ed. Auctoritas is the word his enemies would have called it potentia. They were right. Yet the ‘Restoration of the Republic’

g interest of history and precludes a fair judgement upon the agents. They did not know the future. Heaven and the verdict

he ministers and agents of power, the same men but in different garb. They are the government of the New State. It will th

he governing class. For that surrender they were scorned by senators. They did not mind. 1 Some lived remote and secure in t

te, destroyed Sulla’s system but left the nobiles nominally in power. They were able to repel and crush the attempt of the p

e tenacity of the Roman family and the pride of their own traditions. They waited in patience to assert their ancient predom

birth and wealth, linked by ties of kinship and reciprocal interest. They called themselves Optimates: they might properly

s whose clientela carried many votes. 5 The oligarchy knew their man. They admitted Cicero to shut out Catilina. The consu

s consulate and public glory, shaming the mediocrity of their elders. They were Caesar and Cato, diverse in habit and morals

, the tribunes recovered the powers of which Sulla had stripped them. They soon repaid Pompeius. Through a tribune’s law the

, the conquerors of Carthage and of Spain, belonged only to the past. They had been able to show only one consul in the prec

on than for public splendour or conspicuous ability in war and peace. They sought to profit by help from Pompeius without in

ar, whether it came to war or not, in either way gaining the mastery. They were not duped they knew Pompeius: but they fanci

y what was often conceit or stupidity and mistook craft for sagacity. They might have known better Cato’s stubborn refusal t

it was his personal honour. His enemies appeared to have triumphed. They had driven a wedge between the two dynasts, winni

nasts, winning over to their side the power and prestige of Pompeius. They would be able to deal with Pompeius later. It mig

would at once be prosecuted by his enemies for extortion or treason. They would secure lawyers reputed for eloquence, high

true wishes of a vast majority in the Senate, in Rome, and in Italy. They pretended that the issue lay between a rebellious

es of Caesar had counted upon capitulation or a short and easy war. They had lost the first round. Then a second blow, qui

nd bitter resistance of the Pompeian cause in Africa and in Spain. ‘ They would have it thus,’ said Caesar as he gazed upon

rief for the havoc of civil war, half in impatience and resentment. 1 They had cheated Caesar of the true glory of a Roman a

he defeated faction he behaved with public and ostentatious clemency. They were members of his own class: he had not wished

ed as object- lessons of the clementia and magnitudo animi of Caesar. They took the gift of life and restoration with suppre

aristocrat, a friend and a benefactor, for better reasons than that. They stood, not merely for the traditions and the inst

sts of their own order. Liberty and the laws are high-sounding words. They will often be rendered, on a cool estimate, as pr

story do not arise from the conflict of conventional right and wrong. They are more august and more complex. Caesar and Brut

pon Caesar, when Caesar was an ally and agent of the dynast Pompeius. They now turned against the oligarchs. Catullus and Ca

: it may be presumed that he gave them guarantees against revolution. They had more to fear from Pompeius, and they knew it.

patricians were ready to enlist allies wherever they might be found. They spread their influence among the local aristocrac

the Republic. 4 Pride kept the legends of the patricians much purer. They did not need to descend to fraud, and they could

and Lucania rose against Rome and fought for freedom and justice. 3 They were all hardy, independent and martial peoples,

s took up arms. It was not to extort a privilege but to destroy Rome. They nearly succeeded. Not until they had been baffled

the memory of Sertorius in the Caesarians Vatinius and Sallustius. 6 They were no doubt followed by knights whom Caesar pro

ei publicae, proponere. nosti optime homines. ’ 7 P-W VII, 1817 ff. They were a noted commercial family, trading with the

an, the colonial Roman, the native magnate from Spain or Narbonensis. They represented, not regions, but a class in society

r way to the Capitol to render thanks to the gods of the Roman State, They had no further plans the tyrant was slain, theref

et upon the Capitol, it was afterwards urged. 3 But that was treason. They should not have left the consul Antonius alive.

