary treatment, for nob

no scandal. The strictest champion of constitutional propriety might be constrained to concede their necessity. 1 If the

anarchy out of which his domination had arisen. But Augustus was to be consul as well as proconsul, year after year with

ent and tradition, by a rooted distaste of change unless change could be shown to be in harmony with ancestral custom, ‘mo

ition, by a rooted distaste of change unless change could be shown to be in harmony with ancestral custom, ‘mos maiorum’—w

idity of the inferences thence derived is another question. It will be doubted whether Augustus, his counsellors or his

ng years. Certain precedents of the recent past were so close as to be damaging. Pompeius Magnus governed Spain in absen

sanctified Cato were not the only victims of the Civil Wars who could be called up and enlisted in the service of the revi

up and enlisted in the service of the revived Republic. Cicero might be more remunerative for every purpose; and the blam

form and shape in the New Republic of Caesar Augustus. 3 That would be comforting, if true. It only remains to elucidate

ot for a princeps like Pompeius. For the rest, it might pertinently be urged that the political doctrine of Cicero was c

Cicero was couched in phrases so vague and so innocuous that it could be employed by any party and adapted to any ends. Th

rinzipats, 3-12. 3 Cicero professes in De legibus (3, 4, cf. 12) to be legislating for the state depicted in the Republi

t on Cato, that anybody who does not wish the present dispensation to be altered is a good citizen. 1 Precisely for that e

ured, to conserve the new order, announcing it as his dearest wish to be known as the ‘optimi status auctor’. 2 He called

New State, which was quite different from Dictatorship, Cicero would be honoured by Princeps and Senate for his eloquence

nimity of success to pass over the scorn of the nobiles; he would not be harried by tribunes or constrained to speak in de

. Augustus proudly dispensed with support of precedents—he claimed to be unique. Romans instructed in a long tradition of

der Hellenen 11, 428 n.). 3 Scipio held the ancient constitution to be far the best (De re publica 1, 34); and he was no

opriate and inevitable that the unofficial title by which he chose to be designated was ‘princeps’. Auctoritas has a vener

entela. He fed them with doles, amused them with games and claimed to be their protector against oppression. Free election

nsul as legally defined appears portentous and alarming. Yet it would be an elementary error to fancy that the ceremony of

e of peace, it was necessary that the primacy of Caesar’s heir should be strengthened and perpetuated. Not, however, under

not deigned to allude to this transaction at all. 2 In truth, it may be regarded merely as the legalization, and therefor

tue of the Senate’s decree. 1 The significance of the measure could be grossly exaggerated by the adulatory or the uncri

and without opposition. This time the domination of a faction was to be permanent and unshaken: the era of rival military

y provinces. Definition of powers and extent of provincia might later be modified how and when he pleased. One thing could

all too often been ignored or evaded. Augustus proposed himself to be consul without intermission. During the next four

na’ (2, 91, 2). Similarly, the ‘Murena’ of Horace, Odes 3, 19, 11 may be identified with the ‘Licinius’ of Odes 2, 10, 1.

onsuls of consular rank, with a tenure longer than annual. That would be most unfortunate. 3 Among the ex-consuls were men

ion in question and the men available—or safe to employ. 1 They might be ex-praetors or ex-consuls. Thus Pompeius Magnus h

stem was suddenly introduced in the year 27 B.C.—Augustus’ men should be described as legati in his provincia rather than

vinces. To begin with, they are praetorian in a majority. That was to be expected. Consulars who had governed vast provinc

ivals to the Princeps in power as well as in military glory. It would be expedient to rely instead upon the interested loy

s either noble in birth or consular in rank. Not a single nobilis can be found among his legates in the first dozen years,

ntistius Vetus (cos. suff. 30) and M. Titius (cos. suff. 31). It must be admitted, however, that full lists of provincial

governors in the early years of the Principate of Augustus are not to be had. 3 Namely M. Acilius Glabrio (cos. suff. 33

governed by proconsuls of consular rank. In the early years it might be expected that from time to time men of consular r

t might be expected that from time to time men of consular rank would be put in charge of the military provinces of Illyri

rk of conquest and pacification went on, or whether order was held to be established, the territories of Augustus’ provinc

eld to be established, the territories of Augustus’ provincia were to be firmly held by men whom he could trust. Northern

tention. A beginning had been made; 3 and the work of conquest was to be prosecuted. 4 As for the provincia of the Princep

re direct appointments of Augustus, responsible to him alone. It will be conjectured that the Senate’s choice of governors

tas and pledge of civil concord or vested interests there was work to be done. The restored Republic needed a friendly han

is New State would require yet deeper foundations. The provinces must be pacified, their frontiers secured and extended, t

4–22 B.C. (in Dio 53, 29, 1 the name Λoύκιoς Aἰμίλιoς should probably be corrected, cf. Cassiodorus, Chron. min. 2, 135; c

oom by its publica auctoritas. 1 The truth of the matter will never be known: it was known to few enough at the time, an

certain L. Sestius took office another exercise of auctoritas, it may be presumed, arbitrary but clothed in a fair pretext

it all there lurked a deep sense of disquiet and insecurity, still to be detected in contemporary literature. The past was

, his continued tenure debarred others. Active partisans clamoured to be rewarded, legates of recent service like M. Lolli

r shunned the holding of a magistracy, his powers in public law might be described as magisterial, an impression which was

over the senatorial provinces in the East has been argued, but cannot be proved. Nor can precision be extorted from Joseph

in the East has been argued, but cannot be proved. Nor can precision be extorted from Josephus’ statement (AJ 15, 350): π

