xford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence

nsformation of state and society at Rome between 60 B.C. and A.D. 14. It is composed round a central narrative that record

likewise direct and even abrupt, avoiding metaphors and abstractions. It is surely time for some reaction from the ‘tradit

r for convenience, the books and papers mentioned in the footnotes. It will at once be evident how much the conception o

ke him raise his eyebrows. Its imperfections are patent and flagrant. It has not been composed in tranquillity; and it oug

ertain mistakes of fact or attribution, and to remove some blemishes. It was not possible to register, still less to utili

baffle by its length and solidity all human and rational calculation. It lasted for forty years. No astrologer or doctor c

owever, Tacitus, Ann. 6, 20. PageBook=>002 ‘Pax et Princeps. ’ It was the end of a century of anarchy, culminating

danger of an indulgent estimate of the person and acts of Augustus. It was the avowed purpose of that statesman to sugge

the Revolution as that bitter theme demanded, in a plain, hard style. It is much to be regretted that he did not carry his

d that he could not treat his subject with freedom and with veracity. It was no other than Claudius, a pupil of Livy. 3 Hi

en but in different garb. They are the government of the New State. It will therefore be expedient and salutary to inves

y years from the Dictatorship of Sulla to the Dictatorship of Caesar. It was the age of Pompeius the Great. Stricken by th

’. 2 And Pompeius is in the direct line of Marius, Cinna and Sulla. 3 It all seems inevitable, as though destiny ordained

ate but access to the consulate was jealously guarded by the nobiles. It was a scandal and a pollution if a man without an

whom it pleased. 3 Popularity with the plebs was therefore essential. It was possessed in abundance both by Caesar and by

of their enmity will be reckoned Lucullus, Catilina and Gabinius. It was no accident, no mere manifestation of Roman c

port in the higher ranks of the aristocracy rather than in the lower. It is all too easy to tax the Roman nobility in the

o 97 f., on the definition of ‘optimus quisque’. PageBook=>016 It was an alliance of interest and sentiment to comb

lution represented by the army-commanders and their political agents. It took shape at first in his consulate as concordia

the time, but often evading historical record and baffling posterity. It is manifest in action on various occasions, array

emnation of their treason but sought to avert the penalty of death. It was the excellent consul who carried out the sent

for his own. 6 The career of Pompeius opened in fraud and violence. It was prosecuted, in war and in peace, through ille

. Pompeius never forgave Cicero. But Cicero was not the real enemy. It was the habit of Pompeius to boast of the magnitu

the next year the domination of Pompeius Magnus was openly revealed. It rested upon his own auctoritas, the wealth and in

nger of a breach between Pompeius and his ally might appear imminent. It was not so in reality. Pompeius had not been idle

or him to be consul or dictator. 3 The Senate was compelled to act. It declared a state of emergency and instructed Pomp

nd fruitless contests with the consul and the tribunes of Pompeius. It was later claimed by their last survivor that the

had given him a pointed reminder of the dignitas of their house. 4 It was the oligarchy of Sulla, manifest and menacing

prestige of Pompeius. They would be able to deal with Pompeius later. It might not come to open war; and Pompeius was stil

and damning. Disillusion followed swiftly. Even Cato was dismayed. 1 It had confidently been expected that the solid and

the mere creation of arbitrary power, doomed to perish in violence. It was rational to suspend judgement about the guilt

his ordering of the Roman State? Was this a res publica constituta? It was disquieting. Little had been done to repair t

Caesar postponed decision about the permanent ordering of the State. It was too difficult. Instead, he would set out for

high and momentous theme of the last designs of Caesar the Dictator. It has been supposed and contended that Caesar eithe

State by the interested device of the leaders of the Caesarian party. It might appear that subsequent accounts have been g

as derided as ‘the first foreign king at Rome since the Tarquinii’. 2 It was to silence rumour that Caesar made an ostenta

ination of Pompeius. The present was unbearable, the future hopeless. It was necessary to strike at once absence, the pass

rse than a crime a folly. The verdict is hasty and judges by results. It is all too easy to label the assassins as fanatic

be rendered, on a cool estimate, as privilege and vested interests. It is not necessary to believe that Caesar planned t

n oligarchy. But Caesar was being forced into an autocratic position. It meant the lasting domination of one man instead o

tage of the Civil War and reinvigorate the organs of the Roman State. It was going to last and the Roman aristocracy was n

llus 65, 2), the son of the orator, joined Caesar (Ad Att. 10, 4, 6). It will hardly be necessary to quote the evidence fo

he bond of personal allegiance may be compared to that of the family. It was often stronger. Whatever their class in socie

ous or idealistic enemies of the dominant oligarchy took heart again. It was evident that Caesar would restore and reward