ked prestige and confidence. The majority was for order and security. They were not to be blamed. Of consulars, the casualti

erators were at once confronted by a solid block of vested interests. They were careful to profess in public an intention to

tion. 1 Nor were the veterans to be won merely by material advantage. They became truculent and tumultuous. Not without excu

the other provinces of the West were a counterbalance to D. Brutus. 2 They were in the charge of Caesarians: Plancus took Ga

matters little. PageBook=>116 as well as extreme Republicans. They knew what the last extended command in Gaul had m

us the tribune was to be president of a board of seven commissioners. They were chosen, as was traditional at Rome, from par

d no word in their edict. But they now prepared to depart from Italy. They had hesitated to take over the corn- commission v

sometimes obscure the nature and sources of political power at Rome. They were patent to contemporaries. For the ambitious

n to the soldiers and officers of Caesar’s great army of the Balkans. They did not forget him, nor did he neglect opportunit

d turned westwards. Antonius confronted the mutineers at Alba Fucens. They would listen neither to argument nor to bribes: w

Marcellus were both desperately anxious not to be openly compromised. They would have to go quietly for the present but thei

fus and M. Vipsanius Agrippa, ignoble names and never known before. 1 They were destined for glory and for history. When Sal

to restore concord in the Caesarian party and so in the Roman State. They would gladly see Antonius curbed but not destroye

ath lay through Aquinum, but apparently he missed Hirtius and Balbus. They were journeying to Campania, ostensibly to take t

entation the hardy tribe of Roman politicians soon acquired immunity. They were protected by long familiarity, by a sense of

ry far from corresponding with definite parties or definite policies. They are rather ‘ideals’, to which lip-service was ine

1 B.C. The breach was not yet irreparable. The Senate was obdurate. They rejected the proposals and passed the ultimate de

r legions northwards from Egypt through Palestine, to join Dolabella. They too went to swell the army of Cassius. NotesPag

essed, he would be the next of the Caesarian generals to be assailed. They protested loyalty to the Republic, devotion to co

t of Antonius, curb Caesar’s heir and impose some kind of settlement. They were honest patriots. With their providential rem

May 30th that Antonius and Lepidus carried out their peaceful coup. They had now to reckon with Plancus. In April the gove

ign the Caesarian generals for lack of heroism and lack of principle. They had no quarrel with Antonius; it was not they who

hat they were described as ‘Madmen’ by the adversaries of Antonius. 1 They deserved a friendlier designation. The behaviour

two thousand five hundred denarii more than ten times a year’s pay. 5 They had still to receive as much again. With a devote

in the East, the Caesarian leaders were drawn irresistibly together. They were instruments rather than agents. Behind them

desired. Their plan was simple to hold up the enemy and avoid battle. They commanded both the Ionian Sea and the Aegean. If

arsh. Brutus pitched his camp on the right wing, Cassius on the left. They had leisure to unite and fortify their front. T

stripped off his purple cloak and cast it over the body of Brutus. 3 They had once been friends. As Antonius gazed in sorro

ht to exploit the confusion in the interests of his absent brother. 1 They played a double game. Before the veterans they la

aesarian leaders to their will and saved the lives of Roman citizens. They refused to fight. On each side deputations of sol

nstructed Pompeius to call off his fleets. Serious conferences began. They were conducted for Antonius by Pollio, the most h

red from Dio 48, 26, 3. 4 Appian, BC 5, 65, 276. 5 Dio 48, 32, 1. They had a very brief tenure. 6 Velleius 2, 76, 4: ‘

several children. Their destiny, save for the eldest son, is unknown. They were surely employed at an early age for dynastic

erals, and Lepidus as well, had secured a firm footing in the island. They soon overran the greater part. Pompeius was force

mpeius and Caesar, but of a wider and even more menacing perspective. They might reflect upon the death of Alexander the Mac

er yet sat in the Roman Senate. That mattered little now, it is true. They NotesPage=>269 1 Appian, BC 5, 139, 579. C

at least to judge by Per. 131) fully exploited this attractive theme. They had no reason to spare Antonius. PageBook=>2