αίσαρι. Against a grant of authority over all the East in 23 B.C. can be urged the fact that a few years later, in 20 and

province of Galatia and Pamphylia. 2 Moreover the time might seem to be near for renewing diplomatic pressure upon the Ki

the wars of the Revolution. 4 Syria was distant from Rome, there must be care in the choice of Caesar’s legate to govern i

oice of Caesar’s legate to govern it. Conspiracy in the capital might be suppressed without causing disturbances: if backe

ipate assumed form and definition. If an exact date must at all costs be sought in what is a process, not a series of acts

not a series of acts, the establishment of the Empire might suitably be reckoned from this year. The legal and formal c

ces and a beginning of social and moral reform. 4 That process was to be celebrated as the inauguration of a New Age. It w

ation of a New Age. It was perhaps intended that Secular Games should be celebrated precisely in that year; 5 and it is at

eholder: men could not confront it. 1 Statues show him as he meant to be seen by the Roman People youthful but grave and m

habits that have been preserved, despite the inferences plausibly to be derived from the social and moral programme which

On him the Princeps set his hopes of a line of succession that should be not merely dynastic, but in his own family and of

y days there was no love lost. The men of the Revolution can scarcely be described as slaves to tradition: but the dour Ag

ms which the poet Horace has so candidly depicted. 5 Maecenas might be dropped, but not Agrippa; and so Agrippa prevaile

Some at least of the perils which this critical year revealed might be countered if Augustus silenced rumour and baffled

unsellors. It was thwarted. Agrippa’s conception, backed, it may well be , by a powerful and domestic ally, triumphed over

ephew. Agrippa received for himself a share in the power. There would be some warrant for speaking of a veiled coup d’état

n should become consul at the age of twenty-three: his adoption would be catastrophic. Not merely that it shattered the co

acter of Marcus Agrippa seems to lack colour and personality he might be the virtuous Aristides of Greek historians and mo

andum which advocated that art treasures in private possession should be confiscated by the government for the benefit of

in his lifetime or commemoration afterwards. There was never meant to be . Any prominence of Agrippa would threaten the lea

om they all supported for Rome’s sake. The service of the State might be described as a ‘noble servitude’. For Agrippa, hi

2, 20. PageBook=>345 Though the patrician Claudii were held to be arrogant, they were the very reverse of exclusive

to herself and to Augustus. Livia deserved to succeed. It may fairly be represented that the secret coup d’etat of 23 B.C

s and definition before the law. Agrippa was not, Agrippa never could be , the brother and equal of Augustus. He was not Di

s had been. The nobiles would not have stood it. Agrippa is rather to be regarded as the deputy-leader of the Caesarian pa

1930). PageBook=>346 To the Principate of Augustus there could be no hereditary succession, for two reasons, the on

ated the rule of one man. No sooner destroyed, the Triumvirate had to be restored. The alliance of equals had proved unsat

Antonius cunning and temperance: Octavianus had been too ambitious to be a loyal partner. Now that one man stood supreme,

l others, he could invite to a share in his rule allies who would not be rivals. It was hardly to be expected that the q

share in his rule allies who would not be rivals. It was hardly to be expected that the qualities requisite for a ruler

cted that the qualities requisite for a ruler of the world should all be found in one man. A triumvirate was ready to hand

PageNote. 346 (No Notes) PageBook=>347 Augustus might not be a second Caesar: he lacked the vigour and the spl

Augustus had neither the taste nor the talent for war: Agrippa might be his minister, the organizer of victory and warden

the only system available. Indeed, for the empire of Rome it might be too narrow, especially as concerned provinces and

with developments of the imagined future. Two emperors might one day be required or four. Yet the fabric must be held tog

. Two emperors might one day be required or four. Yet the fabric must be held together. Two remedies were available. The P

the Princeps after all stood at the head of the Roman State and would be required in the capital. It might be desirable to

ead of the Roman State and would be required in the capital. It might be desirable to convert the Principate into a partne

t yet over. Gaul and the Balkans, large regions with arduous tasks to be achieved, might clamour for competent rulers over

eeded to his duties. Before long Marcellus, Tiberius and Drusus would be available to second or to replace him. Even they

le to second or to replace him. Even they would not suffice. It would be necessary, behind the façade of the constitution,

dred and more disloyal or misguided senators were not all tenderly to be spared out of respect for dignity: local magnates

more tightly organized. Capital felt secure. A conservative party may be very large and quite heterogeneous. Cicero, when

ng reaction under the Principate, the gains of the Revolution were to be consolidated and extended: what had begun as a se

e equestrian order and from the equestrian order to the Senate was to be made incomparably more easy. The justification fo

ered some prospect that their aspirations for land and security would be recognized, the soldiers had been able to baffle

aymaster. Like the armies as a whole, the individual legionary was to be isolated from politics, divorced from his general

the centurionate, but no higher. After service, it is true, he might be in possession of the equestrian census, and hence

had not yet held the quaestorship). Ex-centurions would naturally not be excluded, if they had acquired the financial stat

etonius, Divus Aug. 49, 1. 2 Ib. 25, 1. 3 Ib. 56, 4. The name may be ‘Scruttarius’, cf. C. Cichorius, R. Studien, 282

or. 3 By the time of the Flavian dynasty a common soldier can rise to be governor of the province of Raetia. 4 Secondly, t

the governing class, proconsuls, legates and quaestors, permitted to be acknowledged. Centurions had no monopoly of long

sus. 2 Balbus under Caesar in Spain, Mamurra in Gaul. It might also be conjectured that men like Ventidius, Salvidienus

d to Egypt elsewhere for the needs of war an equestrian officer might be placed in temporary charge of a Roman legion. 5

bar marriage or discredit inheritance. A recent municipal taint could be detected in the most distinguished of noble famil

e vitae, nullis rei publicae negotiis permixtos. ’ Augustus is not to be taken too seriously here. 5 Cf. above, p. 81.