constitution did not matter they were older than the Roman Republic. It was the ambition of the Roman aristocrat to maint

teer Sabinus in Virgil, Catalept. 10, cf. Münzer in P-W I A, 1592 ff. It is not really very plausible. Ventidius was perha

ably derived from L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus, above, p. 44, n. 4. 3 It may be presumed that he had a hand in the pact of

recast events with some accuracy and face the future with equanimity. It is much to be regretted that his letters to appre

d and associate of certain local dynasts,2 the Italians took up arms. It was not to extort a privilege but to destroy Rome

and even Atina, had long been integral members of the Roman State. It was no part of Cicero’s policy to flood the Senat

enterprises of Marius and the insurrections of Lepidus and Catilina. It is not merely that so many of his soldiers and ce

the peninsula was taken long before it was manifest and announced. It is evident enough that Caesar’s new senators, som

(esp. Appian, on whom see E. Schwartz, P-W II, 230), but is suspect. It is by no means clear that it suited his plans to

strife so firmly imposed by the Dictatorship might even be prolonged. It all turned upon the Caesarian consul. Marcus An

an leader was later to be taunted with inconsistency on this point. 2 It would not be paradoxical to assert that Antonius

days fortune seemed to smile upon the Roman State and upon Antonius. It had been feared that the assassination of Caesar

rovisions of two agrarian laws passed in the consulate of Antonius. It is by no means clear that the behaviour of Antoni

cquired the new and legal designation of C. Julius Caesar Octavianus. It will be understood that the aspirant to Caesar’s

. The enemies of Antonius, taking new courage, may have gone too far. It was known before the event that there would be cr

ina, which may have been Piso’s proposal (cf. Appian, BC 3, 30, 115). It must be repeated that the only clear account of t

power revealed, he could build up a new Caesarian party of his own. It was the aim of Octavianus to seduce the moderate

man political behaviour that he possessed and that was all he needed. It is a common belief, attested by the existence of

e oligarchs. Caesar had been saved because he had a party behind him. It was clear that many a man followed Caesar in an i

ate in October disquieting news came to Rome through private sources. It was reported that the legions at Alexandria in Eg

there. 3 Further, Cassius might appeal to the large armies in Syria. It was probably at this point that Dolabella, withou

2. 3 Ib. 16, 15, 3. 4 Appian, BC 3, 42, 174. PageBook=>126 It would surely be easy to incriminate or to intimid

d to Rome. On November 28th the Senate met by night upon the Capitol. It was later alleged that a consular was ready on th

ianus’ following could not raise the semblance even of being a party. It was in truth what in defamation the most admirabl

at least of the reserves of money which he needed for his campaigns. It would be folly to leave a large treasure behind h

Dictator and of the annual tribute from the provinces of the East. 2 It is alleged that he duly dispatched these moneys t

ld to avert hostilities. He showed both judgement and impartiality. 1 It was too late. He had few illusions about Pompeius

majority of the active consulars. The leaders were Pompeius and Cato. It was clearly the better cause and it seemed the

o join Pompeius, without waiting for news of the decision in Spain. 2 It was not passion or conviction, but impatience and

2 He may, however, have been influenced by circumstantial rumours. It was by no means unlikely that Caesar would be ent

For the moment, a lull in affairs. Early in October the storm broke. It came from another quarter. The collected correspo

nst Antonius and discard him in the end, if he did not prove pliable. It was Cato’s fatal plan all over again the doom of

earumque oppressionem taetram et detestabilem gloriosam putat. ’ 4 It was finished first and sent to Atticus in July (A

as firm as Cato had stood, he would be the leader of the Optimates. It might fairly be claimed that Cicero made ample at

failures and earlier desertions, if that were the question at issue. It is not: a natural and indeed laudable partiality

when he passes from the character of the orator to defend his policy. It is presumptuous to hold judgement over the dead a

he seems to have borne Cicero no malice for the speech In Vatinium. 2 It was a point of honour in a liberal society to tak

ents of aiming at regnum or dominatio that was too simple, too crude. It had all been heard before: but it might be hard t

not a code of constitutional law, but a vague and emotional concept. It was therefore a subject of partisan interpretatio

Cicero, no unique revelation of patriotism and political sagacity. It was easier to formulate an ideal than a policy. T

and negative notion freedom from the rule of a tyrant or a faction. 1 It follows that libertas, like regnum or dominatio,

s could not be monopolized by the oligarchy or by any party in power. It was open to their opponents to claim and demonstr

g the constitution in its own interests. Hence the appeal to liberty. It was on this plea that the young Pompeius raised a