. The new consuls summoned the Senate and took office on January 1st. They did not read the dispatch of Antonius, which they

ch of Antonius, which they had received late in the preceding autumn. They may previously have made a compromise with Octavi

ls in protest fled to Antonius, bearing with them the unread missive. They were followed by more than three hundred senators

ews of the documentary evidence that Octavianus so urgently required. They told him that the last will and testament of Anto

g ago, not perhaps at Pharsalus, but finally and fatally at Philippi. They knew it, and they knew the price of peace and sur

ran legions. 1 But would Roman soldiers fight for the Queen of Egypt? They had all the old personal loyalty of Caesarian leg

d in the calumny against his leader and suffered a double detraction. They said that he had deserted the legions after Actiu

nt to render thanks, to confer honours upon the saviour of the State. They voted that a wreath of laurel should be placed ab

sel with his friends and allies—and perhaps with neutral politicians. They knew what they were about. In name, in semblance

of the region in question and the men available—or safe to employ. 1 They might be ex-praetors or ex-consuls. Thus Pompeius

osed of three orders, each with definite rank, duties and privileges. They were to remain: the Romans did not believe in equ

s men to superintend the collection of the revenues of his provinces. They were drawn from the aristocracy of the towns, pro

sharp line of division had hitherto separated senators from knights. They belonged to the same class in society, but differ

pet. 53), ‘equites et boni viri ac locupletes’. PageBook=>360 They were the backbone of Augustus’ faction, the prime

c names had never been heard of before in the Senate or even at Rome. They were the first senators of their families, someti

Italy contributed soldiers, officers and senators to the Roman State. They were themselves a part of it; the bond of unity w

ch as Paullus Fabius Maximus, may even have enjoyed his confidence. 3 They were not all trusted: yet he could not deny them

ng birth, protection or desperate ambition stood aloof from politics. They could hardly be blamed. The consulate was the mon

d to the heritage of power and command, both nobles and novi homines. They had hitherto been kept in the background for poli

art or on a prolonged and deadening course of professional training. They kept their heads clear for decision and for actio

cured the appointment of a pair of censors, the first for many years. They were Plancus and Paullus Aemilius Lepidus, collea

discordant with each other and perhaps recalcitrant to the Princeps. They may have suspected, and with reason, that he inte

the various judicial consilia were open, public and unobjectionable. They facilitated the conduct of public business or the

, for the formulation was of the simplest. Politicians were needed. They were available among the party-chieftains. Note

ife and showed the strength of his determination by a voluntary fast. They could not stop him. Tiberius retired to the islan

n, were permitted by Augustus to govern the great military provinces. They made alliances among themselves and with the fami

his intention revealed the bitter frustration of his dearest hopes. 1 They were not lost upon Tiberius or upon the principes

ravem, moderatum, sed mersum et vino madentem. ’ PageBook=>437 They never let out a secret. It will be recalled that

ould have prevailed over the youthful vigour of the martial Republic. They were emboldened to doubt it. 2 More than that, th

nt for honest women: they became politicians and patrons of the arts. They were formidable and independent, retaining contro

non hic Atridae nec fandi fictor Ulixes: durum a stirpe genus. 3 They were peasants and soldiers. Tradition remembered,

on Rome and Italy to supply soldiers for warfare all over the world. They were united now, and strong, a nation wrought by

r hand, their genius was not the creation of the Augustan Principate. They had all grown to manhood and to maturity in the p

d petty tyrants promoted the cult of their patron, friend and master. They gave cities his name, they erected temples in his

r itself the right of free speech, as no order else in the New State. They demonstrated against the moral code and later cla

g to overthrow the New State that had been built up at their expense. They had no illusions about it and they remembered Phi

the Princeps) happened to be defending a man prosecuted for adultery. They were roughly handled by the prosecution. Augustus

k the opulent provincial families issuing from Spain and Narbonensis. They were now dominant in the social and political hie

d tragedy of their decadence. The nobiles have not spoken themselves. They have left no personal and authentic record to sho

entic record to show what they thought of the Principate of Augustus. They were preserved, pampered and subsidized by the Ne

of those dynasts never meant so drastic a depression of the nobiles. They were now confronted by an organized party and an

e Triumvir and L. Aemilius Paullus, the husband of the younger Julia. They were destined never to grasp it. The last of them

and kept on good terms with Tiberius, acquiring a new lease of life. They display seven consuls on the Fasti of Augustus’ P

ve become emperor. 3 Nero and his advisers had made a prudent choice. They also thought that they could safely entrust a mil

or Picene, Spain and Narbonensis open the roll of provincial consuls. They herald the Empire’s invasion of the Roman governm

28. 5 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, c. VII, init. PageBook=>514 They could be safe and happy at last. As a survivor of

nd contest the greatest of the principes and better than all of them. They had been selfish dynasts, but he was ‘salubris pr