. Didia Decuma, daughter of Barbus, from Larinum (CIL IX, 751), might be related to this family. 2 There could scarcely

L IX, 751), might be related to this family. 2 There could scarcely be any doubt about [M]amius Murrius Umber (ILS 8968)

wed advance of novi homines, most of them military. Picenum, as would be expected, supplied soldiers: the two Poppaei came

ome a lawyer, a Roman senator, a provincial governor: he preferred to be a fashionable poet and he paid for it in the end.

nicipia had been invoked in the crisis of civil war: they were not to be neglected in peace. Augustus encouraged the towns

ow and exclusive. The generous policy of Caesar and of Augustus could be supported by the venerable weight of ancient trad

eral theory and the long-desired unifying of Italy may with propriety be taken to commend and justify, but they do not exp

the execution of a theory or the act of any one man, it could hardly be suspended at one blow. Even had he desired, a rul

d hardly be suspended at one blow. Even had he desired, a ruler would be impotent to arrest the working of a natural proce

f history. 3 The difference between the policy of the two rulers will be explained in large measure by circumstances by th

7 Caesar’s liberalism is inferred from his intentions, which cannot be known, and from his acts, which were liable to mi

resentation. Of his acts, one of the most significant might appear to be his augmentation of the Senate by the promotion o

, for they are an integral part of the Roman State, wherever they may be Corduba, Lugdunum, or even Pisidian Antioch. 6 It

llus. C. Turranius (c. 7-4 B.C.) came from Spain, if he is rightly to be identified with Turranius Gracilis (Pliny, NH 3,

r. Rttterstand, 389. Further, C. Julius Aquila (c. 10 B.C.) may well be provincial, perhaps from Bithynia- Pontus (for an

eps was not altogether a frank enthusiast for merit wherever it might be discovered and careless of class, but a small-tow

family and to the new system, with no little success. But there must be no going back upon his earlier supporters the ple

l designs of Augustus and prevented the adoption of Marcellus; it may be conjectured that certain among them, above all Ag

had probably fixed thirty as the age at which the quaestorship could be held, forty- two the consulate. Caesar had been h

eight hundred to six hundred members. He professed half that size to be ideal and desirable. 1 That would have been harsh

ower and all their patronage, he conveniently revived the Republic to be used as they had used it. To the People Augustus

ers in certain provinces of public affairs and by the promise, it may be , of an imminent programme of reform. The consulat

he was replaced by M. Vinicius, another of the marshals. Nor will it be forgotten that Taurus was there all the time, wit

After 19 B.C., however, a development is perceptible. Yet this may be a result, not only of Augustus’ own enhanced secu

ed the consulate. Here and on the Fasti of the years following are to be discovered the aristocrats who rallied to the Pri

ped into a series of separate commands, it was right that they should be regarded and governed as separate provinces; many

f. below, p. 394 f. PageBook=>374 Election by the people might be a mere form, but it could not be abolished by a s

t;374 Election by the people might be a mere form, but it could not be abolished by a statesman who claimed to have rest

uls secured the consulate even to the most unworthy which was held to be right and proper, a debt repaid to ancestors who

corative occasions as speaker for the government. It was necessary to be pliable. The spirit of independence cost an hones

ly talents, like Cassius Severus, were doomed to opposition. It would be impertinent and pointless to scrutinize the merit

prosa 1, 289 f. A portion of Fabius’ letter to the cities of Asia can be recovered from several fragmentary copies, OGIS 4

openly advertised as the justification for ennoblement. Nothing could be more fair and honest. There were also deeper and

service to the patron and leader of the Caesarian party continued to be the certain avenue of advancement. Of his politic

ere dangerous only if they had armies and even then they would hardly be able to induce the soldiers to march against thei

n oligarchical society, it is evident that sacerdotal preferment will be conferred, not upon the pious and learned, but fo

n filled with partisans during the Revolution: they continued thus to be recruited. 3 Calvisius and Taurus each held at le

ium by not many more than twenty members. The sons of the slain would be available before long. But they would not suffice

reover, the choice of a proconsul or the disposal of a province could be resigned by the Senate to the Princeps. 1 If appo

ion: his influence, checked no doubt for a long time by Augustus, may be detected in the frequent promotion of novi homine

clanum (ILS 1335). As the gentilicium is not uncommon it would hardly be fair to conjecture a relationship with Cn. Magius

entered the Senate. 3 The influence of M. Vinicius of Cales may here be detected. Velleius repaid the debt by composing a

into the equestris militia, thence perhaps into the Senate. It might be conjectured that the patriotic clubs (collegia iu

s man had married well his wife was Aelia Galla, the daughter, it may be presumed, of that Aelius Gallus who was the secon

the husband of Aelia Galla (Propertius 3, 12, 1, cf. 38), may surely be identified with the senator C. Propertius Postumu

he Roman People, but aloof, majestic and heroic. Livia might seldom be visible in public save at religious ceremonies, e

a with Livia is attested by Tacitus, Ann. 2, 34; 4, 21 f. It may also be surmised in the marriage of her granddaughter to

moured about Livia poison and murder. Her power and her following can be detected in the time of her son, most distasteful

;387 THOUGH by no means as corrupt and inefficient as might hastily be imagined, the governing of all Italy and a wide e

on or desperate ambition stood aloof from politics. They could hardly be blamed. The consulate was the monopoly of the nob

of administration. In a sense, the consulars of the Republic might be designated as the government, ‘auctores publici c

as forty. For the future, the chief purpose of these principes was to be decorative. Except for Agrippa, only six of them

roconsuls. 1 There were good reasons for that. Rome and Italy could be firmly held for the Princeps in his absence by pa

ii, that the great secret was first published abroad an emperor could be created elsewhere than at Rome. 2 Everybody had k

bition of the Princeps or justify his mandate. There was hard work to be done in the provinces and on the frontiers, calli

f. M. Reinhold, Marcus Agrippa (1933), 98 ff. Whether or no he should be called co-regent is a question of terminology.

no mention of M. Vinicius here or under 13 B.C. (54, 28, 1). It might be conjectured that Vinicius was proconsul of Illyri

and fought a campaign in the winter of 13-12 B.C.2 The design, it may be conjectured, was that Agrippa should prosecute th

ht well appear desperate for Princeps and for Empire. Who would there be now to prosecute the northern wars or govern the

ble in the earlier years, as deputy wherever Augustus happened not to be , above all as vicegerent of the whole East; and h

red by Horace with the dedication of an ode. 2 The nobiles can hardly be said to fare any better. 3 To the military men wh

al and opportunistic rule of the Princeps; and special commands could be created at will, to face an emergency or to promo

in 27 B.C. was likewise neither final nor systematic. Augustus might be requested by the Senate either to nominate a proc

ublic provinces classified as praetorian and consular. Africa, it may be presumed, was governed from the beginning by men

and reveals its own inadequacy. It is here assumed, though it cannot be proved, that M. Vinicius was the last proconsul,