A. Alföldi, Zeitschr. für Num. XL (1928), I ff. PageBook=>156 It is the excuse of the revolutionary that the Repub

B.C., was inaugurated under the auspices of concord and appeasement. It therefore became a reproach to be ‘afraid of peac

om he had described as ‘madmen’, ‘raging brigands’ or ‘parricides’. 7 It would be necessary to ‘bring them to their right

arsalus, the Caesarians passed round the watchword ‘parce civibus’. 4 It was repeated and imitated in twenty years of civi

not lent its sanction? Why, true patriots were their own Senate. 9 It is evident that res publica constituta or liberta

inertia, a treacherous instrument if cajoled or coerced into action. It showed a lack of personal energy as well as of so

ry 1st came the time for action. Hirtius and Pansa opened the debate. It lasted for four days. Calenus spoke for Antonius,

fied; in addition, dismissal after the campaign and estates in Italy. It was also decided that governors should continue t

te of a gilded statue on the motion of Philippus was a small thing. It was claimed by conservative politicians and widel

gt;168 be invoked to confer senatorial rank upon a private citizen. It had not been done even for Pompeius. That the fre

proclaimed in public and prayed in secret. 1 The embassy set forth. It comprised three consulars Piso, Philippus and Ser

4 Phil. 9. PageBook=>171 A state of war was then proclaimed. It existed already. For the moment, however, no chan

, Brutus went to Athens and was seen at the lectures of philosophers. It may be presumed that his agents were at work in M

s. The Caesarians were thus forced to disown their compromising ally. It was Calenus and no other who proposed a motion de

bout declaring the young man a public enemy. The danger was manifest. It did not require to be demonstrated by the advice

nary command over the fleets and sea-coasts of the Roman dominions. It was high time for the Caesarians to repent and cl

anus, his kinsman, had actually fought at Mutina (Ad fam. 10, 30, 1). It was Q. Terentius Culleo who joined Antonius inste

’s firm rejection of his earlier proposals for peace and concord. 2 It was on May 30th that Antonius and Lepidus carried

ircuit to Macedonia. He was trapped and killed by a Gallic chieftain. It would be easy and unprofitable to arraign the Cae

d high principle were invoked to justify the shedding of Roman blood. It was no time-server or careerist, but the Stoic Fa

5, 3: ‘populi vero Romani totiusque Italiae mira consensio est. ’ 3 It was trivial (1 per cent.), but the rich refused t

porting the ambition of Octavianus. 4 Who was the destined colleague? It may well have been the ambiguous P. Servilius, fo

ly to be discarded. 3 Cicero and Octavianus were to be joint consuls. It might fairly be represented that the mature wisdo

employed in guiding and repressing the inordinate ambitions of youth. It had ever been Cicero’s darling notion to play the

be no more civil wars. 5 The plea of Brutus was plain and dignified. It was more important to avert the strife of citizen

. Antonius had been thwarted and defeated at Mutina. That was enough. It lay neither in the plans nor even in the power of

terrible stories were told of the rapacity and blood-lust of Fulvia. It may be doubted whether contemporaries agreed. If

m 200 to 300 (Cicero 46; Brutus 27; Antonius 20) presumably senators. It is to be regretted that there is such a lack of e

and the threat of taxation or confiscation drives money underground. It must be lured out again. Capital could only be te

’ann. ép., 1937, 62: shortly to be published by A. Degrassi in Inscr. It . XIII, part 1); and perhaps Q. Marcius Crispus, i

of Domitius Calvinus, who was conveying two legions to Dyrrhachium. 3 It was not the ghost of Caesar but an incalculable h

us and Ahenobarbus on the Ionian Sea and Sex. Pompeius in Sicily. 8 It was a great victory. The Romans had never fought

enied justice and liberty, Italy rose against Rome for the last time. It was not the fierce peoples of the Apennine as in

nite message, but Nerva stayed with Antonius. NotesPage=>208 1 It is impossible to discover the ultimate truth of t

ing of the adversaries at Gabii, half-way between Rome and Praeneste. It was arrested by mutual distrust and an interchang