, 113 ff., with an inclination to the later years. It could, however, be urged that the new command was set up as a result

ree did not have to wait too long for a province Africa or Asia might be his by the working of the lot after an interval o

the command of an army was the reward of birth, ambition or greed, to be won at the cost of intrigue and corruption. Noble

he general’s council. Again, the equestrian officer might turn out to be a valuable person, with long years of continuous

sually, quaestorian in rank, cf. ILS 931 and 945. The first person to be described as legate of a definite legion is P. Co

e Princeps intended that the military achievements of his rule should be glorified at the expense of their real but subord

ere political rather than administrative. The legate of Syria might be a menace to the government in Rome. NotesPage=&

e years; after that, he was proconsul of Asia; 7 subsequently, it may be , legate of Syria. 8 NotesPage=>398 1 He is

of his command is probably 9–6 B.C. (P-W I A, 1519 ff.). There might be room for another legate between Titius and Sentiu

B.C., proconsul of Asia (ILS 8814). 8 No evidence: but there would be room for him in the period 4–1 B.C. The dedicatio

ilicia, published in Jahreshefte XVIII (1915), Beiblatt 51, would not be sufficient or secure support, for it may belong t

ate; and Castabala was the capital of a native principality. It would be possible, however, to assign to Piso the acephalo

of Judaea) always seem to break down somewhere. Though ILS 918 could be claimed for Quirinius (and the war which he fough

fought as legate of Galatia- Pamphylia c. 9-8 or 4-3 B.C.), it cannot be made to prove two governorships of Syria. 5 Dio

olated on west and east. If they could with accuracy and completeness be recovered, the full record of wars and generals i

the Danube to the Elbe; 3 after him and before A.D. 4 are perhaps to be inserted the names of M. Vinicius and Cn. Corneli

ady have been transferred to the legate of Moesia. 5 However that may be , no consulars can be established in this period,

rred to the legate of Moesia. 5 However that may be, no consulars can be established in this period, only praetorians in c

4, 44; Strabo, pp. 303-5; and by the elogium with some confidence to be assigned to M. Vinicius (ILS 8965). On the propri

f. CQ XXVII (1933), 142 ft. JRS XXIV (1934), 113 ff. Certainty cannot be attained, or even precision in detail. But this d

from Callatis (for P. Vinicius). The successor of P. Silius may well be Sex. Aelius Catus (cos. A.D. 4), for a certain ae

ossibly Saturninus, if an earlier command than that of A.D. 4-6 could be assumed (cf. Velleius 2, 105, 1); below, p. 435,

.C., ILS 8895 (Bracara), cf. CIL II 2581 (Lucus Augusti). If it could be proved that he was legate of Citerior rather than

=>402 For certain services in the city Augustus devised posts to be held by Roman knights. For the rest, he called up

dure was devised to try certain cases of extortion the judges were to be four men of consular rank, together with three pr

ised for a large number of consulars. An anomalous dignity remains to be mentioned, that of praefectus urbi. In the nature

e nature of the matter, it is difficult to see how the Princeps could be represented by a deputy, and the behaviour of Mes

did not understand its functions or because he disapproved, need not be too harshly scrutinized. 8 NotesPage=>403

ense. Augustus, who waived the name of Romulus, could justly claim to be the second founder of Rome. A government had be

ht assume the title of imperator. 6 Before long that honour too would be denied. Military glory was jealously engrossed

entela. 2 Descendants of Pompeius survived: no chance that they would be allowed to hold high command in Spain. The earlie

ofit, for the governor now received a salary in money. 5 Politics can be controlled but not abolished, ambition curbed but

d government of the Roman Senate the real and ultimate power needs to be discovered. NotesPage=>406 1 Tacitus, Ann.

htsprechung im Principat des Augustus (1935), 93 ff. There can hardly be any doubt that their powers were developed and us

and free debate in the Senate, it is evident that there would have to be expert preparation and firm control behind the sc

administration, not of authority. As it was there, it might suitably be employed by the Princeps as a group of counsellor

records. Their existence, their character and their composition must be deduced from the relations between the Princeps a

m their effects as revealed in the course of events: it would have to be postulated, were it not flagrant and evident. The

of the Empire demanded expert counsel and many advisers. It will not be imagined that there was any permanent body of cou

probably present at most deliberations. Whether the rule of Augustus be described as Republic or Monarchy, these advisory

ors each year, chosen by lot. 6 The finances of a great empire cannot be conducted in so simple a fashion. There must be f

a great empire cannot be conducted in so simple a fashion. There must be financial experts lurking somewhere. Moreover, it

he budget of Empire. The rationarium imperii was kept by Augustus, to be divulged only if and when he handed in his accoun

ceps to keep in touch with the Senate but who decided the business to be brought before that convenient and docile committ

ient and docile committee? The auctoritas of a senior statesman might be suitably invoked to express or to guide the opini

Senate should confer the name of Augustus upon Caesar’s heir. It will be inferred that the motion was inspired in every se

ura annonae. 2 Tacitus, Ann. 1, 7. His son was at once appointed to be his colleague, ib. 1, 24. 3 Suetonius, Divus Au

. 317, probably of 21 B.C., mentions a Cn. Dom[itius], who can hardly be anybody else. On this, and on other religious act

peace. 2 That was not necessary. Embassies from foreign powers might be introduced to the Senate after a suitable rehears

cide against whom; the wars, however grandiose and arduous they might be , were not always dignified with that name and sta

rinceps, and a number of distinguished personages, among them (it may be conjectured) men well versed in eastern affairs,