NotesPage=>210 1 Appian, BC 5, 20, 80 f. 2 Dio 48, 10, 1. 3 It is quite impossible to reconstruct these operatio

spoused the cause of liberty and the protection of their own estates. It may be supposed that the escape of the greater nu

ge=>214 1 Appian, BC 5, 4, 15 ff. 2 Plutarch, Antonius 25. 3 It will not be necessary to repeat Plutarch’s dramat

ival Caesarian leader, might well seem to cry out for an explanation. It was easy and to hand Antonius was besotted by dri

year which bore as its title the consulate of Pollio and Calvinus. 4 It might not have happened: the armed confrontation

year 43 B.C. bear symbols of power, fertility and the Golden Age. 3 It was in this atmosphere of Messianic hopes, made r

the Caesarian leaders in concord and established peace for the world. It is a fair surmise that the Fourth Eclogue was com

facta parentis iam legere et quae sit poteris cognoscere virtus. 2 It may have been rehandled and made more allegorical

r the legend ‘Q. Salvius imp. cos. desig. ’ (BMC, R. Rep. 11, 407 f.) It will not be necessary to add that we possess only

in sympathy or alliance, Antonius began with a formidable advantage. It waned with the years and absence in the East. O

rrendered (July, 37 B.C.). The authority of Rome had been restored. It remained to settle the affairs of the East upon a

ng the course of the following year they were modified and completed. It will be convenient to mention later in one place

wn. They were surely employed at an early age for dynastic alliances. It is not known whom Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus marrie

with little risk to its author but a fine show of splendid courage. 6 It was easier to deal with generals than with soldie

ssion to the hope that the Free State would soon be re-established. 2 It only remained for his triumviral partner to perfo

ral consul. 3 The noble Calvinus is a solitary and mysterious figure. It was from his house that Caesar set forth on the I

ly depreciated; his own achievements would be visible and tangible. It was on the north-east that Italy was most vulnera

ampaigns of 35 and 34 B.C. His was the glory. NotesPage=>240 1 It has sometimes been argued that Octavianus in thes

contest of display and advertisement that heralded an armed struggle. It had begun some six years before. 2 At first Oct

r minister Maecenas had been working more quietly and to set purpose. It was his task to guide opinion gently into accepta

crown worn by a man called Vipsanius, or the elephant of Cornificius. It would have been vain to point in extenuation to t

completing his Eclogues while Pollio governed Macedonia for Antonius. It was about this time, in the absence of Pollio, th

eluctant, the patron too wise to insist. Yet something might be done. It was folly not to exploit the treasures of eruditi

confidence from the language, habits and religion of his own people. It was much more than the rule of the nobiles that h

e guise of divinity, Caesar’s heir as Apollo, Antonius as Dionysus. 5 It was by no means evident how they were to operate

te the strength and popularity that by now had accrued to Octavianus. It was great, indeed, not so much by contrast with A

child was to bear the historic and significant name of Philadelphus. It has been argued that precisely on this occasion A

lth and wide influence in Asia, founding thereby a line of kings. 6 It was not enough to acquire the adherence of influe

, 2; Strabo, p. 625). 3 Josephus, AJ 14, 137; 143; 162, &c. 4 It is seldom possible, however, to determine whether

llery. Antonius, lacking light horse, could not bring them to battle. It was already late in the season when he appeared b

, for Armenia was unsafe. He postponed the revenge upon Artavasdes. It was a defeat, but not a rout or a disaster. The R

onia could have competed with Italy in valour and even in discipline. It would take time to train them: Antonius wanted th

f Mr. M. Grant on the aes coinage of the period. PageBook=>267 It was later remarked that certain of his most intim

άν καὶ ἀντυστράτηγὸν (ILS 9461). He was a Calpurnius Bestia by birth. It is not quite certain that his adoptive parent was

Plutarch (Antonius 54) and Dio (49, 41, 1 ff.) are lavish of detail. It is strange that neither Velleius (2, 82, 2 f.) no

ius. PageBook=>271 consuls and the constitution on his side. 1 It was therefore necessary to demonstrate that Anton

ed Egypt might likewise play its part in the Roman economy of empire. It was doubly necessary, now that Rome elsewhere in

him) as they were to Octavianus’ agents and to subsequent historians. It might be represented that Antonius was making pro

ance in history, apart from literature and legend, is another matter. It NotesPage=>274 1 Plutarch, Antonius 26: ὡϛ

f Actium as it was designed and contrived by the party of Octavianus. It was not a war for domination against Antonius Ant

aut Salviam Titiseniam aut omnes. an refert, ubi et in qua arrigas? ’ It is evident that this famous fragment, matching in

esented, for peace. For war his prestige and his power were enormous. It is in no way evident that the mishap in Media had

esis of forgery, at least partial, should not summarily be dismissed. It is a question not of scruples but of expedience h

er degenerate could have descended to such treason in his right mind. It was therefore solemnly asseverated that Antonius

NotesPage=>283 1 Plutarch, Antonius 58. 2 Velleius 2, 83, 3. It was C. Coponius, an ex-Pompeian and one of the pr

nning of the work that Augustus the Princeps was later to consummate. It is evident that the most confident as well as the

a party-leader, as clients to a patron, as soldiers to an imperator. It resembled also the solemn pledge given by the Sen

were under the control of Octavianus’ firmest friends and partisans. It would be a brave man, or a very foolish one, who

nd the Greek East. The Empire might split into two parts very easily. It is one of the miracles of Roman history that in s

last thirty years, though liberty perished, peace might be achieved. It was worth it not merely to the middle class, but

in the Caesarian party, old and new, about Plancus, or about Agrippa. It is to be regretted that no history preserves the

orces. NotesPage=>295 1 As Tarn argues, CQ XXVI (1932), 75 ff. It is clear, however, that provincial levies were he

g remained on Antonius’ side, Canidius, Sosius and Gellius Poplicola. It would not be long before the defection of the lea

decided before it was fought. The true story is gone beyond recall. It is uncertain whether Antonius designed to fight a

led by troubles in Italy. There had been a plot—or so it was alleged. It was suppressed at once by Maecenas. 2 The author

a Roman politician. The adversary must have been redoubtable indeed! It was not the glorious battle of Actium and the def

culus fervently extols the clemency of Italy’s leader after Actium. 5 It is naturally difficult to control or refute these

he confirmed their titles when he did not augment their territories. It had been an essential part of his propaganda to d

relevant to the history of those years. Octavianus had his own ideas. It might be inexpedient to defy, but it was easy to

an rule. There were to be no more civil wars. So much for the East. It was never a serious preoccupation to its conquero

Horace, Odes 1, 12, 53 ff.; 3, 5, 2 ff.; Propertius 2, 10, 13 ff. 2 It was an especial habit of the Greeks to make much

seldom be divorced from notions of conquest, or at least compulsion. It was Rome’s imperial destiny to compel the nations

red supreme power—‘per consensum universorum potitus rerum omnium. ’1 It has often been believed that the words allude to

ans to face and frustrate any mere constitutional opposition in Rome. It would be uncomfortable but not dangerous. Armies

ag, P-W XIII, 283 ff. 3 Nonius Gallus (ILS 89s, cf. Dio 51, 20, 5). It is not certain, however, what position he was hol

; and the victor of Actium was the last and the greatest of them all. It could also fit a political leader—dux partium. Bu

ce and in theory the sovranty of Senate and People had been restored. It remains to discover what it all amounted to. On

it stood, the Roman constitution would serve his purpose well enough. It is, therefore, no paradox to discover in the Prin

ical validity of the inferences thence derived is another question. It will be doubted whether Augustus, his counsellors

ost in war. 1 His murders and his treacheries were not forgotten. 2 It would not do to revive such memories, save by cov

w Republic of Caesar Augustus. 3 That would be comforting, if true. It only remains to elucidate NotesPage=>318 1

ed their social and political Utopias in the past, not in the future. It is a more convincing view that Cicero, in despair

legality’ should find no quarrel with a rigid law of high treason. It is time to turn from words and theories. Only a r

smen or principes viri. 2 Augustus was the greatest of the principes. It was therefore both appropriate and inevitable tha

conspiracy of decent reticence about the gap between fact and theory. It was evident: no profit but only danger from talki

tion of a ‘novus status’. 4 From a distance the prospect is fairer. It has been maintained in recent times that Augustus

s and Agrippa. The transition to liberty was carefully safeguarded. It is an entertaining pursuit to speculate upon the

PageBook=>328 in his old age, twenty years from his consulate. It was Sex. Appuleius, a kinsman of the Princeps. 1

es were rivals to the Princeps in power as well as in military glory. It would be expedient to rely instead upon the inter

ely C. Antistius Vetus (cos. suff. 30) and M. Titius (cos. suff. 31). It must be admitted, however, that full lists of pro

gates were direct appointments of Augustus, responsible to him alone. It will be conjectured that the Senate’s choice of g

.C. certain powers in law. No trace hitherto of their employment. 3 It was not until this year that the Princeps thought

rene (for a text of which, cf. J. G. C Anderson in JRS XVII, 33 ff.). It is reasonable enough to suppose that the powers g

here, but in Gaul and Spain (Dio 54, 11, 1 ff.). PageBook=>338 It was not for ostentation but for use that the Prin

4 That process was to be celebrated as the inauguration of a New Age. It was perhaps intended that Secular Games should be

but the Principate was now more deeply rooted, more firmly embedded. It remains to indicate the true cause of the settlem

family. Augustus never failed to take her advice on matters of state. It was worth having, and she never betrayed a secret

66, 3; Tib. 10. 7 Pliny, NH 7, 149: ‘pudenda Agrippae ablegatio. ’ It is evident that Tiberius’ retirement to Rhodes ha

aps his secret wish, perhaps the intention avowed to his counsellors. It was thwarted. Agrippa’s conception, backed, it ma