J 17, 229. PageBook=>413 It was not intended that there should be foreign wars in the East. But the needs of West a

were urgent, organization as well as fighting, and grave decisions to be taken about the frontiers of Empire. Veterans of

er his consulate he governed Macedonia and Gaul in succession; it may be presumed that he had formed certain impressions a

ted as an impressive example of converging strategy, may not unfairly be attributed to the great road-builder and organize

never entirely concealed, its origin. But the act of usurpation could be consummated in a peaceful and orderly fashion, so

ul and orderly fashion, so that the transmission of power appeared to be no different from its first legitimation, namely,

not always due to threat or exertion of open violence. The deed could be done in secret and in advance. The rule of Nerva

erva by its impotence threatened to precipitate a civil war. It might be conjectured that the danger was averted by a veil

om the provincial armies. Late in 97 or early in 98 Syria is found to be without a consular legate (ILS 1055). 2 Dio 69,

a new policy, in which Agrippa and the sons of Livia in turn were to be the instruments of Augustus in ensuring the succe

ve years yet even this hardly meant the succession. The measure would be a visible reminder and check to conspirators. For

ted the prestige of the dynasty, the rule of the young princes was to be consolidated in his absence, at his expense and a

ave been deceived. In 6 B.C. there was an agitation that Gaius should be made consul. 2 Augustus expressed public disappro

turn. 3 Much happened in that dark and momentous interval, little can be known. 4 With the steady and public progress of m

s, the nominal leader. may emancipate himself from control, or he may be removed by death. For the moment, Augustus had hi

sty. But Augustus was now aged fifty-seven. The crisis could not long be postponed. A loyal but not ingenuous historian

of Regency, open or secret, would control the government. It would be idle indeed to speculate upon the composition of

period of Tiberius’ seclusion. None the less, they were personages to be reckoned with especially the son of M. Antonius.

return. On her own side of the family she lacked relatives who might be built up into a faction. 2 To be sure, there were

amily she lacked relatives who might be built up into a faction. 2 To be sure, there were her grandchildren, the three chi

A. Plautius (cos.suff. 1 B.C.) descend from that family: which cannot be proved. As perhaps with certain other families in

rtain other families in the time of Augustus, genealogical claims may be tenuous or dubious. These Plautii have their maus

an adopted son. On the difficulties about Cotta, cf. PIR2, A 1488. To be noted further are connexions with the successful

e., probably of Tiberius’ father or grandfather. This Q. Volusius may be the father of L. Volusius Saturninus (cos. suff.

Rome and defeat of the Claudian faction would create repercussions to be detected on the consular Fasti and in the apporti

s honest or dishonest, and the loyal servants of whatever happened to be the government of Rome now had their turn for nin

waited and worked for her family, patient and unobtrusive. There must be no open evidence of discord in the syndicate of g

er misbehaviour, her paramours and her accomplices: they were said to be numerous, of every order of society. Five nobles

e laws that were to sanction the moral regeneration of Rome. 7 It may be tempting, but it is not necessary, to rehabilitat

gatives of her station and family8 was it necessary that there should be public scandal? NotesPage=>426 1 Velleius

from Augustus’ accusations against his daughter. The same source can be detected in Pliny, NH 21, 9; Dio 55, 10, 12. 8

ipal was probably Iullus Antonius. The son of the Triumvir might well be politically dangerous. Like the early Christian,

n Julia and Antonius, it was not from tenderness for Tiberius. It may be that through the ruin of his daughter he sought f

against this powerful and unpopular ally of the Princeps may perhaps be held confirmed rather than refuted by Horace’s ea

r. His spirit appears to have been broken. He had already begged to be allowed to return, and his plea had been reinforc

for permission to dwell in the East in a private station. However it be (and scandal has probably embellished the topic i

ad a son; but Tiberius, though designated to replace Augustus, was to be cheated, prevented from transmitting the power to

to power, no testimony exists. 2 In his own order and class, it will be presumed, no lack of open joy and welcome, to dis

ilios mihi eripuit’, &c. 2 But Velleius (2, 103, 4) deserves to be quoted: ‘tum refulsit certa spes liberorum parent

epida was perhaps already betrothed. L. Aemilius Paullus could hardly be accused of adultery with Julia, for she was his w

nally exiled when she proved incorrigible in her vices. If this could be taken as quite reliable, the conspiracy of Paullu

llowed, supposing M’ Aemilius Lepidus, cos. A.D. I I (PIR2, A 363) to be meant. Wrongly M. Aemilius Lepidus, cos. A.D. 6 (

s. 4 A new party becomes discernible, dual in composition, as might be expected. In the six years following the return t

madentem. ’ PageBook=>437 They never let out a secret. It will be recalled that Seius Strabo had a wife from one br

d drawn up his last will and testament. 4 About the same time, it may be inferred, three state-papers were composed or rev

ons of the government and the Index rerum a se gestarum, which was to be set up on tablets of bronze in front of the Mauso

eme power. As in 27 B.C., it was necessary that the Principate should be conferred by consent upon the first citizen for s

cate might appear preferable to a principate:5 none the less, it must be demonstrated and admitted that there could be no

none the less, it must be demonstrated and admitted that there could be no division of the supreme power. NotesPage=>

rolled the destinies of the New State but different ‘mores’ needed to be professed and inculcated, if not adopted. It is n

, the candour and the chivalry of Antonius all these qualities had to be eradicated from the principes of the New State. I

ew State. If anything of them remained in the Commonwealth, it was to be monopolized by the one Princeps, along with demen

cient ideals of duty, piety, chastity and frugality. 4 How could they be restored? About the efficacy of moral and sumpt

bout the efficacy of moral and sumptuary legislation there might well be doubts, if men reflected on human nature and past

gorously at work upon the Roman People. The New Age could confidently be inaugurated. The Secular Games were therefore hel

id not fit a Roman and a senator. 2 Only law and oratory were held to be respectable. But they must not be left to special