. There would be some warrant for speaking of a veiled coup d’état. It was bad enough that the young man should become c

public men like Agrippa had no great reverence for forms and names. It went beyond the practices of Roman dynastic polit

historians and moralists. The picture is consistent and conventional. It was destined for exhibition to a docile public. D

decoration and publicity. 2 PageNote. 343 1 Seneca, Epp. 94, 46. It was nothing less than the sallustian epigram ‘nam

great general to herself and to Augustus. Livia deserved to succeed. It may fairly be represented that the secret coup d’

could invite to a share in his rule allies who would not be rivals. It was hardly to be expected that the qualities requ

ory of the Caesarian party and by the demands of imperial government. It was not the only formula or the only system avail

at the head of the Roman State and would be required in the capital. It might be desirable to convert the Principate into

e available to second or to replace him. Even they would not suffice. It would be necessary, behind the façade of the cons

the Princeps and his family, to build up a syndicate of government. 1 It is time to investigate in some detail the composi

ers; and subsequent accessions have been indicated from time to time. It grew steadily in numbers and in dignity as Caesar

public did not belie its origin and cannot evade historical parallel. It was a formidable collection of hard-faced men enr

la and of Crassus. 2 Balbus under Caesar in Spain, Mamurra in Gaul. It might also be conjectured that men like Ventidius

taken too seriously here. 5 Cf. above, p. 81. PageBook=>359 It was not so: the property qualification was low in

, wherever they may be Corduba, Lugdunum, or even Pisidian Antioch. 6 It cannot have been Augustus’ aim to depreciate or r

, 2 ff. Consular elections in the years 22–19 B.C. are very puzzling. It almost looks as though, in each year, Augustus ha

12 B.C at least, when four or five large commands already existed. 4 It was some time before their number increased throu

ns. 1 The year A.D. 14 marks the legal termination of the Republic. It remains to indicate the ostensible qualification

ed and designated its candidates, often in advance, to the very year. It took the compact of Luca to rob L. Domitius Aheno

much in demand on decorative occasions as speaker for the government. It was necessary to be pliable. The spirit of indepe

most lively talents, like Cassius Severus, were doomed to opposition. It would be impertinent and pointless to scrutinize

randdaughter, the beautiful Lollia Paullina, paraded like a princess. It was her habit to appear, not merely at state banq

Augustus conveniently omits the adlection in 33 B.C. (Dio 49, 43, 6). It belonged, of course, to a period of ‘irregulariti

entiments into the equestris militia, thence perhaps into the Senate. It might be conjectured that the patriotic clubs (co

of Urgulania with Livia is attested by Tacitus, Ann. 2, 34; 4, 21 f. It may also be surmised in the marriage of her grand

l armies lay the real resources of power and the only serious danger. It was not until a century elapsed after the Battle

36), 161 ff. PageBook=>389 Spain and Gaul were very different. It was necessary to subjugate the Asturians and Cant

3), with no mention of M. Vinicius here or under 13 B.C. (54, 28, 1). It might be conjectured that Vinicius was proconsul

al partition of provinces in 27 B.C., and reveals its own inadequacy. It is here assumed, though it cannot be proved, that

cf. JRS XXIV (1934), 113 ff., with an inclination to the later years. It could, however, be urged that the new command was

ntment of an Ahenobarbus when Caesar monopolized Gaul for many years. It does not follow that the wars waged by nobles or

y later date; and Castabala was the capital of a native principality. It would be possible, however, to assign to Piso the

n regains for a time the prerogative of coining in gold and silver. 5 It acquires new functions, derived from its practice

and fifteen senators chosen by lot, was to change every six months. 1 It appears to have persisted throughout his reign, b

eing held to repose upon general consent and modest executive powers. It was therefore advisable for the government that i

e management of the Empire demanded expert counsel and many advisers. It will not be imagined that there was any permanent

e person who turns up as a studiis and a libellis under Claudius. 9 It was handed to the consul in 23 B.C., Dio 53, 30,

hat the Senate should confer the name of Augustus upon Caesar’s heir. It will be inferred that the motion was inspired in

Messalla may have played his part along with the diplomatic Plancus. It was Messalla who twenty-five years later introduc

. 3, 75, cf. above, p. 382. 2 Cf. W. Kolbe, Aus Roms Zeitwende, 51. It is not safe to infer from the Lex de imperio Vesp

his power, explicitly. 3 Josephus, AJ 17, 229. PageBook=>413 It was not intended that there should be foreign war

moribund despot. Modesty or ignorance deterred him from the attempt. It would have required imagination that he did not p

isode that attracted the inventive fancy of an unknown rhetorician. 1 It was reported that Cn. Cornelius Cinna, a grands

nts were the real government. The Principate arose out of usurpation. It never forgot, it never entirely concealed, its or

rule of Nerva by its impotence threatened to precipitate a civil war. It might be conjectured that the danger was averted

ady defunct, by Plotina his wife and by the Prefect of the Guard. 2 It is evident that Augustus and his confidential adv

with the gay elegance of Julia to call it by no more revealing name. It was the duty and the habit of the Roman aristocra

. The purpose of Augustus was flagrant, and, to Tiberius, criminal. It was not until after his departure that Augustus r

ubt who studied dynastic politics and the working of human character. It took an astrologer, the very best of them, to pre

a Council of Regency, open or secret, would control the government. It would be idle indeed to speculate upon the compos

them was colleague with Ap. Claudius Caecus in his famous censorship. It is assumed by Münzer that M. Plautius Silvanus (c

s apparently neutral or discreet, while Quirinius trimmed artfully. 5 It is evident that the political crisis in Rome and

ated the laws that were to sanction the moral regeneration of Rome. 7 It may be tempting, but it is not necessary, to reha

uck down Julia and Antonius, it was not from tenderness for Tiberius. It may be that through the ruin of his daughter he s

PageBook=>428 The position of Tiberius had long been anomalous. It now became doubtful and perilous. In the next yea

knew the truth of the whole episode, they were not likely to tell it. It is evident, and it is demonstrated by another inc

ack of open joy and welcome, to dissemble the ruin of high ambitions. It was expedient to demonstrate without delay that h

et vino madentem. ’ PageBook=>437 They never let out a secret. It will be recalled that Seius Strabo had a wife fro

e official and inevitable version, inevitably mocked and disbelieved. It did not matter. Everything had been arranged, n

of bronze in front of the Mausoleum. These were official documents. It is evident that Augustus had taken counsel with t

was said in the Senate of the summary execution of Agrippa Postumus. It was ordered and done in secret, through Sallustiu

ferent ‘mores’ needed to be professed and inculcated, if not adopted. It is not enough to acquire power and wealth: men wi

mething more than a cause for congratulation and a source of revenue. It was a danger and a responsibility. By its unwield

individuals a symptom of civic degeneration and a cause of disaster. It was the Greek period of Roman history, stamped wi

e archetype of foreign vices ’externi mores ac vitia non Romana’. 2 It was not merely the vices of the principes that ba

ities. Soon after Actium Augustus appears to have made a beginning. It was abortive: if promulgated, his law was at once

Pax et Honos Pudorque priscus et neglecta redire Virtus audet. 2 It had not been easy. Opposition arose in the Senate

uthentic religious sentiment here than has sometimes been believed. 4 It will suffice to observe that Augustus for his par

ttle generals and soldiers alike the products of ‘saeva paupertas’. 4 It was the virile peasant soldier, rusticorum masc

3, 6, 37 f. 6 Georgics 2, 532 ff., cf. 167 ff. PageBook=>451 It is by no means certain what class of cultivator t

elor of Epicurean tastes, a man of property and an absentee landlord. It was observed with malicious glee that neither of

s of a concealed oligarchy or the general mandate of his adherents? It was not Rome alone but Italy, perhaps Italy more

e the religion of the family, was not totally repugnant to sentiment. It was pietas, the typical Roman virtue. Augustus mi

ual or faction, appear to be fervently on the side of the government. It would be premature to discern in this metamorphos

s. When Pompeius thus became a respectable figure, so did Octavianus. It was the fashion to be Pompeian rather than Caesar

be Pompeian rather than Caesarian, for that was the ‘better cause’. 2 It may be presumed that Augustus’ historian also spo

n of the army: militat omnis amans, et habet sua castra Cupido. 3 It was not merely improper verse that incurred the d

n to be known as the home of an erotic poet. Augustus did not forget. It was in vain that Ovid interspersed his trifles wi

f’ (The British Academy, Raleigh Lecture, 1937). PageBook=>470 It is a little surprising that the rich vocabulary o

own form and features were reproduced in Rome and over all the world. It is true that he caused no fewer than eighty silve

rve the convenience of Rome without creating a dangerous nationalism. It was a neat calculation. The different forms whi

proconsul. 4 Lack of prosecutors does not prove a lack of criminals. It took courage to assail openly the leading men in

out during his absence in the East a salutary reminder to the Senate. It was only from members of that body that serious o

fewer than four under-shirts, not to mention puttees round his legs. It may be added that the garments of the First Citiz

uld reveal one man at least who was killed though begging for life. 5 It was a commonplace of antiquity that Princeps was

ied the prosecution and hounding to death of the assassins of Caesar. It was no doubt recalled that Caesar’s heir had been

not as daring as it might appear, but is rather a subtle compliment. It was Messalla who proposed in the Senate, with mov

iumph a masterly exercise on the august theme of ‘tantae molis erat’. It is to be regretted that Pollio’s comments upon th

ich stripped away shams and revealed the naked realities of politics. It is in no way surprising that Pollio, like Stendha

so it is recorded by Quintilian, criticized Livy for ‘Patavinitas’. 3 It is by no means certain that Quintilian himself un

e moral and romantic view of history. 1 Pollio knew what history was. It was not like Livy. Augustus’ historian of imper