2 Only law and oratory were held to be respectable. But they must not be left to specialists or to mere scholars. To promo

itate the ancient ideals, personified in their betters: but it was to be a purified Roman People. At Rome the decline of

was accompanied by certain grave disadvantages. Slaves not only could be emancipated with ease but were emancipated in hor

ror, 181 ff.; 215 ff. PageBook=>447 The Roman People could not be pure, strong and confident without pietas, the

uption to the next, each worse than the last, till the temples should be repaired. 1 Whose hand would Heaven guide to begi

oration? cui dabit partis scelus expiandi Iuppiter? 2 There could be only one answer. The official head of the state r

of Italy, on the other the bestial divinities of Nile. 2 Phoebus, to be sure, was Greek in name and origin. But Phoebus h

t of Greek deities on the right side, so that the War of Actium could be shown as a sublime contest between West and East.

nc omne principium, hue refer exitum. 6 Virtus and pietas could not be dissociated; and the root meaning of virtus is ‘m

. 1 He caused their statues, with inscribed record of their deeds, to be set up in his new Forum, where the temple of Mars

rugum, Saturnia tellus, magna virum ! 2 Where was that peasant now to be found? In the course of two centuries the profits

d living in some valley of the Apennines. Small farmers there were to be sure, and cereals continued to be grown, though n

nnines. Small farmers there were to be sure, and cereals continued to be grown, though not for profit. 3 Thousands and tho

housands of veterans had been planted in Italy but may more correctly be regarded as small capitalists than as peasants. 4

d. Though a number of these men may have practised commerce and might be called town-dwellers, especially the freedman cla

in Italy was not complete and exclusive the new proprietors would not be utterly alien to the practice of agriculture. Cit

, had mostly been born, or had lived, on country estates; and it will be recalled that such apparently sophisticated types

economic science, or reveal the manner of their operation. That would be inexpedient. The political theorists of antiquity

good life which the retired military tribune C. Castricius caused to be engraved on his sepulchre, for the edification of

hods of cultivation. As in politics, so in economic life, there could be no reaction. None was intended. No thought of mul

them came of a noble Samnite family now reconciled to Rome: it might be added that the other was a Picene. That was no pa

e all others should have provided the ‘Itala virtus’ that was held to be lacking in the decadent, pleasure-loving aristocr

g aristocracy of Rome. Among the intimate friends of Augustus were to be found characters like Maecenas, childless and vic

in the War of Actium. The Principate itself may, in a certain sense, be regarded as a triumph of Italy over Rome: Philipp

ned town in Latium certain features in his character may not unfairly be attributed the hard realism, the lack of chivalry

of the family and even to the ancient worship of the gods appears to be deep-rooted and genuine. He admired the aristocra

of the Italian middle class. No less genuine his patriotism: it might be guessed that his favourite line of verse was Ro

e accepted terminology and standards. Beside provincial paragons will be set the figure of the earliest Narbonensian senat

cerning the legions of the West in the Principate of Augustus, it may be presumed that men from Spain and Narbonensis woul

ugustus, it may be presumed that men from Spain and Narbonensis would be discovered in large numbers. 3 There was less nee

nary in the time of Augustus far too high. 3 Indirect arguments can be used. For example, Narbonensis supplies only two

cum (ILS 2033) and Thracians from Macedonia (ILS 2030; 2032) can also be found. 4 Compare the list of soldiers from Copt

of mutiny (Dio 56, 12, 2). PageBook=>458 No new legions could be raised. As a partial remedy for the lack of legio

t it had been to attack the dominant individual or faction, appear to be fervently on the side of the government. It would

ction, appear to be fervently on the side of the government. It would be premature to discern in this metamorphosis a fran

even with benevolence. He insisted, however, that his praises should be sung only in serious efforts and by the best poet

ature were left far behind. Pollio lost his Virgil. Messalla had to be content with the anaemic Tibullus. Fabius Maximus

o xxx (1937), 232 ff. 2 The two Epistulae, even though authenticity be denied, are far from contemptible. 3 Suetonius,

empire that was both Roman and Greek. The War of Actium was shown to be a contest not so much against Greece as against E

to the great age of Greece. The new Roman literature was designed to be civic rather than individual, more useful than or

service. Stoicism, however, was salubrious and respectable: it could be put to good use. Living in a changed and more bra

fervent sympathy with martial and imperial ideals. In his Odes may be discovered the noblest expression of the Augustan

his high mission, Aeneas is sober, steadfast and tenacious: there can be no respite for him, no repose, no union of heart

tatory. Even antiquarianism had its uses. But history did not need to be antiquarian it could be employed, like poetry, to

ism had its uses. But history did not need to be antiquarian it could be employed, like poetry, to honour the memory of an

became a respectable figure, so did Octavianus. It was the fashion to be Pompeian rather than Caesarian, for that was the

eian rather than Caesarian, for that was the ‘better cause’. 2 It may be presumed that Augustus’ historian also spoke with

igin. Whatever racial differences the curious or the uncritical might be disposed to infer between Mantua, in legend a fou

Etruscans, and Patavium, the city of the Illyrian Veneti, they cannot be detected in the character or in the political sen

character or in the political sentiments of Virgil and Livy. Both may be taken as fairly typical representatives of the pr

transcended in a common national devotion to Rome. Further, as might be expected of a region that had only recently becom

usia. 3 Propertius’ distaste for war was well- founded. He claimed to be the poet of love and of peace: pacis amor deus

pacis amor deus est, pacem veneramur amantes. 4 No son of his would be a soldier: nullus de nostro sanguine miles erit

t incurred the displeasure of Augustus. Poetry, it was agreed, should be useful. Ovid accepted that principle and turned i

ut. He might have instructed the youth of Rome to honour the past, to be worthy of Rome in valour and in virtue. Instead,

mposed a didactic poem on the Art of Love. The tract was not meant to be taken seriously it was a kind of parody. August

al laxity was a topic of innocent amusement. 4 Nor can Ovid himself be taken seriously in his role of a libertine or a c

outh. He made the conventional excuse of the erotic poet his page may be scabrous, but his life is chaste: vita verecund

>468 Despite earlier vaunts of erotic prowess, he is probably to be believed. The Corinna of the Amores cannot match

er contribution to the New Italy and achieved a nobler repute than to be known as the home of an erotic poet. Augustus did

Augustus’ granddaughter Julia (A.D. 8) provided the excuse. There can be no question of any active complicity on the part

cial occasions there were distributions of wine and oil. But he could be firm. PageNotes. 468 1 She was a protégée of

ixty-one living descendants in three generations. 4 Even slaves could be commended Augustus set up a monument in honour of

rue that he caused no fewer than eighty silver statues in the city to be melted down and converted into offerings to Apoll

about to begin, the Senate voted that an altar of Pax Augusta should be set up. The monument was dedicated three or four

s dedicated three or four years later. On its sculptured panels could be seen the Princeps, his family and his friends mov

ntee and the testimony of prosperity. Nor was the significant past to be omitted Aeneas appears in the act of sacrifice af

mises to his family an abiding home in Italy. Pax Augusta could not be dissociated from Victoria Augusti. The martial or

ed by his son and heir. This dynastic monument is a reminder, if such be needed, that Dux was disguised but not displaced

ld was portended. When the child could first speak, he bade the frogs be silent. No frog croaked in that place ever again.

n shocked had he known that the testimony of his earlier dreams would be preserved and invoked a boy descending from heave

me, his birthday and his health, his virtues and his attributes could be suitably celebrated. Worship might not be paid to

es and his attributes could be suitably celebrated. Worship might not be paid to the man but to the divine power within hi

sulares and of the official religious calendar. 2 In Arretium were to be seen the statues and inscriptions of Roman genera

e at Rome and in relation to the laws of Rome. A similar oath, it may be presumed, was administered to the Eastern provinc

ed habit and inevitable fashion, it was natural that the ruler should be an object of veneration, with honours like the ho

bt in the spirit in which they were granted: policy and system cannot be discovered. Once again Augustus stands revealed a

such was the demeanour of citizens or free men, the fervent zeal may be imagined with which kings, tetrarchs and petty ty

and could make another; and the change from Republic to Empire might be described as the provinces’ revenge upon Rome. Ar

own or country there was poverty and social unrest but Rome could not be held directly responsible for the transgressions

d against the moral code and later clamoured loudly that Julia should be restored from exile. 5 Too prudent or too gratefu

graver danger than the dagger of a casual assassin, whether he might be a misguided man of the people or a vindictive nob

ims of civil war and proscriptions, except for such as could usefully be revived to adorn legend or consecrate the governm

ns and the most abominable actions of the Triumvirs. The people might be fooled and fed, the knights persuaded to disguise

rom the present order. For the sake of peace, the Principate had to be . That was admitted. But was Augustus the ideal Pr

Principate but against the Princeps. PageBook=>480 That might be doubted. The person and habits of Augustus were n

cal criticism. To turn from the scandalous to the ridiculous, it will be observed that the Princeps was by no means as maj

than four under-shirts, not to mention puttees round his legs. It may be added that the garments of the First Citizen were

and ostentatiously homespun. As with Pompeius, face and mien might be honest and comely. 2 What lay behind the mask? Th

oach. With all allowance made for hostile propaganda, it will have to be conceded, at the very least, that his native caut

o death no citizen of his enemies’ armies who had asked that his life be spared. 3 The claim was impudent: it is refuted b

the Senate, with moving and patriotic language, that Augustus should be hailed as pater patriae (2 B.C.) Pollio, howeve

er patriae (2 B.C.) Pollio, however, did not suffer himself thus to be captured by the government. This austere and embi

in the only fashion he could, by freedom of speech. 3 Too eminent to be muzzled without scandal, too recalcitrant to be w

ech. 3 Too eminent to be muzzled without scandal, too recalcitrant to be won by flattery, Pollio had acquired for himself

ntrigue. Augustus was invulnerable. Not so his friends: a trial might be the occasion either of a direct attack upon their

Maecenas and Sex. Appuleius (a relative of the Princeps) happened to be defending a man prosecuted for adultery. They wer

he future. He did not intend that his retirement from politics should be either inglorious or silent: he introduced the pr

Certain politicians had not delayed to produce their memoirs: it may be presumed that they were not alarmingly outspoken

asterly exercise on the august theme of ‘tantae molis erat’. It is to be regretted that Pollio’s comments upon this intere

stus might permit the cult of Cicero for his own purposes. Yet it may be that his real opinion of the character, policy an

torian. Both writers had practical experience of affairs; and it will be a fair inference that Pollio, the eminent consula

of interpretations have been advanced. Tatavinitas’ has been held to be a characteristic of the literary style of Livy in

ty. One thing is evident, however: the nature of ‘Patavinitas’ cannot be discovered from Livy’s writings alone, without re

ould ostentatiously omit certain passages, explaining that they would be read after his death. 4 The last years of Augus

titude became a wild paradox under the Empire. Augustus’ memory might be safe after death to attack or traduce the Founder

nobarbus were simply left out altogether. Vinicius could not decently be omitted: the praise of his military achievements

Antonius for leadership in his party. To the Domitii, primacy might be delayed, but not denied for ever. The complex mar

9 For prudence and for success, it might have seemed that all would be outdone by the Cocceii, Antonian partisans ennobl

or insinuating, devoted to the government whoever the Princeps might be . The son of the consular Passienus, adopted by th

e ambition and the agency of individuals. On any count, Balbus should be added. The banker Atticus knew all about contempo

s, however, and among the army commanders of Claudius and Nero are to be found Curtius Rufus, whom some alleged to be the

Claudius and Nero are to be found Curtius Rufus, whom some alleged to be the son of a gladiator, Duvius Avitus from Vasio,

Vespasian’s nobility was his own creation. The Flavians had cause to be suspicious. Though the murderous tyranny of the J

t their lack of ability; and much of the hostile testimony that could be adduced is nothing more than the perpetuation of

sions to Greeks in the militia equestris. 1 The movement might only be accelerated by ‘bad emperors’ or masterful servan