, was a cobbler, his mother a baker’s daughter turned prostitute. 1 It was Cassius who defined for all time the characte

rum supplicia coeperunt quo ingenia desierant! ’ PageBook=>488 It was impossible to tell the truth about the living

ge of laudation, or, as he calls it, ‘iustus sine mendacio candor’. 6 It is lavishly bestowed upon social distinction or p

young Lepidus. Scaurus was spared after Actium. PageNotes. 492 1 It is not certain that the delator Porcius Cato (Tac

us servitude: to the burden was added the discomfort of a false role. It broke Tiberius and the Principate as well. When

the dynasty of the Julii and Claudii, their rivals and social equals. It was fitting that they should all end with the end

morated his unswerving loyalty ’pietatis immobilis erga principem’. 2 It might have been set up under any reign. Such men

been done. The millionaires Balbus and Seneca were the real enemies. It is in every way fitting that Spain and Narbonensi

fer, cos. suff. 39. 2 The origin of Burrus is revealed by ILS 1321. It is no accident that the governors of Lower German

lass of the Republic was fertile in talent of the most varied orders. It is too simple an explanation of the decline of th

auses lie deeper: as has been shown, they are political and economic. It was the acute consciousness of personal insecurit

as insecure. The nobiles suffered from their own ambitions and feuds. It was a temptation to harass the reluctant ruler; a

ccelerated by ‘bad emperors’ or masterful servants of the government. It could not be arrested. The defeat of the nobiles

rested. The defeat of the nobiles was spiritual as well as political. It was not merely that the Principate engrossed thei

as and virtus, that was hard for a patriot and an honest man to bear. It is not so much the rigour of despotism as the ser

us and Tarius left no consular sons as objects of fear or flattery. It is evident that a traditional Roman prejudice, sh

eerfully adopted by the snobbish fervour of other classes in society. It is precisely the sons of Roman knights who have h

he Princeps would provide: Rome owed them a debt for their ancestors. It was paid by the Principate, under pretext of publ

ius, proverbial for agility, deserted every side at the right moment. It is curious that Horace should have felt impelled

manifestation of active discontent with the present state of affairs. It need not be taken as seriously as it was by suspi

sovranty of law, one man ruled. 2 This is his comment on Tiberius. It was no less true of the Principate of Augustus ra

philosophic thought held monarchy to be the best form of government. It was also primeval, fated to return again when a s

f absolute power. The Principate, though absolute, was not arbitrary. It derived from consent and delegation; it was found

e. The Principate provided the middle way between these extremes. 4 It was not long before the Principate gave birth to

irit of the Principate. All too long, soul and body had been severed. It was claimed that they were united in the Principa

show of phrases, namely, the real and imminent menace of a civil war. It was averted by the adoption of Trajan, the govern

be a Republican: in his life and in his politics he was a monarchist. It was the part of prudence to pray for good emperor

had once boasted that he alone enjoyed libertas while ruling others. It was now evident that obedience was the condition

mans to the Roman People and quietly practised the higher patriotism. It was not glorious: but glory was ruinous. A surer

crystallize into titles official or conventional, were already there. It was not until 2 B.C. that Augustus was acclaimed

h might also be described as organic rather than arbitrary or formal. It was said that he arrogated to himself all the fun

se might fittingly be applied to the whole fabric of the Roman State. It was firm, well-articulated and flexible. By appea

volution; but the rhythm, though abated, was steady and continuous. It had been Augustus’ most fervent prayer that he mi

ocrat from among the principes, by general consent capable of Empire. It might have been better for Tiberius and for Rome

and basis of his domination. Such were the Res Gestae Divi Augusti. It would be imprudent to use the document as a sure

y of Professor Degrassi, the editor of the Fasti Consulares in Inscr. It . XIII, I (forthcoming), the new material is here

here utilized and incorporated (cf. above, pp. 199 f., 235, 243 f.). It is of decisive value for the following years: 3

g the identification with P. Cornelius Scipio (for whom cf. 35 B.C.). It is not certain, however, who he was. 36 B.C. Th

s not pretend to be in any sense an edition of a part of the Fasti. It is merely an up-to-date list of consuls, designed