‘bad emperors’ or masterful servants of the government. It could not be arrested. The defeat of the nobiles was spiritual

rpse of the Republic. Libertas, as has been sufficiently shown, may be appropriated by any faction and any government: i

g. 85, 1. PageBook=>507 The argument and the moral may readily be inferred Cato, always an advocate of ordered gove

iberius Caesar down to the end of Nero. Period and subject might also be described as ‘The Decline and Fall of the Roman A

me and abroad, for it sought to abolish war and politics. There could be no great men any more: the aristocracy was degrad

istocracy was degraded and persecuted. The record of their ruin might be instructive it was not a happy task for an histor

y has triumphed in violence and seized control of the State, it would be plain folly to regard the new government as a col

ay dazzle, but it cannot blind, the critical eye. Otherwise there can be no history of these times deserving the name, but

. 2 More good fortune perhaps than merit that their characters should be colourless and innocuous. Their descendants enjoy

rincipled scoundrels of the previous age, there were excellent men to be found in this company, sons of the old Italian ar

in the race for wealth and power. The nobilis, less obtrusive, might be no better. After a social revolution the primacy

a’ under the New State. Pollio hated Plancus and composed a memoir to be published after Plancus’ death; 3 and it was Mess

civilium’. 4 Yet, on a cool estimate, Pollio as well as Messalla will be reckoned among the profiteers of the Revolution.

ed when Virtus was shattered at Philippi. Political liberty, it could be maintained, was doomed if not dead long before th

n themselves. That end is security of life and property: it could not be guaranteed by the constitution of Republican Rome

. ‘Acriora ex eo vincula’, as Tacitus observes. 4 The New State might be called monarchy, or by any other name. That did n

monarchy. 5 Under the new order, the Commonwealth was no longer to be a playground for politicians, but in truth a res

bbon, Decline and Fall, c. VII, init. PageBook=>514 They could be safe and happy at last. As a survivor of the pros

r spurious principles, no longer were the peaceful men of property to be driven into taking sides in a quarrel not their o

n of active discontent with the present state of affairs. It need not be taken as seriously as it was by suspicious empero

rresponsible type of serious-minded person. No danger that they would be challenged to put their ideals into practice. N

e, and the threat of another, did not allow his judgement entirely to be blinded by literary and sentimental conventions.

It was no less true of the Principate of Augustus rather more so. To be sure, the State was organized under a principate

cause a respectable tradition of philosophic thought held monarchy to be the best form of government. It was also primeval

East. The Romans had not sunk as low as that. Complete freedom might be unworkable, but complete enslavement was intolera

Roman should live under any other dispensation. Hence Libertas could be invoked as a catchword against unpopular rulers,

=>517 Libertas, it was widely held in senatorial circles, should be the very spirit of the Principate. All too long,

he sombre theme of the Annals. As a Roman historian, Tacitus had to be a Republican: in his life and in his politics he

3 Given the nature of man ’vitia erunt donee homines’ it was folly to be utopian. 4 But the situation was not hopeless. A

comes a change. For the senator, as for the State, there must surely be a middle path between the extremes of ruinous lib

he family of the Cocceii, they had a genius for safety. There could be great men still, even under bad emperors, if they

stentatious opposition of certain candidates for martyrdom, who might be admired for Republican independence of spirit but

libertatem, pars magna iustos dominos volunt’. 5 The two were now to be reconciled, with constitutional monarchy as a gua

d the Populus Romanus: under his trusteeship the State could in truth be called the Commonwealth, ‘res publica’. The last

the ‘Romulus from Arpinum’. 5 Augustus, however, had a real claim to be known and honoured as the Founder, ‘augusto augur

nis oras. 6 Augustus’ relation to the Roman Commonwealth might also be described as organic rather than arbitrary or for

described the Empire and its armed forces. The phrase might fittingly be applied to the whole fabric of the Roman State. I

ther he had played well his part in the comedy of life. 2 There could be one answer or none. Whatever his deserts, his fam

stand outside his monument, the Res Gestae]5 or at the least, it may be conjectured that some such document was included

er to the consul Piso in 23 B.C. But earlier versions may more easily be surmised than detected. The Res Gestae in their f

composed early in A.D. 13, along with the last will and testament, to be edited and published by Tiberius. 6 NotesPage=&

of his domination. Such were the Res Gestae Divi Augusti. It would be imprudent to use the document as a sure guide for

ff Dessau’s insistence that the inscription was primarily designed to be read by the plebs of Rome, very precisely the cli

Book=>524 While the Princeps lived, he might, like other rulers, be openly worshipped as a deity in the provinces or

der who was also Aeneas and Romulus, and, like Divus Julius, he would be enrolled by vote of the Roman Senate among the go

s Gestae as the title-deeds of his divinity. 1 If explained they must be , it is not with reference to the religions and ki

12, p. 219), now supersedes L. Cocceius Nerva, previously supposed to be the Cocceius of the Fasti Biondiani (ib., p. 65).

o) and T. Peducaeus are new. 32 and 29 B.C. The two Valerii can now be clearly distinguished (for earlier difficulties,

aterius emerges as cos. suff., and the praenomen of Galba is shown to be Gaius, not Servius. 4 B.C. New suffecti: C. Cae

Plautius and A. Caecina (Severus). What follows does not pretend to be in any sense an edition of a part of the Fasti.

f., 485; popularity of, in the Triumviral period, 250 f.; suitably to be written by senators, 5, 251, 420, 485; Republican

277 f., 279; merits of, as a form of government, 347. Troy, not to be rebuilt, 305; Trojan descent of Julii, 305, 318,

; campaign against Salassi, 329; repairs Via Latina, 402; declines to be praefectus urbi, 403; proposes the title of pater

Magnus. Neither this table nor any of the six that follow claims to be exhaustive, to give all collaterals or descendant

PIR2, C, facing p. 54. M. Crassus Frugi (cos. A.D. 27) is assumed to be the son of L. Piso, adopted by the last of the Li